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9Preface
The compilaTion of arTicles in This book originated in papers de-
livered at a two day workshop that took place in san José, costa rica, in march 
2007. This workshop is part of the africa/asia/latin america scholarly collab-
orative program jointly undertaken by apisa-clacso-coDesria with the 
generous support of asDi. This program is designed to serve as a research forum 
for the generation of fresh and original comparative insights on the diverse prob-
lems and challenges facing the countries of the south. in doing so, it is also hoped 
that the activities will contribute to the consolidation of cross-regional network-
ing among southern scholars, foster a scholarly culture of southern cross-refer-
encing, and contribute to a type of theory-building that is more closely attuned to 
the shared historical contexts and experiences of the countries and peoples of the 
south. participants from all three continents in equal numbers are invited to each 
activity. each scholar is exposed to the socio-historical contexts of other regions 
of the south as an input that will help to broaden their analytical perspectives and 
improve the overall quality of their scientific engagements.
	 	Four	papers	that	were	presented	at	the	conference	were	not	submitted	by	their	
authors	 for	publication:	Habib,	Adam	“South	Africa:	Conceptualizing	a	Politics	of	
Human-Oriented	Development”,	 Prakash,	Aseem	 “Social	Collectives,	 Political	Mo-
bilization	and	the	Local	State”	and	Mukhopadhyay,	Surajit	“Participation	and	Local	
Politics	in	West	Bengal”,	Nnaemeka,	Obioma	“Gender,	culture	and	democracy	in	the	
Age	of	Globalization”.	However,	they	participated	actively	in	the	workshop´s	discus-
sions.	By	doing	so,	they	contributed	to	the	ideas	presented	in	the	introduction.	
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Dialogue among scholars of the south is not easy. at the most basic level, 
there is not a common language. English has been defined as the lingua franca 
for these encounters, since no other language has such a broad coverage, and 
translation into the variety of languages of the “south” would be not be viable 
and financially impossible. This decision excludes some of the regions´ most 
prominent scholars who do not have a working knowledge of the language. be-
sides, even for those that do, english is usually not their native tongue, which 
makes comprehension of different uses and accents very difficult. However, lin-
guistic difficulties are only the beginning of the communicative problems. In 
general, scholars from the South have a weak knowledge of the other regions´ 
history and theoretical developments. contexts have to be made explicit to foster 
understanding and concepts frequently have to be defined as there are different 
uses of the same words. These factors make this enterprise so challenging and the 
san José workshop so interesting. 
as all endeavors of the kind, the organization involved the participation of 
many people. The workshop was jointly organized by the south-south program 
of the consejo latinoamericano de ciencias sociales (clacso) and the insti-
tuto de investigaciones sociales of the Universidad de costa rica (iisUcr). 
Gladys lechini coordinator of the clacso south-south program until febru-
ary 2007 and ciska raventós of the instituto de investigaciones sociales coor-
dinated the organization during 2006 and January 2007, with Victoria mutti and 
Silvia Tordoni´s support. Hari Singh, general secretary of APISA coordinated the 
call for asia, while coDesria did the same in africa. Gerardo hernández, then 
at the colegio de méxico, collaborated with the organizers in the selection of the 
participants from latin america. The african selection was made by coDes-
ria. The post workshop follow up was made by Victoria mutti with Gladys 
Lechini´s support. Lucas Sablich and Victoria Mutti coordinated the editorial 
process. elizabeth clarke did the english grammar correction and editing.
our gratitude to all, to asDi, to the organizing institutions, and to each of 
the participants for making this encounter possible.
Ciska RaVentós 
Instituto	de	Investigaciones	Sociales
Universidad	de	Costa	Rica
Introduction
Ciska Raventós*
The 1980s reGisTereD a widespread expansion of electoral democracy around 
the world. mainstream social sciences referred to this change as the “third wave of 
democratization” and they explained it through a theoretical approach that was 
called the “transition paradigm”. according to this paradigm, countries that were 
previously under authoritarian rule were viewed to be moving towards democracy. 
The shift towards a democratic regime was characterized by the development of 
free and competitive elections, and by the existence of basic political and civil 
rights. To a large extent, democracy was equated with elections. in this analytical 
framework, the key factor in bringing about this political change was the accep-
tance of electoral results by elites and power-holders with veto power. some of 
these actors were democrats, while others accepted these rules on the grounds that 
democratic government was a lesser evil, preferable to the dictatorships that were 
in decline. The centrality of elite competition for the definition of democracy re-
veals the schumpeterian thrust of the “transitionists’” conception of democracy. 
although the transition paradigm belongs to the procedural theories of de-
mocracy, its emphasis on elite behavior leads to the neglect of other aspects that 
	 	I	wish	to	thank	Alberto	Olvera	and	Inés	María	Pousadela	for	their	useful	com-
ments.
*	 Political	 sociologist	 at	 the	 Instituto	 de	 Investigaciones	Sociales,	Universidad	de	
Costa	Rica
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are crucial to democratic procedure. some of these omissions even pertain to the 
more limited area of electoral practices, so central to the paradigm. examples of 
this are the limited consideration of the regulation of electoral finance –so as to 
permit access to politics regardless of material wealth and to prevent plutocratic 
tendencies– and the equal access to the media by all participants. From a broader 
perspective, other omissions such as effective rights of citizen participation, gov-
ernment accountability and the rule of law, also exist.
Additionally, the transition paradigm has a strictly “political” definition of 
democracy, in contrast with the theories that prevailed in the previous decades. 
in the latter, democracy was viewed to be possible only when some social pre-
conditions were achieved: it required a certain level of income, distribution of 
wealth, national integration or cultural homogeneity (lipset, 1959). The transi-
tion theorists and policy-makers isolated the political process from the distribu-
tive issues that had been at the heart of the dominant theoretical trends and the 
political hegemony of social democracy of the three decades that followed the 
second World War. in many regions of the south, but especially in latin ameri-
ca, the paradox is that these democratic regimes have survived for a longer period 
than ever before despite a significant proportion of the population living in pov-
erty and the highest levels of within-nation inequality in the world. additionally, 
despite their shortcomings, these 2regimes are an improvement in relation to the 
military dictatorships that existed p2reviously. 
The international aid community for the promotion of democracy abroad, 
which originated in the United States foreign policy and is mainly financed by its 
government, also adopted this perspective. most of the global south was exposed 
to the language and practices that linked the institution of elections to foreign aid 
and these changes were viewed to be acting in the advancement of democracy 
(carothers, 1997). 
Two decades later, the new democracies´ achievements are, in general, 
restricted. although most countries have regular elections, citizens all over the 
world are disappointed with the results of these political regimes that fall short 
of their expectations. This translates into political malaise and disaffection. in 
some –although few– countries of the global south this disenchantment with the 
practice of the democratic regimes has even led to the preference of authoritarian 
governments among large sectors of the population. basic problems, such as the 
significant proportion of the population that lives in poverty as well as the huge 
and growing social and economic inequalities that prevail in most countries of 
the south, were not and have not been dealt with. as has already been mentioned, 
they were not even part of the third wave’s ethos. however, positive social out-
comes do form part of citizen´s expectations of democracy and democracy has to 
provide mechanisms of inclusion in order to be sustainable in the long term.
from the standpoint of the present, the shallowness of the transition para-
digm’s assumptions and practice is obvious (carothers, 2002) and it is clear that 
a broader lens of observation is required. if we think of liberal democracy as an 
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indigenous product of Western europe and the United states, where the content 
of these regimes is a product of the social and political struggles that took place in 
those countries and the concrete historical processes by which popular demands 
and elite politics were –an2d constantly are– negotiated and renegotiated, we can 
also look for different roads and proposals in the global south, where elections 
have been imported, and in some cases have even been an imposition. This path, 
however, demands a shift away from the institutional arrangements that charac-
terized the development of liberal democracy in europe and the United states and 
to look at and evaluate the processes that take place in the global south. it requires 
that we move from the study of democracy (as a specific institutional regime) to 
that of democratization (as a process). charles Tilly (2007) recently set forth a 
useful framework for the study of democratization in historical perspective. he 
defines democracy as a kind of relationship between state and society character-
ized by political inclusion and equality of all citizens, the existence of mutually 
binding consultation between those that govern and those that are governed, and 
the protection of citizens from arbitrary state action. De-democratization occurs 
when there are reversals in these conditions. 
Tilly identifies three broad mechanisms that lead to democratization: the 
development of political trust, the increase in political equality, and the decrease 
of the autonomy and the impact of independent power centers on the making of 
public policy. The development of political trust occurs when “trust networks 
integrate significantly into regimes, and thus motivate their members to engage 
in mutually binding consultation” (Tilly, 2007: 74). This process entails the dis-
solution or integration of segregated trust networks and the creation of politically 
connected trust networks. The sec2ond mechanism, that of an increase in politi-
cal equality, is grounded on the principle that democracy requires the insulation 
of politics from categorical inequality. This takes place through two combined 
processes: in the reduction of inequality and in the buffering of politics from 
inequality in other terrains (so that social, economic or ethnic differences do not 
translate into differences of effective political rights). finally, the decrease of the 
autonomy of independent power centers on public policies is a necessary condi-
tion, as a requirement of democracy is that all citizens, groups and power centers 
are accountable to the law. it is particularly important that the military are subor-
dinated to civilian government and that powerful economic and political actors 
are legally accountable (O´Donnell).
in this broader conception of the processes that lead to the creation of demo-
cratic regimes, the institution of elections, as the rule of “one citizen one vote”, 
is an important condition of democratic practice, as it provides a mechanism for 
translating political equality into collective decision making and the selection 
of governments. However, elections are clearly not sufficient, as they in and of 
themselves, do not eliminate the obstacles for effective inclusion and political 
equality of all citizens. in fact, when elections are not grounded in practices that 
guarantee fair competition, ample citizen participation and the construction of 
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political representation, they often become a façade for regimes that are in prac-
tice authoritarian. 
as a consequence, the political equality necessary for effective inclusion 
cannot be considered as given, since different forms of social, economic, cultural, 
educational or ethnic inequalities translate into politics. full political equality is 
as yet an unachieved ideal in the entire world. The greater level of political equal-
ity that exists in some countries is the outcome of long historical processes and 
not a point of departure. The absence of –or limitations to– political equality are 
a necessary starting point for the discussion of democratization. This also opens 
our analytical perspective so as to discuss which processes lead to the develop-
ment of citizenship. 
Discontent with the results and achievements of the democratic regimes 
have led scholars to take one step back, to processes were citizens become in-
volved in politics and social struggles. as a consequence, the main strains of 
recent research in relation to democratization in the south have revolved around 
the promise of participation. much research has been done on the impact of citi-
zen participation in achieving substantive goals in the distribution of power and 
social and economic goods through social movements and citizen organizations. 
however, very often this research does not elaborate the impact that these col-
lective experiences have on the political regime. The regime level is dismissed 
as “formal”, “electoral” or “liberal” democracy, which is often viewed as impen-
etrable, despite the fact that it is there where the political decisions that have the 
broadest implications are made. 
as a result of these trends, most of the papers presented in this workshop 
–and the core of our discussions– dealt with different forms of popular participa-
tion, this is, the participation of subaltern groups in social movements, organiza-
tions or in the planning and implementation of government programs. Despite 
the emphasis on participation, we sought to elaborate how these different forms 
of popular democracy impact on political regimes. The articles presented thus at-
tempt to answer two kinds of questions. first: has citizen participation led to insti-
tutional or cultural changes in the polity? if so, in what ways? What can be learned 
from these experiences? secondly: have different forms of participation contrib-
uted to the democratization of political regimes in the south? What relationships 
between civil and political society have been conducive to the enhancement of 
representation? are the politics of political representation of social movements 
and civil society conducive to the deepening of democratic governance?
In the following pages I briefly describe the contributions that these papers 
make to this discussion. 
The first part of the book deals with citizen participation in civil society. The 
most ambitious effort is that of Dagnino, Olvera and Panfichi. They provide us 
with some conclusions of a research endeavor that spanned many years and in-
vestigated participatory experiences in many latin american countries, in search 
of the many innovations in the articulation between state and society that have led 
Introduction
15
to democratic outcomes. Their paper does two things: it presents a characteriza-
tion of what the authors call the democratic-participatory project, and it provides 
some examples of participatory democratic experiences. They focus on (1) insti-
tutional innovations that have attempted to increase oversight and accountability, 
with a particular emphasis on those that imply citizen initiative and participation; 
(2) the creation of public spaces that make conflict public and ensure that differ-
ent interests and positions debate and deliberate different political options and 
projects; and (3) what they call “interfaces” between the state and civil society. 
These interfaces refer to “places and moments of interaction between social and 
political actors, limited by institutions or normalized practices, in which conflict-
ing views and interests are put forward, publicized and negotiated”. These spaces 
are both instituted and instituting thus opening the possibility for a politicization 
of political and policy issues. 
The review of the experiences studied over the past decade has led the au-
thors to determine that the main contributions of the democratic-participatory 
project are the broadening of the field of politics and the construction of citi-
zenship through innovations in the relationship between state and society. The 
re-politicization of conflicts that the neoliberal project had confined to the terrain 
of technical expertise or philanthropy and the placing of conflict at the center 
of the political endeavor, leads to a re-signification of politics. Notwithstanding 
the horizon of hope that these experiences open, the authors also point to the 
limited and fragmented nature of the participatory-democratic project. citizen 
participation in budgeting and councils that allocate public resources finds limits 
in the restricted amount of money that is to be distributed. The experiences of 
the creation of public spaces are limited by the social impact of the commercial 
media that does not follow the logic of politicization of issues or of fairness in the 
participation of positions and interests. societal efforts at ensuring oversight and 
accountability are limited by the asymmetry between these organizations and the 
political and economic resources of power-holders that allow the latter to circum-
vent efforts at holding them responsible for social and political actions. 
Chaguaceda, much in the same field of inquiry as Dagnino, Olvera and Pan-
fichi, examines the different forms of the “associative space” in contemporary 
Cuba. He defines it as “the relatively autonomous creation of groups (organization) 
and collective action, beyond and outside of the political and economic spheres, 
that channel the voluntary actions of citizens in diverse spheres of particular inter-
est, characterized by logics of reciprocity, solidarity, symmetric interaction and the 
defense of shared identities” (chaguaceda). The contribution of these associative 
spaces to democratization lies in their contribution to the building of trust and so-
cial integration, as well as the creation of a sociopolitical sphere beyond the state. 
however, the broader political impact of these associations is not clear.
Both contributions find the discourse of participation to be a mine field 
that creates difficulties for conceptual development and for the action of social 
groups. Dagnino, Olvera and Panfichi have identified a “perverse logic” in that 
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both the democratic project from the left and the neoliberal project claim the 
virtues of participation, although with different and ultimately opposed implica-
tions for the relations of power and the field of politics. Chaguaceda identifies a 
relatively different “perverse logic” between the organizations’ concept of the as-
sociative space and that of the bureaucratic logic, which is dominant in –although 
not exclusive of– the state and parastate organizations.
The second part of the book deals with participation in the contentious ac-
tion of social movements. Three papers are included. Two of them deal with 
social movements in Argentina at the beginning of the twenty-first century: Inés 
María Pousadela´s research on the experience of the neighborhood assemblies of 
buenos aires (2001-2003) and Gabriela bukstein’s on the piquetero movement. 
The third paper included in this section is Gudavarthy and Vijay´s study on the 
struggle of the villagers of kazipally in india against the pollution brought about 
by government-backed industrialization. 
ines pousadela analyses citizen participation in the context of the profound 
crisis of representation that reached its peak on December 19th and 20th, 2001, in 
argentina. she then elaborates on the discourse of political representation and de-
liberation developed by the neighborhood assemblies that emerged in its wake. one 
important idea that emerges from her paper is that the events of December 19-20 
show how critical junctures and citizen mobilization can contribute to democratic 
outcomes. on December 19th, the government declared a state of siege to control 
the crisis that it was facing and the threat of ingovernability. During that night 
masses of citizens took to the streets in open defiance of the curfew. Hours later, the 
president resigned. Unlike other moments of Argentina´s history, the military did 
not step in. rather, different leaders, parties, and the remaining authorities sought a 
solution to fill the political void for a protracted period of several months 
The short episode of December 19 and the following months signal two crucial 
differences with the past in terms of the process of democratization: (1) the active 
rejection by citizens of an authoritarian power strategy and (2) the unwillingness 
or inability of the military to take over at a critical moment, contributing decisively 
to the definition of the course of history. Additionally collective action empowered 
those citizens by bringing them together in the pursuit of a shared goal
The second part of Pousadela´s paper deals with the discourses on repre-
sentation and forms of political power held by the members of the neighbor-
hood assemblies that emerged in the wake of the mobilization. The elaboration 
of the crisis of representation led to a profound questioning of representative 
democracy, through meetings, deliberations and discussions that took place over 
several months. however, as a “normality” of some sort returned, attendance to 
the assemblies waned, leaving behind relatively scarce achievements in relation 
to their members’ initial hopes and goals. 
pousadela concludes on a note of uncertainty as to the durable contribu-
tion of the assemblies to democratization. Their achievements at the institutional 
level are clearly restricted as most assemblies have stopped meeting and those 
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that have continued to do so have changed their goals. however, it is also clear 
that they created new discourses and practices of deliberation. They might have 
also contributed to the creation of some sort of social capital at a local level since 
many neighbors who had never spoken to one another before became acquainted 
and participated jointly in the assembly. according to assembly members, there 
is agreement that these practices could become reactivated if and when a new 
crisis strikes. additionally, the activation of a citizenry now aware of the limits 
of representative democracy might force governments to be more accountable 
for their actions, thus keeping them in check. last but not least, as a result of the 
assemblies’ interactions with local governments and politicians, these tend to be 
no longer viewed as an undifferentiated corrupt mass, and citizens are more able 
to tell the difference among them.. however, only time will tell whether these are 
the soon-to-disappear effects of a critical set of events, or the long-lasting results 
of a process of collective learning triggered by a traumatic situation. 
Gabriela bukstein works on another form of contentious collective action 
that emerged in the nineties in argentina, that of the “piqueteros”. These are 
organizations of the unemployed that united former workers of those areas of the 
economy that were eliminated, generating the destruction of thousands of jobs. 
They developed piquetes (roadblocks) as their main form of struggle, hence their 
name. Bukstein traces the development of a specific group, that of the MTD-
evita. her focus is on the forms in which their success at the grassroots level 
and through contentious collective action translates into traditional forms of par-
ticipation at the local level; through the participation in local government of the 
movement’s leader. she considers that the main democratic outcomes of their 
actions are the increase in popular claim-making, the articulation of territorial 
organizations and the institution of assemblies where issues are discussed and 
decisions are made through a horizontal mode of organization. she also high-
lights how these spaces where neighbors meet and discuss reverses the fatalism 
that imbued political life during the 1990s and “reinvests individuals with their 
capacity to be true actors in public life”, while simultaneously reconstructing 
social bonds and trust.
The third paper in this section analyses a set of acts of resistance by the vil-
lagers of kazipally against an industry that threatens not only their livelihood but 
also their health. Gudavarthy and Vijay explain how a poor area was included in 
a program of incentives for industrial development in peripheral areas, which led 
to the attraction of highly polluting industries, both transnationally and locally 
owned, which contaminated land and water. These enterprises engage in lobbying 
in political circles, bribing of bureaucracy and nexus with mafia to sustain their 
illegal manufacturing practices. Through interviews with three groups of villag-
ers (an association of farmers, a youth group and a microcredit association of 
women), the authors find that “whenever the people have raised structural ques-
tions through their collective political activity, they have faced uncivil means of 
repression both from the coercive state apparatus like the police and coercion from 
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organized mafia”. On three occasions the villagers demanded the closure of pol-
luting industries, in 1989, 1994 and 1995. every time the leaders of the movement 
were accused of attempted murder and were attacked by the local mafia, to the 
extent that they had to leave the village. in 2005 however, the case reached the 
supreme court. Despite the threats, villagers mobilized in huge numbers to testify 
against the industry. When industrialists saw the hearing might go wrong for them 
they attacked a Greenpeace activist, thus dispersing attention. The following day 
the industry bribed a group of villagers to attend the hearing in its defense. 
parallel to this “structural demand” of the villagers, the authors also point to 
other struggles for employment, repairs to the water tanks, refraining industries 
from dumping untreated effluents into the village tank and setting up a health 
center (the occurrence of some diseases is between 200 and 300 normal rates). 
however, none of these demands have been achieved. additionally, the provision 
of monetary compensation and chances of employment to certain individuals has 
contributed to dividing the community over the access to benefits.
Gudavarthy and Vijay´s paper leaves us with a feeling that the disempower-
ment of these villagers is extreme and will find no easy remedies, despite their 
courage in their struggle against the industries. Their lack of protection from 
arbitrary state and non state action has weakened their political activity, damaged 
their environment and their health, and left unanswered questions in relation to 
the possibilities for democratization in conditions of such extreme inequality of 
resources and access to the political system. This paper, more than any other 
presented at the workshop, leaves us with the uneasy feeling that there are situa-
tions in which basic conditions  for democratization are absent and that people´s 
struggle is not framed in a minimal protection from arbitrary action by powerful 
actors. how many villages of the global south are exposed to similar conditions? 
can there be democratic outcomes out of struggles that are so uneven, with popu-
lations that are so unprotected by the rule of law?
The third section of the book shifts away from the issues of citizen par-
ticipation in democratization and emphasizes the role of institutions. Gillian hui 
Lynn Goh´s paper analyses the impressive legal reform that has taken place in 
china after Tiennamen (1989). The approval and enforcement of legislation that 
protects citizens from arbitrary state action has led to the exponential growth of 
local associations, protest movements, citizen denunciations of corruption and 
irregular practices by state officials and the institutionalization of elections at the 
local level. The chinese communist party cells have been weakened or disap-
peared in much of rural china and have been substituted by local associations 
of government. Like Chaguaceda´s paper, the author identifies the autonomy 
from state power and intervention to be the main change necessary to foster the 
development of democratic associative life at the local level. her focus on the 
institutional and legal changes that have taken place over the past two decades 
highlights the importance of regulatory changes to foster democratization. how-
ever, she also shows that progress is not linear, as illustrated by the case of the ar-
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bitrary repression of a religious organization, the falun Gong. in this incident, the 
communist party reverted to the discretionary action of the ruler, a practice that 
is strongly embedded in chinese political culture since the time of the emperors, 
thus invalidating the rule of law as a universal principle applicable to all.
Alex Freepong´s paper addresses institutional change in the electoral field 
in Ghana. Through his paper, we go full circle, returning to the importance of 
regulating elections to make them free and fair, so as to permit the rule of “one 
citizen, one vote”. freepong shows how an independent electoral commission 
has had a crucial role in regulating elections since 1992, by simultaneously main-
taining autonomy and permanent communication with other political actors. in-
dependence, dialogue and consultation seem to be the key to Ghana´s success. 
a particularly important innovation of the electoral commission has been the 
creation of a site for consensus-building with representatives of political parties, 
the interparty advisory committee. additionally, political actors as diverse as 
NGOs, churches, youth and women´s organizations have assumed roles in do-
mestic electoral observation. The media has contributed by reporting widely on 
the electoral process, generating interest among the population.  Jorge Rovira´s 
commentary on this paper, situates the importance of the interparty advisory 
committee in comparison to the central american experience.
The fourth and final section of the book includes one paper, that of Ashok 
Swain on minority rights. Swain elaborates his paper on the basis of Tocqueville´s 
insight  that democracy in and of itself does not necessarily protect minorities, 
as majority rule can lead to the abuse of the rights of groups that cannot achieve 
their goal. as a consequence, swain posits that norms and regulations are re-
quired for the protection of groups that are quantitatively at a disadvantage. 
During the workshop our main and most heated debates were related to 
the extent to which experiences of participation lead to democratic outcomes. is 
all popular participation democratic? are the outcomes always democratic? This 
discussion was triggered by Partha Chatterjee´s (2004) framework for the analy-
sis of popular politics. Chatterjee does not assume a specific institutional form of 
politics in those countries that do not belong to the historical experience of the 
developed west. rather, he suggests that politics in “most of the world” (which 
is similar to what we are here calling the “global south”) “is conditioned by the 
functions and activities of modern governmental systems that have now become 
part of the expected functions of governments everywhere.” (chatterjee, 2004: 
3). The direct relationships between the subaltern and the state shape politics in 
what he calls “political society”. These relationships bypass the mediation of 
civil society which is assumed to be a natural part of democratic governance in 
the western model, and construct different forms of mediations. This theoretical 
	 	“In	a	general	sense,	those	parts	of	the	world	that	were	not	direct	participants	in	
the	history	of	the	evolution	of	the	institutions	of	modern	capitalist	democracy”,	Chat-
terjee,	004:).
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step, shifts the center of the debate away from democratization into the field of 
governmentality, and sheds a different light on popular struggles and the state´s 
action in confronting the people´s claims, as they do not necessarily lead to the 
development of citizenship or democratization.
Two important points were drawn from the debate around Chatterjee´s 
framework. first, that for the attending african and latin american scholars 
alike, what chatterjee calls political society is part of what is named “civil soci-
ety” in these regions. in other words, the african and latin american traditions 
do not place emphasis on the “civil” and legal nature of civil society, but rather 
on the historically specific forms in which society (or civil society) is related to 
the state. These can be civil or uncivil, legal or illegal. 
The second point is more important. Chatterjee´s framework opens the exami-
nation of the relationship between the state and the subaltern beyond democratiza-
tion. as a result not all forms of popular participation are democratic and secondly, 
that not all participatory processes lead to democratic outcomes. most importantly, 
many questions remain unanswered as to what conditions of participation lead to 
full citizenship and democratic governance and which do not. This debate illumi-
nated a field of theorization and research which forces us to question our assump-
tions on popular participation and its possibly diverse links to democratization.
having made this very important point, the experiences of participation that 
the authors chose to bring to the workshop are all related to the quest for democ-
racy, which means that they belong to a subset of forms of participation, those 
that are or aspire to be, conducive to democratization.
 To organize the balance of the impact on democratization of the experi-
ences analysed in the workshop I draw on Tilly´s (2007) three process analysis. 
1. The development of political trust.
The papers included in this book find strong evidence of the contribution of participa-
tory experiences to the development of political trust. several papers point to the im-
portance of the opportunities they create for citizens to meet, to act together, to iden-
tify common interests and construct common identities (Dagnino, Olvera, Panfichi; 
chaguaceda; bukstein; pousadela). in this sense, it can be said that much is about 
constructing networks of trust that are politically connected. it is important to point 
out that many of these networks are created through political action, meaning that 
these networks do not exist previously and are then politically integrated. in most of 
the studies people meet and develop political trust in the course of political action. 
however, again Gudavarthy and Vijay force us to situate this conclusion: 
the development of political trust is only possible in a context of rule of law and 
the protection of basic rights. 
2. The increase in political equality
The empowerment of citizens also seems to contribute to democratization in 
terms of the increase in political equality. The activation of citizens in and of 
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itself implies demands of recognition. however, it is also clear that full inclu-
sion is still a goal to be achieved and multiple mechanisms of power continue to 
restrict democratic achievements. The piqueteros are to a large extent structurally 
unemployed workers, persons who cannot hope to return to their jobs because 
they have disappeared and new ones have not been created (and when they are, it 
is highly probable that they will not match their professional abilities, as is often 
the case with the long-term unemployed). political action makes them visible 
and introduces their demands into the public sphere. however, their social and 
economic hardship also makes them more vulnerable to unequal relationships 
such as patronage and clientelism. Pousadela´s middle class assembly members 
are less vulnerable. however, there is a large degree of inequality between them 
and the strong capital holders that were able to avoid the restrictions set by the 
corralito (freezing of bank deposits). Dagnino, Olvera and Panfichi point to the 
scarcity of resources to be distributed through participatory budgeting. They also 
show the attempts of bureaucratic officials to limit the power of advisory coun-
cils. chaguaceda points to associations that pay for their independence through 
the lack of access to state resources. in short: popular participation and struggles 
contribute to political equality and make diverse social actors visible in the pub-
lic sphere, but power relations remain extraordinarily asymmetric, and ordinary 
citizens still face tremendous odds when they act politically.
 
3. The decrease of the autonomy and the impact of
independent power centers on the making
of public policy
The evidence provided by the papers does not point to a uniform decrease 
of the autonomy of independent power centers. The most dramatic case of a large 
degree of autonomy of powerful actors is that presented by Gudavarthy and Vi-
jay, where it is clear that the enormous inequality in the access to legal action 
between the villagers and the factory owners puts the former at an extraordinary 
disadvantage, to the point of threatening to destroy the villagers’ form of life and 
even their lives, as well as the trust networks amongst them. factory owners and 
the local mafias are relatively autonomous power centers that are not subject to 
the rule of law. as a consequence, the courage of the villagers’ resistance and 
their alliance with NGO activists is insufficient. The judicial system does not in-
tervene to support their claims which ultimately confirms the mafias’ and factory 
owners’ relative power. 
In contrast, Pousadela points to a very significant positive change in relation 
to the past: the unusual political action of citizens and the inaction of the military. 
in her account of December 19th, 2001, mobilized citizens rejected curfew, and 
demanded not less, but more democracy. The military did not take over where the 
civilian government failed. This is clearly a movement towards democratization 
in relation to the military dictatorships of two decades ago, where the military 
frequently stepped in at moments such as this one. 
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however, two important problems with autonomous power holders seem 
to continue to exist: the lack of accountability of public officials that do not ac-
cept being held by the terms of the law, and the autonomous power of business. 
These issues were only marginally dealt with in the workshop due to the angle 
from which the subject matter was approached. one of the shortcomings of the 
focus on participatory experiences for the study of democratization is that it cre-
ates blind spots such as those related to the study of elite politics as well as the 
relationship between the subaltern and political elites. 
The	rejection	of	officials	to	abide	by	the	rule	of	law	is	particularly	
clear	in	Gillian	Hui	Lynn	Goh’s	paper,	as	well	as	that	of	Gudavarthy	
and	Vijay.	Indirectly,	much	can	be	inferred	from	the	Latin	American	
experiences	as	well:	while	participatory	politics	is	restricted	to	the	lo-
cal	level	and	applies	to	relatively	small	budgets,	decisions	at	the	na-
tional	 level	 are	 strongly	 insulated	 from	citizen	overview.	Two	prob-
lems	derive	from	this	insulation:	the	limits	of	citizen	access	to	crucial	
distributive	issues,	and	the	corruption	of	public	officials.
The	autonomous	power	of	business	frequently	takes	place	through	
the	joint	action	of	transnational	corporations	and	domestic	business.	
They	 act	 as	 a	 formidable	 autonomous	power	 that	 is	 often	not	held	
accountable	by	 the	state.	Additionally,	 the	neoliberal	 revolution	has	
weakened	the	state	capacity	in	relation	to	the	power	of	business.	This	
situation	is	particularly	acute	in	the	global	south,	where	the	policies	
of	the	international	financial	institutions	have	contributed	to	this	shift	
in	power	relations.	This	is	particularly	visible	in	the	role	of	business	
in	Gudavarthy	and	Vijay´s	study.	In	the	case	of	Argentina,	Pousadela	
shows	that	big,	concentrated	capital	amounts	were	not	affected	by	the	
“corralito”,	which	diminished	the	savings	of	ordinary	citizens.	Sum-
ming	up	the	argument:	participatory	experiences	have	contributed	to	
the	development	of	trust	and	political	equality.	The	main	obstacle	for	
democratization	in	the	global	south	lies	in	the	difficulty	of	diminish-
ing	the	autonomous	power	of	political	and	economic	elites.	
Our	conclusions	are	 limited	and	tentative.	Citizen	participation	
can and	in	many	circumstances	does contribute	to	the	development	
of	 more	 active	 and	 knowledgeable	 citizens.	 However,	 the	 limits	 of	
participatory	models	beg	the	question	in	relation	to	the	other	aspects	
needed	for	democratization	of	political	regimes	and	how	to	achieve	
them	in	the	extraordinarily	asymmetric	power	relations	dominant	in	
the	global	 south.	Empowered	citizens	are	part	of	 the	 equation,	but	
they	are	not	enough.	The	creation	of	institutions	that	protect	citizens	
against	the	arbitrary	action	of	the	state	or	other	social	or	political	ac-
tors,	provide	them	with	access	to	accurate	information	and	hold	pub-
lic	officials	accountable	are	equally	necessary	for	democratic	develop-
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ment.	The	papers	that	point	to	legal	and	institutional	settings	(Goh,	
Freepong	and	Swain)	shed	some	light	on	this	direction.	However,	this	
again	leads	us	to	the	modeling	of	democracy	in	the	terms	of	the	values	
and	institutions	of	“modern	capitalist	democracy”.	It	still	remains	to	
be	seen	if	this	is	the	only	possible	form	of	democracy.	In	terms	of	this	
model,	the	main	problem	that	remains	to	be	dealt	with	in	the	“South”	
–and	possibly	elsewhere	also–	is	the	power	and	the	autonomy	of	eco-
nomic	and	political	elites,	both	national	and	foreign,	and	their	accept-
ance	of	the	rule	of	law.	
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Part I
Civil society, public space
and democratization
Evelina Dagnino*
Alberto J. Olvera**
Aldo Panfichi***
Democratic innovation in Latin 
America: A first look at the Demo-
cratic Participatory Project
Introduction
in this paper, we present an analysis of the democratic-participatory project in 
latin america. This project is not a standardized and uniform discourse nor an 
explicit set of practices and institutions, but rather a collection of principles, ide-
as, practices and institutions that –at an experimental level – have been fought 
for and achieved in different latin american countries. experiences as diverse as 
the well-known participatory budgeting in brazil, the “Mesas de Concertación” 
in peru (type of regional roundtables), the “Auditorías Articuladas” in colom-
bia (practices of society-state partnerships for overseeing public contracting, the 
execution of public works or the accountability of state agencies), the “Consejos 
Gestores” in Brazil (public management councils for defining public policies in 
education and health), and the “Consejos Autogestivos” in méxico (self-manage-
ment councils in protected zones), among many others, demonstrate that alterna-
	 	This	chapter	draws	heavily	on	the	introduction	to	a	collective	book	entitled	(trans-
lated	from	Spanish)	The Dispute for the Democratic Construction in Latin America,	
edited	by	Evelina	Dagnino,	Alberto	J.	Olvera	and	Aldo	Panfichi	(FCE-Universidad	Ve-
racruzana,	México	006).	This	contribution	is,	therefore,	a	collective	text	coauthored	
by	the	three	above	mentioned	editors.
*	 Evelina	Dagnino	is	a	political	scientist	at	the	Universidade	de	Campinas,	Brazil.	Al-
berto	J.	Olvera,	is	a	sociologist,	at	the	Universidad	Veracruzana,	México	and	Aldo	
Panfichi	is	also	a	sociologist	at	the	Pontificia	Universidad	Católica	de	Perú	
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tive forms of citizen politics (generally referred to as “citizen participation”) are 
possible. however, these experiences have yet to be proven over the long-term 
effect and are fairly limited geographically, as well as in terms of their cultural 
(and therefore political) influence. These limitations are due to the preliminary 
and exploratory nature of the democratic-participatory project. as well, the eco-
nomic limitations imposed by the neoliberal economic policies that dominate the 
entire region generate obstacles for more profound democratic innovations. 
in the following pages we have two objectives. first, the components of the 
democratic-participatory project, as well as its historical and national contexts, 
are outlined. Secondly, examples of the project’s implementation in specific po-
litical contexts are presented. for these purposes, information gathered through 
case studies presented in a collective book (see footnote 4) are used.
This paper is inspired by the current debate on democracy in latin america. 
fortunately, the current situation differs greatly from that of several years ago. 
The themes which, for over a decade, dominated the analysis of democracy in 
the region – mainly the transition to and consolidation of – have been gradually 
replaced by new theoretical and political concerns. The new content of public 
debate is a result of three processes. firstly, electoral democracy has been con-
solidated throughout latin america (although there have been both positive and 
negative aspects and varying degrees of institutional instability). indeed, in recent 
years, countries such as peru, ecuador, bolivia, argentina and Venezuela expe-
rienced critical national political crises yet were able to overcome them through 
constitutional means with no evident risks of authoritarian reversal.  nonetheless 
– and herein lies the second process – at the same time, a profound dissatisfac-
tion with the results produced by these democracies, in terms of social justice, 
governmental efficiency and political inclusion, spread over the region. The no-
table research carried out by the UnDp (Democracy in Latin America, 2004), 
can –among other things– be credited with the indisputable demonstration of the 
magnitude of citizens’ disenchantment with the actually existing democracies. 
The third process, which the aforementioned report has totally ignored, is of 
a different type. it refers to the various experiments that are currently underway 
in several latin american countries for more profound and innovative democ-
racy, broadening the field of politics, and constructing citizenship. These experi-
ments change the very idea of democracy. They demonstrate, on different scales 
and to different degrees, that it is possible to build a new democratic project 
based on principles which extend and generalize rights, create public spaces that 
include decision-making power, increase political participation in society, and 
	 	We	do	not	mean	to	pass	premature	judgment	of	the	final	result	of	these	processes.	
The	way	in	which	they	unfold	remains	open	to	future	developments.	What	we	want	
to	make	clear	is	that	democracy	as	a	regime	now	seems	to	be	the	only	possible	hori-
zon	for	the	formation	of	governments	that	citizens	and	international	institutions	will	
accept	as	legitimate.	
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recognize and make space for differences. it is precisely the importance of these 
experiences that has led to the renovation of debates on democracy. This debate 
is characterized by a major dispute between political projects that use the same 
concepts and appeal to similar discourses, but are in fact completely different. 
This refers to, on the one hand, what can be called the participatory democracy 
project and, on the other hand, the neoliberal project which privatizes broad areas 
of public policy, while maintaining a “participationist “discourse that places a 
so-called symbolic value on civil society (also referred to as the Third sector). 
certainly, besides these two projects there is room for the survival of the authori-
tarian project, which is characterized by a formal respect for democratic institu-
tions, while in practice eliminating the rule of law and citizenship rights. 
 This process coincides with the introduction of a new political discourse 
within the international public arena of multi-lateral development agencies, the 
Un and its agencies, and some of the major private foundations that provide sup-
port to nGos globally. it is related to the new value that is being placed on the 
role of civil society in the construction of democracy and governability. Within 
this arena we also find a variety of political projects using an apparently homoge-
neous discourse, however some of which are more oriented towards participation 
as a way to guarantee governability and others which reinforce the dominance of 
management and an explicit depoliticization of public life.
Within this theoretical context, our work intends to contribute research on the 
processes of democratization in latin america, through the combined and system-
atic use of three analytical tools: the notion of heterogeneity of civil society and 
the state, the concept of political projects, and the methodology of civil society / 
political society trajectories. in reality, these three analytical tools identify a prob-
lem that has not been resolved by theories of civil society and not explicitly dealt 
with by theories of citizens’ participation and studies of “social accountability”. 
That is, the critique of the theoretical model that makes a radical separation be-
tween civil and political societies. This model constructs a symbolic dichotomy 
separating a homogeneous and virtuous civil society from an equally homogene-
ous state, which is seen to embody all the vices of politics and is conceived of as 
a mere struggle for power (Dagnino, 2002). on the contrary, we propose situating 
the study of democratization processes within the articulation of connections that 
link and transit between both spheres of activity, and where dispute between dif-
ferent political projects gives structure and meaning to political struggles.
recognizing the existence of these projects, and the more precise identi-
fication of their content and forms of implementation, is fundamental, particu-
larly within the current context of a situation of “perverse confluence” (Dagnino 
2004a) that characterizes political life within the apparent democratic consolida-
tion that is underway over much of the continent. This confluence refers to the 
encounter between, on the one hand, the democratizing projects that were consti-
tuted during the period of resistance to authoritarian regimes and continue to seek 
further democratization and, on the other hand, the neoliberal projects that were 
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introduced, at various paces and times, at the end of the 1980s. There is perversity 
in the fact that although these projects move in different and even antagonistic 
directions, they are marked by a common discourse. 
in fact, both require the participation of an active and creative civil society, 
and adopt the same points of reference: the construction of citizenship, participa-
tion, and the very idea of civil society. “The use of the same, common points of 
reference, though taking on quite different meanings, has produced what could be 
called a discursive crisis: the common language, with its homogeneous vocabu-
lary, obscures differences, dilutes nuances and reduces antagonisms. This is then 
the fertile ground in which surreptitiously, the channels through which neoliberal 
conceptions are pushed forward emerge, coming to occupy unsuspected terrain. 
in this struggle in which semantic slippage and the dislocation of meanings be-
come primary weapons, the terrain of political practice becomes a mine field, in 
which any false step can lead us directly into the adversary’s camp. Therein lies 
the perversity and the dilemma that this represents, establishing a tension that 
today shoots through the dynamics of the advance of democracy.” (Dagnino, 
2004b:198). Therefore, identifying the distinct meanings that are hidden within 
these common references by conflicting projects, may contribute to elucidate the 
dilemma and to face the challenges that it has presented.
Political projects in Latin America
although there are risks inherent to all generalizations, three major political proj-
ects characterize the struggle for democracy in latin america today. preliminar-
ily and for practical reasons, we will refer to these major sets of ideas, principles 
and beliefs, articulated by different perspectives on the building of democracy, as 
authoritarian, neoliberal and participatory democratic respectively. We recognize 
from the start that all of them share a basic position in relation to democratic 
processes that flows from their formal adherence to representative democracy 
and the elementary institutions of the state of law. in addition, although these 
projects’ adherence to a common, minimal level may reveal their fragility in rela-
tion to the authoritarian project, the concrete implementation of the latter during 
recent years has not required – as was the case in the past – the suppression of 
this minimal democracy.
beyond this minimal level, it is possible to identify the opposite, a “maximum 
level”, as it is characterized today on the continent: a view of democracy building 
that is defined by radicalization, that is broader and deeper, and that finds support in 
the notion that societal participation in the exercise of power is a basic condition for 
its fulfillment. Although this “maximum level” has not been implemented in any 
latin american country, the set of ideas behind it has guided the political practice 
of a significant number of actors, to varying degrees, across the continent. 
it can also be claimed that today, the dispute for democracy emerges, in most 
countries, as a clash between unequal parties –between the neoliberal and partici-
patory democracy projects – leading to the polarity around which political debate 
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is currently organized. nonetheless, since the authoritarian project is not consid-
ered to be residual, the possibility that it ascends to be one of the “main actors” on 
this scene cannot be dismissed, if and when the opportunities and political condi-
tions for such a situation appear. It is the aforementioned conflict, however, which 
we will focus on, particularly due to the perverse confluence mentioned, which 
tends to obfuscate, at the discursive level, the basic differences between the two 
projects engaged in this major dispute. it should also be pointed out that a charac-
terization of each one of these projects does not negate their reciprocal influence 
and common elements. part of the reason for these common elements originates 
from the analyses elaborated on the crisis of the state in latin america, which 
coincide in some aspects, and differ in others. (lechner, 1998; o’Donnell, 2004). 
our effort to characterize the different projects is rooted in concrete sub-
jects and the discursive practices that they produce and mobilize. in this regard, 
projects are not merely abstract conceptions but are incorporated in subjects and 
their practice; it is through the latter that we arrive at an understanding of their 
configuration. Thus, the consolidation of these different projects, their political 
weight and meaning, and their practical implementation vary from one country to 
another. our analytical effort places priority on their most successful expressions 
– those manifested in national contexts where the configuration of these projects 
has progressed most significantly, or present in a more fragmented form in con-
texts where other forces restrict their fuller development.
The participatory project characterization presented below is organized 
around a set of variables that have been selected according to their relevance 
to our central theme, the struggle for building democracy. in relation to these 
variables, the differentiation of projects can be more clearly perceived. The most 
encompassing one is the relationship between the state and civil society; this is 
followed by the conceptions of participation, citizenship, civil society and poli-
tics itself. In turn, all of this contributes to the elaboration and specification of 
the relationship between state and society as sketched out by the projects that 
dispute hegemony in latin america. in this chapter, the discussion is limited to 
the specific case of the participatory project. 
The participatory democracy project
The nucleus of the participatory democracy project is constituted by a conception 
that seeks to deepen and radicalize democracy, clearly confronting the limits attrib-
uted to liberal representative democracy as a privileged form of state-society rela-
tions. in order to contend with the exclusive and elitist nature of the latter, models 
of participatory and deliberative democracy are advocated as complementary to it 
(santos and avritzer, 2002:75-76). in this regard, societal participation in decision-
making processes takes on a key role in democratization (fals borda, 1996). This 
participation is seen as an tool for building greater equality, to the extent that pub-
	 	For	a	full	discussion	of	this	theme,	see	Dagnino,	Olvera	and	Panfichi,	006.
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lic policies oriented towards this goal would be formulated. (albuquerque, 2004; 
GecD, 2000; santos and avritzer, 2002; murillo and pizano, 2003; Daniel, 2000; 
Ziccardi, 2004; oXfam/Diakonia, 1999; cáceres, 2006). 
furthermore, participatory democracy is supposed to contribute to a de-
privatization of the state, so that it becomes more permeable to public interests for-
mulated within spaces of societal participation, and therefore less subject to private 
appropriation of its resources. Therefore, participation is conceived as the sharing 
of the state’s decision-making power on public interest issues, distinguishing itself 
from a conception of participation that is limited to consulting the population. 
in latin america, this formulation for deepening democracy through the ex-
tension of participation –which is meant to make the State more truly public so 
that it can ensure citizenship rights– has its most elaborate expression in Brazil. 
beginning in the 1980s, social movements, trade unions, intellectuals, nGos and 
other civil society organizations, as well as some leftist political parties such as the 
Worker’s party (pT), participated in the effort to elaborate and disseminate this set 
of ideas (Teixeira, Dagnino and almeida, 2002). Throughout this period, this con-
ception of participation enjoyed significant cultural and political gains. Further-
more, it became legalized in the constitution of 1988 which, upon consecrating 
the principle of participation in the exercise of power in its first article, made way 
for the implementation of a variety of participatory spaces and mechanisms. These 
include management councils (Conselhos Gestores) and participatory budgeting 
(Orçamentos Participativos). in recent years, this conception has made progress 
in other countries as well. 4 an analysis of the institutionalization of participation 
in several latin american countries’ constitutions (hevia, 2006) demonstrates this 
progress, notwithstanding differences in the contexts that preside over them.
The	forms	and	expressions	adopted	in	the	implementation	of	the	
principles	of	participation	and	social	control	towards	democratic	inno-
vation	vary	according	to	national	contexts:	participatory	budgets,	public	
policy	management	councils,	citizens’	councils,	roundtables,	inspection	
offices	 (veedurías),	 accountability	 mechanisms,	 monitoring,	 etc.	 The	
multiplicity	of	these	experiences	across	the	continent	(Dagnino,	00;	
Panfichi,	00;	Olvera,	00)	has	attracted	the	attention	of	many	ana-
lysts	and	there	an	increasing	amount	of	literature	that	recognizes	its	im-
portance,	even	within	the	adverse	context	of	the	neoliberal	hegemony.	
In	addition	to	participation	in	decision	making	previously	monop-
olized	by	the	State,	the	need	for	social	controls	over	the	State	should	in-
clude	social	mechanisms	for	monitoring	State	actions,	and	ensuring	its	
public	character	–a	practice	that	is	referred	to	as	“social	accountability”	
(Smulovitz	and	Peruzzotti,	006).	The	principle	of	accountability	has	
been	adopted	by	both	projects	involved	in	the	dispute	for	democracy	
4	 	For	examples,	see	Albuquerque,	004;	Sánchez	and	Álvarez,	00;	Múnera,	999;	
Villareal,	004.
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on	the	continent	and,	therefore,	should	be	taken	into	account	given	the	
different	contents	that	it	includes	under	the	auspices	of	each	(Isunza,	
006).	In	the	participatory	democracy	project,	accountability	is	linked	
to	other	forms	of	citizens’	participation,	guided	by	a	perspective	that	
seeks	to	guarantee	rights	and	ensure	public	social	control,	“creating	a	
channel	for	citizens’	participation	in	co-management	in	order	to	ensure	
the	political	responsibility	of	civil	servants	(whether	elected	officials	or	
not).”	(Isunza	004:7).	Within	the	neoliberal	project,	accountability	is	
basically	seen	from	the	perspective	of	assuring	better	communication,	
and	therefore	greater	efficiency,	in	the	relationship	between	the	State	
and	its	citizen-clients,	which	contributes	to	governability.
In	recent	years,	at	least	three	models	of	accountability	have	been	
attempted	in	Latin	America.	In	the	first	model,	there	are	the	actions	of	
civil	society	groups	that	have	assumed	the	task	of	watching	over	some	
State	agencies	or	political	process,	as	is	the	case	of:	the	Civic	Alliance	
(Alianza Cívica)	 in	Mexico,	with	 its	massive	monitoring	of	 elections	
(994-000)	(Olvera,	00);	the	Poder Ciudadano (Citizens’	Power)	in	
Argentina,	with	other	groups	that	were	close	to	them,	regarding	legisla-
tive	and	judiciary	powers	(Peruzzotti,	00);	the	Propuesta Ciudadana 
(Citizens’	Proposal)	group	in	Peru,	a	consortium	of	NGOs	that	created	
a	system	for	civil	society	to	monitor	the	central	and	regional	govern-
ments	on	issues	regarding	the	decentralization	process;	the	non-gov-
ernmental	organizations’	initiatives	such	as	Transparência Brasil,	and	
the	Observatório da Cidadania/Social Watch in	Brazil.	 In	 the	 second	
model,	there	is	the	creation	of	new	State	institutions,	whose	function	
is	to	guarantee	the	right	to	information	or	to	aid	citizens	in	monitoring	
the	actions	of	government.	An	exemplary	case	of	this	first	type	is	the	
Mexican Instituto de Acceso a la Información Pública Gubernamental 
(IFAI)	which	in	its	first	years	of	existence	obtained	several	important	
victories	(Marván,	006);	another	example	of	 this	second	type	 is	 the	
Colombian	Veeduría	Ciudadana,	a	municipal	 institution	whose	 func-
tion	is	to	help	civil	society	groups	obtain	information	on	contracts	and	
bids	and	to	provide	legal	and	technical	supervision	needed	to	accom-
pany	the	monitoring	of	public	works.	(Garcés	Lloreda,	006).	
 in the third model, there is the process of relative internal reform of the state 
that, following the global tendency of institutional development of the public sector, 
has created internal control agencies within the state itself, operating as autonomous 
entities (ackerman, 2006). This is the case of the Auditoría Superior de la Feder-
ación in mexico, the Contraloria General de la República and the Defensoría del 
Pueblo in peru, and even more notably, the Contraloría General de la República and 
the Procuraduría General de la República in colombia. nonetheless, the autonomy 
of these agencies, for example in the peruvian case, varies. The Contraloría, re-
sponsible for the control of the way the state invests public resources, never showed 
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the political will to impose itself on president Toledo’s administration (2002-2006), 
while the Defensoria played an active role in the defense of the rights of citizens who 
have been affected by the actions of the state. The heterogeneity of the state and the 
variety of political wills of those who are in charge of these agencies are some of the 
variables to be taken into account when attempting to explain different patterns of 
action. something similar occurs in brazil where, for example, the creation of the 
Ouvidorias5 linked to the various levels of government and state agencies has had 
varying impacts. however, advances have been made in the transparency of several 
sectors of government, with increasing on-line access to significant official data. 
another central element in the participatory democracy project is actual con-
ception of civil society. (avritzer, 1994; olvera, 1999; nogueira, 2004). made up 
of organized sectors of society, civil society is recognized by its heterogeneity and 
conceived of in a broad and inclusive way, given its role in ensuring the public 
nature of the state through participation and social controls. civil society is con-
sidered to be the constitutive terrain of politics, given that it is within civil society 
that the debate between divergent interests and the construction of provisional con-
sensus is able to shape public interest.
In a similar vein, public spaces –strictly societal or including State participa-
tion– have been built for the purpose of making conflict public and ensuring that 
divergent interests become an object of public discussion and deliberation. These 
spaces take on a central role within the participatory democracy project (avritzer, 
2002; Dagnino, 2002, GecD, 2000). The notion of public space, in its different 
theoretical versions, is strongly incorporated as a key political instrument for the 
advancement of the process of building democracy.6 looking beyond the mere 
existence of an organized society, the constitution of these spaces is considered 
to represent a tool for the implementation of real participation, whether in public 
spaces of co-management with the state, or in those public societal spaces where 
diversity, as well as fragmentation, find a place where conflicts are made explicit 
and where discussion, articulation and negotiation on public issues occur. 
an additional element that is central to this project, and directed at the con-
struction of greater equality –in all its dimensions– is the development of citizen-
ship. A redefinition of the classical vision of citizenship, as formulated by Marshall 
during the 1940s, has been developed by social movements and other civil society 
organizations in order for it to meet the specific needs generated by the struggle to 
deepen democracy. Through the basic premise of the right to have rights, this re-
definition has sustained the emergence of new themes and the constitution of new 
5	 	Note:	 government	departments	where	 citizens	may	voice	 complaints;	 literally,	
“listeners”	or	“auditors”.
6	 	Reading	Hannah	Arendt’s	work,	and	particularly	that	of	Jurgen	Habermas,	have	
served	as	a	source	of	inspiration	here,	as	they	have	in	other	parts	of	the	world.	Many	of	
the	intellectuals	tied	to	this	project	have	used	in	more	or	less	critical	ways	the	Haber-
mas	notion	of	public	space.	(Avritzer,	00).	
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political subjects that, through their practices, define what they consider to be their 
rights and struggle for their recognition (Dagnino, 1994).7 
 Thus, in different time periods, with different particularities, the emergence 
of a new notion of citizenship seeks to link struggles demanding specific rights 
(health, housing, education, etc., and also ethnic rights, women’s rights, gay and 
lesbian rights, etc.) with the larger struggle to build democracy. The defense, 
broadening and/or invention of rights results from the perspective of citizenship 
that guarantees collective rights (marés, 1999) and in some versions, recognizes 
the right to participation in the management of the state and in political deci-
sion-making. furthermore, an indelible link between the right to equality and the 
right to be different (Dagnino, 1994) is crucial, and therefore, the homogenizing 
character of the liberal vision is criticized. for this reason, this perspective has 
become a reference for women’s and gay rights, black liberation and indigenous 
people’s movements, among others. (peña, 2003; Domínguez, 1999). 
another important element of this vision of citizenship is how it serves as 
a proposal for new forms of sociability, given it transcends the legal recognition 
of rights and the strict limitations on the relationship between individuals and 
the state, and instead focuses on social relations as a whole, where the recogni-
tion of rights constitutes new parameters for conviviality in society. (Telles,1994; 
Dagnino, 1994, 2003). The emphasis on this dimension results from the authori-
tarian and hierarchical social order that prevails in the region, in which being poor 
not only refers to material and economic deprivation but also to the submission to 
cultural rules that fail to recognize those impoverished as bearers of rights. (Telles, 
1994). Thus, this view of citizenship expresses a broader notion of democracy 
that goes beyond the formal status of a political regime to designate a democratic 
society, organized through more egalitarian cultural matrices (chauí, 1981), thus 
giving voice to “aspirations for democracy as actual sociability”. (paoli, 1999:7). 
similarly, as with the notion of participation, it seems that the formulation of 
a conception of citizenship linked to this project is most advanced in brazil. how-
ever, there is a growing emphasis on the adoption of this conception, in distinct 
variations, in countries such as colombia (González, segura e bolívar, 1997), ec-
uador (menendez carrion, 2002-2003; pachano, 2003), argentina (Wappenstein, 
2004; cheresky, 2001; bloj, 1994), Uruguay (Villareal, 2004), among others. 
even in chile, where the emergence of the contemporary notion of citizenship was 
strongly linked to the neoliberal project, the dispute between different versions of 
the concept is indicative of its importance. (De la maza, 2005). 
7	 	 According	 to	 some	 definitions	 given	 by	 Brazilian	 social	movement	 partici-
pants	in	research	carried	out	in	99,	citizenship	was	itself,	at	times,	seen	as	con-
stituting	this	process.	Thus,	the	ability	to	struggle	for	rights	was	seen	as	evidence	
of	their	citizenship,	even	in	the	absence	of	other	rights.	(Dagnino,	Teixeira,	Silva	
e	Ferlim	(99)	
	 For a summary of the debate on citizenship in different Latin American countries see 
Dagnino,	Evelina,	“Meanings of Citizenship in Latin América”.	IDS	Working	Papers.	
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lastly, from this set of elements that constitute the participatory democracy 
project there emerges a broader notion of politics which affirms the multiplicity 
of its terrains, its subjects, themes and processes. The recognition of “new ways 
to do politics” –the formula that a number of analysts have found to designate 
the emergence of new political subjects such as social movements– bringing new 
issues to the public arena and claiming their political nature, finds its place here. 
(sader, 1988; nun, 1989; paoli, 1995). 
it is necessary to note that, on the one hand, the dynamics of the dissemination 
of this project and the attempts for its practical implementation in latin america 
show a verifiable “demonstration effect” linking different countries, in which one 
learns through the experiences of the other. This process has intensified with the 
growth of continental networks of social movements, nGos, academics and politi-
cal parties. The most obvious, although not the only example of this, is the prolif-
eration of the brazilian experience of participatory budgets which began in 1989 in 
porto alegre and has today spread to different countries across the continent. 
On the other hand, these attempts have encountered a series of difficulties 
throughout the continent as well. in particular, obstacles exist related to the scar-
city of resources available for social policies which result from economic limita-
tions from a number of factors: the priority of paying the external debt, the fiscal 
costs of banking crises, corruption that has gotten out of hand, the fiscal ineptness 
of the state, and so on. furthermore, the possibilities for its complete implemen-
tation within the context of the current form of the capitalist order (or according 
to some versions, in any of its forms) has been an object of intense debate among 
those affiliated with the project. This discussion includes those who believe that 
there is a contradiction between the broadening of democracy and capitalism as 
a system, and advocate socialism as an answer, as well as those who become 
theoretically and politically engaged in what has been termed the “social” or 
“solidarity” economy. (singer, 2003; singer and de souza 2003; santos, 2002). 
in this latter version, which is being disseminated throughout several countries, 
the main idea is to introduce a democratic and egalitarian logic into the spheres 
of production and the market.
Some experiences in the implementation of the project
This section contains information about specific experiences of the participatory 
project in latin america. The information was gathered from case studies com-
missioned by the authors of this chapter, within the framework of a comparative 
research project on the actors and scenarios in the construction of democracy in 
latin america, published in brazil and mexico in 2006. 
The well-known mechanism of participatory budgeting, or Orçamento Par-
ticipativo (op), in brazil is surely the most disseminated and successful experi-
Brighton,	University	of	Sussex,	005	as	well as the special issue on this theme in Latin 
American Perspectives,	volume	0,	number	,	issue	9,	March	00.
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ment inspired by the participatory democracy project. Due to its success, the model 
of participatory budgeting, which was inaugurated in 1989 by the Workers’ party 
(pT) in porto alegre, state of rio Grande do sul, spread not only to other countries 
but was also adopted, within brazil, by other parties and political projects. 
for Teixeira and albuquerque (2006), the democratizing scope of the par-
ticipatory budgets seems to depend, on the one hand, on the relationships that 
the democratizing project has established with its environment and with the other 
projects that are present therein. Thus, the ability of this project to move ahead 
with proposals and the degree to which its representatives negotiate with and/or 
subordinate themselves to other conceptions – those that are dominant in the local 
culture or those advocated by allies, interlocutors or adversaries – are issues of 
concern. “if the chance that the op becomes a public space of real power sharing 
depends mainly on the vitality, vigor and maturity of the democratizing political 
project coming from the local civil society, it is also undeniable that it radically 
depends on the clarity and consistency with which the government implements a 
democratic and participatory political project.” (Teixeira and albuquerque, 2006, 
pp. 206). The dispute, which tends to shape this clarity and consistency, includes 
in some cases not only the parties that govern in alliance with the pT, and the 
sectors that prevail in local power, but also unfolds between the different sectors 
of the party itself. 
on the other hand, the project that serves as inspiration for the op faces 
clear limits imposed both by the scarcity of resources for social investment that 
characterizes brazilian governments today, as well as by the precarious condi-
tions for societies organizing their own participation, particularly in cities with 
weak associative traditions. Together with this instability comes varying degrees 
of experience, training and maturity of societal organizations to participate au-
tonomously in conflictive processes that negotiate distinct interests, as well as 
difficulties originating from the qualification and specialization that are required 
for OP participation. The issue of representation –central to the process– also 
encounters problems that derive both from this precariousness as well as from 
the sometimes quite difficult dialogue that is established between the OP and 
representatives chosen through electoral democracy. 
According to the authors, “The way in which conflict is dealt with is im-
portant for the perception of different forms of action, on the part of government 
and society”…. They found both “forms of action that seek to ‘manage’ conflict 
through avoiding it” as well as “forms of action that locate in the very conflict the 
possibility of defining public criteria for the understanding of the world” (Teix-
eira and albuquerque, op. cit, pp. 210). 
participatory budgeting is possibly the most important experience in terms 
of power-sharing between society and local government in brazil. however, it is 
limited to a small part of public budgets and the processes have not always led to 
the transformation of the overall political culture and practice. it created a popular 
participatory democratic practice that coexists with forms of “normal politics”, 
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that is, clientelism and neoliberal public policies. The final result remains to be 
seen, but in a profound way, the op demonstrated that it is possible to conceive of 
and implement public policies that are deliberative and participatory. 
The study done by palomino and colleagues (2006) on argentina reveals 
the presence of a variety of political projects within social movements such as 
unemployed piqueteros9, asambleas barriales (neighborhood assemblies), and 
the occupation and “recovery” of recently closed industrial plants, all of which 
erupted on the argentine political scene in the mid-1990s as a response to the 
harsh effects that the neoliberal project implementation had on the living condi-
tions of its citizens. 
These political projects are quite diverse and can be distinguished from one 
another by their ideological particularities, their unequal abilities to influence so-
cial movements and their varying degrees of connection to political parties and to 
the state. some projects are oriented toward direct intervention in electoral com-
petition through their own candidates or alliances established with other move-
ments and parties. other projects prefer direct action and placing demands on the 
state as a way of obtaining resources, while others conceive of participation in so-
cial movements as a way of building more ambitious alternative policies for social 
transformation. There are also those that share several of these characteristics. 
Differences notwithstanding, a good deal of these projects share the same 
rejection of the neoliberal project, a strong critique of forms of delegative rep-
resentation and a commitment to promoting democratic and participatory ideas 
and practices. 
as a consequence, the sphere of politics and even of electoral democracy is 
broadening, with the unfolding of new social practices that include deliberation 
and collective action in assemblies and public spaces. These are practices that 
underwent gradual development until they became substantial traits of the move-
ments. similarly, there is a strong emphasis on the social movement’s autonomy 
in relation to the state and the Partido Justicialista –old partners in the populist 
corporative model of earlier decades. and lastly, the boundaries of citizenship are 
broadening to incorporate the rights of the poorest sectors defended by the new 
social movements as well as the defence of the “right to have rights”. 
Panfichi and Dammert’s study of Peru (2006) shows how a participatory 
democracy project promoted by a group of civil society activists, who became 
civil servants at the beginning of the peruvian transition (which began in 2001), 
achieved important progress in the institutionalization of a variety of citizens’ 
participation mechanisms. nonetheless, as these experiences are consolidated, 
the participatory sectors are obliged to confront resistance first, and soon after 
outright opposition of a sector of political society –authorities, State employees, 
and government parties– that respond to the more traditional and clientelist ori-
9	 	 The	piqueteros are	 a	 set	 of	mainly	 spontaneous	 organizations	 of	 unemployed	
people	that	used	the	interruption	of	traffic	as	a	mobilization	strategy.
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entation and projects. The analysis of political disputes on the content of citizens’ 
participation, and in particular, on the strategies in the struggle to combat pov-
erty, is one the contributions of this study.
Gonzalo de la maza and carlos ochsenius’ study of chile shows how the 
virtuous confluence of “political projects” (Dagnino, 2003) originating in civil 
and political societies, which were both mobilized to rebuild democracy in chile, 
was not enough to guarantee the expected democratization of state and society. 
according to the authors, part of the explanation is found in both the institutional 
conditions of the chilean political transition itself, which impeded the political 
majority that had been in the government since 1990 to exercise its power more 
completely (Garretón 2000), and the non-participatory character of the project 
developed by the Concertación governments. in effect, the authors consider that 
the end of the pinochet period and the transition to democracy were based on 
a political pact that ensured the preservation of the neoliberal political model, 
preserved military power quotas and sanctioned an elitist and highly segmented 
conception of democracy. This political arrangement allowed the reconstitution 
of an institutional political system of representative democracy that has, until 
now (with possibilities for future change), functioned in such a way as to block 
the deepening of democratic participation and the strengthening of civil society. 
chile is usually presented as a successful case of the application of the neo-
liberal economic model in which the notion of citizen participation is de-politi-
cized and reduced to its most instrumental aspects in the provision of services. 
nonetheless, a new and growing idea has some sectors of civil society attempting 
to build new spaces of participation and local negotiation between authorities and 
citizens. These experiences are still poorly developed and unarticulated, but they 
also demonstrate the growing dissemination of ideas and aspirations for partici-
patory democracy throughout the region.
in mexico, the cases studied by ernesto isunza (2006) point to the fragment-
ed and experimental existence of a participatory democracy project in some “in-
terfaces”0 of government and civil society interaction which are defined around 
specific fields of public policy. As we shall see, the Mexican democratic project is 
still in an initial phase, designed and implemented as a set of micro co-manage-
ment projects, and not yet articulated as a more general proposal.
in the case of the hiV-aids council, isunza shows that the combination of 
a high level of activism on the part of organizations of aiDs-infected people and 
the attitude of openness that was shown by the federal government’s secretariat 
of health during 2002-2004 opened the doors for the formation of councils that 
were given decision-making and evaluation functions. These councils were made 
up of citizens (representatives from these organizations, health-related nGo’s, 
0	 	Interfaces:	places	and	moments	of	 interaction	between	social	and	political	ac-
tors,	limited	by	institutions	or	normalized	practices,	in	which	conflicting	views	and	
interests	are	put	forward,	publicized	and	negotiated.
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and some university researchers) and civil servants in the public health sector 
in charge of the implementation of aiDs related programs. The case study indi-
cates that, as long as the authority of the civil servants was not questioned, the 
council was able to operate almost as an instance of co-management, in which 
the hiV bearers and their allies were heard. The public space created by these 
councils was open, deliberative and at the same time, a locus of decision-making. 
However, when the operational efficiency of the civil servant staff came under 
questioning, the council was then boycotted by the government representatives. 
however, the council constitutes the example that is most similar to the manage-
ment councils in Brazil, although applied in this case only to the specific case of 
people living with hiV-aids. 
in the case of the federal electoral institute (Instituto Federal Electoral 
- ife), isunza argues that the organizational model of the institution responsible 
for the coordination of mexico’s federal elections constitutes a democratic in-
novation in the context of a country that has only recently emerged from political 
authoritarianism. The fei created a General council made up of nine citizens 
who were designated by the federal chamber of Deputies to be in charge of the 
organization of elections. These nine people were selected in 1996 on the basis of 
their personal autonomy in relation to political parties and their professional or 
academic prestige. Upon conceding them real power in supervising and making 
decisions on elections, these counsellors then acquired notable power over the 
administrative apparatus of the ife and thus created a space of relative autonomy 
in relation to the government and to political parties. applying this same model 
to 32 local councils –one for each state in the republic– and in the nation´s 300 
electoral districts, the principle of the so-called “citizenization” (ciudadaniza-
cion) of the IFE has allowed the organization of elections to stay firmly in the 
hands of politically independent citizens that have authority over the professional 
electoral bureaucracy. 
although this institution cannot be considered part of a participatory democ-
racy model, it does contain some elements of the latter, to the extent that it es-
tablishes de facto co-management between symbolic representatives of mexican 
citizens and those of the government, within the framework of an autonomous 
institution that has been created specifically for that purpose. Isunza gives promi-
nence to this form of “transversal accountability” that consists of an institutionally 
established space for the definition and application of public policy, with citizen 
representatives who “penetrate” state structures. The participatory nature of this 
institution can be questioned on two different bases. firstly, there is a problem in 
the fact that citizen representatives are chosen by the chamber of Deputies, that 
is politicians, rather than by civil society. This circumstance imposes a structural 
limitation on the institution, making it dependent on the decisions of a state in-
stitution. Secondly, a flaw lies in the fact that real citizens’ participation is only 
sporadic, occurring every three years and operating according to rules and norms 
previously established within a strict margin of action and decision-making. 
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felipe hevia (2006), in his analysis of participation in latin american con-
stitutions, demonstrates how they have come to reflect normative understandings 
that were produced in the region, in the cycle of transition to democracy. in effect, 
as has already been pointed out, almost all south american nations, beginning 
in 1988, have participated in the wave of elaborating new constitutions, whereas 
central american and caribbean countries (with the exception of nicaragua) and 
méxico have not. hevia has observed that in most of the new constitutions the 
principle of citizens’ participation has been directly or indirectly included, with 
Venezuela and nicaragua as the most explicit and extensive cases. nonetheless, 
the author notes that there is considerable distance between the content of these 
constitutions, as abstract legal discourse, and the real possibilities of implement-
ing such measures. This is most often not contemplated by constitutional precepts 
and require another legislative cycle (secondary legislation, regulation, etc.) that 
does not always come about. The inclusion of participation is linked to the con-
stitutional recognition of diverse mechanisms of direct democracy, a process that 
has made it possible to legalize the plebiscite, the referendum and the “popular 
consultation” (consulta popular) in almost all south american countries. never-
theless, these legal resources have seldom been used in practice, with Uruguay as 
the only real exception. furthermore, the only countries that have legalized the 
possibility to revoke a mandate are peru and Venezuela; in the latter case, this 
resource was in fact implemented through a nation-wide vote which proved quite 
traumatic and ended in the ratification of President Chavez’ mandate. 
if, from a juridical point of view, there has been enormous progress in latin 
america related to participatory democracy, in practice citizens’ participation 
remains quite limited and is concentrated mainly in brazil, where management 
councils in the area of health continue to represent the most successful example 
of a mechanism established by the constitution that operates at the national level, 
notwithstanding the practical difficulties they faced. The other major Brazilian 
contribution to participation, participatory budgeting (op), lacks an explicit con-
stitutional base. This demonstrates that democratic innovation does not neces-
sarily require legal spaces specifically designed to ensure the materialization of 
participatory practices. 
Final Remarks
in order to contextualize this analysis of the participatory project in latin amer-
ica, it is necessary to mention briefly its opposite –the neoliberal project. The 
conceptions of citizenship, civil society and participation formulated by the neo-
liberal project intend to depoliticize and represent what we might call a mini-
malist view of politics. This view, which reacts against broadening the political 
sphere –the exact democratization effort that the participatory democracy project 
has struggled to carry out– is translated into its opposite: the reduction of spaces, 
subjects, themes and processes that have been considered essential to politics. 
if a broad view of politics includes civil society as a legitimate political arena 
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and emphasizes citizenship as a process that establishes political subjects, than 
the minimalist version of politics is based on, firstly, the selective reduction of 
civil society to specific types of organizations, with the subsequent exclusion of 
other actors, and on the redefinition of its role, which becomes a compensation 
for state absences in the implementation of social policies. The very substitution 
of the term civil society for that of Third sector is indicative of this new function 
and demonstrates that an attempt is being made to remove the essential part that 
civil society plays as the foundation of the political domain. The latter becomes 
once again limited to political society. self-denominated as a-political, the Third 
Sector reinforces a statist definition of power and politics –one that participatory 
democracy’s view of civil society as confronting the monopoly of power by the 
state and political society has been directed against.  
secondly, these policies and the issues that they address are treated strictly 
from a technical or philanthropic angle. as a consequence, poverty and inequal-
ity are withdrawn from the public (political) arena and from their own domin-
ion –that of justice, equality and citizenship. The distribution of social services 
and benefits increasingly replaces the space for human rights and citizenship, 
obstructing the demand for rights –there is no place left for this, since their dis-
tribution depends entirely on the good will and competence of the sectors in-
volved. even more insidiously, obstacles block the formulation of rights, notions 
of citizenship and the very enunciation of the public (Telles, 2001). Thirdly, the 
privatization of the most urgent issues in Latin American countries – poverty 
and inequality – contrasts starkly with recent efforts to create public spaces for 
the discussion of these and other issues of public interest that are defended by 
the democratic project as ways of broadening the political debate so that conflict 
between divergent interests can be publicly exposed and negotiated within demo-
cratic parameters. 
In contrast to a conception that recognizes conflict as central to public life 
and democracy as the best way of dealing with it, the neoliberal vision attempts 
to confine conflict or make it invisible by giving it a technocratic and managerial 
treatment. This characteristic of the neoliberal project is at the root of the critique 
by those who consider it to be a “fascist pluralism” (santos, 1999) or a kind of 
totalitarianism centered on the triad of “privatization of the public, destitution of 
speech and annulment of politics” (oliveira, 1999). 
	 	 The most common accusation made by governments and conservative media 
against social movements, such as the Landless Peasants Movement (Movimento dos 
Sem Terra) in Brazil, is that they “are political” -- this is symbolic of this restrictive 
view of politics.	
	  In Brazil, the contrast	between these two projects as far the depoliticization of the 
process of creating and implementing social policies goes, was paradigmatically ex-
pressed in the elimination, during the very early days of President Fernando Henrique 
Cardoso’s presidency, of the Conselho de Segurança Alimentar,	substituted by the 
Conselho da Comunidade Solidária	(Telles,	00;	Almeida,	this	volume).	
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Without considering the merit of these evaluations, the approach in our 
book offers a distinct emphasis: the need to illuminate the differences, conflicts 
and disputes among the political projects that are currently present in the politi-
cal scene. otherwise, it is possible for fatalism to replace the euphoria that was 
present in countries such as brazil during the decades of the 1980s and early 
1990s, in which the dynamics of building democracy, nourished by a favorable 
environment and the visibility of social movements, contributed to a simplified 
view of what the democratization process would look like and the dimensions of 
the disputes that would unfold within it.
perhaps we have overestimated the political strength of one side involved in 
the struggle and thus minimized the power of its adversaries. The practical and 
overwhelming revelation is that what seemed to be a linear and ascendant pro-
cess was in fact met by contradictions, limits, dilemmas, unequal paces, which 
seems to make us forget that political dispute is an intrinsic and essential ele-
ment of building and deepening democracy. recognizing and elaborating on the 
permanence of this struggle, carefully examining its characteristics, seems to be 
a procedure that can contribute to elucidating the dilemmas and overcoming the 
limits that confront us today. 
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Citizens’ participation and
associative space 
 
“What does non-governmental mean in a country 
with a traditional State? Why not use the associa-
tions as a better criteria for evaluation, given their 
concept of participation and more importantly, 
the way they promote community involvement?” 
	(Lopez,	997)
cuba is changing. While caricatured by certain newspaper articles, a com-
plex transformation is unfolding, affecting lifestyles and spiritualities, consump-
tion habits and status symbols, family roles and political cultures. although the 
institutional and regulatory frameworks linger behind –more than is advisable– a 
transformation is underway, rejecting dogma imposed by the neoliberal claudica-
tion and bureaucratic inactivity, both forms of historical fatalism. if one wishes to 
accurately approach the depth of change under way, we can find a privileged and 
seductive scenario for analysis in associative space (espacio asociativo), which 
is understood to be the social dimension that hosts relatively autonomous forms 
of groupings and collective action, outside the political and economic institu-
tions, that channel the voluntary activity of citizens in disparate areas of par-
ticular interest, characterized by the logic of reciprocity, solidarity, symmetrical 
interaction and the defense of common identities.
	 This	article	has	been	inserted,	together	with	a	CLACSO-ASDI	project,	as	the	cen-
tral	investigation	topic	for	the	authors	future	doctorate.	Preliminary	versions	have	
already	been	published	at	www.inprecor.org.br,	www.lescahiersdelouise.org	and	it	is	
currently	being	edited	by	Sur-Sur	de	CLACSO	program.
*	 Political	historian,	a	professor	from	the	University	of	Habana	and	investigator	for	the	
Juan	Marinello	Center.	He	is	a	member	of	the	Cátedra	Haydee	Santamaría	project	
and	neighbourhood	activist.	Email	xarchano@yahoo.es.	
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During recent years in our country participatory experiences in associations 
have expanded, contributing to the process of gradual democratization of diverse 
agencies of political society (especially local government branches), which per-
form an important part of the inspection, coordination and material support of the 
forms of association --  which is a source of synergies and conflicts. (Suarez, 2000). 
The process is not exempt from contradictions and setbacks, derived from exog-
enous variables (U.s. harassment) and domestic variables (synonymous with un-
derdevelopment and state traditions), which illustrate a dynamic tension between 
traditional leftist democracies and bureaucratic trends, typical of a socialist state 
system. in analyzing these collective groupings, their traditions and organizational 
imagination, we need to evaluate their political nature, their ability to build alterna-
tive or functional paradigms to the domination found within each social context.
a key element is the study of the associations, analyzing participation as a 
variable of great importance in democratic functioning (Vergara, 1988), (pateman, 
1970). broadening participation is considered a crucial contribution to social in-
tegration, strengthening the legitimacy of consensus and communication policy, 
along with the construction of an active citizenship. from participation, the citizen 
is not only understood to be the subject of constitutionally guaranteed rights but 
as acting in a responsible manner and being involved in the reproduction of social 
coexistence and its constraints (chaguaceda, 2007). This process embodies and 
unfolds not only in state institutions but also in so-called civil society (cs).
The context of Participation: Civil Society
as space and discourse
cs is a concept that serves simultaneously legitimate, mobilization, policy and 
descriptive roles, among others. it expresses an independent self-organization of 
society, made up of volunteer action and public activities within a context of le-
gally defined relationships between the State and society (Wergle and Butterfield, 
1992) . it can be considered the basis for legitimacy and political confrontation 
of political projects, which reorient (without substituting) the traditional state-
power relationships (monopolizers of legitimate violence) towards the areas of 
culture, daily-life and exchange. It is simultaneously a subject – universal, like a 
citizen’s community, or particular, including specific groups or individuals that 
make it up – and is a way to organize social relations and express ideologies of 
power – a kind of inter-subjective relation where diverse hegemonic relationships 
are constructed (núñez, 2005). it adopts local, national and transnational expres-
sions (serbin, 2004) with different degrees of fragmentation, heterogeneity and 
interconnection of components (neveu and bastien, 1999).
	 	Wergle	and	Butterfield	recognize	an	institutional	component	in	CS	which	defines	
the	 legal	 framework	guaranteeing	 its	 autonomy	and	permanency,	 and	 likewise	 its	
relationships	with	the	state	and	other	dimensions	which	define	their	own	character,	
feelings	and	methods.	
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Some authors have defined it as the area for relationships between individu-
als and social classes outside the institutional power relationships characteristic of 
the state (hernandez, 1994), and as the social dimension characterized by being 
centred around processes of permanence, organization and consensus of associate 
members on collective purposes. at its heart is “(…) the set of organs commonly 
considered private, that facilitate the intellectual and moral direction of society 
by forming  consent and the adhesion of the masses, … [and includes] cultural, 
educational, and religious social organizations, but also political and economic 
ones”, that offer “a legitimate space for the confrontation of aspirations, desire, 
objectives, images, beliefs, identities, projects and projects that express the di-
versity of the social component.” (acanda, 2002: 248 and 257). its agencies have 
standard non-profit goals, external financing (public or private), rely profusely on 
voluntary contribution and produce collective goods, intervene in social politics 
and call for solidarity and democratization. (keane, 1992). however, they do not 
escape the negative processes of bureaucracy. (linares et al, 2006).
 
in their disparate interpretations, the notion of cs has an intimate relation-
ship with the fundamental problems of modern political reflection and action: the 
internal articulation of society through the voluntary cohesion of its members, 
the legitimacy and workings of institutionalized mechanisms of explicit power 
(alonso, 2002; azcuy, 1996), the pretension of neutrality and universality of the 
modern state, the de-politicizing of particular interests and the  domination-he-
gemony articulation  (acanda, 2002). Therefore, it expresses a contradiction be-
tween conflict, social control and its liberating potential.
In my case, I define CS as an area of plural social interaction (families, as-
sociations, social movements, etc.) that articulates hegemony through everyday 
specific civic actions, within socialization, association and public communica-
tion structures that are not integrated in the political and economic systems. This 
assumes essential traits such as plurality (connecting various human groups), 
publicity (expanding cultural and communicative institutions), legality (promot-
ing forms and general principles that mark its area of action versus the economy 
and state) and individuality (an area for self-development and moral choice), 
among others (arato and cohen, 2000). recent, more sophisticated visions rec-
ognize a pentagonal social design where cs interconnects with economic and 
political systems through interfaces that would be economic and political society 
(isunza in olvera, 2006).
faced with the fact that a complex “really existing” cs, various authors 
have highlighted the risks of confronting resulting distortions like de-politiciza-
tion -withdrawing in the face of actions of the political system- or over-politiciza-
tion of cs, presumably framed and homogenized around a sole anti-state agenda 
and struggle. This has led some analysts to invalidate the analytical usefulness of 
the concept. in my case, i believe it is equally naive to abandon the concept with-
out reflection, or to use it indiscriminately: what is necessary is to define, in each 
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context, the sociological content and mobile economics, the worldview paradigm 
and the current ideology to which it subscribes – in summary, the political project 
that is intertwined with each particular reading of cs, assumed as a concept to 
designate a wide region and diffuse social issues. Thus, we shall assume the need 
to overcome the phraseology that mobilizes everyday scientific analysis without 
preventing its political conditions and its potential propositive function.
There are currently various approaches to civil society, which can be summa-
rized in four main paradigms, expressed within the western paradigm (hegemonic) 
and its diverse transpositions and worldwide alternatives. The neo-conservative 
approach is business, anti-statist and exclusive -- looking to compensate social 
inequalities through occasional charitable actions -- which claims a distinction 
between cs and state, binary and organic, from the exterior. The liberal pluralist 
-- which may be accompanied by an occasional denunciation of capitalism and 
demand for social reforms -- defends independence and co-determination with 
relationship to the state, emphasizes the idea of a particular “a society of lobby-
ists” identity, and is focused on nGos. (burchardt, 2006: 168 and 169).
anti-neoliberal perspectives offer another reading of this phenomenon as an 
asymmetrical, diverse (in capacities and discourses) space for the articulation of 
hegemonies. (hidalgo, 1998). cs, a terrain of non-state oriented social actions, 
where new questions, demands, legitimacy and civic cultures are generated (Gal-
lardo, 1995), is considered to be a landmark that is useful to rebuild associative ties 
in de-politicized spaces, capable of overcoming the alienation and fragmentation 
in authoritarian contexts, and in hands of the people, it can legitimize processes of 
democratization (romer, 2006), (houtart), confronting dominant groups, purging 
political and administrative corruption, and activating patriotism (meschkat, 2002). 
These views run counter to what has been called the myth of pure virtue of cs, 
which is slowly being abandoned by more sophisticated and realistic social liberals, 
for compensatory mechanisms such as a diverse-range of institutional designs.
however, the heterogeneity of cs includes non-civil and less than demo-
cratic actors according to Western standards, expressing their own forms of ac-
tion, identities, projects, etc.. (Dagnino et al, 2006). The criticism of the uni-
versalist Habermas model of CS – that it is perceived as an area governed by 
communicative action (Habermas, 1987) – provides evidence that there are other 
visions of cs (putting more weight on the spiritual and communitarian rather 
than the secular and individual), anchored in the contexts of ethnic and aborigi-
nal communities and religious movements. from this perspective, the historical 
non-Western experiences (that is most of the human endeavour, in terms of time 
and scope) demonstrates the existence of collective forms of action that fall out-
side of state institutions, which are able to meet individual demands (revilla et 
al, 2002). This is important to point out as we are seeing surprising vitality and 
growing discourses, such as those by the latin american indigenous peoples, the 
islamic religious groups and afro-asian rural communities -- all this despite the 
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liberal paradigm being extended as a universal phenomenon capable of permeat-
ing regional experiences.
however, defending the relative independence of the components of the 
social whole means recognizing a certain inter-penetration of its individual logics 
in the operation of their respective structures. assuming this recognizes that in 
each context exists a specific type of relationship and strong correlation between 
these actors. Therefore, the influence and traits of a national CS can also be as-
sessed based on the scope, nature and logic of its state counterpart. in fact, the 
idea of administration policy as a factor in mediating between citizens (repre-
sented in its cs) and the modern state -- which occurs as a result of the rise of 
class struggle -- provokes contradictory results by encouraging, through forced 
government intervention, the recognition and expansion of the scope of cs itself 
-- a process illustrated by the expansion of rights frameworks and citizen’s par-
ticipation (neocleus, 1996).
The types of relationships between cs and state (kramer, 1981) whose ex-
pressions can be identified in the case of Cuba, are pragmatic cooperation, through 
which the state subsidizes or provides material and moral support to associations 
for their social role and political importance; and public sector monopoly, which 
generates a model called “state-led” that is marked by the prominence of the 
state’s role.  The state administers citizen’s welfare and becomes virtually the 
sole provider of social services, while civil society is only responsible for iden-
tifying needs, subordinating its associations to the state planning. studying the 
types of interrelationships between cs and state as processes of inter-penetration 
and simultaneous separation (armony, 2005) is useful because it helps determine 
in each case: degrees of state autonomy types of dominant actors -- located on a 
spectrum ranging from local to national -- and styles of more or less competitive 
interaction that exist between these actors. it involves analyzing the relationship 
between the administrative, coercive and symbolic state dimensions and their 
resources, and the socioeconomic base, organizational mobilizing capacity and 
internal dynamics – ideologies -- that inspire any CS (Armony, 2005).
The emergence of cs (and particularly of associative space) is related to 
the tensions and dynamics of change that impact from and on state space. in-
ternationally, successful experiences have been recognized where “(…) civil 
society actors marked by anti-state suspicions and state actors imbued by an 
anti-participatory culture have had to create mechanisms for joint work (…)” 
(isunza in olvera, 2006: 308). in cuba, the weakening of the state monopoly 
on the production of legitimate values (the hegemony of decades past) can not 
be recovered by activating the coercive dimension but rather by preserving the 
	 	Likewise	a	minister	could	support	transnational	contaminant	affecting	a	neigh-
bourhood;	the	same	community	could	ask	for	help	from	the	public	sector	(universi-
ties,	courts,	social	assistance)	to	counteract	the	impact	of	this	action,	an	alliance	of	
associations	could	promote	economic	support		to	the	neighbours,	etc.
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consistency and cohesion of the national project, by inserting cs demands and 
agencies into ongoing or potential policies. That is why today any tendency that 
recommends overextension of the same, at the expense of action deployed from 
within the associations, is irresponsible. We need to expand even further a notion 
of complementarity of responsibility ‘state-associations’ to meet the challenges 
of an increasingly complex and heterogeneous society (collective of authors, 
2003), with trends towards pluralism (boves, 2005).
The Cuban associative context: a brief outline. 
The revolution in 1959, coming in from the socialist process of national liberation, in-
tegrated organically and originally the ideals of the national martí project (Proyecto 
Nacional Martiano) -- social justice, political independence and economic develop-
ment – mixing with it a renewed dose of democratic and civic commitment. (Fern-
andez, 1999). in the 60’s, the cuban revolution gave rise to a sui generis cs , where 
millions of people “found themselves”, participating enthusiastically: they entered 
politics, were socialized and experienced a sense of belonging to a cause greater than 
themselves; transforming themselves along with their reality. With the disappearance 
of the many forms of social associations that existed before the revolution, the gaps 
were filled by new mass organizations or people’s organizations, which over the 
course of time were accompanied by other professional associations and civil rights’ 
groups. metaphorically, we could consider that the revolutionary people -- the vast 
majority of the Cuban population – recognized as Voluntad General, signed a sui 
generis Social Contract, which created a specific type of socio-political participation 
in the 60’s -- through numerous associations and political organizations -- capable of 
combining massive ratification on large popular congregations with the centralized 
execution of leadership, and no classical, recognizable rule of law (and of constitu-
tionality). (chaguaceda, 2007), (prieto, perez, sarracino, Villabella, 2006).
This functioned for the early needs of the project – succeeding to undertake 
titanic tasks (educational, health, defense) with large masses modestly educated and 
of high political commitment. however, soon signs of exhaustion were revealed and 
an institutional restructuring was required, close to the soviet Union model, which 
took off in the second half of the 70’s. (Garcia, 1998). Unfortunately, this process was 
mediated and did not achieve its democratic promises (Dilla, 1995), however it did, 
parallel to the opening of new coded spaces and stable citizen’s action, strengthen the 
bureaucracy and achieve enduring personal and centralized traits of social conduct. 
in this context, reserve towards democratic institutional mechanisms, reinforced by 
the incompetence of the bourgeois republican institutions and its disruption by two 
periods of right-wing dictatorships, and the urgency of major changes, continued to 
legitimise the existence of a strengthened state with its immense bureaucratic appara-
tus and control of the nation’s material and human resources. (burchardt 2006).
Despite this, the libertarian component (martinez heredia, 2005) of the revo-
lutionary project did not succumb completely to statism and therefore, soon after, 
processes of latin american popular participation and self-organization began 
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to have an impact on cuba (sandinista revolution, the experiences of popular 
education) and leave their mark on the organizational and personal experiences 
of many cubans. This meant that in the 80’s, reanalyzing the direction of cuban 
socialism, there was an attempt to rescue the associative and participatory com-
ponents in order to meet the demands arising from processes of heterogeneity and 
socialist social mobility. One of the first changes appeared in the legal field.
from 1976, the right to association in cuba was recognized in article 53 of 
the constitution as a means through which citizens can hold multiple scientific, cul-
tural, recreational, solidarity and social benefit activities.4 This was regulated by 
law no. 54, in effect since December 27, 1985, which stated “(…) transformations 
in the country require the reorganization of association records at a national level 
and the approval of a new legislation adjusted to current needs, that responds to the 
growing interest shown by the people with regards to the formation and develop-
ment of associations for the social good”, and thus opened up a channel for revolu-
tionary association.5 The nature of these should be for social benefit, non-profit and 
their essential purpose should be directed to the development of science, technol-
ogy, education, sports, recreation and different cultural events. as well, it included 
promoting relations of friendship and solidarity between peoples and studying their 
history and culture, leaving space for any other sphere of action not included in 
those previously mentioned, provided that the proposal was of social interest.
However, the Law of Cuban Associations has many deficiencies, for example, 
despite proposing the proven internal democracy of associations as a condition for 
its existence, the norm -- and its implementation -- favors the stability of associa-
tive elites. it leaves enormous power for decision-making in the hands of related 
organs and relatively few mechanisms for appeal against potential abuse of these 
conditions. it establishes conditions that affect less organized people’s groups. it 
is sufficiently ambiguous as to accommodate in one space NGOs, foundations and 
community experiences, making less formal experiences invisible, among others. in 
addition, its existence has not prevented the unfortunate state resistance to enrolling 
new associations -- a position that has existed now for a decade. The public interest 
in self-organization advocates that different participatory plans are welcomed into 
state associative institutions and associations created, or in areas of contact between 
the two (for example, through socio-cultural projects), conducting activities whose 
performance occasionally exceeds the formal and logical objectives of the former. 
in the 90’s, an explosive revival of associations was witnessed in cuba ,  si-
multaneously attributed to the crisis resulting from the collapse eastern europe, the 
retreat of the state as a socio-economic agent, the ideological and practical discredit-
ing of state socialism, and the emerging debates (legitimized by the appeal to the 
4th congress of the ccp) on the future of the cuban project. This also prompted 
4	 	Constitution	of	the	Republic	of	Cuba,	Official	Bulletin	No.	.		January	0th,	00.	
5	 	Associations	Law	No	54/5	Official	Bulletin	of	the	Republic	of	Cuba,	La	Haba-
na,	95.	
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a boom of global and regional decentralization processes, the growth of solidarity 
movements with cuba, the emergence of new problems and reclaiming discourses 
(environmental, gender, ecumenical and popular religion, urban participation). Dur-
ing these years, the combined efforts of communities, various foreign actors and the 
state mitigated the effects of the crisis and promoted the associative boom.
Currently associative space can be classified according to several types6, 
depending on the reference used. i propose to start by recognizing four clusters: 
para-state associations (pa), anti-systemic associations (asa), sectoral or pro-
fessional associations (asp) and territorial or popular associations (aTp). some 
of their traits will be described below.
The pa (committees for the Defense of the revolution - cDr), central of cu-
ban Workers (cTc), federation of cuban Women (fmc), federation of University 
students (feU) and federation of education students (feem) have a structure, 
missions and a symbolic repertoire closer to that of state institutionalism, covering, 
under its umbrella, all major social groups in the country. a phenomenon typical of 
“state socialism” experiences, they are national and monopolize the representation 
of certain interests and associative identities. Useful to the political system -- as 
mechanisms for mobilization and propaganda -- they are also social organizations 
that should formally represent the interests and views of their members before the 
state. certain conventionality, uniformity and inertia have been enthroned in the 
styles of several of these organizations, although some do retain dynamic participa-
tory bases or possess more legitimacy and are potential revivors (feU), but they 
need to promote distinct, autonomous discourse of the sectors they represent.
The asa (opposition groups, certain centers are linked to the catholic 
church and its hierarchy, etc.) is considered the “political opposition” and has 
an internal membership and influence of dissimilar impact and a high-profile 
overseas. This phenomenon is not related to the counterrevolution restoration 
of the 60’s and 70’s, shares exogenous (promoted by Western governments) and 
endogenous (dissent from the sector of society opposed to the regime) matrices, 
has no mass base and its various groups are polychromatic, but the majority are 
aligned with U.s. and / or european policies. (aGe, 2003).
On the other hand, there are sectoral or professional associations – ASP 
– represented symbolically by NGOs, civil associations, training centers and ser-
6	 	An	“authoritative”	sector	is	talked	of	--	a	State	which	would	include	PA	and	most	of	the	
authorized	ASP	and	other	“democratized”	groups,	which	are	minorities,	legally	precari-
ous,	transparent	and	predominantly	of	the	ASA.	(Puerta,	996).	This	is	also	the	case	with	
top-down	organizations,	that	have	community	connections,	and	entities	oriented	towards	
citizen	empowerment,	with	levels	of	contact	with	the	State	apparatus,	in	a	kind	of	fluid	
and	diffused	relationship.	(Gunn,	995).	Other	authors	offer	a	suggestive	taxonomy	ex-
pressed	in:	fraternal,	cultural	and	sport	associations;	mass	social	organizations;	churches	
and	religious	gatherings;	developmental	NGOs,	and	academic	publications	and	centres;	
community	movements:	dissident	groups;	cooperatives	and	new	economic	actors.	(Dilla	
y	Oxhorn,	999).	There	are	also	authors	who	prefer	to	offer	a	general	evaluation	of	the	
phenomenon	without	putting	forward	precise	classifications	(Friedman,	006).
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vices –- including some religiously inspired -- foundations, fraternities, lodges, 
etc. These entities are characterized by a tendency of professionalism and institu-
tionalization. Some have significant operating expenses and the capacity to fun-
draise external resources, and they tend towards stability and selective member-
ship, included in this employed staff and client populations. as a rule, the most 
powerful implement complex workplanning (programs, projects) in various areas 
and, have formal leadership and significant levels of professional qualifications. 
(herranz, 2005) frequently they mediate between governments and international 
cooperation, on the one hand, and various grassroots entities, usually depending 
on external funds (from private or governmental agencies). 
Other visible actors are the territorial or popular associations – ATP – in the first 
place, those known as neighbourhood movements; associated with structures such 
as integral neighbourhood Transformation Workshops (coyula, olivares, 2002) 
and various community projects promoted by cuban and foreign nGos (colectivo, 
2002). They have local interests at heart and the groups are not essentially connected, 
as they tend towards informality and territoriality. They have limited access to eco-
nomic resources and depend on exogenous sources, and therefore have a self-man-
agement calling and aim for a comprehensive transformation of communities based 
on socio-cultural considerations. They have a modest thematic agenda characterized 
by their focus on problems and have a massive, casual membership, which hampers 
the goal of collective leadership. They display a “diffused” exercise of coordination 
and activism -- different to the logic of leaders and members of more formal associa-
tions -- with a high prominence of women, professionals and ex-leaders.
in its shaping, the state has played a contradictory role. (Dilla, fernandez 
and castro, 1998) on the one hand, it disseminates technology and material re-
sources (urban organic agriculture, alternative constructions), provides special-
ists in these and other fields (psychologists, planners) and pays wages to team 
leaders. but while it implicitly recognizes the existence of these movements, it 
prevents their legal recognition, rejects the formation of popular economy experi-
ences and tries to absorb local production ventures. Yet these experiences have 
shown relationships of reciprocity (help from neighbors, sharing food, gifts), pro-
moting community assistance by some of the workers, of their own accord, and 
cooperative arrangements to hire their services for project activities. 
Participation: between the conceptual debate and pro-
grammatic dispute
Within the agendas and approaches of the associations, the participatory com-
ponent is a leading issue. any form of collective action has its own participa-
tory wealth --expressed in participatory structures, dynamics and cultures -- built 
from their specific experiences of organization and struggle. In them, the vertical, 
instrumental or hierarchical character of their mobilizations confronts growing 
forms of democratic and autonomous action. broad or restricted ideas of pow-
er are are discussed. The repertoire of democratic rights and non-conventional 
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forms of political participation are constrained or expanded. Demands and con-
flicts are expressed, related to questions that were once considered purely acces-
sories: moral, environmental or cultural.
When we talk about participation, we refer to another polysemantic term, 
endowed as well with an ontological sense, which allows it to focus on itself, 
often ignoring contexts, motives and actors of said action. (olvera, 2006: 368). 
This concept refers to forms and processes of social action where subjects who 
share a given situation, have the opportunity to identify common interests and 
demands, and translate them into forms of collective action. it integrates popu-
lar knowledge and capabilities, looks for a comprehensive transformation that 
goes beyond the relationship of dependency and subordination of communities 
members in relation to specialists and leaders. it involves several basic factors: 
knowledge (akin to culture), power (formal right and effective capacity) and de-
sire (motivation and commitment) to participate.
based on these factors, different timely participatory plots develop in each 
territorial or sectoral context, which can be analyzed as scenarios of the par-
ticipation of their citizens, or they can even become subjects of participation 
when interacting with other entities in participatory networks in each interactive 
process (through overlapping, integration or intervention) that links two or more 
participatory plots. These would channel their respective participatory cultures 
-- that is, the web of ideas, values and beliefs about participation recreated by 
each social actor. They have structures, or a set of more or less formalized and 
regulated organizational spaces, where the diverse forms (direct, delegated, ac-
tivism, among others) of participation take shape. They develop participatory 
dynamics (a sequenced set of actions through which participation unfolds) in 
which the protagonism of the subjects involved is essential – which leads us to 
emphasize the term citizen.
Participatory
cultures
Participatory 
structures
Participation
A multi-dimensional 
phenomenon recreated 
indivdually by each
social actor.
Participatory 
dynamics
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participation as a process is complemented by bodies of representation, through 
which certain groups participate indirectly in institutions, maintaining more or 
less stable and functional relationships with those represented, and legitimized 
according to the mechanisms used and the interests defended. such participa-
tion is related to economic, social, cultural and symbolic capital that illustrates 
the web of styles and preferences of a class or social group (habitus), and allows 
us to classify, perceive and articulate the system of these actions in the midst of 
an interactive area and dynamic power relationships (social field). (Burchardt, 
2006). It must be studied in a specific socio-historical context, assuming the de-
centralization of powers and resources, which implies the development of strong 
local power and popular control over the national bodies of power.
It is necessary to define the type of participation assumed here. The notion 
of social participation is too ambiguous a term (every actor is social) and only 
makes sense if it is confined to entities (NGOs, social movements, etc.) of the as-
sociative space. This would assume the notion of a total social system divided into 
watertight compartments with different logics, and separated into subsystems, and 
political, economic and cultural activities, etc.7 however, we run the risk of ignor-
ing or diminishing the political meaning of this participation, since associations 
contain, even if unintentionally, socialization spaces and citizen’s formation.
on the other hand, it is obvious that here we are not referring to the actions 
of political institutions (government, parties, parliaments) classified as political 
participation. The main functions it is traditionally “responsible” for are the de-
velopment of political communication processes, social inclusion and the remov-
al of the elites, through activities undertaken by private citizens that are more or 
less directed at influencing the selection of government personnel and the actions 
they take. (Verba and nie, 1972). an understanding of the orthodox notion of 
political participation reduces our focus to the performance within spaces of the 
political system and excludes people’s processes and political influence deployed 
from within the heart of the associations. 
Even in the field of cultural action, participation has been recognized as hav-
ing political implications on many occasions -- it hides strategies of domination, 
7	 Thus	 “(…	 systematic	 analysis	 produces	 a	 vision	of	 society	being	 artificially	 or-
dered	into	spheres	of	distinct	action,	separated,	enclosed	for	good	or	bad	in	a	great	
“social	 totality”	organized	and	coherent”	 recognizing	 that	 “some	 researchers	have	
taken	illustrative	graphic	schemes,	whose	unique	function	was	to	allocate	functions	
in	a	political	system	…	using	the	same	explanation	as	political	behaviour	…)”	(La-
groye,	99:	4)	
	 	Political	participation,	recognized	as	a	variant	of	social	participation	in	the	public	
sphere,	proposes	many	definitions	with	larger	or	smaller	differences	and	approaches.	
Its	particularity,	according	to	Juan	Valdés	Paz,	lies	in	that	(…)	it	should	make	itself	ef-
fective	in	the	political	system,	that	is	to	say,	in	the	institutions	of	the	political	system	
that	“really	exist”.	(Pérez,	004:	7).	For	Marisa	Revilla	Blanco,	political	participation	
is	the	activity	of	influencing	and	mediating	the	behaviour	of	political	power	and	ac-
tors	for	the	conservation	or	modification	of	the	existing	order.	(Revilla	00)	
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whose implicit purpose is to demobilize subordinate sectors, to attract them and 
to incorporate them into their socio-political project. (perez in linares, 2004).
The relationship between participation and citizenship are visible when the 
former is  synthetically defined as the ability of citizens to influence decision-
making processes beyond electoral participation, transforming power relations 
and reducing the gap between decisions and their executors. (Dilla et al, 1993) 
Therefore, it claims a concept of citizen’s participation that emerged from pre-
political levels of collective action, hosting the activity of conscious and active 
involvement of the subject(s) in socio-political processes related to the establish-
ment, exercise and ratification of power in institutional and associative spaces, 
and in the distribution of resulting resources. it is a process that is expressed as 
much in action from within the political institutions (partisan, state) as within the 
various specific associations that host the subjects.9
many authors talk about popular participation, which we conceive as part 
of citizen’s participation. even cuba, whose rates of integration and social equity 
are high, shows cultural, social class, territorial and other kinds of differences 
that hardly make certain associations equivalent to the notion of popular par-
ticipation, regardless of their noble actions.0. This way any popular participation 
qualifies as citizen’s participation -- even in those contexts where the differences 
and exclusions are reduced almost to the formality of voting or the precarious 
legality of the protest action of the poor -- but not all citizen’s participation is 
popular.
Popular is a category that, in our regional contexts, identifies individuals 
who suffer social asymmetries, and in mobilizing movements are likely to be-
come liberators. (Gallardo, 2005). The notion of a popular subject covers a range 
of sectors and social classes which are susceptible to being easily integrated into 
a project of anti-capitalist changes, related to communitarian, taking into account 
an identification with minimum levels of organization and autonomy from the 
market and the state: unions, neighbourhood associations, women’s or youth or-
ganizations, cultural clubs with public presence, etc.  (Dilla, 1996). for another 
9	 	We	 found	many	elements	 that	build	bridges	 and	at	 the	 same	 time	promote	a	
distinction	between	the	action	of	the	political	organizations	and	their	non-political	
counterparts,	 such	 as	 associations.	 They	 all	 contribute	 to	 the	 socialization	 of	 the	
people,	which	construct	reference	groups	and	can	serve	as	a	framework	for	selecting	
leaders	and	spreading	beliefs	--	all	this	despite	differences	in	working	methods,	logi-
cal	functioning	and	action	areas,	as	they	develop	reciprocal	recognition	of	interests	
rights	and	particularities.	(Lagroye,	99:	76)	
0	 	It	should	be	discussed	whether	the	client-population	of	certain	NGOs,	even	shar-
ing	the	framework	of	popular	participations,	develop	autonomous	actions	that	help	
to	define	it	and	show	leadership	roles	regardless	of	the	subordinates	and	liabilities	
allowed	by	the	entities.	
	 	This		is	unlike	the	concept	of	“civil	society”,	which	involves	groups	outside	the	
place	they	occupy	in	the	social	hierarchy,	ignoring	the	asymmetries	and	related	ide-
ologies	that	precisely	surround	the	popular	subjects.
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researcher, popular participation is defined as the capacity and activity of large 
majorities to act in decision-making, in relationships of power and influence, at 
different levels of social development.
Undoubtedly, there are many readings of the alluded phenomenon. even ref-
erences to the so-called “popular participation” have become invoked more fre-
quently since the mid 90’s, within the frameworks of the reformist version of latin 
american neo-liberalism. This calls for effective and efficient administration of 
public policies in contrast to the paternalistic and bureaucratic models, which leads 
certain communities to assume a management pattern not consistent with their 
emancipating emphasis. such participation, turned into a tool of management, with 
a technical element and a supposedly neutral re-distributive focus of on action, also 
adds its ideals to the political culture of national associations. (olvera 2006)4.
The culture of participatory
associations: side notes.
in its various spaces, the political culture of association frequently reforms ide-
als and modes of undemocratic action (authoritarianism, patronage, co-modifica-
tion), although their entities incorporate alternative practices (popular education, 
participatory diagnosis, community work) and aim for a more participatory and 
democratic society. in fact, relationships between these associations are as com-
plex as the rest of the components of the social system -- they reveal collaborative 
relationships, competition and conflict in their interactions.
The actors, by using various themes privileged by international cooperation 
(gender, environment, culture of peace, participation), look to leverage material, 
methodological, analytical and organizational resources, in order to effectively 
guide their collective action, and build capacities and sensitivities for social par-
ticipation processes and resistance to crisis. luckily, the metaphoric and cautious 
language of many of these associations does not always express attitudes of mere-
ly fear or opportunism. in many cases, it reveals the real power dynamics between 
these actors and the state and the desire to sustain spaces -- even if minimal -- of 
social transformation, avoiding generalizing and direct criticism, in order to allow 
for commitments and alliances with certain state institutions on timely matters.
These factors lead to various views on the opportunities and challenges of 
operating associations in cuba. according to ricardo alarcon de Quesada, the 
veteran chairman of the national assembly of people’s power -- a cuban legisla-
tive body -- “These organizations and others -- such as farmers, or professionals 
	 	Olga	Fernández	Ríos,	Cuba:	participación	popular	y	sociedad,	in	Dilla,	996.	
	 	See	the	use	of	the	Promising	Popular	Participation	Act	of	994	under	Bolivian	
right-wing	governments	of	the	past	decade.	(Thevoz,	006)
4	In	this	perspective,	a	logical	instrument	is	deployed,	where	“practical	problems	
are	reduced	to	technical	problems	solvable	by	a	formal	calculation”.	Lechner,	Nor-
bert,	“Especificando	la	política”	in	Cabrera	004:	-9.	
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or neighbourhoods -- have a vital, natural role in the direction of society. it makes 
sense, therefore, that they should propose candidates for national deputies and 
provincial delegates. They are not only heard, but are directly involved in deci-
sion-making. among other examples that could be mentioned are: the law of 
Taxation, that, before its submission to the national assembly was subject to an 
extensive review by workers’ unions , which produced significant modifications 
to the original text; the agricultural cooperatives act, an initiative presented by 
the national association of small farmers, was discussed by hundreds of thou-
sands of members in all cooperatives and from that discussion came the final 
draft that was considered and approved by the assembly.. “(serrano, 2003).
however, as the sociologist Juan Valdes paz points out: “Developments in 
the decentralization of authority, resources and information for non-state sectors 
or local state entities, have not been enough. To a large extent, the institutional 
order shows high levels of centralization in all systems, which is partly a result 
of the environmental conditions in which they operate, and partly a result of their 
institutional design and high centralization of political power; (…) the systemic 
objective of popular participation in all its moments and increasingly, in decision-
making, is blocked by the tendencies of bureaucratic institutions of each system, 
which are understood not only as an excess of staff and procedures, but as de-
cision-making without democratic control. advances in the decentralization and 
rationalization of the institutions in political and economic systems, have been in-
sufficient in reducing bureaucracy. “(Valdes in Chaguaceda and Coderch, 2005).
in such an environment, mobilization and consultation are presented as basic 
levels of participation appreciated in cuba, both in the institutional and associative 
realms. Given the shortcomings of the socio-political institutions, although the as-
sociative universe seduces as being an area of communication and democratic de-
mands and feelings, not everything is idyllic. in many cases, the teams leaders are 
elected by the grassroots, but afterwards their roles are decisive and poorly con-
trolled, leaving a passive role for the members. often, directives are given special 
attention by institutions that express their consent or dissent, and in concrete cases 
show dissatisfaction with candidates who, once elected, perform discourses and 
actions that are more autonomous than that which is “officially acceptable” (even 
when they are systemic), usually based on uniform and monolithic traditions.
This affects the nature of the relationship, the ideological foundation of its 
discourse, the intellectual formation of its leaders, the role played within the bu-
reaucracy; for instance, the approaches of the ministry of culture and ministry of 
science, Technology and environment are not identical. each association has to 
defend their unrestricted margins of autonomy, the ability to negotiate tactically, 
the ability to build bridges and win allies within the spectrum of associations, and 
with their foreign counterparts and, obviously, with the cuban state, their power 
to mobilize public opinion around decisive conflicts, etc. It should be noted that 
the participation and commitment of members is a precondition for the vitality 
and respect which associations enjoy, but the opposite is also true.
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in the context of different, coexisting cultures, in which none are intrinsi-
cally “bad” or “good”, but they simply have different concerns (historical, class, 
cultural), more traditional, passive approaches (self-informing, awareness raising 
and mobilizing) can be found, which are preferred by many of our institutions 
whose reason for being is historical and, despite the need to be overtaken, still 
retain great force. We have another type of participation, “active”, with several 
occasions where the community meets, brainstorms problems, defines an agenda 
of priorities, makes a plan, delegates the power to execute it, and later controls 
it. it is a complex process that does not reject the knowledge of experts -- it is no 
utopia where everybody decides all of the time, as some would try to portray it in 
order to discredit it -- but is an experience where everybody can participate, just 
not on every issue all of the time. 
occasionally, members are unaware of the participatory possibilities (poten-
tial or actual), and their attitude is one of passively expecting material, cultural, 
identity, socialization or other types of benefits, and they allow certain types of 
behaviour by their leaders. The actions and traits of these leaders depend on their 
individual backgrounds, levels of literacy and education, as well as, obviously, 
personal traits. it is necessary to deconstruct dangerous myths, such as the one 
that implies there are specific profiles (ethnocentric, sexual orientation, occu-
pational, etc.) that allow, for example, a young, environmentalist, black, poor, 
lesbian leader to run for leadership as an inherently emancipating subject, given 
the enormous number of contextual and personal settings that can bring a range 
of undesirable surprises.
Within the associations participation is satisfactory, connected to the central 
issues on the agenda -- and a wide range of personal expectations, including profes-
sional, livelihood, affective and communicative dimensions, etc. The members con-
tinue to participate in their dynamic associations despite external difficulties (mate-
rial shortages, legal constraints, institutional interference), which demonstrates their 
commitment to the group. This continues despite the strenuous and lack of effective 
results of a certain “multiple militancy” characteristic of cuban society 5
at present, within the associative spaces, there are various ways to assume 
and deploy participation, which are translated into participatory projects. some 
identify participation as mere mobilization, define its subjects as mass and reduce 
its role to that of implementing policies designed by the state. others project an 
image of  professional, urban and efficient NGO activists, who provide services 
to client-populations and dominate the sophisticated language of project manage-
ment and the latest agendas of international cooperation (gender and violence, 
local development, the environment and participation and citizenship). 
finally, there is a third group who sees participation as a from of solidarity, 
autonomous and self-managing, (D Angelo, 2005) which defines the actors as 
5	 	See	“Poder	más	allá	del	poder:	reflexiones	desde	la	experiencia	cubana”,	Elena	
Martínez	Canals	in	(Chaguaceda	005).	
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active citizens and expands the vision of a responsible associative space which 
shares and co-manages activities with the state institutionalism, from the per-
spective of a critical commitment to the socialist project. These positions have 
complex generational, territorial and cultural correlations that place them in dif-
ferent points on our spacial and human planes. its defenders are found in texts, 
debates and processes laid out by different scenarios of the nation. (see table)
For	 those	who	 are	 interested	 in	 the	 study	 and	development	 of	 par-
ticipation	within	associative	spaces,	all	of	this	presents	a	set	of	the-
oretical	 and	 practical	 challenges,	 among	 which	 are	 highlighted:	
The	imperative	to	renew	the	debate	surrounding	the	concept	of	
civil	society,	placing	its	components	in	the	context	of	a	system	
of	social	relations,	especially	in	its	interaction	with	State	and	
party	institutionalism	(Mirza,	006),	by	inserting	the	notion	of	
associative	space.
Studying	the	types	of	CS	and	State	 interrelations	as	simulta-
neous	 processes	 of	 inter-penetration	 and	 separation,	 evalua-
ting	the	relationships	between	the	administrative,	coercive	and	
symbolic	dimensions	of	the	State	(and	its	resources),	and	the	
-
-
Table 1
Participatory Projects / 
Orientation
Traditional -- Socialist 
paradigm or the state, 
anti-neoliberal
Citizens - Democratic 
paradigm, anti-neoliberal 
and anti-capitalist, 
socialist
Business
paradigm - professional, 
assistentialist and 
mercantile 
Involved subjects
Associated ideas and 
values
Mass / Workers
Discipline, Commitment, 
Unity, Solidarity.
Workers / Citizens
Responsibility, Initiative, 
Autonomy, Solidarity, 
Citizenship
Citizens / Clients
Efficiency, Solidarity, 
Philanthropy, Subsidiarity
Action
Role of State and Civil 
Society (ideally)
Mobilization and 
Consultation 
Active state,
passive Civil Society
Co-management and 
Implementation
Proactive state, co-
responsible Civil Society 
Consultation and 
Consumption
Passive state, active Civil 
Society 
Central Objective Implement / 
(evaluate et post)
public policies
Co-design and perfect 
public management
Re-distributive, focused, 
and assistential social 
intervention
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socio-economic	 base,	 the	 organizational-mobilizing	 capacity	
and	 the	 internal	dynamics	–	 ideologies	 --	which	animate	any	
CS	(Armony,	005).
The	incorporation	of	concepts	such	as	socio-state interface (or 
others of similar meaning) in	order	 to	 raise	awareness	of	 the	
participatory	traits	 integrated	into	resources,	 interests,	social	
and	State	actors	involved	in	concrete	public	policies	(Isunza	in	
Olvera,	006).
The	need	to	delimit	/	define	the	content	of	the	diverse	partici-
patory	cultures	(class,	cultural,	technical,	generational,	racial,	
territorial,	environmental,	etc.)	in	each	case.	
The	sine	qua	non	requirement	of	evaluating	the	diverse	com-
ponents	of	the	participatory	projects,	and	jointly	(for	example,	
those	of	the	same	project)	with	their	context.
The	usefulness	of	identifying	visions	and/or	contact	zones	(fal-
se	 or	 real)	 between	 the	 participatory	 projects	 undertaken	by	
the	associations,	addressing	the	warnings	expressed	by	resear-
chers	on	what	has	been	called	"Perverse	Confluence",	between	
participatory	 democratic	 discourses	 and	 so-called	 "solidarity	
participation."
Integrating,	strategically,	the	orientation	of	genuinely	emanci-
pating	participatory	traits	 (and	their	content)	with	the	natio-
nal	project,	and	its	Cuban	anti-capitalist	expression	(Armony,	
005;	Martinez	Heredia,	006;	Olvera,	006).	
The	political	value	of	identifying	multiple	connections	from	the	
associative	space	with	transnational	actors	and	trends	(Moller,	
990;	Revilla,	999).
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action and democratization

Inés M. Pousadela*
Participation vs. Representation?
The Experience of the Neighborhood 
Assemblies of Buenos Aires, 00-003
Introduction
This work is based on a series of in-depth interviews conducted with present and 
former participants of the movement of political protest formed by the “popular” 
or “neighborhood” assemblies founded in buenos aires around the end of 2001 
and the beginning of 2002. Discourses produced in exceptional times tend to be 
profoundly revealing of ordinary, widely shared notions. Thus, the aim of this 
work consists in analyzing the discourse about political representation and de-
liberation that constituted the axis of the aforementioned experience, which took 
place in the midst of a deep crisis of representation. More specifically, it seeks 
to analyze the discourse of assembly members about the assemblies and their 
practices; about representation, delegation, participation, political parties, repre-
sentative democracy and direct democracy in order to apprehend their underlying 
conceptions of representation, its paradoxes, its potential and its limits.
What kind of space for participation and deliberation were the assemblies? What 
stance did they take towards the institutions of political representation? Did they pres-
ent themselves as a complement, a correction, or an alternative to their deficiencies 
*	 Researcher	 at	 the	 Instituto	 de	 Altos	 Estudios	 Sociales	 (IDAES),	 University	 of	
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ences	(CLACSO).
71
Democratic Innovation in the South
72
and failures? What were the reasons for their rapid decline; what remained from them 
in the deep layers of argentine politics? These are some of the questions that we try 
to answer through the analysis of the discourse of present and former participants of 
the assemblies, the appearance and rapid multiplication of which we locate at the in-
tersection of two distinct processes: on the one hand, the slow, generalized and long-
term process of metamorphosis of representation, conducive from “party democracy” 
to “audience democracy”; on the other hand, the crisis of representation, an explosive 
phenomenon, limited in time and space, characterized by the very absence of recog-
nition of the representative bond on the part of the represented.
This analysis is not based on a representative sample of the universe under 
study. The main reason for that is the absence of complete knowledge of that uni-
verse, which is the direct effect of the peculiar nature of the assembly movement. 
We are indeed dealing with a fluid movement of undefined limits, with highly 
fluctuating numbers of participants over time and with a “membership” that can 
only be estimated, at any given moment, within very wide margins of error. The 
available socioeconomic and demographic classifications of its participants are in-
tuitive at best, based on prejudice at worst. secondly, even if it had been possible 
to design a sample fitted to our object, it would have turned out to be too big for 
our modest means, given all the supposedly relevant variables. our aim has thus 
been to compile a reasonable quantity of discourse from present and past mem-
bers of the assemblies in order to analyze it in the context of all the information 
available from both primary and secondary sources. That is why we discarded the 
possibility of a sample and chose instead to look for as much diversity as possible 
among our interviewees; in other words, we opted for variety instead of statistical 
representation. Thirty-seven detailed interviews were held with twenty-one men 
and sixteen women, whose ages ranged from twenty-three to eighty-five (with the 
highest concentration between forty and fifty years old) and who belonged or had 
belonged to a wide variety of assemblies in the city of buenos aires and, sec-
ondarily, in its metropolitan area. our interviewees diverge widely in occupational 
terms: university students, primary school teachers, merchants, artists and artisans, 
liberal professionals, public employees, unemployed and retired people, and even 
one person that defines himself as an “activist” are included. The group is also di-
verse where previous political experience is concerned: it includes people with no 
political experience who confess that they went through a sort of “second birth” as 
they got involved in a political mobilization for the first time in their lives; others 
that claim to always have had “political interests” but whose previous experience 
was limited to attending demonstrations, mostly related to human rights issues; oth-
ers that were once “sympathizers” of some political party or were briefly members 
of one, most often left-leaning; others who used to have an intense participation in 
a (probably left-wing) political party or while at the university; others who label 
themselves “lifetime activists” and have indeed been members of different parties 
and organizations, but did not belong to any of them at the time of their entry into 
the assembly movement; and others that were politically active as of December, 
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2001, mostly in left leaning political parties. in contrast with the great majority of 
available research –case studies involving one or, more frequently, two assemblies 
in a comparative perspective–, we analyze the experience that took place in a set of 
assemblies as wide and diverse as possible, so as to achieve a characterization di-
vorced from the peculiarities of any particular assembly and from the constellation 
of circumstances that originated and shaped each of them. some of the assemblies 
mentioned no longer existed, while others were still active when the interviews 
took place. Twenty-two of our interviewees still participated in them at that time, 
whereas fifteen of them had already quit. Some of the latter had abandoned either 
because their assemblies had lost dynamism and were almost extinct, or because 
they had been let down for any reason (different aims, ruptures, attempts at coopta-
tion and inefficacy, among others); others, finally, had stopped participating at the 
very moment when their assemblies disappeared.
The fact that our interviews were conducted in the year 2005 demands an 
additional explanation. The time gap between the facts and their narration pres-
ents both advantages and disadvantages. We have tried to capitalize on the bene-
fits of a retrospective look at already concluded processes without being affected 
by the disadvantages related to the intervention of memory, such as the “distor-
tions” that result from oblivion and from the “contamination” with information 
obtained later in time, as well as from the retrospective adaptation to knowledge 
not available at the time of the events. Where necessary, we have compared the 
information offered by the interviewees with data from other sources. however, 
at the center of our attention are the ideas held by our interviewees about political 
representation and their interpretations of the processes they went through rather 
than the empirical accuracy of their recollections.
in the next few pages we offer a reconstruction of the context of the crisis 
of representation of October-December, 2001, based on journalistic and official 
sources, academic material and testimonies from our interviewees. in the third sec-
tion we deal with the emergence of the assembly movement, while in the last one 
we proceed to analyze the discourse of our assembly members on three big issues 
that are revealing of the existence of various visions of representation as well as of 
the depth of its crisis. We analyze the different interpretations of the battle cry of the 
protest of December, 2001, Que se vayan todos (“everyone must leave”); their vi-
sions of the relationships between their assemblies and representative institutions; 
and, last but not least, their descriptions and interpretations of the deliberation and 
decision-making processes that took place within the assemblies, as well as of the 
eventual emergence within them of leaderships and instances of delegation.
Representation in crisis. From electoral outburst
to street mobilization.
first it was the electoral outburst. it was no coincidence that dissatisfaction be-
came apparent when the center-left Ucr-frepaso alliance failed. not only had 
the alliance government inaugurated in 1999 turned out to be particularly inept 
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and lacking in imagination: it also was, from the prevailing point of view at the 
time, the only remaining chance after a radical government (1983-1989) trun-
cated by hyperinflation and a Peronist one (1989-1999) whose heritage was one 
of poverty, unemployment and corruption.
by the time of the 2001 legislative elections the failure of the alliance was 
apparent on all fronts: not only where it had made little or no promise at all but 
also on issues that were at the core of its identity and the satisfaction of which 
depended mostly on political will rather than economic resources. among them 
was the corruption issue, which had been placed by the alliance at the center of 
its 1999 presidential campaign. less than a year after their electoral triumph a 
scandal had exploded after the denunciation of alleged bribes received by sena-
tors in exchange for the passing of a bill introduced by the government. The lack 
of presidential willingness to investigate the facts then became apparent. as a 
result, the vice-president (also president of the senate) resigned and thus broke 
the governing coalition at the end of 2000. The governmental attitude revealed 
to the public the existence of a “political class” in the strong sense of the word, 
that is, of “a caste that permanently recycles itself”, that involves “the whole 
political spectrum” (male, 57, retailer, asamblea popular de pompeya, with pre-
vious political experience), and that is at the base of a “system” that functions 
“unrelated to its specific function”. Politicians, especially those in the legislative 
branch, were thus perceived as representatives unable to represent since “they 
do not relate to us, to citizens’ opinions, and they do not comply with their ba-
sic purpose that is the common good. They form a closed circle aimed at the 
maintenance and the increase of their own power” (female, 60, psychologist, 
Vecinos indignados de Vicente lópez, without previous political experience). 
more than from the results of the judicial process, the relevance of the bribe 
scandal resulted from its verisimilitude for public opinion. in that sense, it was a 
moment of open visibility in which the gap became apparent between the idea of 
democracy as “government by the people” and its factual reality as “government 
by politicians”. politicians that, in addition, were considered to be “all the same”: 
equally “corrupt”, “thieves” and “criminals”, according to the most frequent epi-
thets. only the opening of a window of opportunity was needed for the crisis to 
overtly explode.
That is what eventually happened when mid-term elections were held in oc-
tober, 2001, barely twenty-four months after those 1999 elections characterized 
by mild optimism as menem’s decade-long government drew to a close. how 
did the protest start? explanations based on the sheer enumeration of damage 
are spectacular but ineffective. numerous explanations indeed function on the 
assumption that an accumulation of “objective data” is sufficient as a cause for 
political and social mobilization. We nevertheless know –at least since Alexis de 
Tocqueville’s explanation for the eruption of revolution in France– that no “ob-
jective” information is enough without the intermediation of the imaginary and 
the construction of subjectivities. The abrupt fall of the national gross product, 
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the effects of successive adjustment policies that reached their peak in July in 
election year and the astronomic figures of unemployment and poverty reveal 
nothing by themselves. According to official data, in October, 2001 the unem-
ployment rate was 18.3%, whereas underemployment reached 16.4%. sixteen 
million of the thirty-six million inhabitants of the country were below the poverty 
line and more than five million had fallen below the line of extreme poverty. 
now, why was the explosion to happen when unemployment hit, say, 20%? Why 
not earlier; why not later?
The key is to be found in the ways in which citizens process bare empirical 
data such as country-risk figures or unemployment and poverty rates. Through-
out 2001 argentina’s country-risk mark had been constantly increasing. for 
some time the government tried to prevent the figure from surpassing the line 
that separated attraction of investment from capital flight. By the time the figure 
surpassed all limits, it had become a piece of basic information that any citizen 
apparently needed to know in order to leave their home every morning, as if 
it were the weather forecast –while only experts had known about its very ex-
istence only a few months earlier. The crisis was then perceived in the feeling 
that macro-level variables had direct and immediate effects on everybody’s daily 
lives. The overwhelming sensation was that the news brought by the newspaper 
had the potential to overturn each individual’s fate, which turned out to be in for-
eign, uncontrollable hands. as for unemployment and poverty data, what was at 
stake was the very self-image of argentines, torn to pieces by the fact that there 
were hungry people in a country with a potential to feed the world. Television 
broadcasted images of starving children in the northern provinces; argentina 
started receiving donation shipments from the same european countries whose 
emigrants had populated its territory a century earlier; web sites started spread-
ing among prosperous europeans the idea of fostering an argentine child so she 
could eat and attend school. it was then that argentines suddenly realized that 
they were not as “european” as they had believed themselves to be: not only did 
argentina belong indeed in latin america, but it was also undergoing conditions 
that its middle class plainly identified with Africa. It was, in sum, the image that 
Argentines had of themselves and their future –which seemed to be suddenly cut 
off– which had changed. The collective state of mind had shifted from the eupho-
ria of the nineties to plain self-denigration. This feeling was soon to have a vivid 
translation in the image of the hundreds who lined up at the doors of the spanish 
and italian consulates to get a passport that was the promise of a fresh start in the 
land of their ancestors. The fact that many people left the country in precarious 
conditions was another translation of the reigning sensation that nowhere could 
things be worse.
several months before the elections, the rejection that would become appar-
ent in the polls –and later on in an extra-electoral and even an extra-institutional 
way– was in the air both in streets and in the virtual space of the web turned into 
a forum for citizen expression and communication. Dissatisfaction with the po-
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litical offer abounded, as it was criticized for displaying the same old faces, the 
very senators suspected of receiving bribes in exchange for the passing of a law, 
the unknown people who occupied their congressional seats thanks to the widely 
criticized “blanket lists” (listas sábana) that nobody seemed to be really willing 
to get rid of; in sum, the same politicians that had long been participating, without 
partisan distinctions, in transactional activities resulting in the detour of large 
public funds and the distortion of their mission as representatives of the people. 
in that context, appeals by individual “common citizens” or by ad hoc citizen 
associations mushroomed to cast blank votes or to void the vote by using hand-
made fake ballots instead of the official ones –so as to “vote” for funny fictional 
characters or for respectable historical figures– or by placing in the envelope crit-
ical or insulting messages for politicians or any kind of object that could be used 
to express anger and dissatisfaction. still others refused to sanction the reigning 
lack of options by abstaining: the so-called “kilometer 501” group, for instance, 
planned to deceive the authorities by organizing collective excursions on election 
day to transport voters somewhere more than five hundred kilometers away from 
their voting places, therefore legally exempting them from their electoral duty.
The results of the election were attuned with this climate of opinion. Those 
who did not vote or cast some form of “negative” vote (void or blank) added up 
to more than 40% of all qualified voters, more than the added votes received by 
the two major political parties. Though it varied enormously from one district to 
another, abstention reached an unprecedented 24.58 % at a national level. Void 
and blank votes added up to 23.99 % of the votes cast for national representa-
tives (13.23% and 10.76%, respectively). Those electoral behaviors –more ac-
centuated within urban sectors and among those with a higher socioeconomic or 
educational level– were not an expression of apathy or lack of interest but they 
had –especially the former– an active and even “activist” character. The ava-
lanche of void votes was indeed a novel occurrence. blank votes had slowly but 
continuously increased since the restoration of democracy in 1983; a similar path 
had been followed by abstention, despite voting being compulsory. Until 2001, 
however, surveys showed that the main reasons for abstention were the lack of 
interest and time to sort out information rather than sheer rejection of politics due 
to its identification with corruption (Ferreira Rubio, 1998). That was still not a 
situation of crisis of representation, but the normal (though certainly precarious 
and volatile) state of affairs in the context of the new format of representation that 
had been established gradually since 1983 (pousadela 2004, 2005). The transition 
from “party democracy” towards “audience democracy” –which we describe, 
following Bernard Manin (1992, 1998), as a “metamorphosis of representation”– 
implies indeed a series of transformations. among them can be mentioned the 
personalization of political leaderships, the transformation of parties into de-ide-
ologized electoral machines, the decline of the importance of party programs, the 
growing impact of the mass media –and of television in particular– as a scene 
where political events are produced, the consequent prevalence of image over the 
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debate of ideas, the decline of captive electorates and the fluctuation of the politi-
cal preferences of voters, whose loyalties can no longer be taken for granted. it 
was this situation of apathetic normality that was shaken by the citizens’ electoral 
behavior in october, 2001.
While electoral results and survey data in the previous twenty years had at 
all times adjusted to what was reasonable to expect in the context of audience 
democracy, the events that took place on october 14th, 2001 and in the following 
months took on a completely different shape. They constituted indeed a quali-
tatively different phenomenon: an authentic crisis of representation. from then 
on, the focus was redirected towards the relationship of representation and the 
mechanisms that seemed to make representatives “disloyal” from the very mo-
ment they became so; towards the “political class” rejected for its homogeneity, 
that turned political competition into a useless formality, as well as for its power-
ful corporate interests; and towards the search for alternatives to the conflictive 
relationship between representatives and represented.
Two months after the electoral cataclysm the extra-electoral outburst oc-
curred. The process sped up since the beginning of December, when it became 
apparent that the national government would be unable to honor the service for 
the national debt due at the end of the year. The refusal by the imf to unblock a 
new loan to make sure that those payments could be made and that the minimal 
expenses of the State apparatus could be covered provoked a huge capital flight. 
on December 3rd a decree was enacted that drastically limited cash withdrawals 
from banks; in no time, this policy came to be popularly known as the finan-
cial “corralito”, named after the play pens that will not allow babies to escape 
from adult surveillance. a month later the parity between the peso and the dollar 
on which the stability of the economy had been built a decade earlier was al-
ready history, and savings trapped in banks had undergone a brutal devaluation. 
Thousands of million dollars, mostly held by big business, had nevertheless fled 
abroad. at the same time, strikes of civil servants continued to spread across the 
provinces demanding unpaid wages, converging with the demonstrations staged 
by the movements of unemployed workers who had already been out in the streets 
for a long time making themselves visible through piquetes (pickets) and cortes 
de rutas (roadblocks). on December 12th the first cacerolazo (pot-banging) took 
place in the city of buenos aires, starring middle-class citizens in protest for the 
freezing of their bank accounts. The next day, there was a general strike sum-
moned by the three union federations (the two CGT –official and dissident– and 
the cTa). in the same week a national consultation also took place organized by 
the Frente Nacional contra la Pobreza (national front against poverty), an alli-
ance of the cTa and some center-left and left wing parties. its results surpassed 
the organizers’ most optimistic predictions, as three million people expressed 
their support for the proposal of a universal unemployment benefit. On the 14th 
riots and looting took place in two important cities, rosario and mendoza, gradu-
ally spreading to other districts and arriving in the Great buenos aires three days 
Democratic Innovation in the South
78
later. in the latter, the climate of confusion was additionally fed by the provoca-
tive intervention of the peronist party machine. Two days later, on December 19th, 
the riots and clashes with the police in Great Buenos Aires caused the first deaths, 
some of them at the hands of retailers seeking to defend their businesses, many 
others as a result of police repression. in various places there were strikes and 
demonstrations, mostly by public employees, which targeted not just the federal 
government but also provincial and municipal ones, most of them under peronist 
rule. particularly violent street combats took place in several districts. many of 
our interviewees recall the feeling that the situation had “exploded”, which hap-
pened to make them “responsible” for what came after. The prevalent thought 
was –in the words of a former assembly member from Lanús– that “everything 
was over, we needed to do something” (female, 26, with no previous political ex-
perience). on that same night president De la rúa pronounced a televised speech 
in which he denounced the “enemies of order and of the republic”, threatened 
with repression, declared the state of siege and summoned the opposition –much 
too late– for “national unity”.
pot-banging began in buenos aires as the president was still reading his 
speech, which many of our interviewees describe as “pathetic” and “autistic”. 
once the speech was over, demonstrators began to converge spontaneously, hold-
ing their pots and pans, towards plaza de mayo, in an open and explicit challenge 
to the state of siege that had just been established. This particular element is 
underlined by most people interviewed, who concede comparatively less impor-
tance to the freezing of bank accounts and to the existence of a conspiracy to 
overthrow De la rúa as an explanation for the mobilization.
The state of siege is indeed identified by our assembly members as “the 
legal symbol of military dictatorships” and “a memory of past times”. its im-
plantation “had a decisive weight as a trigger for the people’s response” (male, 
50, left wing activist), itself a result of “so many years of activism by human 
rights organizations [that] have left an indelible mark on the brain, or in some 
place of the collective unconscious” (female, 38, foro social de la ciudad de 
buenos aires, with political and partisan experience). in that sense, the challenge 
to the state of siege signals the “closing of a historical phase that began with the 
dictatorship”. it was precisely that challenge which made it possible to re-signify 
and recover the national symbols that had been captured by the military: thus, for 
example, explains an interviewee that “i don’t like to sing the argentine anthem, 
and i believe that night i sang it, because it was a different context” (male, 49, 
journalist, asamblea de palermo Viejo, exiled during the dictatorship).
in any case, most of our interviewees agree that it was precisely when the 
state of siege was announced that the noise of pots and pans began. a few hours 
later, already in plaza de mayo, the demand that would become the hallmark 
of the political protest, still incomplete, was initially heard: que se vayan (“go 
away”). at one in the morning on December 20th the resignation of the minister 
of economy demanded by demonstrators turned into fact. six hours later it was 
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the president himself who left the Casa Rosada aboard a helicopter after signing 
his own resignation. For the first time in history, a government born out of free 
elections had been overthrown not by a military coup but by popular rejection 
expressed in the streets. it was, according to an assembly member who describes 
the day as “feverish”, “an unprecedented situation, [because] it seemed that the 
people were overthrowing a president” (male, 32, photographer, asamblea Gas-
tón riva, with little prior political experience).
The bulk of the literature devoted to the analysis of the events describes 
them in epic terms, as a situation of rupture after which nothing would remain 
the same. Under the same light they are viewed by many of the protagonists. 
although not all of our interviewees went out on the night of the 19th, those who 
did unanimously describe their nightly outing as a “wonderful” and “extraordi-
nary” moment and the events of those days as the “culmination of a great social 
process”, a “moment of rupture” or “a hinge in argentine history”. however, 
whereas some try to capture their sense by means of the classic vocabulary of 
class struggle or by analogy with other, better-known historical processes, many 
more emphasize the absolute novelty of the phenomenon.
among the many novelties, the participation of people with no prior politi-
cal experience is systematically mentioned by our interviewees, who describe the 
population as previously “asleep” as a result either of the repression that took place 
in the seventies, or of the benefits yielded by economic stability in the nineties. “It 
reminded me of the film Awakenings”, points out a former member of an assembly 
in flores. “[There was] an absolute paralysis, inertia (…) and suddenly people went 
out to the streets… i don’t think they will do that again, not even if their football 
team wins the cup” (female, 38, with political and partisan experience). among 
those who “went out” for the first time was a member-to-be of the Asamblea de 
castro barros y rivadavia that views himself as part of “the social class favored 
by menemismo” (thus, although he “saw that things were not too well”, he did not 
react before “because it didn’t affect me”). “What happened on December, 19th and 
20th”, he says, “was that i lost my innocence” (male, 36, business administrator).
also original was the fact that the openly questioned logic of representation 
was temporarily supplanted by the “logic of expression” (colectivo situaciones 
2002:15). mobilization on December 19th is indeed described as an “outbreak” or 
an “explosion”, and the state of siege is recognized as the window of opportunity 
that allowed for the free channeling of tiredness, anguish, fear or fury, among the 
many feelings repeatedly mentioned. it was all about “going out and protesting 
and making a catharsis. something that seemed very tragic suddenly turned into 
a carnival” (female, 29, sociologist, asamblea de palermo Viejo, self-described 
as “independent”). another member of the same assembly adds that “there were 
thousands and thousands of people in the streets, defying the state of siege, not 
knowing very well why they were there (…) There was a sensation of ‘wanting 
more’, although nobody knew very well of what” (male, 49, journalist, with po-
litical experience in the ‘70s and ’80s).
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along with the mainly expressive character of the demonstration, its spon-
taneous, self-summoned and unexpected nature is also systematically underlined. 
“it was a chain almost without an origin”, writes horacio González, a well-known 
sociologist. “nobody could say ‘i initiated this’, and in the Bar Británico, a few 
days later, people discussed: ‘i saw you and i began’.” (colectivo situaciones 
2002:48). A member of an assembly in Flores reflects in the same way: “I said: 
‘Who was the first to bang?’ As in a football stadium, who starts singing the 
song? There is someone who is the first one. Perhaps one day a saucepan’s lid fell 
and thus it began”. so spontaneous were the cacerolazos that in those days “no-
body knew when the next one would come”, stresses another assembly member 
(male, 49, asamblea de palermo Viejo, with prior political experience).
The act of challenge that was the nocturnal excursion of December 19th was 
also the celebration of a surprise: its protagonists were gained by the feeling that 
they were living through an historical event; the feeling of being dragged by an 
unexpected collective process that, at the same time, turned them into actors. “i 
was surprised, overwhelmed, moved as i passed by the neighborhoods and saw 
people coming out to their balconies; it was a moment of communion”, explains 
a member of the asamblea Gastón riva who says that at that precise moment 
he had the “feeling that i was living a historical moment, that i was making a 
historical moment” (male, 32, with little previous political experience). a former 
member of the asamblea de pedro Goyena y puán frames it the following way:
It	is	very	strange	to	be	conscious	on	the	very	moment	that	you	are	li-
ving	something	historical.	(…)	We	felt	that	finally	something	was	going	
on	(…)	That	effervescence,	that	idea	that	life	had	a	meaning	(…)	There	
was	also	uncertainty.	We	tried	to	be	alert	and	not	miss	anything	(Male,	
4,	with	no	previous	political	experience)
The same individuals who, in their role as an audience, had spent long hours 
following the evolution of the events on television; the same ones that had gath-
ered in front of their screens to watch the last public appearance of the president 
declaring the state of siege and that soon –still as spectators– had moved towards 
windows and balconies so as to listen and watch what was going on outside; those 
individuals became actors at the very moment when, not knowing exactly why 
–or maybe knowing that but not knowing if their own motivations were in agree-
ment with those of the others– they rushed to their kitchens to get a pot, a frying 
pan or bucket to hit, still from their windows. Those individuals became part of 
the multitude when they saw their neighbors –people that, according to many 
interviewees, they had never talked to before– with their pans at their respective 
doors and joined them, first from their own doors, soon on the street corner, later 
at some emblematic intersection or in the neighborhood park, and somewhat later, 
perhaps, on the way to plaza de mayo, or to the president’s residence in olivos, 
or to the home address of the resigned minister of economics. “people went like 
81
Inés M. Pousadela
this, almost individually… not in a collective movement”, remembers a former 
assembly member of palermo Viejo (male, 65, with no previous political experi-
ence). alone, TV sets remained on with nobody to watch them for hours, even 
for the whole night. The clothes worn by demonstrators, the company of young 
children and babies in strollers who now moved in groups along the streets was 
another sign of the unplanned character of the departure. There were no political 
parties, and only the national flag was to be seen. Another member of the same 
assembly recalls that “there were more people than placards, and placards were 
behind people and not the other way round” (male, 48, unemployed and student, 
with brief previous political experience). “people did not shout political slogans, 
it was not the usual stuff”, ratifies another assembly member, also from Palermo 
(male, 49, with long previous political experience).
The people who participated that day –acknowledges a former member of 
the same assembly– were “disorganized people, neighbors who barely recog-
nized each other” (female, 44). interviewees who identify themselves as “com-
mon citizens” accept more naturally the spontaneous character of the events; by 
contrast, those with a greater activist experience tend to express doubts about 
it. They certainly recognize they were surprised by the first cacerolazo; some 
even say they went to bed after listening to the presidential speech or that at the 
moment they were at some holiday toast or somewhere in the company of other 
activists, none of whom knew how to react. “some of us were not sure whether 
we had to go downstairs and outside. The activists were more like puzzled”, re-
members one of them. “We activists arrived after the people… that is, after the 
first people who came out with no previous organization”. But they state that later 
on the same night, activism began to “operate” providing some form of organiza-
tion. others, however, refuse to believe that such a demonstration could even be 
possible without some kind of political direction. says one of our party activists: 
“i have some doubts, as a result of the way i see politics, that mobilizations on the 
19th were just the effect of spontaneity. I find it difficult to convince myself that 
there was nobody with the political vision to summon the mobilization” (male, 
50). Those doubts become apparent in the hesitations of language; a member of 
an assembly of san cristóbal, for example, talks about the arrival of the “col-
umns” of demonstrators at the plaza to rapidly correct herself: “no, it was not 
organized in columns, we just came like this, and people converged”.
During the days of the protest a temporary suspension of previous social 
identities took place (Giarraca, 2003). our interviewees refer to it by means of 
the description of the events as a “celebration” or a “carnival”, a vortex in which 
“you were not aware of time or of where you were” (male, 29, student, asam-
blea de palermo Viejo, with no previous political experience). Thus, under one 
and the same motto a chain of equivalence among extremely diverse demands 
and reclamations was knit. central among them were the repudiation against a 
model of economic growth based on exclusion and the rejection of an inefficient, 
ineffective and corrupt political system. The slogan “que se vayan todos” (“ev-
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erybody must go away”) that was for the first time uttered in those days included 
whichever unanswered complaint was in need of the identification of a culprit.
in contrast to the happy climate of the 19th, on the 20th plaza de mayo turned 
into a battlefield and a stronghold that some people wanted to occupy and others 
wanted to clear. “The spontaneity and the family-thing of the 19th”, says a mem-
ber of the asamblea 20 de Diciembre de flores “changed on the 20th when there 
was already an action by groups minimally politicized, but politicized still. There 
were people on their own, guys in suits throwing floor tiles, inflamed. But the 
presence was very strong of politicized groups, with no party banners” (male, 33, 
party activist). “You could see four or five [acquaintances], the Mothers [of Plaza 
de mayo], their head scarves… but the activism you know, that of my generation 
was not there”, tells an assembly member of parque patricios. “The one that con-
fronted the cops was clearly another activism (…) The left was there, but it was 
outside the mayhem. (…) The left did not confront [the police]. and i saw how 
other people did: the motoqueros, the nonpartisan piquetero organizations (…) 
it was basically a rebellion of the underclass youth. (…) it was a popular rebel-
lion, but a rebellion without a leadership” (male, 54, with activist experience in 
the ‘70s). an “unruly” violence occupied the center-stage. it was an intense vio-
lence whose precedents could not be found in the guerrilla actions of the 70’s but 
“in soccer stadiums and in the rock concerts that took place in neighborhoods” 
(Colectivo Situaciones 2002:63), and also –as is mentioned by several interview-
ees– in the piquetero struggles and in puebladas (popular uprisings) such as those 
of santiago del estero (1993), cutral-có, plaza huincul (1996) and corrientes 
(1999), where the repertoire of collective action that was now re-shaped in plaza 
de Mayo was originally compiled. The final count of the two-day experience in 
December, 2001 included 35 people dead, 439 wounded and 3273 under arrest.
Despite the efforts made by various left wing political parties to lead them, 
those events did not have an author –that is, they were not summoned, started, 
guided, directed or controlled by anyone. “The main party leaders [of the left] 
were like me, drinking mate at home as they heard the noises”, states an in-
terviewee. however, as a result of the activation of the cleavage separating the 
“commoners” and the “political class” and as an effect of the subsequent division 
of the political space into two antagonistic fields, the events did indeed produce 
a subject. One of an unprecedented amplitude and an undefined character, as 
roughly a third of buenos aires’ inhabitants participated in the cacerolazos and/
or in the assemblies that followed.
after the president’s resignation, after the successive resignations of those 
who followed in the chain of succession and after two days of intense negotia-
tions, the legislative assembly (that is, both chambers of congress deliberating 
together in a special session) eventually appointed the peronist governor of san 
luis, adolfo rodríguez saá, as a substitute president with the mandate to rule 
until new elections were held on march, 3rd, 2002. a euphoric rodríguez saá 
was inaugurated on December 23rd and announced to the legislative assembly 
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the suspension of payments for the external debt and the country’s subsequent 
fall into default (thus receiving the shameful applause of his congressional audi-
ence), the promise to create a million new jobs in a month, the maintenance of the 
peso-dollar parity along with the creation of a “national third currency” (there-
fore, a concealed devaluation), the end of the “corralito” that kept savings out 
of the reach of their proprietors, and the immediate initiation of the “productive 
revolution” that had been announced –but not undertaken– by President Menem 
in 1989. Once in his seat, the new president expressed his willingness –contrary 
to his mandate– to remain there until the end of the unfinished De la Rúa’s term, 
that is, December 10th, 2003. popular demonstrations resumed when it was an-
nounced, in open contradiction with the promises made the previous day, that 
the corralito was to be maintained, and when highly criticized former members 
of menem’s government were appointed to important posts. in that context, the 
peronist governors soon undermined the new president, who finally resigned on 
new Year’s eve. in the course of the protest against rodríguez saá the battle 
cry “Que se vayan” was transformed into the well-known, definite one “Que se 
vayan todos” (“everybody must go”). in addition, a precision was added: “Que 
no quede ni uno solo” (“not a single one should stay”). indeed, neither union 
leaders nor judges were spared their share of public disbelief and rejection. What 
this cacerolazo made clear was how weak governments –and public figures in 
general– were once placed under the vigilant reflectors of an unusually alert citi-
zenship that had already successfully de facto revoked their rulers’ mandate and 
was ready to do it again if necessary.
on January 2nd, 2002 the legislative assembly appointed a new president: 
eduardo Duhalde, former governor of the province of buenos aires, powerful 
leader of the peronist party machine in the district and, paradoxically, the same 
presidential candidate defeated in 1999 by fernando De la rúa, whose term he 
was now called to complete. At the time –recalls one of our interviewees– “a 
cacerolazo took place that was not so talked about in the media. it was a holiday, 
so it did not have as much of a repercussion, but i was near the congress when the 
vote was going on and the noise of pots and pans was audible. it was a joke, to ap-
point him who came from the PJ (Partido Justicialista), from that mafia, he who 
had been with menem and who had lost the election against De la rúa” (male, 
29, sociologist, asamblea de palermo Viejo, with no prior political experience).
in the process that led from De la rúa’s resignation to the relative stabi-
lization of a substitute government around April, 2002 five presidents and six 
ministers of economy followed one another. During those months all kinds of 
conflicts took place: strikes and conflicts stemming from poverty, unemployment 
	 	 Indeed,	 the	Legislative	Assembly	 entrusted	Duhalde	with	 the	presidency	until	
the	end	of	00.	Nevertheless,	 in	June,	00,	after	a	police	repression	that	caused	
the	deaths	of	two	young	piqueteros	in	Avellaneda,	Duhalde	felt	compelled	to	trim	his	
mandate	and	called	for	an	early	election	in	April,	00.
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and hunger –pickets, roadblocks, food demands and lootings– converged with 
the protest of the impoverished and attacked middle-class who verified its veto 
power through the cacerolazos and, secondarily, through verbal and sometimes 
physical attacks against politicians –identified as the most prominent people re-
sponsible for the situation. Days were “so intense”; “presidents were replaced 
all the time”, remembers an interviewee. “With each change you went out to the 
plaza; it was necessary to go there and exert pressure because the demand was for 
a constituent assembly” (male, 43, artist and university professor, ex-asamblea 
de pedro Goyena y puán, with no previous political experience).
The assembly movement as a response
to and a catalyst of the crisis
The most novel and longest-lasting product of the events of December 19th and 
20th, 2001 were the “popular” or “neighborhood” assemblies. assemblies were 
the organizational by-product of the spontaneity of the insurrectional days and 
at their origin was the experience of power. several assembly members indeed 
locate the origins of their own participation in that new feeling that “something 
could be done”:
It	was	not	the	seizure	of	power,	nor	the	foundation	of	a	party…	I	knew	
that	 I	did	not	have	a	clear	goal	 to	 reach;	all	 I	knew	was	 that	 it	was	
possible	to	participate	in	some	way	and	generate	a	power	that	could	
change	things.	At	that	moment	you	felt	you	had	a	lot	of	power,	because	
we	had	knocked	two	presidents	down,	we	had	another	one	in	check,	
and	also	 the	Supreme	Court	 (Male,	 9,	Asamblea	de	Palermo	Viejo,	
with	no	previous	political	experience)
power is here understood in arendtian terms, as something that comes to ex-
ist when people meet through speech and action, that is to say, when people act out 
	 	Different	assemblies	adopted	different	denominations,	in	many	cases	after	heat-
ed	arguments	about	the	profile	that	was	to	be	given	to	them.	As	Rossi	(005)	explains,	
the	label	of	“neighbor	assemblies”	emphasizes	the	shift	towards	territorial	organiza-
tion	by	those	that	although	no	longer	have	a	steady	job	able	to	produce	solidarity	and	
a	feeling	of	belonging,	still	have	a	place	of	residence	capable	of	creating	new	forms	
of	solidarity.	The	term	“popular	assemblies”,	on	the	other	hand,	underlines	the	re-
articulation	of	“the	people”	as	a	subject.	According	to	Rossi,	the	self	definition	of	an	
assembly	as	“popular”	is	linked	to	an	interpretation	of	December,	00	as	a	context	
of	crisis	of	the	capitalist	system	or	the	neoliberal	model	and	of	representative	democ-
racy	and	“partidocracia”,	and	to	an	understanding	of	the	slogan	“Que se vayan todos”	
as	the	call	for	the	creation	of	an	alternative	to	those	structures	in	crisis.	By	contrast,	
the	 self-named	 “neighborhood	assemblies”	 tend	 to	conceive	 the	crisis	as	 resulting	
from	the	persistent	and	excessive	delegation	of	authority	in	a	political	system	lacking	
effective	mechanisms	for	accountability	and	citizen	participation	and	control.	Con-
sequently,	they	interpret	the	“Que se vayan todos”	in	terms	of	the	re-legitimization	of	
political	representation	and	the	straightening	of	its	mechanisms.
85
Inés M. Pousadela
of common agreement. The assemblies –states a former member of one in Mont-
serrat– appeared simply because “people met their neighbors, people joined others 
and said ‘we must do something’, because they had the feeling that on that day 
they had gone out and done something” (female, 55). in fact, many assemblies 
were born in the same places and at the very moment when the self-summoned 
neighbors were taking part in the cacerolazos. a neighbor of olivos explains:
Where	do	you	have	 to	go	 in	order	 to	 shout	at	 the	president?	To	 the	
presidential	residence	[in	Olivos]	(…)	There	people	started	saying	‘this	
is	the	assembly	of	Olivos,	the	assembly	of	Olivos’,	and	the	same	neigh-
bors	continued	to	meet	once	and	again	and	that’s	it…
Another	interviewee	recounts	that	the	Asamblea	0	de	Diciembre	
de	Parque	Avellaneda	“started,	the	same	as	the	others,	being	a	sponta-
neous	group	of	neighbors	who	met	to	go	to	the	cacerolazos	in	Plaza	de	
Mayo	together.	(…)	After	two	weeks	of	going	to	the	cacerolazos (…)	the	
idea	started	to	emerge,	on	the	way	back,	that	we	should	meet	prior	to	
the	demonstrations,	maybe	an	hour	before,	so	as	to	plan.	Thus,	we	first	
started	being	an	assembly	so	as	to	discuss	how	we	would	go	to	the	cace-
lorazos;	and	then	other	conversations	started	to	arise”	(Male,	4,	with	
union	experience).	The	perception	that	power	resides	in	being	together	
explicitly	emerges	in	the	discourse	of	an	assembly	member	who	explains	
that	what	was	valuable	in	the	first	encounter	was	just	“the	commitment	
to	meet	again”	(Male,	45,	employee,	Asamblea	de	Palermo	Viejo).
In	spite	of	emphasizing	the	“spontaneous”	character	of	the	mush-
rooming	of	 the	assemblies,	many	of	our	 interviewees	accept	 the	 fact	
that	they	were	indeed	summoned	by	somebody.	What	they	underscore,	
instead,	is	that	the	summoning	was	done	by	“common	neighbors”	like	
themselves,	often	with	little	or	no	prior	political	experience,	who	simply	
took	the	initiative	to	write	a	poster	or	to	print	and	distribute	a	flyer	so	
as	to	originate	something	that	would	soon	grow	through	the	voluntary	
decision	of	each	adherent,	by	its	own	impulse	and	without	any	direc-
tions	or	leaderships.	According	to	many,	spontaneity	conferred	a	“genu-
ine”	character	to	a	movement	that	is	repeatedly	characterized	as	“arisen	
from	below”	and	at	the	back	of	political	parties	and	leftist	activists	and	
organizations,	who	happened	to	be	distracted,	looking	in	a	different	di-
rection.	“Although	I	had	political	experience”	–states	a	journalist–	“I	did	
not	summon	my	assembly;	four	people	with	no	experience	did.	(…)	All	
my	political	experience	notwithstanding,	I	could	not	see	the	phenom-
enon	coming,	while	they,	without	any	political	experience,	could	and	
did	take	the	initiative”	(Male,	49,	Asamblea	de	Palermo	Viejo).
Also	mentioned	once	and	again	is	the	fact	that	“people”	were	then	
available	to	respond	to	this	kind	of	call:	what	was	extraordinary	was	
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not	the	fact	that	somebody	summoned,	but	the	fact	that	so	many	peo-
ple	responded.	More	important	than	the	call	itself	was	indeed	the	fact	
that	the	process	was	not	controlled	or	directed	by	anybody.	As	is	ex-
plained	by	two	assembly	members:
Assemblies	were	 relatively	 spontaneous.	 It	 is	 just	 as	with	 the	 chant	
in	the	football	stadium:	it	is	organized	during	the	week.	The	thing	is	
whether	you	are	allowed	to	sing	it,	whether	everybody	wants	to	learn	it	
and	whether	they	sing	it	when	you	tell	them…	It	is	the	same	here.	The	
assemblies	were	summoned.	(…)	[But]	just	try	to	summon	an	assem-
bly	with	a	couple	of	flyers	and	gather	three	hundred	people	out	there	
in	 the	street…	(Male,	47,	Asamblea	0	de	Diciembre	de	Flores,	with	
political	experience)
You	found	little	signs,	‘we	neighbors	will	meet’.	Evidently	those	signs	
had	to	come	from	somewhere.	(…)	[There	were]	organizers.	However,	
this	is	just	anecdotal.	(…)	What	made	the	difference	was	the	presence	
of	neighbors	who	wanted	 to	participate,	who	felt	deceived,	unrepre-
sented	(Female,	50,	Asamblea	de	Álvarez	Jonte	y	Artigas)
Other	interviewees	maintain	that	their	assemblies	were	summoned	
by	preexisting	organizations:	those	are	the	cases	of	the	Asamblea	Popu-
lar	de	Liniers	–whose	foundations,	says	one	of	its	members,	were	set	a	
week	before	December	9th,	when	the	retailers	of	the	district	staged	a	
protest	in	Plaza	de	Mayo–;	the	assemblies	of	both	Palermo	Viejo	and	
Congreso	–which	recognize	their	origins	in	the	actions	of	a	group	of	peo-
ple	who	had	been	mobilized	for	more	than	a	year	outside	the	Congress	
in	demand	for	an	impeachment	process	against	the	Supreme	Court–;	
and	the	Asamblea	Gastón	Riva	in	Caballito,	summoned	from	a	Centro 
Cultural (Cultural	Center).	A	few	interviewees	state	that	their	respective	
assemblies	were	“proposed”	by	some	political	party,	such	as	the	Partido	
Obrero,	or	by	individual	activists	belonging	to	some	organization.	More	
numerous,	however,	are	those	who	emphasize	that	the	initiative	–both	
in	the	case	of	“common	neighbors”	and	of	activists–	took	place	as	the	
result	of	the	“demonstration	effect”	caused	by	other	assemblies	already	
in	place.	That	is,	they	contend	that	the	first	assemblies	were	doubtless	
“spontaneous”	in	the	referred	sense	of	the	term	and	that	“others	were	
later	formed	by	parties,	on	the	wave	of	the	already	existing	ones.	[But]	
there	was	already	an	objective	process	going	on”	(Male,	4,	Asamblea	
0	de	Diciembre	de	Flores,	with	prior	political	experience).	Accounts	
such	as	the	following	are	thus	common	enough:
[One	day]	I	found	an	assembly	on	the	corner	of	Castro	Barros	and	Ri-
vadavia.	The	road	was	blocked	and	there	were	twenty	or	thirty	people	
shouting	with	a	megaphone,	and	I	stayed	(…)	I	mentioned	it	to	friends	
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and	to	the	compañeros	(fellow	activists)	in	the	neighborhood	and	two	
or	 three	days	 later	we	saw	the	same	thing	going	on	 in	Cid	Campea-
dor.	 It	was	 then	 that	we	 decided	 to	 organize	 one	 in	 Flores.	We	 put	
up	a	couple	of	posters	summoning	people	to	Plaza	Aramburu	(…)	We	
thought	that	maybe	somebody	would	show	up,	and	we	found	out	that	
we	were	 two	hundred.	 (…)	We	who	had	summoned	 introduced	our-
selves	as	neighbors	and	acted	as	chairpersons.	(…)	We	used	the	same	
methodology	that	we	had	seen	in	other	places	(Male,	,	Asamblea	0	
de	Diciembre	de	Flores,	party	activist)
Once	the	assemblies	had	been	born,	the	cacerolazos	could	be	rep-
licated	thanks	to	the	organizational	resources	they	had	put	into	mo-
tion,	but	for	that	same	reason	they	started	to	lose	spontaneity,	since	
it	 was	 increasingly	 the	 assemblies	 themselves	 who	 summoned	 and	
tried	to	coordinate	them.	As	the	cacerolazos	that	had	preceded	them,	
therefore,	the	assemblies	were	soon	charged	with	two	opposite	accu-
sations:	on	one	hand,	the	motive	that	was	supposed	to	be	at	the	roots	
of	their	actions	–that	is,	the	rejection	of	the	corralito–	was	denounced	
as	despicable	or	spurious;	on	the	other	hand,	they	were	denounced	as	
left	wing	hideouts	with	shameful	political	motivations.
The	unacceptable	character	of	“material”	and	“bourgeois”	moti-
vations	as	springs	for	political	action	is	internalized	by	most	of	the	in-
terviewees,	who	thus	typically	insist	in	denying	the	first	accusation.	As	
for	the	second	one,	it	has	to	be	said	that	although	the	assemblies	were	
often	propelled,	maintained,	colonized	or	manipulated	by	political	or-
ganizations,	 the	attempts	at	cooptation	and	manipulation	tended	to	
be	fiercely	 resisted	by	 those	who	–self-defined	either	 as	 “non-politi-
cal”,	“nonpartisan”,	“indifferent	to	ideologies”	or	believers	in	politics	
understood	as	a	creative	activity	as	opposed	to	its	degradation	in	the	
hands	of	professional	politicians	and	activists–	were	sincerely	looking	
for	a	genuine	form	of	self-organization	and	deliberation.	The	persist-
ent	presence	within	the	assemblies	of	activists	from	left	wing	political	
parties	 and	 their	 tendency	 to	manipulate	 debates	 and	 to	 introduce	
and	advance	their	own	agendas	is	also	denounced	by	several	assembly	
members	as	one	of	the	main	reasons	for	the	drain	of	“neighbors”	and	
the	assemblies’	subsequent	decline.	A	young	member	of	the	Asamblea	
de	Palermo	Viejo	illustrates	it	the	following	way:
The	 neighbors	 were	 all	 here,	 we	 were	 about	 a	 hundred	 and	 twenty,	
[everything	was]	very	nice	until	we	started	to	notice	who	was	speaking	
with	the	microphone,	who	shouted	or	who	did	not	let	others	speak	or	
tried	to	impose	his	own	views.	Coincidentally,	they	all	belonged	to	cer-
tain	parties.	We	started	to	talk	about	it	and	a	whole	reaction	was	set	up	
to	prevent	cooptation	from	taking	place.	But	that	was	a	strategy	that	was	
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commonly	used	by	leftist	parties.	Because	the	assemblies	were	a	creati-
ve,	spontaneous	social	attempt:	no	visionary	from	the	avant-garde	came	
here	to	say	‘this	has	to	be	done’.	But	once	they	existed	they	wanted	to	sei-
ze	them.	(…)	Some	[participants]	admitted	that	they	belonged	to	parties	
and	others	did	not,	but	we	uncovered	them.	[It	was]	a	complicated	thing	
to	do	(Female,	9,	sociologist,	with	little	prior	political	experience)
“some of us were acquainted with those practices because we had also em-
braced them in the past”, states a member of the asamblea de palermo Viejo 
(male, 49, with prior political and partisan experience, currently an anti-global-
ization activist). “We who had some experience with that” –recalls an assembly 
member from Flores– “were all day identifying them. They all came to the as-
semblies, and a feeling grew that still persists among the population: a rejection 
against the party model and structures. You could not mention that you belonged 
to a party” (male, 47, with prior political and partisan experience). explains an-
other politically experienced assembly member of palermo Viejo:
In	the	second	or	third	meeting,	a	youth	came	who	evidently	had	politi-
cal	experience	and	said	‘we	must	organize	committees	and	begin	to	give	
ourselves	some	structure’.	The	majority	did	not	want	anything	structu-
red.	(…)	The	mistake	made	by	most	leftist	parties	[was]	not	to	unders-
tand	that	they	were	facing	a	novel	phenomenon	and	that	they	were	not	
the	avant-garde	but	marched	at	the	rearguard	instead.	(…)	They	bear	a	
strong	responsibility	for	the	decline	of	the	assemblies,	because	they	in-
troduced	debates	that	people	were	not	interested	in,	debates	related	to	
their	own	political	characterization	of	the	situation.	Each	leftist	party	
tried	to	push	the	assembly	towards	their	side,	because	there	was	a	com-
petition	among	left-wing	parties	to	see	who	had	more	assemblies.	They	
thought	that	[the	assemblies]	were	soviets	that	needed	to	be	led.
praised by those who saw them as a superior evolutionary stage after the 
spontaneous cacerolazos and criticized by those who considered them as the 
cause for the loss of the vigor and the innocence of the spontaneous, the assem-
blies were undoubtedly one of the most novel practices grown amidst the heat of 
the representation crisis that had so violently erupted towards the end of 2001. 
The assembly movement contained an unusual revealing power of the nature of 
the crisis from which it had emerged as well as a potential for innovation beyond 
the dominant political practices. The assemblies were sites for the production 
both of discourse about a highly problematic representative bond and of political 
practices directed towards the search either of complements or of alternatives 
to the current practices of political representation. in other words, its prolifera-
tion around the end of 2001 and the beginning of 2002 can be simultaneously 
understood as a symptom of the crisis of representation (and of the economic 
and social crisis as well) and –due to its nature as a producer of discourse and 
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practices related to representation– as a factor leading to the further denunciation 
and deliberate deepening of that crisis.
The assemblies were not as massive as the cacerolazos had been, because 
–unlike the latter– they demanded from their members time, patience, rhetorical 
abilities, organizational skills and/or interest in political debate. participation in 
the cacerolazos was accessible to anyone: the only requisite was to have some 
reason for complaint and to go out with a pan to express it in a space that did not 
have nor could have had any hierarchy, as there would be in the assemblies as soon 
as “natural leaderships” began to emerge. however, less than three months after 
December 19th the number of assemblies had already surpassed a hundred in the 
city of buenos aires, with a similar number in the Great buenos aires. between 
January and february, 2002 forty assemblies had also been founded in the province 
of santa fe, approximately ten in córdoba and seven more in four other provinces. 
still, the assembly movement is described by our interviewees as a “phenomenon 
of the capital city [of buenos aires]”. “We cannot say that it was a national process, 
because it was not so, but at the moment it did have national connotations because 
it was widely amplified and expanded from a political point of view” (Male, 47, 
retailer, asamblea popular de liniers, with large political experience).
Despite its low quantitative incidence –retrospectively admitted by numer-
ous interviewees, who speak of dozens or maybe a hundred members in neighbor-
hoods with tens of thousands inhabitants– the prevailing feeling throughout the 
first weeks of assembly life was that “anything could happen”, that “any change 
was possible”. “it had a multiplying effect, people came, invited neighbors, print-
ed flyers”, explains a former member of the Asamblea de Palermo Viejo (Female, 
44, with no prior political experience). “You walked by the neighborhoods and 
found assemblies here and there”, recounts a former member of the asamblea de 
flores sur. “it was impressive, everybody took part in an assembly, you went on 
the subway and you met the same people that you met at the Interbarrial, and it 
was quite a strange feeling, an effervescence” (female, 38, with prior political 
and partisan experience). at the same time, however, many of those assembly 
members were already aware of the limits of the process as they found difficulties 
in mobilizing the people who were not yet mobilized:
What	we	 saw	 as	 we	walked	 [during	 demonstrations]	 is	 that	 people	
were	on	the	balconies,	they	waved	but	remained	there.	There	was	no	
way	to	get	them	down	to	the	street	(…)	There	was	a	slogan	those	days	
that	went:	‘Turn	the	TV	off	and	come	out’.	One	of	the	memories	I	have	
is	 of	 the	 buildings	 along	Rivadavia	Avenue	with	 the	windows	 open.	
The	country	[was]	in	flames	and	people	[were]	comfortably	watching	
television.	It	is	a	terrible	image;	it	made	us	angry	and	impotent	when	
we	saw	that	people	did	not	react	(Male,	4,	Asamblea	de	Pedro	Goyena	
y	Puán,	with	no	prior	political	experience)
as far as their composition, procedures and mechanisms (more or less hori-
zontal, more or less pluralistic) were concerned, the assemblies were so different 
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from each other and internally heterogeneous as the concert of pans had been. 
Their initiatives were varied and diverse as well, ranging from the publishing of 
newspapers and bulletins or the broadcasting of radio programs to the organiza-
tion of “escraches” (graffiti protests) against politicians or the organization, coor-
dination and participation in diverse forms of protest, and including the opening 
of soup kitchens, the organization of communitarian food purchases, the elabora-
tion and distribution of all kinds of goods through local cooperatives aiming both 
at promoting self-sufficiency and autonomy and at preserving or creating jobs. 
Their mottos and demands were also as wide and diverse as the cacerolazos’ had 
been: general elections now, support for the piquetero movement (through the 
slogan “piquete y cacerola, la lucha es una sola” –“pickets and pans, the struggle 
is the same one”), participatory budgeting, the creation of mechanisms for deci-
sion-making by neighbors at the local level, the nationalization of the banking 
system, the re-nationalization of previously privatized utilities companies, the 
decision not to pay the external debt, the removal of supreme court Justices, the 
revocation of all mandates and the summoning of a national constituent assem-
bly, the end of the “corralito”, various reclamations to local and provincial gov-
ernments (ranging from the cession of physical space for meetings and activities 
to the yielding of food or medicine for distribution). among them it was possible 
to identify concrete and immediate demands related to the social crisis; classic 
vindications of small leftist parties, such as the rejection of the obligations de-
rived from the external debt; demands stemming from the negative re-interpreta-
tion of the structural reforms undertaken throughout the nineties; and, last but not 
least, many others that were the direct expression of the crisis of representation.
Political representation and the assemblies
according to their members
The discourse produced by the assemblies on the issue of political representation 
also varied widely. it included reformist stances in demand of a renovation that 
could “clean” the representative system of its evils and allow it to function cor-
rectly, as well as radically contesting positions based on the idea that representa-
tive devices were inherently evil as they had been designed precisely with the aim 
of moving the people away from a power that was rightly theirs but that makes 
domination unstable when exercised.
in the next pages we try to elucidate what political representation meant for 
assembly members; how doomed they thought it was; what their demands were in 
relation to its unfulfilled promises; and what alternatives they perceived. Did they 
demand a “more representative” democracy? or, on the contrary, did they want 
to turn democracy into a “more direct” one? in other words: how did assembly-
	 	In	the	city	of	Buenos	Aires,	however,	the	assemblies’	socioeconomic	profile	was	
defined	enough:	they	existed	in	greater	quantities	in	middle-	and	upper	middle-class	
districts	such	as	Belgrano,	Almagro,	Palermo	and	Flores.
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members reflect about their own assemblies? How did they understand the rela-
tionships they maintained with political parties and government institutions? Did 
they think of the assemblies as an alternative or as a supplement to other forms of 
mediation between society and the state? Did they accept the possibility of devel-
oping their activities within the framework of the existing representative institu-
tions? Did they consider them as an additional and more effective form of “citizen 
control”? Did they perceive in them some echo of other well-known participatory 
experiences, such as the brazilian participatory budgeting? Did they allow for any 
space for representation, or did they radically reject all forms of representation? 
Did they propose any specific practices at the neighborhood level that could make 
it possible to completely get rid of the distance between the rulers and the ruled?
Que se vayan todos
The motto “Que se vayan todos” (QSVT) first uttered on the rebellious final days 
of 2001 has ever since been subject to a great variety of journalistic, academic 
and political interpretations. Those interpretations are continuously framed and 
re-framed by assembly members, who thereby relate in quite different ways to 
the system of political representation.
a bulky set of interviewees maintains that the QsVT must be literally in-
terpreted. nevertheless, few of them state that the slogan simply demanded that 
“absolutely all of them” went away so as “to start anew right now” (female, 36, 
ex-asamblea de flores sur, with limited prior political experience). instead, the 
vast majority gives some specification as for the content of the expression “all”, 
which usually translates as “all those who hold seats”, “the politicians of the sys-
tem”, “the corrupt, treacherous politicians” or “the ones that have always ruled 
us”. others take a little step further to state that “all” those that should go were 
“the members of the political corporation, the judges” or those who held posi-
tions in “the three branches of the system”. What the slogan demanded was –as 
an assembly member of Almagro puts it– that “not only the politicians who have 
always ruled us and still do” should leave, “but also the whole political class, 
supposedly representative of the citizenry, which means all political institutions, 
the church, unions… the whole old way of doing politics based on clientelism, 
on the idea that ‘i give you this money, now vote for me’” (male, 36, with no 
prior political experience). in that sense, the target was “old politics” and the 
reclamation was, as some make it explicit, of a “renovation of parties” (female, 
50, asamblea de Álvarez Jonte y artigas, with little prior political experience). 
This reclamation stretched to include, after the assemblies’ experience, also the 
parties of the left, even though the latter “do not feel that the message concerns 
them, they [behave] as if they had nothing to do with it” (male, 65, ex-asamblea 
de palermo Viejo, with no prior political experience)4.
4	 	The	 left	 is	 the	 target	 of	 accusations	 of	 a	 different	nature	 from	 those	directed	
against	the	rest	of	the	parties,	blamed	for	colonizing	the	state	apparatus	with	its	cor-
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among those who interpret the slogan literally are those who no longer ap-
prehend it in terms of a “renovation” –understood either as the replacement of the 
people in charge or as the substitution of the old criticized practices– but in terms 
of the replacement of the system of representation with “another democracy”, 
described by some as “direct”, by others as “participative” and still by others as 
“more representative” than the existing one. The refusal to interpret the slogan 
as a demand for a “mere exchange of faces” is in many cases explicit; thus, for 
example, a former member of the asamblea de lanús declares that QsVT meant 
“that all the rulers had to go away but also that nobody had to come to take their 
place (…) [although] i cannot imagine what it would be like to be organized that 
way” (female, 32, with brief prior political experience). in the words of an as-
sembly member from parque avellaneda:
[QSVT]	is	a	slogan-guideline	for	the	construction	of	a	popular	force	of	
a	different	type.	In	that	sense	it	seems	to	us	that	the	model	of	Mosconi	
is	the	most	advanced	in	our	country.	It	seems	to	us	that	there	are	other	
models	to	study,	such	as	that	of	Brazil’s	Landless	Workers’	Movement,	
the	Zapatistas,	 the	Colombian	 guerrilla,	 the	 coca	 growers	 in	 the	 te-
rritories	where	they	function	as	a	real	popular	power	(Male,	4,	with	
union	experience)
Generally speaking, this position involves the vision of assemblies as an 
alternative to representative democracy. In the Asamblea de Palermo Viejo –re-
members one of its members “the phrase had been extended by saying ‘every-
body should go away, we’ll be in charge’” (female, 65, with no prior political 
experience). The same extended phrase is cited by an assembly member from 
pompeya, for whom it conveyed a clear message to politicians: “you cannot ad-
minister anything anymore”. “politicians”, he explained, “are dreadful. in thirty 
rupt,	clientelistic	practices.	According	to	most	of	our	interviewees,	the	left	has	sinned	
by	default,	due	to	its	inability	to	take	advantage	of	“historical	opportunities”.	Says,	
for	example,	a	member	of	the	Asamblea	de	Álvarez	Jonte	y	Artigas	that	leftist	parties	
“are	responsible	for	the	fact	that	nobody	has	gone	away,	for	the	fact	that	a	popular	
force	was	not	formed”,	that	is,	“for	the	inexistence	of	a	popular	organization	repre-
senting	the	population”	(Female,	50,	with	brief	prior	political	experience).	“I	do	not	
have	anything	against	the	left,	I	also	consider	myself	a	leftist”,	explains	an	assembly	
member	of	Pompeya,	“[but]	 the	 left	 let	go	of	a	historical	opportunity	 to	create	an	
alternative	with	the	assembly	movement”	(Male,	57,	with	prior	political	experience).	
Consequently,	the	fact	that	they	have	not	had	power	with	which	to	do	wrong	does	not	
exempt	the	left	from	its	share	of	responsibility;	on	the	contrary,	it	is	held	accountable	
for	its	very	inability	to	build	power.	As	one	of	our	interviewees	reminds	us,	we	are	
talking	about	parties	that	obtain	less	than	%	of	the	vote,	which	means	that	“they	do	
not	have	a	very	positive	sense	of	[political]	construction”.	The	same	inability	is	ap-
parent	in	their	behavior	within	the	assemblies,	guided	by	the	objective	of	recruiting	
a	handful	of	new	activists	rather	than	of	carrying	on	any	tangible	project	(Male,	65,	
ex-Asamblea	de	Palermo	Viejo,	with	no	prior	political	experience).
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years they have not found the solution. They prostituted the branches of the gov-
ernment, they led 50% of the people under the poverty line, and corruption is 
structural” (male, 57, with prolonged prior political experience).
A second set of interviewees, equally numerous as the first one, attaches 
to the QSVT a metaphorical sense, that is, a figurative, non-literal meaning that 
eases the comprehension of the phenomenon in question. in the words of a for-
mer member of the asamblea de montserrat:
[QSVT	was]	a	metaphor	like	that	of	the	Mothers	of	Plaza	de	Mayo,	‘Apa-
rición	con	vida’	(‘Reappearance	with	life’).	That	is,	everybody	knows	that	
they	are	dead,	but	‘Reappearance	with	life’	is	the	slogan,	the	strong	line,	
and	this	‘Que	se	vayan	todos’	seems	similar	to	me,	because	I	personally	
cannot	believe…	Who	has	to	go	away?	How?	Why?	Who	stays?	And	who	
will	come	instead?	(Female,	55,	with	prior	political	experience)
as a metaphor, two main characteristics are attributed to the slogan. on one 
hand, a great capacity of symbolizing weariness, disgust and rejection towards rep-
resentatives, the representative system and even the “system” as a whole. it was, 
according to various present and former assembly participants, “a catharsis through 
refusal”, “a shout of protest and [a way] of setting a position”, “a cry of revolt”. it was 
“just an expression, a way of saying ‘we are fed up of this and we still do not know 
how to change it; we are simply fed up and we show it’”, says a member of the asam-
blea 20 de Diciembre de flores (male, 33, party activist). “it was very visceral”, con-
firms a former member of the Asamblea del Botánico. “There was no deeper analysis 
than that. it was a rebellion cry, like a rubber that you stretch to its maximum to see 
how much it bounces back. it did not stretch much because in fact they are all still 
here…” (male, 48, unemployed, with limited prior political experience).
on the other hand, the slogan is characterized by its synthetic power and 
its inclusive potential. it was “a synthesis like those that fans make in soccer 
matches”, according to a member of an assembly of flores who provides the fol-
lowing explanation:
[The	 phrase]	was	 coined	 in	 the	 streets.	 ‘Everybody	 should	 go	 away’	
means	 ‘That’s	enough!’	It	is	a	translation,	it	is	not	literal.	It	does	not	
mean	that	we	are	going	to	go	and	kill	the	referee’s	mother,	no.	(…)	It	
was	a	simple	phrase:	it	didn’t	mean	that	all	of	them	had	to	go,	all,	all,	
all,	all	the	sons	of	a	bitch	who	negotiate	behind	the	backs	of	the	people,	
who	profit	as	much	as	they	do,	who	live	isolated,	who	work	against	the	
interests	of	the	already	damned,	who	don’t	give	a	damn	about	anybody,	
who	keep	indebting	the	country	(…)	Some	of	us	said	‘Let’s	go	further,	
let’s	make	the	revolution’,	[there	were]	others	who	wanted	superficial	
reforms,	but	the	‘Que	se	vayan	todos’	included	us	all	(Male,	47,	Asam-
blea	0	de	Diciembre	de	Flores,	with	political	experience)
some interviewees consider the amplitude of the slogan to be a positive trait as it 
allowed it to encompass diverse reclamations; they also contend that the phrase becomes 
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a “double-edged sword” when literally understood. others, however, use the very same 
expression to refer to the dangers involved in a slogan so “vague” and “diffuse” so as to 
encompass everybody, and therefore ready to be “appropriated by the right”.
Our interviewees –both those who understand the phrase in some literal 
way and those who emphasize its metaphorical character– are also divided as to 
whether they think the slogan is still valid, if it ever was so. in fact, some of them 
claim that they never supported it or that they stopped doing so long ago, for one 
of many reasons: its irresponsible, insufficient, excessive or negative character, or 
the obvious inevitability of its failure. There are also some (few) who reject the 
first part of the phrase –the passivity of the idea that they should go away– when in 
fact, they say, it was necessary that we got rid of them all. conversely, others (also 
in small numbers) oppose the idea that everybody should go away based on the 
argument that not all politicians are the same. “There were people [in congress] 
who, from my point of view, had performed well (…) i [even] suspected that [the 
slogan] might have been invented by the right so as to create a situation in which 
everything was mixed, everything was put at the same level”, suggests a former 
assembly member from caballito (male, 43, with no prior political experience).
As for the “irresponsible” character of the slogan, it is affirmed with at least 
two different senses. on one hand, the expression is considered to be irrespon-
sible in that “it locates responsibility outside us. [That way] nothing gets fixed. [It 
is as when we say] ‘i did not vote for him’, ‘i do not have anything to do with it’, 
‘it has been like that for a long time’” (female, 23, student, ex-asamblea de pal-
ermo Viejo, with little prior political experience). The slogan is also denounced 
as a “whim”, a result of the temporary urgencies of “the same people [who now] 
go to the demonstrations [in demand for a “zero-tolerance” policy against crime] 
led by Blumberg” (who is systematically identified by the interviewees as “right-
ist”) (female, 26, ex-asamblea de lanús, with no prior political experience). on 
the other hand, the phrase is considered to be a product of the “unconsciousness”, 
the “lack of thought” about the results of its eventual application. “You can’t 
tell everybody to go away because if you are governed then comes mr. George 
W. [bush] and tells you: ‘i will rule for you’”, says a former member of the 
asamblea de olivos (female, 45, volunteer in a popular library, with political ex-
perience and party affiliation). However, the most common reference to the irre-
sponsibility of the phrase –described as “ridiculous”, “childish”, “misadjusted”, 
“impulsive” and “meaningless” – appears in between interrogation marks: “If 
everybody goes away, who is going to come?” The question is frequently asked 
alongside the ascertainment of the assemblies’ failure at “occupying the space” of 
those who had to go, and/or of the failure of “the people” at organizing an alterna-
tive and rising up to the challenge that was the result of their own demands.
The phrase is denounced either for its excessive (and, therefore, impossible) 
character or for its insufficiency. “Nobody went away”, states a member of the 
asamblea Gastón riva. “These all-or-nothing positions are all the same, and it 
ends up this way. We wanted everything and we got nothing” (male, 32, with 
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little prior political experience). Those who consider the slogan to be insufficient, 
on the other hand, are mostly party activists and assembly members with a vast 
prior political and partisan experience who criticize the alleged reformist stance 
of the vast majority of the mobilized citizenry:
[The	 slogan]	 said	 ‘all	 politicians	 should	go	away’,	 but	 it	 did	not	 say	
[that]	the	parliamentary	system	is	an	indirect	system	of	delegation	of	
politics	and	that	as	long	as	you	vote	for	somebody	who	is	not	revocable	
and	can	do	whatever	he	wants	in	between	elections,	it	is	a	great	politi-
cal	renunciation.	(…)	The	assembly	wanted	everybody	to	go	away	but	
it	did	not	want	to	change	the	system	(Male,	47,	member	of	the	Asam-
blea	Popular	de	Liniers,	with	experience	in	activism)
The insufficiency of the slogan is also linked to its “exclusively negative” charac-
ter. consequently, the lack of a “positive” alternative is pointed out as a problem 
by many assembly members –mostly party activists– who claim to have tried to 
solve it by organizing groups parallel to the assemblies whose aim was to allow 
for “strategic political discussion”.
in any case, the majority of our interviewees consider that as for its practi-
cal effects, the slogan was a failure. “nothing changed”, “nobody went away”, 
“little changed so nothing fundamental was changed” are some of the expressions 
typically used. A few people, however, affirm that assemblies were instrumental 
in changing the vision of previously passive citizens and in creating a sort of 
state of alert, as well as greater sensitivity and responsiveness on the part of the 
government elected in 2003. The latter is indeed recognized by many as having 
picked up through words and deeds the heritage left by the demands originally 
put forward by caceroleros and asambleístas.
Assemblies and representative institutions
The relationship with the local government
A minority of our interviewees emphatically affirm that their assemblies main-
tained no relationship with the Centro de Gestión y Participación (cGp)5 in the 
neighborhood because they wanted to remain faithful to the QsVT, thus rejecting 
all relationship with the government, political parties and institutions in general. 
a member of an assembly of flores recalls:
5	 	These	Centers	for	Administration	and	Participation	are	decentralized	adminis-
trative	units	of	 the	city	government	of	Buenos	Aires	where	neighbors	can	process	
paperwork,	have	access	to	social,	cultural	or	educational	services,	make	denuncia-
tions	about	violated	rights	or	make	reclamations	related	to	public	services	and	utili-
ties	companies.	The	CGPs	are	announced	on	the	local	government’s	web	page	as	“a	
channel	for	neighbors’	participation	through	different	mechanisms	that	promote	col-
lective	agency	and	the	concerted	search	for	solutions”	and	as	“a	tool	for	the	effective	
control	of	the	administration”	(http://www.buenosaires.gov.ar/areadecentralization).
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We	were	all	quite	radicalized.	There	was	a	committee	for	institutional	
relations	that	was	stigmatized	as	the	‘right	wing’	of	the	assembly.	First	
thing	they	wanted	to	do	was	to	enter	into	a	relationship	with	the	CGP,	
the	Church	and	the	police.	Can	you	imagine,	at	that	time…	The	police	
had	been	repressing	us	for	a	month,	the	CGP	did	not	even	exist	for	us,	
the	government	was	an	empty	shell	and	the	Church	was	not	considered	
to	be	a	progressive	institution	open	to	dialogue	(Male,	4,	with	brief	
prior	political	experience)
in contrast, many others declare that their assemblies went through severe internal 
conflict about whether to accept or reject anything offered by the CGP; about 
whether to make requests, or demands, or even to “just go and seize” whatever 
resources were considered to belong to “the people” by their own right –such as a 
place to meet. still more numerous are those who categorically maintain that their 
assemblies had some kind of relationship with the cGp or with the city govern-
ment (and, to a lesser extent, with other institutions). Those relations were, accord-
ing to the majority, “unavoidable”, of a utilitarian nature and based on “permanent 
demand”. from this perspective, the cGp was a mere source from which diverse 
resources could be “obtained” or, better still, “taken”; a place where requests or 
demands could be directed and that could be repudiated or even attacked if de-
mands were not appropriately met. This sort of relationship is frequently (though 
not always) defined as “conflictive”6. only a handful of interviewees describe a 
relationship that was “friendly” or “adult” due to a certain ideological affinity, to 
“governmental good will”, to the recognition by the assembly of some virtue in 
certain official policies, or to mutual respect. The obtaining of resources (physi-
cal space, food to distribute or to feed the soup kitchen, social plans, housing 
subsidies, etc.) or of favorable decisions such as the recognition and legalization 
of assemblies’ activities are consequently understood mainly as the effect of the 
“struggle” led by the assemblies and of their “pressures” on a government de-
picted either as in need of “cleaning its public image” or as “scared” by social 
convulsion. a member of the asamblea de parque avellaneda recounts:
We	had	a	meeting	with	people	from	the	department	of	food	policies.	
[It	was]	the	first	time	that	we	had	contact	with	government	officials.	
At	that	time	people	 in	the	city	government	were	scared,	and	whene-
ver	they	felt	threatened	by	the	possibility	of	a	demonstration	they	just	
6	 	In	some	cases	the	relationship	with	the	government	and	parties	was	even	seen	as	
“dangerous”	for	at	least	two	reasons.	Firstly,	this	relationship	caused	-according	to	
several	interviewees-	“bossy	tendencies”	in	some	assemblies	and	resulted	in	the	co-
optation	of	assembly	members	by	parties	and	governmental	structures.	Secondly,	the	
availability	of	resources	coming	from	the	government	faced	many	assemblies	with	a	
dilemma	that	produced	severe	internal	conflicts.	Should	they	receive	and	distribute,	
let’s	say,	food	supplies?	In	case	they	did,	would	they	be	able	to	do	it	in	such	a	way	that	
did	not	contradict	their	convictions	opposed	to	clientelism	and	“old	politics”?
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threw	[food]	boxes	to	you	out	of	the	window.	(…)	So	thirteen	assem-
blies	went	to	see	them	and	we	told	them	that	we	had	soup	kitchens	and	
many	social	services,	 that	we	needed	food	and	[asked	them	whether	
they	preferred	to	have	a	good	or	a	bad	relationship	with	us].	So	we	got	
periodical	deliveries	of	food,	and	later	we	demanded	premises	to	work	
in	(Male,	4,	with	union	experience)
Besides	the	relationship	of	permanent	demand	already	described,	other	
interviewees	refer	to	a	more	stable	involvement	within	the	framework	
of	certain	governmental	initiatives	–particularly	the	so-called	“partici-
patory	budgeting”	and	the	Bill	of	Communes.	Again,	two	approaches	
can	be	 identified,	one	more	sincerely	 involved	with	the	process	and	
another	one	of	a	more	instrumental	nature.	Most	of	our	interviewees	
identify	with	the	latter.	Among	assembly	members	who	responded	to	
the	abovementioned	government	initiatives,	the	vast	majority	recog-
nizes	that	they	did	it	in	full	knowledge	that	they	were	“a	big	farce”	or	
a	“mockery	of	participative	democracy”.	They	did	so,	then,	as	a	means	
of	accumulating	power	or	achieving	other	aims	unrelated	to	the	proc-
ess	itself.	“We	want	to	rule”,	says	a	member	of	the	Asamblea	de	San	
Telmo.	In	order	to	achieve	it	“we	took	advantage	of	all	resources	avail-
able,	even	the	most	despicable	ones.	Such	as	participatory	budgeting”	
(Male,	5).	The	usefulness	of	which	resides,	according	to	a	member	of	
the	Asamblea	0	de	Diciembre	de	Flores,	in	that	“it	is	an	institutional	
device	that	gives	us	the	chance	to	talk	to	the	people	in	the	neighbor-
hood”	(Male,	4,	with	political	experience).	According	to	a	member	
of	its	homonym	of	Parque	Avellaneda,	its	usefulness	was	located	in	it	
being	a	sort	of	echo	chamber	that	allowed	for	unrelated	reclamations	
to	be	expressed	and	heard	(Male,	4,	with	union	experience).
Few	interviewees	give	some	credit	to	the	government’s	initiatives	
and	find	them	a	real	possibility	for	the	democratization	of	the	politi-
cal	system.	An	assembly	member	of	Castro	Barros	and	Rivadavia,	for	
instance,	 says	 he	 regularly	worked	 “jointly	with	 the	Committee	 for	
Decentralization	of	the	Legislature	of	the	City	of	Buenos	Aires”	based	
on	the	idea	that	it	was	possible	to	introduce	“more	direct	mechanisms	
of	democratic	participation	[because]	to	go	and	vote	once	every	two	
years	is	useless”	(Male,	6,	with	no	prior	political	experience).	In	the	
same	vein,	a	member	of	the	Espacio	Asambleario	de	Parque	Patricios	
explains	that	“the	City	of	Buenos	Aires	has	the	most	progressive	Con-
stitution	in	the	country,	where	participative	democracy	is	mentioned”	
(Male,	54,	with	wide	political	experience);	 that	 is	 the	reason	why	 it	
was	worth	the	trouble	of	taking	part	in	the	process	in	order	to	see	how	
much	could	be	obtained	from	it.	The	outcome	is,	nevertheless,	most	
often	negatively	evaluated:
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[The	de-centralization	of	the	city	government	through	communes]	en-
ded	up	being	codified	at	the	time	of	the	assemblies’	decline,	[so]	what	
was	left	of	[it]	is	very	limited:	it	grants	the	neighbor	very	little	influen-
ce	on	decisions.	He	 is	consulted,	but	he	does	not	decide.	 (…)	Those	
are	the	participation	mechanisms	recommended	by	the	World	Bank,	
which	seek	to	involve	people	but	keep	decisions	within	the	centers	of	
power.	People	are	involved	so	they	believe	they	participate	and	decide	
while	in	fact	there	is	manipulation	(Male,	47,	member	of	the	Asamblea	
Popular	de	Liniers,	with	prior	political	experience)
Assemblies	tend	to	be	considered	as	an	alternative	to	the	local	govern-
ment	by	 those	who	 take	 the	 greatest	 distance	 from	 it,	 and	particu-
larly	by	those	among	them	who	have	more	political	experience	and	
belong	to	assemblies	that	identify	themselves	as	“popular”	rather	than	
“neighbors’”.	For	this	subgroup	of	interviewees	assemblies	were	a	sort	
of	“counter	power”	or	“double	power”.	On	one	hand,	they	underline	
that	in	the	midst	of	the	crisis	the	assemblies	took	upon	themselves	a	
series	of	functions	that	were	in	fact	the	government’s	job.	On	the	other	
hand,	they	mention	the	fact	that	many	neighbors	would	resort	to	the	
assemblies	as	if	they	really	were	the	government.	Some	conclude	that	
it	is	precisely	the	experience	thus	gained	that	helped	their	assemblies	
build	governmental	capabilities:
[The	education	and	health	committees]	started	studying	the	law	in	order	
to	change	it	(…)	They	tried	to	get	involved	with	the	problems	of	life,	with	
the	real	problems	that	all	neighbors	had.	There	were	potential	elements	
of	a	double	power.	There	is	a	power	that	is	institutional,	the	one	of	the	
state;	and	there	is	another	power	of	a	popular	type	that	is	built	from	below	
(Male,	47,	Asamblea	Popular	de	Liniers,	with	prior	political	experience)
We	were	a	counter	power	at	the	time.	There	were	people	who	came	to	
us	and	raised	issues	as	if	we	were	a	government	office	(…)	They	did	
not	go	to	the	CGP,	they	came	to	us	in	order	to	ask	for	things	that	were	
obviously	processed	 in	 the	CGP	 (Female,	 ,	 ex-Asamblea	de	Flores	
Sur,	with	prior	political	experience)
[Lists	the	varied	activities	developed	by	his	assembly]	That	is,	we	must	
get	ready	for	one	day	(…)	to	be	able	to	administer	the	government.	[So	
we	need]	to	learn	how	things	are	done.	And	believe	me,	we	are	at	pre-
sent	in	a	situation,	I	don’t	know	if	to	administer	the	city,	but	to	handle	
a	commune	for	sure”	(Male,	57,	Asamblea	Popular	de	Pompeya,	with	
prior	political	experience)
The	fact	that	neighbors	resorted	to	the	assemblies	to	find	solutions	
to	their	problems,	however,	is	not	necessarily	interpreted	as	a	sign	that	
assemblies	were	treated	as	if	they	were	“the	neighborhood’s	govern-
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ment”,	as	one	interviewee	puts	it.	In	fact,	other	interviewees	interpret	
that	occurrence	as	a	sign	that	assemblies	were	a	kind	of	“neighbors’	
union”,	a	“different	point	of	reference”	who	acted	on	behalf	of	neigh-
bors	and	was	recognized	as	such	by	the	local	CGP	(Male,	54,	Asamblea	
de	Parque	Patricios,	with	political	experience).
The need for the State
Above	the	intention	of	occupying	the	state	apparatus,	eliminating	it	
and/or	replacing	it	a	demand	predominates	among	our	interviewees	
that	the	State	fulfill	its	due	functions.	In	fact,	strictly	anarchist	inter-
pretations	of	the	QSVT	are	almost	if	not	completely	absent;	instead,	
there	are	numerous	indications	of	 the	 importance	that	 is	attributed	
to	the	State.	Some	even	admit	that	it	might	not	be	so	desirable	after	
all	that	everybody	goes	away.	That	is	the	case	of	the	former	member	
of	 the	Asamblea	 de	 Pedro	Goyena	 y	 Puán	who	 remembers	 that	 on	
December	0th,	00,	he	was	scared	when	“seeing	those	people	break	
the	door	and	enter	the	Congress	building	(…)	It	gave	me	the	idea	that	
everybody	had	 left	 (…)	There	was	governmental	 chaos	and	nobody	
was	in	charge	of	keeping	the	situation	under	control	(Male,	4,	with	
no	prior	political	experience).	
The	need	for	a	State	capable	of	encompassing	and	regulating	the	
social	realm	is	raised	in	the	first	place	through	a	stark	contrast	with	
the	limitations	found	by	the	assemblies:
We	think	that	there	must	be	a	State	that	establishes	a	law	(…)	Self-emplo-
yment	and	other	similar	programs	[undertaken	by	assemblies]	are	non-
sense	 if	not	accompanied	by	an	 integral	policy	by	 the	State	 (Male,	4,	
Asamblea	0	de	Diciembre	de	Parque	Avellaneda,	with	union	experience)
We	are	not	against	the	State;	we	want	a	State	that	is	for	us,	which	is	a	
different	thing.	(…)	The	State	must	be	present	in	people’s	lives;	it	must	
come	back	from	its	retreat.	As	citizens	we	demand	the	presence	of	a	
State	that	is	there	to	make	regulations,	that	is	really	in	charge	of	public	
affairs	(Female,	9,	Asamblea	de	Palermo	Viejo)
From	 this	 perspective,	 assemblies	 are	 seen	 as	ad hoc	 solutions	
found	by	neighbors	in	a	context	of	“neglect	and	the	desertion	by	the	
State,	in	hospitals,	in	schools”	(Female,	50,	Asamblea	de	Álvarez	Jonte	
y	Artigas,	with	brief	political	experience).
The	need	for	the	State	is	additionally	recognized,	after	the	assem-
blies’	 experience,	 as	 a	 result	 of	 the	 discovery	 that	 “voluntarism	 has	
limits”,	as	an	assembly	member	puts	it.	Particularly	noteworthy	is	the	
newly	acquired	recognition	of	the	need	for	professional	politicians,	that	
is,	for	individuals	whose	main	occupation	is	related	to	public	affairs,	
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which	is	not	within	constant	reach	for	“common	citizens”.	Typically,	
our	interviewees	start	describing	the	routine	of	an	average	assembly	
member	during	the	peak	months	of	the	movement	as	“very	demand-
ing”,	“tiring”	and	“exhausting”,	since	when	adding	up	plenary	sessions,	
committee	meetings,	mobilizations	and	all	other	activities,	“you	were	
there	all	week	long”.	“Normal”	tasks	and	relationships	–work,	home,	
study,	family	and	friends	prior	to	those	made	in	the	assembly–	were	
temporarily	neglected;	“you	lived	for	the	assembly”,	they	claim.	“It	is	
necessary	to	be	there	twenty-four	hours	a	day	and	people	also	need	to	
live	their	lives”,	explains	an	activist	from	Pompeya	(Male,	57,	with	pri-
or	political	experience).	“We	are	not	wage-earning	politicians.	Going	
to	these	meetings	or	doing	solidarity	work	implies	effort	and	time	for	
people	who	have	scores	of	other	things	to	do”	(Female,	50,	Asamblea	
de	Álvarez	Jonte	y	Artigas,	with	brief	prior	political	experience).
The	 problem	 of	 time	 further	 intensified	 as	 assembly	 members	
started	to	undertake	demanding	tasks	of	the	kind	that	is	usually	left	in	
the	hands	of	politicians,	such	as	the	preparation	of	bills.	Thus,	for	ex-
ample,	a	member	of	the	Asamblea	del	Botánico	remembers	that	when	
he	started	 to	get	 involved	 in	 the	project	 to	reform	the	city’s	Code	of	
Misdemeanours	(Código Contravencional) he	“was	almost	completely	
devoted	to	the	assembly”	(Male,	4,	unemployed,	with	some	previous	
political	experience).	“You	needed	to	be	an	almost	full-time	activist”,	
an	assembly	member	from	Flores	recalls.	“The	dynamics	is	obviously	
tiring	and	it	can	be	sustained	by	a	very	small	group	of	comrades	(com-
pañeros).	(…)	The	present	assembly	is	the	product,	say,	in	0	or	90%,	
of	the	Committee	of	the	Unemployed,	because	it	was	the	most	dynamic	
committee,	the	one	that	did	more	things”	(Male,	4,	with	prior	political	
experience).	Many	 interviewees	 indeed	confirm	 that	 they	could	only	
keep	that	pace	while	their	vacations	lasted	or	as	long	as	they	were	un-
employed.	As	the	above	quoted	assembly	member	explains,	“we	were	
all	day	involved	in	politics	in	the	Plaza	because	we	didn’t	have	a	job”.
Assembly	members	were	not	activists	to	begin	with;	in	fact,	it	was	
precisely	its	proclamation	as	a	movement	of	the	“common	citizens”	
which	 conferred	 its	 peculiar	 character	 to	 the	 assembly	movement.	
The	distinction	between	an	assembly	member	and	an	activist	is	thus	
underlined	by	our	interviewees:
An	assembly	member	is	a	person	who	works,	studies,	goes	home	and	
fixes	things,	and	who	once	a	week	joins	a	group	of	people	he	feels	affini-
ty	with	in	order	to	talk	until	midnight	about	what	he	would	like	to	do	in	
the	future	and	to	plan.	Then	on	Saturday,	he	organizes	an	activity	when	
he	can	or	wants.	(…)	Each	one	enlists	to	work	on	an	issue	and	pushes	it	
forward.	It	does	not	mean	that	he	must	abandon	everything	else.	There	
are	people	who	take	this	as	an	activism;	I	am	not	an	activist.	I	see	it	
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as	a	space	for	participation,	not	for	activism.	Activism	gives	you	a	fra-
mework,	a	structure,	a	hierarchy…	(Male,	4,	unemployed	and	student,	
Asamblea	de	Palermo	Viejo,	with	brief	prior	political	experience)
A	great	proportion	of	the	assembly	members	who	did	not	turn	into	ac-
tivists	deserted	after	a	relatively	brief	time.	The	already	enormous	dif-
ficulties	to	keep	up	with	the	process	were	further	intensified	by	the	fast	
ebb	tide	of	the	initial	wave	of	enthusiasm,	by	the	distance	that	became	
apparent	between	expectations	and	reality,	and	by	the	rapid	transfor-
mation	of	the	political	context	from	which	the	assemblies	had	arisen.
The	recognition	of	the	need	for	professional	politicians	and	pub-
lic	officials	was	also	strengthened	by	the	assemblies’	failures,	consid-
ered	as	such	by	a	vast	majority	of	our	interviewees	–the	few	exceptions	
coming	from	the	members	of	assemblies	that	had	survived	thanks	to	
their	exceptional	dynamism	and	productivity,	but	that	were	also	de-
picted	by	members	of	other	assemblies	as	“partisan”,	“piqueteras”	or	
“state-like”	organizations.	“Assemblies	were	not	effective	at	anything”,	
says	in	a	lapidary	tone	a	former	member	of	the	Asamblea	del	Botánico	
(Male,	4,	with	limited	prior	political	experience).	Most	of	the	deci-
sions	made	were	 simply	not	 implemented.	 “Today	 something	 is	de-
cided	and	when	we	meet	next	we	have	not	done	 it	 and	 if	we	have,	
then	others	come	and	talk	about	it	all	over	and	say	that	it	was	badly	
done.	(…)	There	is	great	stagnation	and	many	reiterations”,	a	former	
member	of	the	Asamblea	Popular	de	Olivos	(Male,	60,	with	previous	
political	experience)	tells	us,	“[The]	things	that	were	done	were	then	
lost,	dissolved.	Everything	was	so	relaxed”,	agrees	a	former	assembly	
member	of	Lanús	(Female,	6,	with	no	previous	political	experience).	
The	explanation	typically	provided	to	account	for	these	difficulties	is	
based	on	the	idea	that	no	organization	functions	when	its	members	
only	do	what	they	want,	because	they	want	to	and	when	they	want	to.	
References	to	the	“lax	organization”,	the	straightforward	“disorgani-
zation”	of	the	assemblies	and	their	character	as	“non-organizations”	
are	indeed	frequently	repeated.	The	“committees”	or	“sub-areas”	that	
the	assemblies	were	 typically	divided	 into	are	described	as	 “affinity	
groups”	where	each	one	worked	“on	what	he/she	 likes”.	Thus,	 “you	
do	absolutely	what	you	feel	like.	And	if	there	is	something	you	don’t	
like,	you	don’t	do	it”,	explains	a	former	assembly	member	from	Núñez	
(Male,	54,	with	prior	political	experience).
Many	interviewees	link	the	decline	and	extinction	of	a	great	part	
of	 the	assemblies	 to	 their	difficulties	 to	get things done.	Conversely,	
there	are	many	who	state	that	the	assemblies	that	still	exist	are	those	
that	have	been	able	to	build	something	valuable	 in	their	 immediate	
context	and	keep	it	going	over	time:	indeed,	they	survive	around	a	Cul-
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tural	Center,	a	soup	kitchen	or	any	other	tangible	achievement	that	is	
“what	allowed	us	to	still	find	a	meaning	in	keeping	meeting”	(Male,	,	
Asamblea	Gastón	Riva,	with	limited	previous	political	experience).
The stance towards the 2003 presidential elections
The	re-arranging	of	 the	political	 scene	and	 the	occurrence	of	presi-
dential	elections	less	than	a	year	and	a	half	after	the	outburst	of	po-
litical	protest	posed	a	difficult	challenge	for	the	assemblies.	Accord-
ing	 to	most	 interviewees,	 assemblies	 did	 not	 establish	 an	 “official”	
position	towards	the	election,	that	is,	no	guidelines	to	be	followed	by	
their	members,	but	instead	they	granted	them	–according	to	the	most	
frequent	 expression–	 “freedom	 of	 action”.	 A	 couple	 of	 interviewees	
say	that	in	their	respective	assemblies	the	issue	“was	almost	not	dis-
cussed”	because	it	was	not	considered	to	be	important;	however,	many	
more	remember	having	taken	part	in	numerous	“chats”,	“discussions”	
and	“debates”	aimed	at	clarifying	what	was	at	stake	and	what	the	dif-
ferent	alternatives	meant	so	that	each	individual	could	find	his	own	
way.	The	following	description	is	thus	typical:
We	talked	a	lot	about	the	elections,	basically	out	of	anguish.	At	a	cer-
tain	point	we	organized	discussions	about	current	events	and	we	ex-
changed	 information	and	views,	we	 reflected	 together.	 It	was	a	 very	
anguishing	situation:	after	all	that	had	happened,	after	the	crisis	and	
everything,	we	did	not	have	anybody	to	vote	for…	(…)	The	idea	was	not	
that	the	assembly	was	going	to	do	this	or	that…	We	talked	about	blank	
voting	and	we	set	out	to	technically	analyze	[its	effects],	a	question	of	
strategy	 (Female,	9,	Asamblea	de	Palermo	Viejo,	with	 limited	prior	
political	experience)
Few	assemblies	called	for	some	specific	stance	or	action	towards	the	
elections,	such	as	abstention	or	casting	blank	or	void	votes.	More	nu-
merous	were	those	that	chose	to	proclaim	the	validity	of	the	QSVT,	
though	 not	 bothering	 to	 make	 it	 clear	 what	 that	 was	 supposed	 to	
mean	in	practical	terms.	Thus,	for	example,	a	member	of	the	Asamb-
lea	de	Castro	Barros	y	Rivadavia	remembers	that	although	“it	did	not	
set	a	position	about	whether	to	go	and	vote”	and	it	decided	“that	each	
one	had	to	do	what	he	wanted”,	his	assembly	“issued	a	ticket	with	the	
slogan	‘Que se vayan todos’. Most	of	us	went	to	vote	with	that	ticket	
and	we	distributed	it	in	the	neighborhood”	(Male,	6,	with	no	previ-
ous	 political	 experience).	 The	Asamblea	 0	 de	Diciembre	 de	Flores	
also	kept	the	slogan,	an	attitude	that	one	of	its	members	describes	as	
“an	elegant	detour	that	helped	avoid	internal	conflicts.	The	assembly	
stood	straight	with	the	ancient	assembly	slogan,	and	those	who	voted	
did	just	what	they	wanted”	(Male,	,	party	activist).
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On	April	7th,	00,	0.5%	of	all	qualified	voters	in	the	country	went	
to	the	polls.	97.%	of	them	cast	a	positive	vote:	void	votes	plummeted	
to	.7%,	and	blank	votes	fell	to	0.99%.	In	the	city	of	Buenos	Aires	per-
centages	were	even	lower:	.4%	and	0.6%,	respectively.	The	presiden-
tial	candidate	of	the	largely	unknown	Confederación para que se vayan 
todos obtained	0.67%	of	the	vote	at	a	national	level	(0.5%	in	the	capital	
city,	and	%	in	the	province	of	Buenos	Aires).	9%	of	the	positive	vote	
was	split	among	five	candidates:	three	of	peronist affiliation	but	with	
divergent	 ideological	 orientations	 (former	 president	 Carlos	Menem,	
with	4.45%;	Néstor	Kirchner,	with	.4%,	and	the	one-week	presi-
dent	Adolfo	Rodríguez	Saá,	with	4.%)	and	two	former	radicals,	one	
located	in	the	center-right	–Ricardo	López	Murphy,	with	6.7%–	and	
another	one	placed	in	the	center-left	of	the	political	spectrum	–Elisa	
Carrió,	with	4.05%	of	the	vote.	The	runoff	election	that	would	have	
decided	the	competition	in	favor	of	one	of	the	two	front-runners,	Men-
em	and	Kirchner,	never	took	place	because	the	former	quit	once	it	was	
clear	that	he	would	suffer	a	massive,	humiliating	defeat.	Thus	Kirchner	
was	proclaimed	the	winner	with	a	magnitude	of	support	that	–it	was	
then	commonly	thought–	would	eventually	cause	him	severe	govern-
ability	problems.	Shortly	after	his	inauguration,	however,	he	surprised	
the	public	with	a	set	of	unexpected	initiatives	that	were	welcomed	by	
the	majority	and	gained	him	the	support	of	a	vast	“virtual	electorate”	
who	assured	that	they	would	have	voted	for	him	had	they	known.	The	
context	of	representation	crisis	had	radically	changed;	thus,	the	very	
soil	in	which	the	assemblies	were	rooted	had	been	transformed.	Born	
out	of	a	mood	that	their	members	now	perceived	as	“capricious”	and	
“superficial”,	with	no	lasting	effects	on	political	culture,	the	assemblies	
were	no	longer	the	citizenry’s	thermometer.
“The	same	people	who	had	participated	in	De	la	Rúa’s	overthrow	
now	went	out	to	vote”,	accuses	a	politically	experienced	member	of	
the	Asamblea	Popular	de	Liniers	(Male,	47).	The	same	accusation	ap-
plies	to	most	of	our	interviewees.	Indeed,	few	voided	their	vote,	and	
although	some	time	before	the	election	the	majority	seemed	inclined	
towards	blank	vote	(or	towards	an	hypothetical	vote	for	Luis	Zamo-
ra,	 whose	 party,	 Autodeterminación y Libertad	 –Self-Determination 
and Freedom– was	not	running),	as	the	date	of	the	election	neared	
they	“dispersed	among	blank	vote,	vote	for	the	left,	vote	for	Kirchner	
or	Carrió…”	(Female,	,	Multisectorial	de	San	Cristóbal,	activist).	
Two	explanations	are	given	to	account	for	that	change.	First	of	all,	
casting	a	blank	vote	was	viewed	as	equal	to	“washing	one’s	hands	of	
the	problem”.	Secondly,	explains	a	former	member	of	the	Asamblea	
del	Botánico,	the	experience	with	municipal	politics	had	produced	
the	certainty	that	politicians	were	not	all	the	same	after	all:
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People	who	[initially]	thought	that	everything	was	the	same	[eventu-
ally]	agreed	that	if	we	hadn’t	had	those	people	[from	Izquierda	Unida]	
in	the	Legislature,	we	would	not	have	been	able	to	do	that	work	(Male,	
4,	with	limited	prior	political	experience)
Divisions	aggravated	soon	after	Néstor	Kirchner’s	inauguration.	Several	
surviving	assemblies,	already	slimmer,	were	put	under	pressure,	suffered	
divisions	or	disintegrated	as	a	result	of	the	disagreements	between	the	
critical	and	the	expectant,	often	settled	with	exit	by	the	latter.	Even	two	
years	later,	an	activist	from	the	Multisectorial	de	San	Cristóbal	acknowl-
edges	that	in	her	assembly	it	is	still	not	advisable	to	discuss	Kirchner’s	
government,	“because	we	 like	each	other	a	 lot	and	we	do	not	want	 to	
kill	each	other”	(Female,	).	Indeed,	many	of	our	interviewees	point	to	
the	expectations	generated	by	the	new	government	as	one	of	the	caus-
es	of	the	assemblies’	decline.	In	particular,	they	underline	that	the	new	
president	“adopted	the	discourse	or	certain	part	of	the	discourse	and	the	
reclamations	expressed	in	00”	(Male,	9,	Asamblea	de	Palermo	Viejo).	
Which	is	disqualified	as	“double	standards”	(Male,	47,	Asamblea	Popu-
lar	de	Liniers)	by	those	who	distrust	the	president’s	intentions	and	be-
lieve	that	“there	is	no	difference”	between	him	and	his	predecessors	or	
electoral	competitors,	because	they	all	executed	or	would	have	executed	
“a	mandate	assigned	by	the	dominant	classes,	that	is,	the	restoration	of	
governability	[and]	of	state	power,	the	fastening	of	exploitation	and	sub-
ordination”	(Male,	54,	Espacio	Asambleario	de	Parque	Patricios).	Others	
recognize	that,	although	Kirchner	is	not	the	same	as,	say,	Carlos	Menem,	
“from	the	point	of	view	of	our	interests	there	is	no	difference”	–while	they	
do	see	a	difference	at	the	municipal	level	where	assemblies	operate,	which	
is	the	reason	why	many	supported	the	president’s	candidate	for	mayor	
against	his	right-wing	challenger.	Last	but	not	least,	there	is	a	third	group	
of	interviewees	who	value	the	new	government’s	human	rights	policies,	
its	stance	towards	the	Supreme	Court	and	its	alleged	severity	against	cor-
ruption.	However,	the	policies	that	are	approved	by	our	interviewees	tend	
to	be	perceived	as	the	result	of	the	actions	undertaken	by	the	citizenry	in	
00	and	by	the	assemblies	in	the	months	that	followed:
It	is	stupid	to	believe	that	[Kirchner]	is	the	same	(…)	He	has	had	ges-
tures	and	signals	that	the	previous	governments	did	not.	What	I	doubt	
is	that	his	signals,	slogans	or	policies	are	really	expressed	out	of	con-
viction.	I	believe	that	 the	process	started	 in	00	deeply	marked	the	
governments	that	followed,	Kirchner’s	in	this	case.	It	seems	to	me	that	
the	specter	of	what	happened	to	the	previous	government	determined,	
maybe	not	a	program,	but	at	least	a	minimum	set	of	measures,	or	of	
discourse,	 to	 be	 embraced	 (Male,	 	 Asamblea	 0	 de	Diciembre	 de	
Flores,	party	activist)
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Deliberation and decision-making
Deliberation and horizontality
Discussion,	reflection	and	deliberation	are	usually	at	the	center	of	the	
definitions	of	“assembly”	given	by	our	interviewees:
An	assembly	is	a	big	interrogation.	It	is	a	questioning	of	many	things	
(…)	A	little	bit	of	free	association	(Male,	9,	Asamblea	de	Palermo	Vie-
jo,	with	no	prior	political	experience)
[The	assembly]	 is	a	space	of	discussion	and	action,	of	discussion	as	
action	 (Male,	,	Asamblea	Gastón	Riva,	with	 limited	prior	political	
experience)
[The	assembly	had]	an	attitude	of	participation,	search,	and	reflection	about	
what	could	be	done	(…)	What	was	new	was	the	fact	that	we	met	to	talk	
about	politics,	that	we	tried	to	change	certain	things	but	without	knowing	
too	well	where	we	were	 leading.	Meeting	 in	order	 to	discuss	without	a	
clear	horizon.	Discussing	politics	without	having	the	ordinary	goals	that	
any	political	organization	has:	obtaining	positions,	reaching	power	(Fema-
le,	6,	ex-Asamblea	de	Lanús,	with	no	prior	political	experience)
The	difference	between	assemblies	and	political	parties	is	systemati-
cally	identified	as	based	on	the	nature	of	the	deliberation	process	that	
takes	place	in	the	former	but	not	in	the	latter:
In	a	party	you	always	have	prior	agreements,	it	is	not	a	place	where	you	
go	and	discuss.	You	basically	know	which	its	political	stance	and	its	
theoretical	assumptions	are.	That	did	not	happen	in	the	assembly	(Fe-
male,	6,	ex-Asamblea	de	Lanús,	with	no	prior	political	experience)
[There	was]	brainstorming.	Nobody	came	and	said	‘this	has	to	be	done’.	
As	I	had	experience	with	activism	in	a	political	party	where	there	was	
always	a	political	head	who	said	what	was	 to	be	done,	 I	 very	much	
liked	the	fact	that	[in	the	assembly]	everything	arose	from	below	start-
ing	with	the	question	‘what	shall	we	do?’	instead	of	‘we	have	to	do	this	
because	the	political	 leadership	says	so’	 (Male,	49,	Asamblea	de	Pal-
ermo	Viejo,	with	vast	prior	political	experience)
If	deliberation	and	decision-making	on	the	basis	of	deliberation	can	
take	 place	within	 the	 assemblies	 it	 is	 precisely	 because	 there	 is	 no	
“political	line”	already	established	by	a	“leadership”,	nor	a	“political	
head”	over	the	plenary	with	decision	and	veto	power.	Only	in	such	a	
situation	can	an	exchange	of	arguments	be	a	genuine	one,	because	
only	then	may	its	participants	allow	themselves	to	be	compelled	by	the	
force	of	the	best	argument	rather	than	by	the	titles	flaunted	by	those	
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who	formulate	them.	In	other	words,	deliberation	requires	horizon-
tality,	which	our	 interviewees	 systematically	 oppose	 to	 the	 “vertical	
structure”	of	political	parties.	Horizontality,	in	turn,	requires	equality	
or,	rather,	a	political	equality	built	within	the	framework	of	the	assem-
bly	–a	“homogeneization	of	places”,	as	somebody	puts	it.	In	the	words	
of	three	former	assembly-members:	
[Within	the	assembly]	all	have	the	same	voice	and	the	same	force.	Doc-
uments	are	produced	that	were	studied	by	everybody.	It	is	possible	to	
achieve	a	situation	where	nobody	believes	 to	be	more	than	anybody	
else	(…)	There	were	people	with	money,	but	within	the	assembly	we	
were	all	equal	(Female,	ex-Asamblea	de	Olivos,	with	political	experi-
ence	and	party	affiliation)
Hierarchies	had	no	weight,	we	all	discussed	as	equals.	It	was	fine	to	
get	rid	of	the	idea	that	because	he	has	a	degree,	the	scientist	is	the	one	
who	knows.	There	was	no	social	division	in	that	sense	(Female,	6,	ex-
Asamblea	de	Lanús,	with	no	previous	political	experience)
We	are	used	to	the	fact	that	decisions	are	always	made	by	somebody	
else.	In	any	place	where	you	are,	you	delegate	or	somebody	represents	
you,	 there	are	always	authorities	and	hierarchic	 levels.	 (…)	 [The	as-
sembly]	is	a	complete	utopia.	I	do	not	know	anything	about	politics,	
nothing	at	all,	and	I	am	here	talking	to	this	guy	who	has	been	an	activ-
ist	for	thirty	years	and	in	order	to	decide	whether	to	go	to	a	demonstra-
tion	what	I	think	is	as	valid	as	what	he	thinks	(Female,	,	ex-Asamblea	
de	Lanús	Centro,	with	brief	prior	political	and	partisan	experience)
What	resulted	from	equality	among	the	diverse	was	the	possibility	“to	
build	your	own	thought	on	the	basis	of	different	thoughts”	(Female,	
44,	ex-Asamblea	de	Palermo	Viejo,	without	prior	political	experience)	
–or,	as	a	current	member	of	the	same	assembly	puts	it:
You	listen	to	what	the	other	thinks	and	you	modify	what	you	are	think-
ing.	I	ask	for	the	floor,	I	am	on	the	list	of	speakers	and	while	the	mo-
ment	 for	me	to	speak	approaches,	 I	keep	changing,	adding	 things	 to	
what	 I	 originally	 thought,	 sometimes	 up	 to	 the	 point	 of	 completely	
transforming	what	I	was	thinking	because	I	happened	to	listen	to	a	rea-
soning	which	seemed	good	to	me,	or	because	somebody	else	saw	things	
that	I	had	not	even	thought	about	before.	That	is	what	I	like	and	what	
impresses	me	most	about	the	assembly:	this	collective	construction	of	
what	is	being	thought	(Male,	9,	with	no	prior	political	experience)
assemblies are therefore ideally thought of as a space where politics is no 
longer monopolized by experts but recovered by and for citizens. according to 
a member of the asamblea de palermo Viejo, participants in assembly debates 
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are “people” or “citizens”, not “specialists”; if that were not the case, “a citizen 
would be like the dentist’s patient, who cannot say anything; the only thing he 
can do is keep his mouth open and abstain from complaining if it hurts” (male, 
48, with prior political and partisan experience).
assembly discussions encompassed subjects as diverse as imaginable, at 
the most varied levels of abstraction and generality. “from growing vegetables 
in a communitarian garden to the socialist revolution, supporting iraq’s or af-
ghanistan’s struggle… it was very eclectic, very strange” (male, 36, asamblea 
de castro barros y rivadavia, with no previous political experience). Debate 
took place about “the country’s problems, the problems of the economy, health 
and education policies, the situation of the political regime” (male, 47, asamblea 
popular de liniers, with long prior political activism), as well as about how to 
undertake a certain task or how to express solidarity with the neighborhood’s car-
toneros7, or about attendance to the following mobilization or to the Asamblea 
Interbarrial, or on the content of a flyer to be printed so as to let neighbors know 
about an activity organized or a stance taken by the assembly.
The level of abstraction of debates was itself turned into a subject for discus-
sion within assemblies, as well as into the object of accusations and misunder-
standings among them. indeed, some assemblies were regularly criticized for their 
alleged “elitist”, “theorizing” and “pseudo-intellectual” tendencies. Whereas some 
assemblies devoted most time to the discussion of “everyday issues”, “problems of 
the neighborhood” and “real needs”, explains a member of the asamblea popular 
de pompeya, others “discussed the law of gravitation” (male, 57, with long prior 
political experience). The accusation is denied by some members of the criticized 
assemblies, whereas others acknowledge that the “high intellectual level” of their 
assemblies, where “very interesting and rich debates took place” (in contrast to those 
“with a shallower composition and a much simpler language”) eventually produced 
tensions, splits and desertions. This effect attributed to “professional knowledge” is 
in other cases equally blamed on the prevalence of “activist knowledge”.
similar discussions took place about the level at which activities were to be 
undertaken, that is, about whether “to work within the neighborhood or at a more 
general level” (nevertheless, in many cases the solution was found in the organi-
zation of committees where “each one could work on what he wanted”. The de-
bate about the scope to be conferred to assemblies’ actions was frequently shaped 
as a confrontation between “common neighbors” and “revolutionary activists”. 
Thus, for example, when the asamblea 20 de Diciembre from parque avellaneda 
discussed the position to adopt in response to the decline of the cacerolazos, “the 
orthodox leftist sectors [that] considered that the situation was ripe for an at-
tack against central power strongly opposed any kind of work at the local level” 
(male, 41, with union experience).
7	 	The	term	is	applied	to	the	unemployed	who	make	a	living	from	collecting	cardboard	
and	paper	from	trash	bags	in	the	streets	and	selling	them	to	recycling	companies.
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assembly meetings are usually described as “chaotic”. “it was almost im-
possible to fix an agenda, not to talk about following it”, states a former member 
of the asamblea de núñez (male, 54, with previous political experience). it is 
frequently underscored by activists turned into assembly members as well as by 
assembly members turned into activists that in those conditions it was impossible 
to run a true “political discussion”:
[After	practical	issues	were	addressed]	there	was	no	time	left	for	dis-
cussion.	There	were	so	many	activities	 that	 it	was	soon	midnight,		
a.m.	and	nothing	had	been	discussed.	So	another	space	was	created	
where	it	would	be	possible	to	discuss	a	little	more.	We	were	few,	just	
the	activists	and	some	neighbors	(…)	[Since	then]	the	plenary	assem-
bly	started	to	be	very	organized	and	expeditious	(Male,	,	Asamblea	
0	de	Diciembre	de	Flores,	party	activist)
Thus, it was not long before “official” opportunities for political discussion 
were confined to special events –typically, all-day weekend activities organized 
around the presentation and discussion of some specific subject– and to special-
ized committees (“committee for political analysis”, “discussion workshop”, 
“debate group”) aimed at “synthesizing” and “raising issues” that were to be later 
introduced into the plenary assembly. This notwithstanding, substantial debates 
continued to take place in assemblies all the time, usually triggered by practical 
issues. “everything in the assembly led to political discussion”, states a member 
of the asamblea de castro barros y rivadavia. “from setting up a soup kitchen 
to whether or not to distribute food packets” (male, 36, with no prior political 
experience). according to an activist from flores, heated discussions about the 
legitimacy of private property took place there when the possibility was consid-
ered of seizing an unoccupied estate as the cold weather made it impossible to 
continue meeting outdoors. in other assemblies, social issues and policies, gov-
ernmental handouts and social rights were thoroughly discussed each time prob-
lems arose related to the organization of the assembly’s solidarity undertakings. 
last but not least, as a result of its unprecedented character assemblies displayed 
still another noteworthy trait: that of hosting a score of self-reflective practices, 
including constant discussion about what an assembly was and should be and 
what their horizontal practices were about.
Vote or Consensus
a widely discussed issue was that of the decision-making procedures that were more 
compatible with –and more conducive to– horizontality. Two of them are mentioned 
	 	At	the	same	time	it	was	considered	to	be	unadvisable	to	introduce	deep	politi-
cal	discussions	in	plenary	meetings,	as	they	would	probably	chase	away	those	who	
considered	themselves	to	be	“plain	neighbors”,	interested	in	“getting	things	done”	but	
reluctant	to	“discuss	politics”.
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by equally numerous groups of interviewees as the form adopted by decision-mak-
ing in their own assemblies: the holding of a vote and the search for consensus.
Whereas some people assume that decision by majority vote is the “natural” 
decision-making process due to its “obviously” democratic character, others say 
that their assemblies only embraced it at the beginning and just for quantitative 
reasons, or as a last resource when consensus was impossible to reach due either 
to special circumstances, or to the peculiarity of the issue under discussion, but 
that it was abandoned as soon as assemblies shrank due to desertions or when 
splits increased their homogeneity9. it is for the very same reasons that some in-
terviewees state that while the search for consensus was the usual practice within 
committees, decisions in plenary meetings were made by means of a vote by 
show of hands. others, however, express their preference for consensus on the 
claim that its effects were less divisive, and out of the conviction that “more 
people will follow a decision made by the whole” (male, 36, asamblea de castro 
barros y rivadavia, with no previous political experience).
both those that vindicate voting and those who prefer consensus (frequently 
identified with harmony, especially by those with little political experience) do it 
out of the conviction that the procedure of their choice is the most “horizontal” 
and “democratic” one. at the same time, criticisms directed both to voting and 
to consensus (and especially to the latter, often described as “more original” and 
“more difficult” to practice) are centered on two issues: their democratic defi-
ciencies and their operational limitations. “i am not going to tell you that [con-
sensus] is that democratic (…) people who disagreed on something left”, says a 
member of the multisectorial de san cristóbal (female, 31 years, party activist). 
“Those who are used to activism do not find any trouble in debating [in search 
for consensus]. but there are other neighbors who are not used to it”, points out 
a former member of the asamblea de olivos (male, 60, with political experience 
and party affiliation), implicitly maintaining that regarding voting, by contrast, 
everybody stands on an equal footing. in any case, both discussion in the search 
for consensus and voting as a way of settling a discussion are admittedly subject 
to manipulation and “aparateadas” –that is, to the intervention of party activists 
able to distort them and twist them in their favor:
9	 	Quantity	and	heterogeneity	were	usually	celebrated	but	at	this	point	they	tend	
to	be	recognized	as	highly	problematic.	“At	the	beginning	it	was	completely	crazy.	
Eighty	thousand	proposals	were	thrown	and	then	they	were	voted	by	show	of	hands.	
Anybody	who	happened	to	be	around	joined	and	raised	their	hand,	it	was	meaning-
less”,	confesses	a	 former	member	of	 the	Asamblea	del	Botánico.	 “It	 took	soooooo	
long	 until	 each	 committee	 submitted	 all	 its	 weekly	 activities	 for	 voting	 that	 they	
ended	up	being	voted	by	ten	people”,	recalls	another	one	from	Flores	Sur.	“It	was	a	
never-ending	story.	Sometimes	it	was	half	past	one	in	the	morning	and	we	were	in	the	
park	since	eight	(…)	Then	the	cold	weather	started	and	we	had	to	set	limits	to	hori-
zontality	and	be	more	expedite”,	agrees	a	member	of	the	Asamblea	0	de	Diciembre	
de	Flores.	The	vast	majority	therefore	agree	on	that	“it	was	possible	to	work	better	
when	there	were	less	people”,	as	an	assembly	member	from	Almagro	puts	it.
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At	the	outset	everything	was	subject	to	vote	because	activists	from	politi-
cal	parties	are	very	used	to	voting;	it	is	a	way	to	impose	their	views	(Male,	
49,	Asamblea	de	Palermo	Viejo,	with	previous	political	experience)
[The	search	for	consensus]	can	be	useful	to	soften	difficult	situations.	
But	there	are	moments	when	I	prefer	a	vote.	Because	in	the	search	for	
consensus	you	can	get	to	constantly	introduce	your	views	(Male,	4,	
Asamblea	de	Palermo	Viejo,	with	previous	partisan	experience)
Very	heated	discussions	[took	place]	that	ended	up	with	a	vote	that	did	
not	settle	the	question	(…)	Losing	an	election	was	not	easily	accepted	
so	 the	 losers	manipulated	 the	whole	 thing	 in	 order	 to	 twist	 it	 from	
within.	There	was	a	certain	resistance	to	accepting	the	decision	of	the	
majority	(Male,	47,	Asamblea	0	de	Diciembre	de	Flores,	with	previous	
political	and	union	experience)
At	 voting	 time,	when	everything	was	almost	over,	 discussion	 erupt-
ed.	(…)	There	were	three	stages:	first,	proposals;	later,	debate	of	pro-
posals,	and	nobody	discussed.	And	when	voting	time	arrived…	blah	
blah	blah.	We	who	had	no	experience	were	a	ping-pong	ball.	There	
were	 the	MST	 (Movimiento	Socialista	de	 los	Trabajadores)	 and	 the	
PO	(Partido	Obrero).And	the	discussion	was	the	ball,	which	bounced	
back	and	forth…	You	felt	like	you	had	arrived	at	the	cinema	to	watch	
a	film	that	had	already	started.	Those	were	really	old	debates	and	you	
didn’t	get	a	thing	(Female,	6,	ex-Asamblea	de	Lanús,	with	no	prior	
political	experience)
Along with the deficiencies of both mechanisms in terms of democratic quality, 
also the quality of the resulting decisions is put into question. The consensual 
practice is the preferred target for the second type of criticisms. Whereas some 
consider as an unavoidable side effect the fact that proposals on which agree-
ment cannot be reached are left aside so as to avoid conflict, others take it as a 
severe structural problem located at the root of assemblies’ lack of agility and ef-
ficacy. The latter is the stance taken by several interviewees who repeatedly point 
out that through consensus “very few” or “too obvious” things could be decided 
–things such as going out and protest against the presence in the neighborhood 
of a former dictatorship’s public official or to attend a demonstration on the an-
niversary of the 1976 military coup. but decisions reached through consensus 
on more controversial issues were “liquified”; that is the reason why a vote was 
resorted to “when the issue deserved it”. “The search for consensus”, explains a 
former member of the asamblea de núñez, “is like a polishing process that goes 
on until the thing is totally blunt and does not cut anymore”. in addition, it is “not 
very operational”: “there is maybe one person in disagreement and you spend 
five hours braining yourself to approach positions with whatever the guy thinks” 
(male, 54, with previous political experience). several interviewees also add the 
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inconvenience that decisions thus made do not leave anybody happy, so they do 
not prompt enough commitment at the time of implementation.
The most radical criticism against the assembly format, though, is that which 
contests both decision-making mechanisms on the basis of the ascertainment of 
a link between emergency, decision and leadership. in the words of a former as-
sembly member from olivos:
You	cannot	live	in	a	permanent	state	of	assembly.	(…)	Some	decisions	
have	to	be	urgently	made,	there	must	be	some	representation,	a	small	
committee	 to	make	urgent	decisions.	Horizontality	 is	fine,	but	 there	
are	decisions	that	have	to	be	made	by	somebody.	(…)	In	an	emergency	
you	cannot	summon	a	general	assembly	(Male,	60,	with	partisan	ex-
perience)
The arising of leaderships
Horizontality	was	not	 just	 a	 practice	 but	 also	 an	 aim	 that	was	 “al-
most	obsessively”	pursued.	“Everything	was	democratically	decided”,	
explains	 an	 interviewee.	 “Each	 time	 it	was	 also	decided	how	a	 cer-
tain	 issue	was	to	be	decided”	(Male,	50,	activist).	For	many	present	
and	past	assembly	members,	however,	horizontality	was	not	a	full	fact	
but	mostly	a	regulatory	ideal,	a	horizon	that	kept	moving	away.	Con-
sequently,	many	insist	that,	although	there	were	no	“titles”	or	“hier-
archies”	 in	the	assemblies,	 there	were	 indeed	“people	with	different	
interests”,	with	different	“histories”,	“careers”,	“training”	or	“person-
alities”,	all	of	which	established	clear	differences	among	them.	These	
were	not	expressed	in	terms	of	the	right	to	speak	(which	was	in	prin-
ciple	accessible	to	all),	but	in	terms	of	the	extent	to	which	each	one’s	
words	were	taken	into	account.	“Proposals”,	states	a	member	of	the	
Asamblea	0	de	Diciembre	de	Flores,	“had	a	different	weight	accord-
ing	to	who	said	them”	(Male,	4,	with	previous	political	experience).
Few	consider	that	the	sprouting	of	this	kind	of	differences	could	
have	 been	 avoided;	 the	 majority	 considers	 it	 instead	 as	 a	 natural	
process	 as	 they	 acknowledge	 the	 presence	 of	 “natural	 hierarchies”,	
“spontaneous	leaderships”	and	“natural-born	leaders”.	“All	processes	
yield	leaders”,	says	a	politically	experienced	member	of	the	Asamblea	
Popular	de	Liniers.	“Who	is	the	one	who	says	‘let’s	do	this’?	There	are	
always	leaders,	natural	commanders”	(Male,	47).
Since	what	is	at	stake	is	the	differential	of	attention	given	to	the	
word	of	some	above	that	of	others	within	a	space	characterized,	above	
all,	by	the	production	of	discourse,	it	is	only	natural	that	those	who	
are	considered	to	be	“points	of	reference”	are	in	the	first	place	those	
who	“know	how	to	speak”,	have	 “rhetorical	abilities”,	 show	“a	high	
cultural	level”	or	bring	in	some	useful	knowledge	on	a	relevant	field.	
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Those	who	fit	that	description	were	usually	professionals	and	intellec-
tuals	who	“could	easily	occupy	all	the	space	with	their	ideas”;	in	other	
assemblies,	however,	the	role	was	played	by	people	with	a	“history	of	
activism”	or	“party	experience”	 thanks	 to	which	“they	knew	how	to	
handle	situations”	(Male,	4,	ex-Asamblea	del	Botánico,	with	previous	
political	experience).	In	either	case,	the	effect	caused	disappointment	
with	the	alleged	pedagogical	virtues	of	debate:
[At	the	beginning	we	thought]	‘fine,	we	have	people	who	did	not	finish	
elementary	school	and	who	join	because	they	want	security,	they	want	
their	children	to	be	able	to	safely	go	through	the	park,	and	at	the	same	
time	we	have	a	psychologist,	an	economist,	people	with	previous	po-
litical	participation.	Our	discussions	are	going	to	oscillate	and	we	are	
going	to	grow	up	together.	The	lady	who	is	worried	that	their	children	
can	walk	through	the	park	is	going	to	learn	from	the	other	one,	and	
the	latter	is	going	to	learn	from	her’.	I	thought	that	was	going	to	yield	a	
change.	But	no,	the	neighbor	simply	left	(…)	People	who	came	as	plain	
neighbors,	without	much	of	an	intellect,	had	to	give	way	to	those	who	
knew,	because	those	who	knew	were	the	visionaries	(Female,	55,	ex-
Asamblea	de	Monserrat,	with	previous	political	experience)
Leaderships	were	built	not	just	on	the	abovementioned	resources,	all	
of	which	existed	prior	to	and	independently	from	the	assembly	experi-
ence.	They	were	also	fed	by	other	resources	accumulated	on	the	spot.	
Thus,	 for	 example,	 the	 authority	 recognized	 to	 the	 “old	 guard”,	 that	
is	to	say,	to	“the	comrades	who	formed	the	assembly,	who	worked	for	
its	construction”	(Male,	4,	Asamblea	0	de	Diciembre	de	Flores,	with	
previous	political	 experience)	 and	 to	 “those	who	are	 always	 there	 to	
organize”	(Male,	57,	Asamblea	Popular	de	Pompeya,	with	vast	political	
experience),	individuals	who	“after	two	or	three	years	have	become	ac-
tivists”	(Male,	,	Asamblea	0	de	Diciembre	de	Flores,	party	activist).	
Indeed,	many	interviewees	establish	a	link	between	leadership	and	the	
burden	of	responsibility.	“We	changed	towards	a	more	organic	structure	
based	on	degrees	of	responsibility”,	explains	our	assembly	member.	“It	
is	not	the	same	when	a	comrade	speaks	who	works	there	all	day	and	
becomes	a	point	of	reference,	than	when	somebody	else	speaks”,	ratifies	
an	activist	from	the	Multisectorial	de	San	Cristóbal	(Female,	).
For	many	of	our	interviewees,	the	sprouting	of	leaderships	with	
some	 decision	 power	 amounts	 to	 the	 definite	 loss	 of	 horizontality.	
According	to	others,	however,	horizontality	 is	able	 to	survive,	albeit	
under	a	modified	 form.	The	 latter	provide	at	 least	 three	arguments	
to	support	their	position.	First	of	all,	the	fact	that	leaderships	arose	
spontaneously	and	leaders	were	not	appointed	nor	had	a	position	to	
which	to	cling	or	 from	which	to	behave	as	“official	representatives”	
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continued	to	establish	a	great	difference	between	assemblies	and	es-
tablished	 political	 institutions.	 In	 the	 former,	 but	 not	 in	 the	 latter,	
compliance	was	 voluntary	 and	 leaderships	 needed	 to	 be	 constantly	
subject	 to	plebiscite,	 so	 to	 speak.	 “There	were	natural	 leaderships”,	
recognizes	a	member	of	the	Asamblea	de	Castro	Barros	y	Rivadavia,	
“but	not	a	leader	that	had	to	be	obeyed”	(Male,	6,	without	previous	
political	experience).	Secondly,	as	the	existence	of	leaders	was	often	
severely	questioned,	ways	were	found	to	limit	its	effects	by	means	of	
devices	such	as	rotation,	the	separation	of	functions	by	areas,	and	the	
collective	exercise	of	responsibilities.	In	the	third	place,	our	interview-
ees	remind	us	that	only	“operational	decisions”	and	“execution”	were	
carried	out	vertically	and	by	small	groups.	“Fundamental	decisions”,	
by	contrast,	kept	coming	from	plenary	meetings.	That	is,	even	though	
horizontality	was	not	“complete”	and	equality	was	no	 longer	“abso-
lute”,	there	still	existed	a	place	where	“everybody,	from	the	one	with	
the	 biggest	 responsibilities	 to	 the	 one	 who	 participates	 less”	 could	
discuss	on	an	equal	footing.	“Management	requires	different	degrees	
of	 responsibility	 but	 even	 so	 the	 assembly	 spirit	 remains	 and	 deci-
sions	are	made	by	everybody”	(Male,	,	Asamblea	0	de	Diciembre	de	
Flores,	party	activist).	Once	this	point	reached,	nevertheless,	the	ap-
preciation	for	the	previously	cherished	principle	of	horizontality	had	
declined	from	the	perspective	of	assembly	activists,	now	a	majority	in	
the	thinned	assemblies	that	still	remained:
[At	the	beginning]	everybody	was	worth	a	vote;	[it	was]	too	horizontal,	
too	democratic	because	people	who	actively	participated	were	worth	the	
same	as	those	who	just	came	and	listened	once	a	week	(Male,	4,	Asamb-
lea	0	de	Diciembre	de	Flores,	with	previous	political	experience)
Participation in the Assembly of assemblies:
Representatives or delegates?
In	mid-January,	00	 the	assemblies	 recently	 formed	 in	Buenos	Ai-
res	started	to	meet	each	Sunday	in	Parque	Centenario	so	as	to	share	
and	coordinate	their	various	activities.	Although	at	the	beginning	for	
many	people	it	embodied	a	“utopia”	and	a	“dream	turned	into	reality”,	
the	Interbarrial	was	soon	the	stage	for	severe	and	even	violent	disa-
greements	on	the	ideas	of	deliberation,	representation	and	the	links	
between	them.
	 The	“manipulation”	and	“maneuvers”	staged	by	leftist	politi-
cal	parties	in	the	Interbarrial	have	been	widely	and	largely	criticized.	
What	 interests	 us	 here	 is	 the	 charge	 that	 true	 deliberation	was	 ab-
sent	 from	 it	 due	 to	 partisan	 interferences.	 Several	 interviewees	 tell	
that	 parties	 “came	 with	 their	 party	 programs	 and	 discussed	 them	
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with	others	who	had	another	party	program.	(…)	And	unfortunately	
what	happened	was	what	usually	happens	in	trade	union	assemblies:	
the	 vote	 took	 place	 at	 the	 last	minute,	when	 three	 quarters	 [of	 the	
participants]	 had	 already	 left”	 (Female,	 49,	 ex-Asamblea	 de	 Parque	
Chacabuco,	with	previous	political	experience).	“You	went	there	as	an	
independent	assembly	member	and	you	quickly	found	out	that	there	
were	prior	alignments,	which	was	not	supposed	to	be	the	rule	of	the	
game”	(Male,	54,	ex-Asamblea	de	Núñez,	with	previous	political	expe-
rience).
Party	behavior	is	also	held	responsible	for	the	excessive	distance	
that	soon	became	apparent	between	discussions	and	reality.	On	one	
hand,	“discussions	in	Parque	Centenario	had	nothing	to	do	with	what	
was	discussed	in	the	assembly”,	points	out	a	member	of	the	Asamblea	
0	de	Diciembre	de	Flores	(Male,	4,	with	previous	political	experien-
ce);	on	the	other	hand,	“lots	of	politics	was	discussed	that	was	comple-
tely	unrelated	to	social	processes.	(…)	Twenty-two	mobilizations	were	
voted	for	a	single	week.	Twenty-two!	And	nobody	attended”,	explains	
a	member	 of	 the	Asamblea	 de	 San	Telmo	 (Male,	 5).	 According	 to	
several	interviewees,	the	problem	was	that	leftist	parties	“arrived	with	
their	handbooks”	and	“interpreted	what	was	happening	on	the	basis	
of	them”	(Male,	9,	Asamblea	de	Palermo	Viejo,	with	no	prior	political	
experience).	Therefore	the	circulation	of	slogans	such	as	“All	power	to	
the	assemblies”,	exposed	by	a	former	member	of	the	same	assembly	as	
an	example	of	the	tendency	“to	bring	categories	and	experiences	from	
other	places”	(Female,	,	with	limited	prior	political	experience).
Interferences	 of	 parties	were	 real,	 and	 parties	were	 indeed	 res-
ponsible	 for	 the	 scandalous	 ending	of	 the	 Interbarrial meetings.	Ne-
vertheless,	their	behavior	was	contingent.	How	different	would	things	
have	been	 if	 those	 interferences	had	not	 taken	place?	This	question	
is	implicitly	addressed	by	those	who	criticize	the	very	existence	of	an	
“assembly	of	assemblies”,	a	structure	of	second	degree	in	which	each	
assembly	participates	by	means	of	the	appointment	of	representatives	
or	delegates0.	“It	was	agreed	on	sending	a	representative.	(…)	Then	we	
had	five	people	voting	on	something	and	expecting	compliance	with	
it”,	says	a	former	member	of	the	Asamblea	de	Flores	Sur	(Female,	6,	
with	 limited	prior	political	experience).	 “This	 relapse	on	representa-
0	 	Dictionary	definitions	 for	both	 terms	are	 similar	and	 include	 reciprocal	 refer-
ences;	 at	 the	 same	 time,	 both	 terms	 are	 often	 used	 interchangeably	 by	 our	 inter-
viewees.	However,	 the	description	that	they	provide	for	the	task	entrusted	to	their	
“representatives”	or	“delegates”	in	the	Interbarrial	fits	the	concept	of	delegation	as	it	
has	been	shaped	by	political	theory.	In	that	sense,	unlike	representatives	within	the	
framework	of	representative	systems,	delegates	are	bound	by	an	imperative	mandate,	
are	instantly	removable	and	perform	for	brief	and	rotating	terms.
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tion	put	 into	question	everything	we	were	 looking	 for	 in	 the	assem-
blies”,	explains	a	member	of	the	Asamblea	de	Palermo	Viejo.	That	is	
the	reason	why	representatives	were	mostly	conceived	of	as	delegates.	
In	the	first	place,	they	were	subject	to	precise	instructions	(“in	writing,	
[because]	there	was	so	much	distrust”,	recalls	a	politically	experienced	
assembly	member	from	Liniers).	“It	had	been	decided	that	they	should	
carry	a	mandate	and	had	to	vote	on	what	each	assembly	had	already	
discussed”	 (Male,	 9,	 Asamblea	 de	 Palermo	Viejo,	with	 no	 previous	
political	experience).	Delegates’	functions	were	consequently	limited	to	
conveying	the	positions	of	their	respective	assemblies.
Secondly,	delegate	rotation	 is	often	emphasized.	Every	week	“it	
was	voted	on	who	would	represent	the	assembly	and	what	they	had	
to	say.	They	rotated”,	explains	a	member	of	the	Asamblea	0	de	Di-
ciembre	de	Flores	(Male,	,	party	activist).	Rotation	is	here	unders-
tood	as	a	mechanism	 to	avoid	 specialization;	as	a	 former	assembly	
member	from	Lanús	Centro	puts	it,	it	was	“a	form	of	[avoiding	that]	
people	were	 type-cast	according	 to	 the	duties	 they	perform”	and	of	
preventing	the	concentration	of	power	that	results	from	“always	doing	
the	 same	 things	 and	monopolizing	 certain	 roles”	 (Female,	 ,	with	
brief	prior	political	experience).	Finally,	the	revocability	of	delegates	
is	also	mentioned.	“For	example”,	recalls	 the	above-quoted	member	
of	the	Asamblea	0	de	Diciembre	de	Flores,	“one	of	them	said	some	
things	that	had	not	been	voted	on	nor	discussed,	and	he	could	not	go	
any	longer”	(Male,	,	party	activist).
However,	 things	were	 not	 as	 easy	 in	 practice.	Most	 assemblies	
(those	that	were	not	under	the	dominion	of	activists	from	some	party)	
proclaimed	themselves	“sovereign”	and	insisted	that	delegates	should	
stick	to	the	limited	functions	already	described.	But	that	“was	not	what	
parties	wanted,	because	 they	mobilized	 their	 apparatus	on	Sunday,	
they	raised	their	hands	and	that	was	it”,	explains	an	assembly	member	
from	Palermo	Viejo,	a	“common	neighbor”	with	no	previous	political	
experience	(Male,	9).	“The	PO	wanted	an	assembly	subordinated	to	
the	decisions	made	in	Parque	Centenario	while	the	vast	majority	of	us	
thought	it	was	a	sovereign	assembly”	(Male,	54,	Espacio	Asambleario	
de	Parque	Patricios,	with	previous	political	experience).
The	underlying	conflict	ran	deeper	than	what	is	made	apparent	in	
the	obvious	attempts	by	leftist	parties	to	“take	control”	of	the	assem-
bly	movement	by	conferring	a	certain	direction	and	a	precise	content	
to	its	actions.	Indeed,	if	the	Interbarrial	had	functioned	according	to	
	This	element	 is	also	questioned	by	some	activists	for	whom	their	“total	 lack	of	
structure”	is	what	prevented	the	assemblies	to	replace	citizenship	participation	when	
the	general	level	of	activity	began	to	decline.
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its	own	principles	–that	is	to	say,	if	its	activities	had	not	undergone	the	
stress	caused	by	party	activism–	the	problem	would	have	presented	
itself	in	terms	of	the	possibilities	for	deliberation	in	a	system	of	de-
legation	based	on	imperative	mandate.	Numerous	interviewees	state	
that	deliberation	in	Parque	Centenario	was	hindered	by	the	presence	
of	activists	who	came	with	their	slogans	and	their	decisions	made	so-
mewhere	else	and	tried	to	impose	them	on	the	rest.	Nevertheless,	if	
that	had	not	happened	and	the	Interbarrial	had	remained	faithful	to	
the	concept	of	representation	as	delegation,	it	would	have	neverthe-
less	been	unable	to	become	a	space	for	deliberation	but,	at	the	most,	a	
space	for	the	exchange	of	experiences	and	for	the	presentation	of	pro-
posals	for	coordination	that	would	have	to	be	sent	to	the	assemblies	in	
the	neighborhoods	and	come	back	with	an	affirmative	or	negative	vote	
a	week	later.	In	other	words,	a	representative	can	only	deliberate	fre-
ely	if	he	is	allowed	to	change	his	mind	when	feeling	compelled	by	an	
argument	better	than	his	own,	which	cannot	happen	(simply	because	
the	rules	prohibit	it)	where	representatives	are	subject	to	precise	ins-
tructions	from	their	principals.
Conclusions
Contrary	to	what	is	usually	expected,	the	crisis	of	representation	–ty-
pically	linked	to	decades	of	governmental	low	performance	and/or	bad	
behavior–	did	not	lead	in	our	case	to	a	rise	in	authoritarian	preferen-
ces	among	the	citizenry	but	to	a	surge	of	deeply	democratic	impulses,	
based	on	the	understanding	–as	quoted	by	one	of	our	interviewees–	
that	“the	cure	for	the	evils	of	democracy	is	more	democracy”.	Indeed,	
most	of	our	interviewees	either	celebrate	the	existence	of	elections	as	
a	necessary	condition	for	democracy,	or	they	simply	take	it	for	gran-
ted.	Most,	if	not	all	of	them,	moreover,	explicitly	state	that	elections	
are	by	no	means	sufficient	as	far	as	the	quality	of	democracy	is	con-
cerned.	Thus,	the	process	described	as	well	as	its	participants’	state	of	
mind	need	to	be	apprehended	in	relation	to	the	issue	of	the	quality	of	
democracy	rather	than	to	that	of	its	consolidation.	In	other	words,	the	
question	that	is	once	and	again	put	forward	is	not	whether	or	for	how	
long	democracy	will	last	in	Argentina,	but	what	kind	of	democracy	is	
the	one	that	we	already	have	and	whether	we	like	it	and	intend	to	keep	
it	that	way	or,	instead,	prefer	to	change	it	for	the	better.
As	has	been	shown,	all	possible	attitudes	towards	the	system	of	
representation	are	present	among	assembly	members,	not	necessarily	
under	 the	 form	of	 consistent	 alternatives,	 and	 in	 various	 combina-
tions.	Among	them	can	be	mentioned	the	rejection	of	the	separation	
between	 the	 represented	 and	 their	 representatives;	 the	 rejection	 of	
the	existing	representative	bond	or	of	the	“political	class”	as	shaped	
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within	the	framework	of	a	“delegative	democracy”;	and	the	rehabili-
tation	of	the	imperative	mandate	and	therefore	of	direct	democracy.	
While	according	to	some	interviewees	 the	QSVT	translated	 into	 the	
reclamation	of	the	end	of	representation	and	the	establishment	of	a	
system	of	direct	and/or	participative	democracy,	according	to	others	
the	realization	of	the	slogan	encompassed	the	revocation	of	all	repre-
sentatives’	terms	and	the	call	for	general	elections	so	as	to	achieve	a	
total	renovation	of	the	“political	class”;	last	but	not	least,	a	third	group	
rejected	the	literal	understanding	of	the	motto	(or	accepted	it	as	such	
only	when	applied	in	a	restricted	way,	such	as	in	the	demand	for	the	
resignation	of	all	Supreme	Court	Justices)	but	happily	embraced	its	
potential	for	the	inclusion	of	the	most	diverse	reclamations	under	an	
umbrella	of	creative	provocation.
Consequently,	 the	 role	 and	meaning	 of	 the	 assemblies	 are	 also	
interpreted	in	various	ways.	Some	think	of	them	as	“an	instrument	for	
a	direct,	non-delegative	democracy”.	“Direct	democracy”,	 in	turn,	 is	
sometimes	differentiated	from	“participative	democracy”	in	that	the	
former	would	require	a	much	greater	involvement	of	the	citizenry	in	
the	decision-making	process.	Thus,	several	interviewees	refer	to	“di-
rect	democracy”	as	the	main	aim	to	achieve	while	they	cling	to	“parti-
cipative	democracy”	as	a	second-best	alternative	in	case	the	preferable	
one	was	not	 achievable.	 In	 other	 cases,	 “participative”	 and	 “direct”	
democracy	are	used	as	interchangeable	expressions	that	refer	to	the	
same	object	 –the	practice	of	direct	democracy–	which	 some	people	
consider	now	to	be	“possible”	due	to	the	existence	of	“the	technology	
to	know	what	people	want”,	at	least	at	the	local	level.
For	 some	 assembly	members,	 assemblies	 embodied	 a	 “political	
alternative”,	 either	 “to	 administer	 or	 to	 control	 the	 administration”.	
In	the	former	sense,	in	particular,	the	experience	tends	to	be	conside-
red	as	a	failure.	Others,	on	the	contrary,	maintain	that	“the	assemblies	
did	not	need	to	be	an	alternative	political	direction	because	they	never	
intended	to	(…)	Because	they	were	born	as	something	different,	as	a	
place	for	rebellion	and	for	a	democratic	practice	of	a	different	natu-
re”	(Male,	54,	Espacio	Asambleario	de	Parque	Patricios,	with	previous	
political	experience).	In	any	case,	even	those	who	apprehend	them	in	
those	terms	feel	sorry	that	those	impulses	and	practices	could	not	be	
institutionalized	and	thus	kept	alive.
From	another	perspective,	assemblies	are	not	understood	as	en-
compassing	an	alternative,	full-blown	system	but	just	as	a	mechanism	
capable	of	functioning	within	the	existing	representative	democracies	
with	 the	aim	of	making	 them	“more	participative”.	This	possibility,	
however,	is	not	equally	valued	by	everybody:	for	some	it	is	a	second-
best	option	while	others	see	it	as	the	optimum	to	reach.	Among	the	
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latter,	a	former	member	of	the	Asamblea	de	Palermo	Viejo	concludes	
that	 “participation	and	 representation	are	 two	different	 things.	 (…)	
One	does	not	need	to	eliminate	the	other	and	together	they	amount	to	
democracy”	(Female,		years,	with	little	prior	political	experience).
Besides	the	diversity	of	explanations	provided	to	account	for	the	
decline	 –or,	 according	 to	 some,	 the	 failure–	 of	 the	 assembly	move-
ment,	most	 (if	not	all)	our	 interviewees	believe	 that	 the	causes	 that	
originally	fueled	it	still	remain	in	place.	Many	of	them,	however,	no	
longer	 see	 those	 causes	 in	 the	 original	 terms.	 The	 “political	 class”,	
for	example,	continues	indeed	to	be	the	main	target;	nevertheless,	it	
sometimes	receives	some	credit,	or	at	least	a	suspension	of	disbelief,	
since	many	assembly	members	(present	or	past)	have	deposited	mild	
expectations	on	the	new	government,	despite	it	having	been	born	out	
of	one	of	the	two	big	partners	in	the	so-called	“partidocracia”.	Equa-
lly	numerous	are	the	interviewees	who	complain	instead	that	citizens	
(including	many	assembly	members,	and	especially	former	ones)	have	
diligently	returned	to	the	polls	to	re-legitimate	a	system	that	no	doubt	
still	functions	perversely.	The	most	ideology-driven	activists	go	on	to	
state	 that	 the	assembly	movement	 failed	because	 it	was	not	 radical	
enough,	as	it	did	not	thoroughly	reject	“the	republican	and	represen-
tative	 regime,	 so	when	 the	 government	 says	 ‘go	 vote	 again’,	 people	
just	go	and	vote	again.	(…)	The	change	was	not	so	deep,	that	is	why	
[the	establishment]	backed	down	a	 little	 to	 later	 institutionalize	the	
process,	giving	it	an	electoral	solution”	(Male,	47,	Asamblea	Popular	
de	Liniers,	with	long	prior	political	activism).
As	for	the	impact	of	the	assembly	experience,	the	overwhelming	
majority	of	our	present	and	past	assembly	members	initially	declare	
to	notice	“little”	or	“no”	substantial	change	in	Argentina,	in	Buenos	Ai-
res	or	even	in	their	neighborhoods.	Most	interviewees	with	absolutely	
no	previous	political	experience	say	that	the	fact	of	getting	involved	
in	an	experience	with	“participative”	“deliberative”,	“direct”	or	“non-
delegative”	democracy	(according	to	their	different	expressions)	has	
instead	changed	them,	shifting	their	views	and	their	lives	as	a	whole.	
By	contrast,	those	with	a	long	history	of	activism	see	their	assembly	
phase	as	“just	one	more	experience”	–innovative	and	interesting,	no	
doubt,	but	in	no	way	a	“point	of	no	return”	or	a	“loss	of	innocence”.	
Both	groups,	however,	 end	up	agreeing	 that	at	 least	 two	 things	did	
change	in	Argentine	politics	after	all.	Firstly,	they	claim	that	despite	
the	subsequent	process	of	“political	normalization”,	the	experience	of	
insurrection	and	popular	self-organization	remains	in	a	state	of	laten-
cy	to	be	activated	as	soon	as	“the	next	crisis”	strikes.	Secondly,	they	
state	that	although	“nobody	went	away”,	the	threat	embodied	in	the	
presence	of	a	vigilant	citizenry	now	aware	of	the	limits	of	representa-
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tive	democracy	has	set	stricter	limits	to	power	abuse.	That	is	precisely	
what,	according	to	some	of	them,	accounts	for	the	relatively	“progre-
ssive”	 characteristics	 of	 the	 “normalizing”	Kirchner	 administration,	
which	–they	claim–	felt	compelled	to	incorporate,	at	least	through	lip	
service,	many	of	the	reclamations	put	forward	by	mobilized	citizens.
The	 assembly	 experience	 also	 resulted	 in	 the	 reformulation	 of	
many	participants’	 prior	 expectations,	 not	 just	 in	 terms	 of	 the	 uto-
pian	character	of	 certain	hopes	 that	grew	 in	 the	context	of	Decem-
ber,	00,	but	also	where	certain	aspects	of	representative	systems	are	
concerned.	More	precisely,	the	experience	allowed	for	the	evaluation	
of	 representative	 democracy	 under	 a	 new	 light.	 Take,	 for	 example,	
the	specialization	and	professionalization	of	administrative	 functio-
ns	and	the	roles	performed	by	political	parties	within	a	competitive	
democracy.	Each	and	all	of	them	are	now	revalued	in	contrast	to	the	
“inefficiency”	displayed	by	the	assemblies.	Even	politics	as	a	profes-
sionalized	and	remunerated	activity	has	been	revalued	by	some	inter-
viewees	who	disclose	the	fact	that	they	could	only	devote	themselves	
completely	 to	 their	 assemblies	 during	 the	 several	months	 that	 they	
spent	unemployed,	and	for	 the	simple	reason	that	 they	had	enough	
accumulated	resources	so	as	to	be	able	to	survive	without	a	job.	This	
intuition	is	reinforced	through	the	analysis	of	the	effects	of	the	fast	de-
cline	of	citizen	mobilization	and	the	transformation	of	assemblies	into	
redoubts	of	activists	–either	activists	turned	into	assembly	members	
or	assembly	members	 turned	 into	activists.	 It	 is	 at	 this	point	when	
some	of	our	interviewees	get	to	glimpse	an	unexpected	alternative	to	
representative	democracy.	What	if	the	alternative	to	a	democracy	in	
the	hands	of	professional	politicians	who	are,	after	all,	elected	by	the	
citizenry	through	free	and	clean	elections,	happened	to	be	not	a	hea-
venly	direct	democracy	but,	in	a	context	of	low	popular	participation,	
the	constitution	of	a	 self-selected	group	of	 leaders	 formed	by	 those	
who	have	the	time,	resources,	charisma	or	interest	to	devote	full-time	
to	politics?	Professional	politicians	would	no	 longer	score	so	 low	 if	
compared	to	such	an	aristocracy,	free	of	the	constraints	of	any	insti-
tutionalized	 accountability	mechanism.	A	 conclusion	 follows:	 given	
the	available	options,	 the	most	valuable	aspiration	 to	pursue	might	
be,	after	all,	that	of	a	functioning	representative	democracy	in	which	
professional	politicians	and	public	officials	are	kept	on	a	leash	by	an	
informed	citizenry	capable	and	willing	to	exert	on	them	all	their	avai-
lable	powers	of	monitoring	and	control.
Was	such	a	citizenry	produced	or	expanded	by	the	assembly	ex-
perience	or,	more	broadly	speaking,	by	the	participatory	upsurge	of	
00?	It	is	apparent	that	the	assemblies’	experience	was	disappoin-
ting	 in	many	ways,	as	most	of	 their	 former	members	easily	admit	
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it.	Disillusionment	is	not	only	related	to	the	assemblies’	actual,	con-
crete	and	tangible	results	in	terms	of	the	goods	and	services	delive-
red	and	the	policies	enacted	–which	are	usually	considered	negligi-
ble–	but	also	to	the	limited	satisfaction	brought	by	the	participatory	
experience	 itself,	 related	 in	 turn	 to	 the	 stark	 contrast	between	 the	
huge	expectations	it	fostered	and	the	modest	outcomes	it	produced.	
It	 is	 important	 to	 keep	 in	mind	 that	 the	 experience	we	 examined	
involved	mostly	middle-class	citizens,	at	least	as	far	as	their	cultural	
standpoint	was	concerned.	Thus,	the	democratizing	potential	of	the	
experience	turned	out	to	be	not	just	a	welcome	but	quite	unexpected	
by-product	of	practices	undertaken	with	other	purposes	in	mind	but,	
instead,	an	aim	located	at	the	very	core	of	the	actors’	understanding	
of	their	own	actions.	For	good	or	for	bad,	our	political	actors	hap-
pened	to	be	theoretically	 informed	–though	sometimes	also	a	 little	
confused	out	of	too	much	theory	delivered	in	too	simplified	a	pac-
kage.	 Indeed,	debates	on	how	 to	make	 the	experience	more	 “hori-
zontal”	and	“participatory”	–and,	thus,	more	“democratic”–	(and	on	
how	to	spill	those	effects	onto	its	surroundings,	eventually	reaching	
the	whole	society	and	political	institutions	alike)	took	place	“almost	
obsessively”	in	most	assemblies,	as	some	put	it.	It	must	also	be	ac-
knowledged	that	the	assembly	experience	took	place	in	the	context	
of	a	huge,	total	crisis	that	produced	a	very	peculiar	collective	state	
of	mind	that,	by	definition,	could	not	endure	long.	What	was	left	of	
it	when	the	participatory	effervescence	subdued	and	the	deliberative	
frenzy	receded?	A	few	assemblies	certainly	remained,	but	they	sur-
vived	through	adaptation	and	mutation	into	clientelistic	machines,	
not	quite	different	from	the	local	branches	of	traditional	parties.	As	
for	the	assemblies	that	disappeared,	the	question	is:	did	they	leave	
anything	behind?
It	can	be	claimed	that	they	did.	Besides	the	appraisal	by	several	
individuals	of	what	came	to	be	the	“experience	of	a	lifetime”,	having	
turned	 them	 into	 more	 assertive,	 stronger,	 self-confident	 persons,	
what	they	left	behind	were	certain	criteria	of	what	“democratic”	is	
supposed	to	mean	that	–though	eventually	acknowledged	not	to	be	
fully	applicable	to	“normal”	politics	and	regular	political	institutio-
ns–	were	nevertheless	thought	to	be	useful	to	judge	their	performan-
ce.	In	that	sense,	the	result	was	the	production	of	a	more	critical	citi-
zenry,	that	for	a	couple	of	years	kept	the	government	strictly	in	check.	
For	some	time	indeed,	the	rebellious	experience	stayed	fresh	in	the	
minds	of	politicians,	who	were	truly	concerned	and	even	afraid	of	it	
happening	again.	In	January,	00,	the	Secretary-General	of	the	Pre-
sidency	for	the	Duhalde	administration,	Aníbal	Fernández,	publicly	
stated	that	the	government	needed	to	respond	to	popular	demands	
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such	as	those	put	forward	by	the	cacerolazos	because	if	it	failed	to	do	
so	“the	people	will	kick	us	out”	(La Nación,	/0/0).	In	April,	00,	
Néstor	Kirchner	was	elected	in	the	first	electoral	round	with	roughly	
%	of	the	vote,	and	went	on	to	build	his	basis	of	support	through	
the	 constitution	 of	 a	 “virtual	 electorate”	 –that	 is,	 by	 following	 the	
dictates	of	public	opinion.	Some	“progressive”,	even	“politically	co-
rrect”	decisions	were	rapidly	enacted.	Until	mid-term	congressional	
elections	were	held	 in	 005,	 alleged	 attempts	 at	 “political	 reform”	
(a	collection	of	disparate	changes	 in	political	practices	 that,	 if	 en-
acted,	would	supposedly	turn	representative	democracy	into	either	
a	more	 representative,	 a	more	 responsive,	 a	more	 accountable	 or	
a	more	direct	one)	continued	 to	make	headlines.	Halfway	 into	his	
term,	 though,	 President	Kirchner	 succeeded	 in	 turning	 his	 virtual	
electorate	 into	 an	 actual	 one,	 therefore	 completing	 the	 process	 of	
reconstruction	of	presidential	authority	as	well	as	his	own	basis	of	
support.	Normalcy	had	successfully	been	restored,	substitute	goods	
were	being	delivered;	soon	after,	political	reform	eventually	waned	
into	oblivion.
How	critical,	how	active,	how	assertive	and	how	much	to	fear	a	
citizenry	is	then	to	be	found	in	present	Argentina?	In	a	country	that	
seems	to	regard	crises	as	a	privileged	tool	 for	political	change,	 that	
still	remains	to	be	seen.	
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-00	and	00	Electoral	Results:	Secretaría	Electoral,	Ministerio	del	
Interior,	República	Argentina.
-Indymedia	Argentina	,Centro	de	Medios	Independientes,	http://
argentina.indymedia.org.	
-Information	and	material	produced	by	the	assemblies,	available	on	
their	web	sites	and	on	leftist	parties’	web	sites.	
-Decisions	by	the	Asamblea	Interbarrial,	listed	on	http://www.po.org.
ar/asambleas.
Gabriela Bukstein*
A Time of Opportunities:
The Piquetero Movement and 
Democratization in Argentina
TRIGGERED	BY	THE	DEEP	economic	and	social	crisis	that	culmi-
nated	 in	 00,	 broad	 popular	masses	 took	 to	 the	 streets	 all	 across	
Argentina,	 protesting	 against	 the	 economic	 decline	 and	 hardship	
brought	by	the	recession.	Gradually	giving	rise	to	more	organized	so-
cial	movement	formations,	the	protest	actions	led	to	increased	levels	
of	political	participation	that	in	turn	altered	the	face	of	the	country’s	
democratic	life.
During	the	peak	of	the	crisis,	the	mobilization,	today	known	as	
the	 piqueteros	 movement,	 spread	 throughout	 the	 society,	 gaining	 a	
strong	social	presence	and	the	status	of	an	increasingly	legitimate	po-
litical	force	on	the	national	arena.	
Within	the	past	five	years,	the	movement	has	become	partly	incor-
porated	within	the	structures	of	governmental	administration,	wielding	
political	power	in	social	policy	decisions	and	on	the	human	rights	plat-
form	through	the	organs	of	regional	government.	In	this	paper,	I	review	
the	ways	in	which	the	movement	has	been	able	to	influence	the	direc-
tion	and	outlook	of	politics	at	the	local	level,	discussing	the	movement’s	
ability	to	shape	governmental	policy	in	the	Province	of	Buenos	Aires.	In	
*	 Master’s	-	Political	Sciences.	Bachelor’s	Degree	of	Arts,	and	Professor	of	Sociol-
ogy	–	University	of	Buenos	Aires.	Researcher	-	Institute	“Gino	Germani”.
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particular,	my	paper	focuses	on	one	of	the	many	“Unemployed	Work-
ers	Movements”	 (Movimientos	de	Trabajadores	Desocupados	 -	MTD)	
founded	by	the	piqueteros,	the	MTD-Evita,	assessing	its	actions	and	out-
comes	from	the	normative	standpoint	of	representative	democracy.
I	will	concentrate	on	three	lines	of	inquiry:
	
What	is	MTD?	This	part	of	my	paper	addresses	the	beginning	
of	the	social	movement.	Which	organizations,	groups,	and	in-
dividuals	became	part	of	MTD?
How	is	grassroots	success	channeled	into	traditional	forms	of	
democratic	participation?
In	which	ways	has	the	interaction	between	political	actors	and	
the	MTD-Evita	 contributed	 to	a	greater	participation	of	 civil	
society	sectors	in	decision-making	structures,	and	to	transpar-
ency	and	accountability	in	politics	more	generally?
A	Social	Movement	is	defined	by	Tilly	as	a	series	of	contentious	per-
formances,	displays	and	campaigns	by	which	ordinary	people	made	
collective	 claims	 on	 others	 (Tilly	 004).	 According	 to	 Tilly,	 social	
movements	are	the	main	way	for	citizen’s	participation	in	public	poli-
tics	(Tilly	004:).	That	is	to	say,	it	is	a	collective	attempt	to	further	a	
common	interest	or	secure	a	common	goal,	through	collective	action	
outside	the	sphere	of	established	institutions.
Anthony	Giddens	(95)	has	identified	four	distinct	areas	in	which	
social	movements	operate	in	modern	societies:
Democratic	 movements,	 concerned	 with	 the	 establishing	 or	
maintaining	political	rights;
Labor	 movements,	 concerned	 with	 defensive	 control	 of	 the	
workplace	and	with	the	contesting	and	transforming	the	more	
general	distribution	of	economical	power;
Ecological	movements,	concerned	with	limiting	environmental	
and	social	damage	resulting	from	transformation	of	the	natu-
ral	world	by	social	action;	and
Peace	movements,	concerned	with	challenging	the	pervasive	in-
fluence	of	military	power	and	aggressive	forms	of	nationalism.
In	this	context,	the	Argentine	“Unemployed	Workers	Movements”	or,	
collectively,	MTD,	have	attracted	 the	 interest	of	 academic	 research-
ers	approaching	 the	 topic	of	movements	and	democratization	 from	
different	perspectives.	Recent	book-length	studies	include	Genealogía 
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
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de la revuelta	by	Raul	Zibechi;	Entre la ruta y el barrio	by	Maristella	
Svampa	and	Sebastián	Pereyra;	Piqueteros, notas para una tipología by	
Miguel	Mazzeo;	and	Piqueteros, una mirada histórica by	Iván	Schnei-
der	Mansilla	and	Rodrigo	Conti.	We	could	also	note	the	several	case	
studies	made	in	the	province	of	Santiago	del	Estero	by	Mariana	Fari-
netti,	who	in	his	“Violencia	y	risa	contra	la	política	en	el	Santiagueña-
zo”	contributes	to	our	understanding	of	the	complexity	contained	in	
the	processes	of	pueblada,	relativizing	linear	analysis	of	an	action;	the	
work	done	by	Javier	Auyero	in	Cutral-Có,	for	example	in	his	“La	vida	
en	un	piquete,”	which	gives	an	account	of	the	“prepolitical”	phase	in	
the	gestation	of	puebladas	and	of	the	impact	of	the	neoliberal	trans-
formation	on	the	processes	of	mutual	recognition	and	identification	
among	 the	 subjects;	 or	 by	Maristella	 Svampa,	who	 investigates	 the	
reconstruction	processes	behind	the	piquetero	movement	in	General	
Mosconi;	and	by	Pablo	Bergel,	who	focuses	on	the	reviving	communi-
tarian	life	in	Buenos	Aires.	The	latter	two	authors	analyze	the	trajec-
tory	of	the	mobilized	social	sectors	from	the	year	00	on,	questioning	
the	forms	and	functioning	of	political	representation	in	their	Nuevos 
movimientos sociales y ONGs en la Argentina de la crisis.	
In	addition,	numerous	journalistic	pieces,	monographs,	and	work-
ing	papers	have	been	written	that	either	directly	or	indirectly	tackle	
the	phenomenon	and	the	forms	of	collective	action	represented	by	the	
piquetero	movement	in	Argentina.
First,	however,	we	should	place	our	analysis	in	the	context	of	the	
broader	literature	on	collective	action	and	social	movements.	A	number	
of	theorists	–Habermas	and	Offe,	rooted	in	German	critical	theory;	La-
clau	and	Mouffe,	with	 their	 synthesis	of	post-structuralism	and	neo-
Gramscian	Marxism;	and	Touraine	in	his	sociology	of	action–	explain	
the	emergence	of	social	movements	with	a	reference	to	structural	trans-
formations	and	long-range	political	and	cultural	changes	which	created	
new	sources	of	conflict	and	altered	the	process	of	constitution	of	collec-
tive	identities.	Habermas	views	new	social	movements	as	struggles	in	
defense	of	the	“life	world.”	Offe	explains	them	within	the	context	of	late	
capitalist	societies,	focusing	on	the	contradictory	role	of	the	capitalist	
state,	which	must	ensure,	simultaneously,	the	conditions	for	capital	ac-
cumulation	and	bourgeois	legitimacy.	Some	authors	(Habermas,	Offe,	
Laclau	and	Mouffe)	highlight	the	notion	of	‘crisis’	(of	hegemony	and	le-
gitimation)	in	contemporary	capitalist	societies	and	conceive	collective	
actions	as	rational	responses	to	such	crisis.	Laclau	and	Mouffe	consider	
movements	in	terms	of	the	availability	of	democratic	discourse	and	the	
crisis	of	the	hegemonic	formation	consolidated	after	World	War	II.	Tou-
raine	focuses	on	the	emergence	of	a	new	societal	type,	postindustrial	
society,	characterized	by	increased	levels	of	reflexivity.
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For	Offe,	the	emergence	of	new	social	movements	must	be	under-
stood	as	a	reaction	against	the	deepening,	broadening,	and	increased	
irreversibility	of	the	forms	of	domination	and	deprivation	in	late	capi-
talist	 societies.	 The	 deepening	 of	 the	mechanisms	 of	 social	 control	
and	domination	–the	expansion	of	steering	mechanisms–	takes	place	
as	more	and	more	areas	of	private	 life	come	under	state	regulation	
“through	the	use	of	legal,	educational,	medical,	psychiatric,	and	media	
technologies”	(Offe	95:46).	This	process,	paradoxically,	has	contra-
dictory	effects	on	state	authority:	on	the	one	hand,	it	strengthens	it	as	
more	areas	of	civil	society	come	under	state	regulation	and	control;	
but,	on	the	other	hand,	state	authority	is	weakened	as	“there	are	fewer	
nonpolitical	–and	hence	uncontested	and	noncontroversial–	founda-
tions	of	action	to	which	claims	can	be	referred	or	from	which	metapo-
litical	(in	the	sense	of	‘natural’	or	‘given’)	premises	for	politics	can	be	
derived”	(Offe	95:).
For	Tilly,	contemporary	social	movements	are	no	different,	in	the	
form	and	content	of	their	actions,	from	early-nineteenth	century	col-
lective	actors,	since	they	both	employ	the	same	“repertoires”	–that	is,	
the	limited	range	of	 legitimate	actions	available	to	collective	actors.	
The	consolidation	of	capitalism	and	the	growth	of	the	national	state	
in	the	early	nineteenth	century	caused	a	shift	from	communal	to	as-
sociational	 forms	of	 collective	 action.	The	 emphasis	 on	democratic	
freedoms	(to	assemble,	to	speak,	to	demonstrate,	to	organize)	encour-
aged	the	creation	of	special-purpose	organizations	and	voluntary	asso-
ciations	and	the	consolidation	of	civil	society.	These	transformations	
gave	rise	to	the	forms	of	collective	action	that	characterize	representa-
tive	democracies:	 rallies,	 strikes	and	demonstrations	 (Tilly	and	Tilly	
9:9-;	44-6	and	99-0;	Tilly	97:5-7).
The Unemployed Workers Movements (MTD) 
The	Unemployed	Workers	Movements	(MTD),	collectively	known	also	
as	 the	piquetero	movement,	 is	 an	 expression	of	 the	development	 of	
popular	power	in	the	country.	
One	could	define	MTD	as	a	form	of	popular	organization	of	men	
and	women,	unemployed	workers,	who	have	 formed	a	 ‘movement’	
–not	a	party	or	a	union–	that,	characteristically	of	the	recent	forms	
of	collective	action,	adopts	a	broad	agenda	aiming	“to	solve	all	the	
problems	 of	 everyone.”	With	 some	 justification	we	 could	 describe	
MTD	as	 a	movement	 of	movements.	 Its	 organization	 is	 independ-
ent	of	the	political	parties,	the	unions,	and	the	Church,	and	has	as	
one	of	its	basic	principles	the	objective	of	coordinating	its	activities	
with	other	popular	mobilizations	cohering	around	various	and	often	
divergent	issues.	
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The	 piquetero	 movement	 consists	 mainly	 of	 former	 employees	
of	metal,	electrical,	and	oil	industries	and	of	transportation	(railway)	
and	public	sectors,	and	of	laid-off	food	industry,	dock,	and	other	simi-
lar	workers.	The	membership	does	not	represent	“the	new	poor,”	but,	
characteristically,	has	as	its	predominant	element	unemployed	labor-
ers	who	come	with	experience	of	union	campaigns	accrued	in	their	
previous	places	of	work.
The	main	form	of	struggle	utilized	by	the	workers	and	the	unem-
ployed	pushing	their	agenda	through	MTD	is	the	piquete or,	literally,	
road-blocking,	exercised	to	put	tangible	and	quite	public	pressure	on	
the	government	in	order	to	obtain	from	it	provision	of	food	supplies	
and	basic	necessity	items	(like	mattresses	or	ceiling	construction	ma-
terials),	social	policy	measures,	 improvements	 in	the	 infrastructure,	
etc.	
In	the	middle	of	the	990s,	during	the	second	presidency	of	Car-
los	Menem,	the	piquetero	campaigns	spread	to	localities	in	the	inte-
rior	of	the	country,	especially	those	areas	that	were	centers	of	the	oil	
industry,	which	was	privatized	and	reconstructed	during	the	Menem	
administration	(such	as	Cutral-Co	in	Neuquén,	and	Tartagal-General	
Mosconi	in	Salta).	In	addition,	the	movement	developed	rapidly	in	lo-
calities	that	served	as	major	railway	junctions	(like	Cruz	del	Eje	in	the	
province	of	Córdoba)	or	centers	of	agro-industrial	production	(such	as	
for	sugar	and	lumber,	or	in	the	citricultural	region	of	Salteño-Jujeña	
and	along	Route	4	connecting	with	the	oil	region)	(González	Bom-
bal,	00).
Later	on,	 the	 spread	pattern	extends	 further	 to	peripheral	pop-
ular	 neighborhoods	 in	 the	margins	 of	 great	 cities	 such	 as	Rosario,	
Santa	Fe,	and	Córdoba,	in	999	reaching	the	popular	neighborhood	
and	the	“villas”	of	the	Conurbano	Bonaerese	near	Buenos	Aires,	where	
piquetero	 action	 campaigns	 started	 rapidly	 increasing	 in	000,	 con-
tinuing	to	present	day.	
It	was	in	La	Matanza,	a	suburb	to	the	west	of	Buenos	Aires	and	
home	to	two	million	impoverished	inhabitants	 living	in	the	shadow	
of	hundreds	of	closed	factories,	that	the	first	road	blocks	were	erected	
during	a	major	campaign	cutting	off	traffic	on	urban	routes	and	cata-
pulting	the	piquetero	movement	to	the	national	political	arena.	Today,	
the	piqueteros	of	La	Matanza	form	the	central	nucleus	in	the	move-
ment’s	activities	that	show	no	signs	of	abatement.	
MTD	thus	began	to	grow	in	size	and	attain	recognition	as	a	new	
actor	on	the	national	level.	Due	to	the	growth	and	concomitant	plural-
ization	that	it	experienced	after	attracting	a	number	of	other	groups	
and	initiatives	under	its	umbrella,	the	movement	became	highly	diver-
sified,	accommodating	orientations	and	currents	with	varying	levels	
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of	organizational	maturation,	as	well	as	different	dimensions,	region-
al	characteristics,	ideological	influences,	relations	to	labor	movement	
and	political	party	organizations,	and	repertoires	of	action	(González	
Bombal	00).	
The	spread	of	MTD	has	been	accelerated	through	the	multiplica-
tion	of	its	constituent	movements	operating	in	different	regions	of	the	
country.	Many	of	the	(rather	different)	MTD	campaigns	formed	and	
continued	developing	independently	of	one	another,	not	as	ramifica-
tions	or	sections	of	a	centrally	organized	and	managed	parent	initia-
tive.	The	participating	movements	were	characterized	by	their	mutual	
diversity	and	by	the	particular	attributes	of	each	neighborhood	or	lo-
cality	in	which	they	operated.
The	newly	established	visibility	and	status	of	the	movement	(com-
posed,	as	stated,	of	a	loosely	knit	network	of	diverse	local	and	regional	
initiatives)	as	a	nation-wide	phenomenon	was	manifested	in	the	two	
national	assemblies	in	which	piqueteros	from	around	the	country	gath-
ered	in	00	and	00,	with	the	intent	of	creating	alliances,	coordi-
nating	logistics,	and	pooling	resources	in	a	broader	struggle	that	was	
formulated	and	also	perceived	as	something	shared	in	common.	Nev-
ertheless,	the	results	of	these	efforts	remained	relatively	unsuccessful,	
much	due	to	the	movement’s	nature	as	something	very	dynamic	and	
decentralized,	frequently	fluctuating	and	relatively	open-ended.
However,	some	significant	coordination	did	take	place	as	a	result	
of	 the	 efforts	 to	 bring	 the	 various	MTD	 actors	 closer	 together.	 The	
MTDs	of	the	ten	districts	of	the	conurbano	–Almirante	Brown,	Lanús,	
Solano,	 Florencio	 Varela,	 Esteban	 Echeverría,	 Quilmes,	 Presidente	
Perón,	Lugano,	J.	C.	Paz	and	Berisso–	and	of	La	Plata,	Quilmes,	and	
Lanús	became	integrated	as	the	Coordinadora	de	Trabajadores	Deso-
cupados	“Aníbal	Verón”	(CTD),	forming	a	joint	organization	coordi-
nating	and	directing	the	actions	of	the	movements	of	the	unemployed	
that	 participated	 in	 it.	 CTD	 is	 composed	 of	 compañeros or	 “com-
panions”	representing	each	of	the	participating	groups	and	meeting	
weekly	to	discuss	the	situation	in	each	district	and	in	CTD	itself.	The	
proposals	of	CTD	then	become	discussed	in	neighborhood	assemblies,	
in	which	all	the	compañeros	from	each	neighborhood	involved	gather	
to	solve	and	elaborate	new	proposals.
Within	MTD,	democratic	decision	making	is	understood	to	evolve	
from	below	up,	as	all	the	decisions,	from	formulating	demands	to	the	
mobilization	for	the	actual	action	campaigns,	are	taken	collectively	in	
assemblies	that	remain	open	for	participation	at	the	level	of	neighbor-
hoods	or	municipalities.	The	assemblies	convene	weekly	 in	the	mu-
nicipalities,	biweekly	 in	the	provinces,	and	monthly	on	the	national	
level	 (as	national	commissions).	The	organization	of	 the	assemblies	
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allows	 for	 an	 open	 participation	 in	 the	 proposals,	 discussions,	 and	
resolutions.	As	intended,	this	is	in	fact	a	two-way	process,	given	that	
the	agreements	reached	as	a	result	of	the	decision	making	processes	
through	their	very	manner	of	coming	into	existence	also	have	as	an	
aim	the	deepening	of	the	formal	democratic	system	actually	existing	
in	the	country.
Using	 narrow,	 effective	 tactics,	 the	 piqueteros	 have	 imposed	 a	
broad	agenda	in	the	form	of	demands	presented	to	the	government.	
During	 a	piquete,	 or	 a	 road-blocking	 action	 campaign,	 demands	 to	
free	 jailed	militants	are	aired,	as	are	calls	 for	the	withdrawal	of	 the	
police	force	from	events	organized	by	MTD,	for	food	assistance,	for	
decent	 jobs,	 for	 better	wages	 and	unemployment	 benefits,	 for	 agri-
cultural	subsidies	and	irrigation	projects,	for	improved	infrastructure	
(paved	streets),	and	for	provision	of	electricity	and	medical	facilities.
At	present,	the	piquetero	organizations	are	aiming	their	main	ef-
forts	at	obtaining	assistance	for	the	neediest	segments	of	the	popula-
tion,	at	creating	spaces	of	open	debate	and	political	formation,	at	gen-
erating	new	levels	of	participation,	at	creating	social	bonds	and	new	
organizational	 ties	 between	neighbors,	 and	 at	 exploring	 new	 forms	
of	communitarian	organization.	MTD	as	a	social	movement	has	 in-
troduced	 a	 new	 tactic,	 the	piquete,	whose	 very	 publicity,	 disruptive	
effect,	and	organizational	bases	allow	workers	and	 the	unemployed	
to	channel	their	rights	claims	into	the	broader	public	arena.	Among	
the	latter,	creation	of	real	jobs	continues	to	play	a	central	role,	posing	
also	a	more	difficult	logistical	and	organizational	problem:	what	this	
demand	 calls	 for	 is	 in	 fact	 nothing	 less	 than	 an	 alternative	 general	
vision	of	the	society,	one	that	could	propel	economic	transformation	
with	an	effect	on	the	rate	of	employment.	Burndened	with	this	neces-
sity,	the	initial	effectiveness	of	the	piquete	strategy	has	started	to	wear	
away,	with	the	tactics	relying	on	daily	road	blockings	affecting	every-
day	life	in	the	cities	and	thus	gradually	starting	to	work	against	the	
piquetero	campaigns	themselves.	The	consequences	may	well	amount	
to	 something	similar	 to	what	 the	 tactics	of	 the	political	 right	 strive	
for:	isolation	of	the	demands	from	below	and	encouragement	of	the	
reactionary	tendencies	in	the	middle	classes.	The	piquete	campaigns,	
originally	 an	 effective	 tool	 of	 political	 and	 economic	 inclusion,	 are	
now	beginning	to	be	orchestrated	from	the	political	right	that	expedi-
ently	mobilizes	piqueteros	of	their	own,	thus	tending	to	progressively	
transform	them	into	a	tool	of	exclusion	and	isolation	instead.
The Movement Expanding towards the Government
The	 great	 political	 disenchantment	 entailed	 by	 the	 hegemonic	 rise	
of	neoliberalism	and	its	values,	making	themselves	felt	in	almost	all	
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spheres	life,	have	refocused	the	attention	of	the	piqueteros	movement	
and	led	it	to	a	search	for	ways	to	reconstruct	the	bonds	of	social	soli-
darity	weakened	during	the	period	of	dictatorship	and	the	subsequent	
era	of	exclusionary	policies.	
The	activities	of	MTD	allow	for,	and	in	fact	encourage,	processes	
of	political	socialization	and	initiatives	to	organize,	to	belong,	to	have	
an	identity,	to	recognize	one´s	own	rights,	and	to	develop	one´s	criti-
cal-analytical	skills,	through	participation	in	various	training	progra-
ms,	study	groups,	and	reading	groups,	thereby	fostering	the	develop-
ment	of	a	better	historical	perspective	and	critical	reflection	vis-à-vis	
the	social	realities	of	the	present.	
Finding	it	relevant	to	enter	into	the	political	arena,	MTD,	espe-
cially	 in	00-0,	 started	promoting	an	 integral	vision	uniting	 large	
sectors	of	social	and	popular	organizations	and	focusing	on	political	
action	as	a	 tool	of	 social	 transformation.	Proposing	political	action	
does	not	equal	apostatizing	social	construction;	political	action	is	ba-
sed	on	the	construction	of	popular	power,	of	an	organized	popular	for-
ce	able	to	turn	the	course	of	so	many	years	of	regressive,	antipopular,	
and	antinational	policies.	
Under	the	Kirchner	government	we	can	see	a	certain	reversal	of	
the	policies	initiated	during	the	990s.	Given	the	back-and-forth	mo-
vement	of	the	political	process	and	the	extreme	social	fragmentation	
we	witness	today,	however,	the	need	for	tactical	alliances	grows	para-
mount	in	a	persevering	hegemonic	system	in	which,	that	which	has	
passed,	has	not	yet	relinquished	its	hold.
In	view	of	this	situation,	MTD	has	taken	a	step	towards	direct	par-
ticipation	in	the	political	process,	now	considering	it	necessary	for	the	
popular	organizations	to	engage	in	actions	that	can	steer	the	gover-
nment	towards	the	construction	of	a	project	of	national	sovereignty.	
For	this	purpose,	its	leadership	has	called	for	expansion	of	the	move-
ment	membership	towards	white-collar	elements	in	the	government,	
in	order	to	ensure	the	kind	public	policy	decisions	it	considers	vital	
on	the	local	level	for	the	maintenance	of	popular	protagonism	as	the	
main	means	of	social	transformation.	
Acting	 in	the	manner	of	community	activists,	 the	piqueteros,	
responding	to	this	call	in	the	neighborhoods	in	which	they	spread,	
have	 started	 turning	 away	 from	 mere	 humanitarian	 assistance	
projects	under	the	banner	of	charity.	In	their	stead,	we	can	see	a	
new	emphasis	on	the	need	to	foster	the	growth	of	popular	organi-
zations	conceived	as	 tools	of	 true	democratic	process	within	 the	
framework	of	the	human	rights,	peace,	and	justice	for	all.	In	the	
interest	of	these	aims,	MTD	has	extended	the	scope	of	its	actions	
and	ambitions	further	still,	proposing	to	work	together	with	other	
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kindred	groups	such	as	 local	assemblies,	youth	groups,	women’s	
movements,	socioeconomic	community	projects,	and	other	activi-
ty	centers.	
Among	 the	 piqueteros	 themselves,	 we	 can	 detect	 different	 cu-
rrents	varyingly	identifiable	with	the	nationalist	and	popular	matrix,	
often	tending	 in	directions	that	vindicate	aspects	of	historical	Pero-
nism.	Some	of	the	organizations	and	associations	act	more	in	the	role	
of	negotiators	or	mediators	(Federación	de	Tierra	y	Vivienda	-	FTV),	
some	are	more	combative	than	others	(Barrios	de	Pie).	In	00,	the-
se	strands	within	MTD	shifted	their	position	with	respect	to	the	go-
vernment,	identifying	as	they	did	a	promise	in	it	of	returning	to	the	
historical	sources	of	Peronism.	On	the	other	hand,	Kirchner	himself	
could	act	in	ways	that	encouraged	the	development	of	new	piquetero	
movements	such	as,	precisely,	MTD-Evita	discussed	below.	These	de-
velopments	coincided	with	the	emergence	of	a	broader	political	bloc	
in	Latin	America,	aimed	on	a	transnational	plane	to	form	a	counter-
balance	 to	 the	prevailing	global	hegemonic	discourse	and	equipped	
with	its	own	anti-neoliberal	rhetoric	that	has	reactivated	–and	to	an	
extent	builds	on–	elements	of	 the	national-popular	 traditions	 in	 the	
countries	involved.	
In	this	way,	we	can	see	a	two	pronged	movement	bringing	MTD	
and	the	government	closer	to	each	other.	Driven	by	a	broader	political	
agenda	on	both	sides,	a	link	between	the	government	and	the	“orga-
nized	masses”	 has	 now	been	 established.	While	 earlier	 on	 only	 the	
unions	were	directly	engaged	on	the	plane	of	national	politics,	now	
also	 the	piqueteros	have	entered	 the	political	horizon	of	 the	central	
administration.	
MTD-Evita	 is	one	of	the	piquetero	groups	that	the	Kirchner	go-
vernment	attempted	to	draw	closer	to	its	political	framework.	In	the	
early	months	of	its	application,	this	strategy	to	open	communication	
channels	with	the	unemployed	and	search	for	ways	to	cooperate	with	
the	largest	and	most	significant	popular	organizations	showed	good	
results,	if	the	official	objective	of	lowering	the	number	of	independent	
mobilizations	is	held	as	a	measure.	In	contrast,	the	initiative	to	create	
an	openly	kirchnerista	movement	for	the	unemployed	has	not	taken	
off	equally	well.	
Within	MTD-Evita	itself,	internal	developments	similarly	encoura-
ged	 this	mutual	 approximation.	 The	 leadership	 in	 the	 organization	
was	assumed	by	Emilio	Pérsico,	a	veteran	activist	from	the	so-called	
“Peronism	of	Left”	and	more	recently	also	 the	piquetero	movement,	
who	maintains	 to	have	 found	 in	MTD-Evita	“a	 tool	 for	 the	struggle	
for	more	work	 and	 for	 social	 inclusion—two	 crucial	 issues	 for	 the	
country’s	reconstruction.”
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Movimiento	de	Trabajadores	Desocupados	Evita	(MTD-Evita)	
Leader:	Emilio	Pérsico
Area	of	influence:	La	Plata	and	La	Matanza	
Capacity	of	mobilization:	,000	people
The	members	 of	MTD-Evita	 show	 considerable	 involvement	 in	
the	national	and	provincial	governments.	Through	his	position	in	the	
organization,	Pérsico	himself	has	been	able	to	advance	his	career	and	
extend	his	 personal	 influence	 as	 a	 political	 figure	 in	ways	 and	 at	 a	
speed	unparalleled	during	his	0	years	of	political	militancy.	Rising	
quickly	through	the	ranks	he	was	soon	appointed	Undersecretary	in	
the	cabinet	headquarters	of	Governor	Felipe	Solá	of	the	Province	of	
Buenos	Aires.	
Reflecting	on	his	reasons	for	joining	the	government	as	a	civil	ser-
vant,	Pérsico	himself	stated:	“I	have	already	lost	count	of	the	compa-
nions	from	the	MTD-Evita	who	work	as	civil	employees	in	the	provin-
ces	and	for	the	state,	who	are	deputies	and	senators.	I	know	who	we	
used	to	be	and	I	can	see	what	we	are	now,	and	that	fills	me	with	fear”.	I	
am	here	to	fulfill	the	objective	of	a	national	project	we	have	embarked	
on:	generation	of	jobs	and	social	inclusion	through	jobs.”	
Assessing	that	“things	are	changing	quicker	than	we	thought,”	Pér-
sico	 acknowledges	 his	 unconditional	 identification	with	 “Kirchner’s	
popular	project”	and	the	concomitant	“task	of	transforming	the	Pro-
vince	of	Buenos	Aires	under	[Governor]	Solá’s	direction.”	
The	 mutual	 understanding	 of	 the	 shared	 stakes	 has	 thereby	
started	 to	 take	 shape.	 According	 to	 Governor	 Solá,	 the	 spread	 of	
MTD-Evita	“exemplifies	how	activism	and	militancy	can	proceed	to	
construct	 and	 articulate	new	 sectors	 of	 representation,	 as	 opposed	
to	merely	working	to	delegitimatize	the	majority	parties”.	Or,	as	Pér-
sico	has	pointed	out,	“the	Evita	movement	is	not	merely	a	political	
expression;	it	is	a	construction	tool	for	uniting	social	organizations	
that	must	become	part	of	the	State	in	the	process	of	creating	a	new	
national	project.”
As	a	new	type	of	social	movement,	MTD-Evita	is	significant	in	the	
context	of	national	politics.	Nevertheless,	its	role	and	impact	on	the	
ground	have	remained	relatively	weak,	even	if	its	actions	in	helping	to	
provide	for	certain	basic	necessities	for	impoverished	sectors	(such	as	
	 	Diario	El	Día	de	la	La	Plata.	“¿Qué	hace	un	piquetero	en	el	gobierno?	Lo	cuenta	
el	platense	Emilio	Pérsico.”	Lunes		de	Enero	de	006.
	 	Diario	Clarín.	4	de	Octubre	de	006.
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obtaining	work	tools	for	those	needing	them	and	organizing	around	
housing	issues)	have	been	consequential.	The	organization	itself	has	
become	confirmed	in	its	belief	that	in	order	to	stimulate	real	results,	
its	membership	must	be	extended	to	civil	employees	who	in	turn	can	
influence	state	policies	and	partake	in	decisions	with	effect	on	unem-
ployment.
Rupture with Traditional Forms of Political
Representation: The Assembly Process and the
Resurgence of Civic Participation
In	the	social	sphere,	however,	MTD	has	been	able	to	move	ahead	with	
its	initiatives,	scoring	a	string	of	successes	that	can	be	said	to	reverse	
some	of	the	consequences	of	the	policies	implemented	during	the	neo-
liberal	stage	of	the	990s—policies	that	gave	rise	to	the	weakening	of	
workers´	organizations	and	a	decline	in	the	status	of	politics	and	the	
politicians.	MTD	actions	have	resulted	in	an	increase	in	popular	claim	
making	 and	 needs	 articulation,	 centered	 around	 territorial	 organi-
zations—not	only	the	piqueteros,	but	also	associations	and	advocacy	
groups	related	to	the	church	and	the	municipality	itself.	At	this	histo-
rical	juncture,	organizing	among	the	urban	poor	gains	in	importance,	
such	as	through	the	heterogeneous	piquetero	movements	constituted	
of	unemployed	and	workers	bound	to	the	informal	sector.	
For	their	decision	making	processes,	these	movements	utilize	the	
assembly	practice.	In	the	assemblies	various	needs	become	expressed,	
and	through	the	ensuing	discussions	and	debates,	also	the	broader	is-
sue	of	the	place	of	movements	in	society	becomes	broached	(if	not	di-
rectly	addressed).	This	practice	of	assembly	participation	corresponds	
to	a	political	movement	with	strong	territorial	presence,	proposing	a	
new	form	in	which	to	think	of	the	role	of	the	institutions.	For	Hannah	
Arendt,	politics	is	not	restricted	to	the	sphere	in	which	the	institutio-
ns	of	government	and	administration	predominate;	what	it	concerns	
rather	is	the	institution	of	a	sense	of	a	political	community	(to	consu-
me	and	to	work).	It	is	constituted	through	the	actions	of	human	be-
ings	entering	into	relationships	with	one	another,	in	a	space	where	the	
type	of	bond	created	emerges	through	actions	and	words.	In	the	light	
of	this	analysis,	the	assemblies	may	indeed	emerge	as	an	instantiation	
of	the	politics	of	representation	superior	to	the	traditional	representa-
tive	politics	within	the	confines	of	representative	democracy.
In	the	space	of	the	assemblies	two	dimensions	intersect4:	
	 	Arendt,	Hannah	(99),	La condición humana.	Barcelona:	Editorial Paidós.
4	 	En	Svampa,	Maristella	(00),	“El	análisis	de	la	dinámica	asamblearia,”	in	Bombal,	ed.,	
Nuevos movimientos sociales y ONGs en la Argentina de la crisis.	Buenos	Aires:	CEDES.
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In	the	first	place,	the	assemblies	constitute	a	space	for	organizing	
and	deliberating	that	represents	a	rupture	with	the	traditional	forms	
of	political	representation,	favoring	instead	alternative	forms	of	self-
organization	that	arise	from	the	social	milieu	and	are	inclined	towards	
horizontal	modes	of	organization	and	the	exercise	of	direct	action.	
Secondly,	 the	 assemblies	 can	be	 viewed	as	 an	 expression	of	 an	
emerging,	disruptive	new	type	of	protagonism,	irreducibly	social	and	
political	at	once,	that	breaks	with	the	fatalism	of	the	ideological	spee-
ch	 of	 the	 990s	 and	 reinvests	 individuals	with	 their	 capacity	 to	 be	
true	actors	in	the	public	life	–indeed,	to	become	subjects	of	their	own	
destiny,	 in	both	 the	 individual	and	 the	social	 sense.	 In	 this	 fashion,	
the	 assemblies	 brought	 with	 themselves	 a	 promise	 of	 the	 creation	
of	trust	and	spaces	of	solidarity	through	which	social	bonds	can	be	
(re)constructed.	
In	the	Human Development Report of the United Nations	(99),	
addressing	the	issue	for	participation,	it	is	stated:	“A	greater	participa-
tion	of	the	population	is	not	any	more	a	vague	ideology	based	on	good	
desires	of	few	idealists.	It	has	become	an	imperative	–a	condition	of	
survival.”	In	Argentina,	the	role	of	MTD	in	this	respect	has	been	signi-
ficant,	in	strengthening	the	processes	of	democratization	and	in	for-
cing	a	confrontation	with	social	problems	that	affect	broad	segments	
of	the	population.
A	great	majority	of	 those	participating	 in	MTD	campaigns	and	
activities	do	not	have	a	past	history	of	union	membership	or	participa-
tion	in	political	and	local	organizations.	The	practice	of	claim	making	
through	 the	piquetes	 organized	 by	MTD	utilizes	 provocative	means	
(men	equipped	with	sticks,	wearing	hooded	jackets)	to	underline	the	
urgency	of	the	activists’	message	before	the	intransigent	government.	
This	mode	of	activism	entails	risks	such	as	repression,	retaliation,	per-
secution,	 threats,	 and	 even	 death.	 For	 the	 practice	 of	 the	piquetera	
struggle,	determined	effort	and	a	strong	commitment	to	an	ideological	
position	thus	become	critical.	The	processes	of	political	and	ideologi-
cal	formation	encouraging	the	emergence	of	such	a	strong	dedication	
and	 loyalty	 to	 the	cause	are	 the	 task	of	 the	 leadership,	which	must	
succeed	 in	convincing	 the	actual	and	potential	movement	members	
about	 the	 legitimacy	of	 the	claims	advanced.	Accordingly,	 the	MTD	
leadership	has	stressed	in	its	speeches	and	position	papers	the	inade-
quacy	of	the	traditional	forms	of	citizen	representation.	
The	question	of	civic	dignity	involves	moral	recognition	of	social	
equality	(Rodriguez	and	Morello	00).	The	social	actors	participating	
in	MTD	actions	assume	a	more	active	role	when	joining	in	marches	
and	piquetes,	 in	this	way	repositioning	themselves	in	a	social	sector	
that,	in	spite	of	the	always	possible	repressive	countermeasures	or	the	
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indifference	of	the	government,	we	see	continuously	regenerating	and	
rejuvenating	itself	in	the	country.	
Besides	staging	direct	action	campaigns	to	express	concrete	de-
mands,	what	MTD	participants	accomplish	is	a	degree	of	participa-
tory	democracy	“in	action,”	building	largely	on	the	distrust	of	the	re-
presentative	and	delegative	political	system	that	is	now	subjected	to	
questioning	as	something	that	has	not	offered	any	tangible	solutions	
during	all	the	years	of	democratization	demands.	What	the	new	social	
movements,	MTD	among	 them,	 in	 effect	demand	 is	 a	new	political	
paradigm	that	lays	fresh	emphasis	on	the	substance	of	democracy.	
We	may	therefore	view	MTD	as	constituting	a	privileged	site	of	
societal	reflection	and	a	proposal	for	political	action	seeking	concrete	
solutions	and	new	paths	for	the	processes	of	problem	solution.	The	
effectiveness	of	MTD	on	these	two	fronts	is	based	on	its	formative	and	
organizational	origins	in	contexts	that,	following	Bourdieu,	we	could	
analyze	with	the	help	of	the	notion	of	“habitus”:	it	draws	upon	and	ac-
tivates	the	values	and	traditions	represented	by	piqueteros,	and	is	im-
pelled	forward	by	the	dictates	of	their	concrete	subsistence	needs	and	
collective	identity	needs.	It	becomes	necessary	for	the	political	system	
therefore	to	become	so	oriented	that	it	can	better	accommodate	and	
productively	absorb	the	impact	of	social	movements	–something	we	
see	happening	in	the	gradual	incorporation	of	MTD	members	into	the	
government	as	well.	However,	following	Giddens,5	new	social	move-
ments,	operating	in	situations	where	elucidation	of	social	problems	is	
at	stake,	are	action	forms	whose	outcomes	may	amount	to	no	more	
(and	no	less)	than	a	creation	of	a	language	of	protest,	significant	in	
itself	but	with	little	or	no	direct	consequences	for	the	administrative	
structures	of	the	government	as	such.	
The	management	role	of	 the	government	appears	central	 in	di-
fferent	instances,	in	the	sense	that	Giddens	criticizes	the	ambitions	of	
social	movements	by	stating	that	neither	the	movements	nor	the	mar-
kets	can	replace	the	functions	of	the	government.	Citizen	initiatives,	
new	movements,	NGOs,	and	the	like	can	never	replace	governments	
acting	on	 the	national	arena;	where	 their	accomplishment	 lies	 is	 in	
making	their	claims	and	demands	heard	by	the	political	system	in	a	
fashion	that	it	can	constructively	respond	to.	
Racelis	 (994)	 has	 pointed	 out	 that	 the	 central	 thrust	 of	 parti-
cipatory	politics	of	this	kind	consists	in	“giving	power	to	the	pueblo	
instead	of	perpetuating	the	constitutive	relations	of	dependency	that	
characterize	the	top-down	approaches”	–in	other	words,	the	idea	is	to	
share	in	the	power,	not	assume	or	even	less	seize	it.
5	 Giddens,	A.	(999):	La tercera vía. La renovación de la socialdemocracia.	Madrid:	Taurus.
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The	practice	of	the	MTD-type	of	participatory	democracy	emphasi-
zes	effective	popular	sovereignty,	political	justice,	economic	equality,	and	
robust	civic	life.	Nevertheless,	as	a	precondition	for	a	better	functioning	
direct	democracy,	greater	involvement	of	MTD	membership	is	called	for,	
if	it	is	to	contribute	with	its	knowledge	of	social	problems,	create	aware-
ness	of	its	agenda	and	the	underlying	issues,	and	thus	better	influence	the	
administrative	offices,	resulting	in	turn	in	better	political	decisions.
The	rise	of	MTD	can	be	deemed	to	mean	an	end	to	“passive	de-
mocracy”	and	the	inauguration	of	an	era	of	“intelligent	democracy,”	
in	which	the	citizens	are	informed,	have	channels	to	express	their	opi-
nions	and	needs,	and	possess	a	degree	of	power	to	exert	constant	in-
fluence	in	the	management	of	public	issues.	However,	the	importance	
of	strategic	alliances	will	still	remain	high,	allowing	different	partici-
pating	actors	to	become	articulated	at	sectoral	and	national	levels	for	
the	benefit	of	effective	political	action	in	concert.
Preliminary Conclusions
At	present,	politics	seems	removed	from	the	level	of	people’s	priorities,	
needs,	and	social	wants.	Given	this	distance,	there	is	a	need	to	reform	
democratic	institutions	and	practices	in	such	a	way	as	to	allow	for	a	
confrontation	with	inequalities	within	the	framework	of	an	effective	
political	process.	Such	a	strengthening	of	democracy	can	only	be	ac-
complished	in	a	continuous	process	bringing	about	the	development	
of	socially	sensitive	institutions	of	the	government	and	predicated	on	
the	existence	and	efficient	operation	of	strong,	independent	mass	me-
dia,	autonomous	 judiciary,	 instruments	of	human	rights	protection,	
and	cooperation	among	networks	of	the	unprivileged	poor	(social	and	
cooperative	networks,	enabling	networks	of	mutual	assistance).
The	development	of	democracy	is	bound	toward	a	search	for	grea-
ter	social	equality,	the	struggle	against	poverty,	and	the	expansion	of	the	
rights	of	citizenry.	Full	and	functional	citizenship	implies	the	simulta-
neous	possession	of	civil,	political,	and	social	rights,	as	well	as	the	abili-
ty	to	make	real	use	of	such	rights	in	the	daily	life	(Kessler,	996).	
How,	then,	to	sum	up	the	experience	of	MTD?	Following	the	line	
of	Toni	Negri	 (00),	 it	 is	my	view	that	 the	confrontation	 into	whi-
ch	MTD	entered	with	the	state	power	allowed	it	to	subsequently	re-
construct	the	kind	of	social	and	political	relations	through	which	then	
emerged	those	“new	singular	and	subjective	devices	that	construct	a	
new	composition	of	resistance	and	desire	to	oppose…	It	is	the	exam-
ple	that	can	be	located	essentially	in	the	documented	struggles	of	the	
piqueteros—the	Argentine	revolt	against	neoliberalism.”6
6	 	Negri,	Toni	(00):	“Argentina:	La	revuelta	piquetera”.	Buenos	Aires.
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During	 and	 in	 the	 aftermath	 of	 the	 institutional	 crisis	 peaking	
towards	the	end	of	00	in	Argentina,	a	prevalent	popular	reaction	has	
been	to	renounce	and	turn	away	from	the	politicians	and	the	political	
parties,	point	to	the	delegitimation	of	the	representative	system	broug-
ht	about	by	corruption,	and	refer	to	the	hegemonic	crisis	of	the	bour-
geois	system,	the	debt	crisis	and	the	crisis	of	the	financial	system,	and	
the	deepening	social	crisis	that,	as	summed	up	by	Toni	Negri	(00),	
has	“destroyed	the	productive	capacity	(rampant	unemployment)	and	
reproductive	 capacity	 (crisis	 of	 public	 education	 and	health)….”	At	
the	same	time	and	building	on	the	foundation	of	this	diagnosis,	we	
have	seen	a	related	response	that,	to	continue	with	Negri,	represents	
“a	multitudinal	antipower	organized	in	independent	systems	of	pro-
duction,	 interchange,	 and	 political	 organization,	 in	 wholly	 original	
forms.”	In	Argentina,	and	all	over	in	Latin	America	as	well,	what	we	
are	witnessing	today	is	the	emergence	of	novel	forms	of	protest	and	
organization,	and	the	formation	of	new	social	activities	as	an	exten-
sion	and	also	building	blocks	of	these	new	phenomena.	
MTD	provides	us	with	an	example	of	a	de	facto	method	of	how	
workers	and	the	unemployed	can	be	organized	and	brought	together	
with	impoverished	elements	of	the	middle	classes,	to	jointly	build	up	
political	networks	of	resistance	both	inside	and	outside	of	the	struc-
tures	of	the	state.	It	was	around	000	that	MTD	started	calling	itself	
piqueteros,	adopting	this	self-identity	on	the	conviction	that	piquete	or	
road	blockage	formed	part	of	the	legitimate	tactics	of	social	protest	
calling	for	increased	aid	and	respect	of	the	protesters’	rights.	The	pi-
quetes	stand	out	as	an	autonomous	expression	of	people	coming	from	
vastly	varying	walks	of	life,	still	equally	motivated	by	their	desire	for	
an	egalitarian	social	system.	Specifically,	the	concept	of	piquetero	re-
fers	to	the	moments	of	mobilization,	defined	by	Tilly	(000)	as	“dis-
ruptive	and	discontinuous.”
The	experience	of	the	piquetero	struggle	in	Argentina	can	be	des-
cribed	as	an	urgent	manifestation	of	“reactive”	tactics	aimed	at	reclai-
ming	or	a	defending	something	lost	or	on	the	verge	of	being	lost,	and	
at	the	same	time	as	an	instance	of	“proactive”	mobilization	for	social	
justice,	anti-corruption	work,	and	a	more	egalitarian	society	capable	
and	willing	to	offer	dignified	work	for	all	of	its	members.
The	unemployed	workers	 have	 demonstrated	 a	 distinct	 capaci-
ty	 to	 promote	 anti-free	market	 tactics	 lending	 themselves	 for	 emu-
lation	worldwide.	The	actions	so	far	demonstrate	that	the	power	be-
hind	fundamental	change	does	not	reside	in	the	cabinet	rooms	of	the	
politicians,	but	comes	 from	independently	organizing	social	 sectors	
spearheading	 participatory	 forms	 of	 democracy	 on	 local,	 regional,	
and	national	levels.	In	Argentina,	the	state	has	been	the	target	of	these	
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actions,	provoking	calls	for	its	reconstruction	and	regeneration	to	en-
sure	its	ability	to	cope	with	the	need	to	reduce	poverty	and	inequality.	
For	this	to	take	place,	though,	the	political	system	itself	will	need	to	
lower	 the	barriers	of	 social	 exclusion	and	 inequity	 and	attain	a	 ca-
pability	 to	promote	economic	growth	 in	harmony	with	 the	broader	
objectives	of	human	development.	
Giddens,	in	a	recent	book	of	his,	outlines	“a	Third	Way”	to	res-
pond	to	the	contemporary	dilemmas	related	to	globalization,	indivi-
dualism,	the	terms	of	the	Left	vs.	Right	thinking,	our	capacity	for	poli-
tical	action,	and	ecological	issues.	For	Giddens,	the	overall	aim	of	the	
Third-Way	politics	should	be	to	help	citizens	pilot	their	way	through	
the	major	revolutions	of	our	time:	globalization	and	transformations	
in	personal	life	and	our	relationship	to	nature.	Such	politics	is	con-
cerned	with	the	equality	of	opportunities,	personal	responsibility,	and	
mobilization	of	citizens	and	communities.	In	addition	to	various	rig-
hts,	 it	 highlights	 the	 role	 of	 responsibilities.	 Accordingly,	 the	 Third	
Way	as	a	political	program	would	have	“to	maintain	social	justice	and	
to	accept	that	the	range	of	questions	that	escape	the	division	into	Left	
and	 Right	 is	 greater	 than	 ever.”7	 Among	 its	 basic	 principles	 would	
have	to	be	the	reform	of	the	state	and	the	government.	The	govern-
ment	must	be	able	to	act	in	concordance	with	civil	society	if	it	is	to	
have	the	capacity	to	manage	the	solution	of	social	problems	and	pro-
mote	the	development	of	the	community	it	serves.	The	economic	base	
of	the	association	between	the	government	and	civil	society	is	a	new,	
mixed	economy,	which	can	only	become	effective	to	the	extent	that	its	
institutions	are	modernized.	
Those	 active	 in	MTD	 affirm	 that	 from	 its	 actions	 a	 renewal	 of	
politics	and	leadership	can	follow,	but	only	if	the	relationship	between	
the	state	and	society	is	articulated	anew,	with	the	movements	contri-
buting	their	experience	and	understanding	of	the	social	situation	of	
the	underprivileged	as	needed	for	the	development	of	a	more	human	
and	participatory	state.	
Social	movements	like	MTD	are	a	fluid	element	within	political	
and	social	systems,	 from	which	more	formal	political	organizations	
arise	and	may	bring	radical	change.	At	the	moment,	the	challenge	for	
MTD	and	other	similar	movements	is	to	find	ways	to	extend	their	for-
ms	and	scope	as	a	mobilized	public	protest	to	new	areas	and	consider	
their	possible	continuities	and	their	 future,	 this	way	expanding	and	
strengthening	the	broader	political	project	behind	the	express	actions	
of	the	temporary	mobilizations.	How,	in	practice,	to	strengthen	direct	
7	 	Giddens,	A.	 (999):	La tercera vía. La renovación de la socialdemocracia,	p.	.	
Madrid:	Taurus.
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democracy	through	participatory	mechanisms,	and	how	can	the	latter	
be	designed	so	that	they	increase	the	responsibility	and	responsiveness	
of	the	government	vis-à-vis	the	citizenry?	At	the	same	time,	MTD	must	
continue	to	explore	ways	to	identify	dilemmas	involved	in	the	efforts	
to	attain	 these	goals,	and	 in	 the	methods	conducive	 to	 the	effective	
formulation	of	social	policies	aimed	at	consolidation	and	extension	of	
democratic	projects	more	generally.
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Antinomies of Political Society:
Implications of Uncivil
Development
THE	 INTER-RELATION	 BETWEEN	 THE	 STATE,	 civil	 society	 and	
more	 recently	 political	 society,	 notwithstanding	 the	 differences	 over	
what	constitutes	each	of	these	domains,	has	emerged	as	the	single	most	
significant	area	of	study	for	understanding	the	process	of	democratiza-
tion.	Civil	society	has	long	been	projected	and	trusted,	post-East	Euro-
pean	debacle,	as	an	all-encompassing	panacea	for	most	of	the	problems	
plaguing	developing	societies.	It	is	a	political	imaginary	that	is	carved	
out	to	stand	for	various	values,	actively	pursued	through	varied	insti-
tutions.	Civil	society	has	become	a	kind	of	‘aspirational	shorthand’	for	
ideas	and	values	of	equity,	increasing	participation,	public	fairness,	in-
dividual	rights,	tolerance,	trust,	legality,	cooperation	and	informed	citi-
zenry	(C.M.Elliot,	00).	These	ideals	are	fostered	and	protected	by	vo-
luntary	associative	activity	independent	or	“outside”	of	the	state.	These	
include	wide	ranging	associations	or	institutions	such	as	clubs,	religio-
us	bodies,	sabhas	(councils	or	assemblies)	and	samajs	(societies),	unio-
	 	Reprinted	with	permission	from	`Economic	and	Political	Weekly`(July,	7,	007)	
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ns,	professional	associations,	community	action	groups,	NGOs,	media,	
research	institutes	and	youth	organisations,	to	name	a	few	(Ibid).	Civil	
society	has	therefore	been	considered	as	a	radical	alternative	in	state	
regulated	societies.	However,	after	the	initial	euphoria	died	out,	scho-
lars	began	to	raise	serious	doubts	about	the	scope	and	nature	of	civil	
society’s	autonomy	and	its	implications	for	the	process	of	democratiza-
tion.	For	instance,	emphasis	on	trust	--	one	of	the	most	significant	mar-
kers	of	a	civil	society	--	in	situations	of	marked	inequality	not	only	offers	
a	false	promise	to	the	poor	but	robs	them	of	their	right	to	struggle	and	
protest	(Michael	Edwards,	00).	Where	associations	are	hierarchical	
and	based	on	ascriptive	ties,	moving	to	an	associative	concept	of	demo-
cracy	only	leaves	intact	and	reinforces	the	iniquitous	social	structures	
(Gurpreet	Mahajan,	999).	A	society	with	unequal	access	to	law	which	
emphasizes	legality	as	a	baseline	criterion	of	civil	society	only	allows	
the	government	to	forcibly	clear	the	slums,	sidewalks	and	tribals	in	the	
name	of	development	(C.M.Elliot,	00;	Nivedita	Menon,	004).	Such	
grave	but	perhaps	obvious	limitations	of	the	civil	societal	domain	are	
completely	overlooked	in	the	euphoric	versions,	as	they	are	abstracted	
from	any	concrete	reference	to	existing	civil	societies	or	the	way	it	is	
transformed	under	the	influence	of	other	domains.	It	continues	to	be	
thought	of	as	neither	 related	 to	 the	 state	nor	 the	market,	due	 to	 the	
conflicting	power	relations	(Neera	Chandoke,	00).	How	do	we	move	
beyond	such	dehistorical,	depolitical	and	flat	notions	of	the	civil	society	
and	re-locate	it	in	the	process	of	democratization?
There	have	been	three	broad	alternatives	suggested.	First,	instead	
of	uncoupling,	civil	society	has	to	work,	or	in	fact,	be	made	sense	of	as	
complimentary	to	the	state.	“State	alone	can	create	conditions	that	are	
necessary	to	protect	the	institutions	of	civil	society”	(Gurpreet	Maha-
jan,	999).	In	other	words,	civil	societies	are	constituted	by	a	commu-
nity	of	citizens	and	therefore	we	need	to	continue	to	recognize	the	state	
as	 the	critical	 ‘mobilizing	agency’,	 instead	of	 ‘letting	 it	off	 the	hook’.	
Therefore	“if	the	project	of	civil	society	is	to	be	saved	and	along	with	
it	 the	 freedom	accorded	 to	 citizenship,	 it	 can	only	be	done	 through	
the	constitutional	democratic	state”	(Dipankar	Gupta,	999).	A	second	
alternative,	along	the	Tocquivellian	line,	emphasizes	the	autonomy	of	
the	 intermediate	 institutions	against,	on	 the	one	hand,	a	demagogic	
state,	and	on	the	other	hand,	and	the	sectarian	and	communitarian	po-
litical	forces.	Assumed	in	such	a	model	is	an	independent	legal-rational	
framework	which,	being	rule-bound	and	norm-based,	would	eventua-
lly	democratize	the	society	(Andre	Beteille,	995).	A	third	alternative	
emphasizes	 the	 significance	of	grassroots	 initiatives	 (Rajini	Kothari,	
9).	This	has	been	developed	further,	and	more	recently,	conceptua-
lized	as	an	alternative	site	of	“political	society”	that	makes	up,	along	
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with	political	parties	and	organized	 social	movements,	non-partisan	
political	formations	for	“strategic”	and	“contextual”	mediations	by	the	
subalterns	(Partha	Chatterjee,	997).	According	to	Partha	Chatterjee:	
“by	 political	 society	 I	 mean	 a	 domain	 of	 institutions	 and	 activities	
where	 several	mediations	are	 carried	out”	 (Ibid).	Thus,	 “the	politics	
of	democratization	must	therefore	be	carried	out	not	in	the	classical	
transactions	between	state	and	civil	society	but	in	the	much	less	well-
defined,	legally	ambiguous,	contextually	and	strategically	demarcated	
terrain	of	political	society”	(Partha	Chatterjee,	99).	The	idea	of	“poli-
tical	society”	is	potentially	radical	in	identifying	that	the	“populations”	
that	make	up	this	alternative	site	are	neither	agents	of	 the	state	nor	
civil	society.	They	are	often	excluded	in	the	process	of	political	partici-
pation.	“For	the	sake	of	survival	and	livelihood,	they	have	to	negotiate	
with	both	state	and	civil	society	or	public	sphere,	domains	often	led	
and	occupied	by	the	middle-class	bourgeois	subjects	and	social	elites”	
(Kuan-Hsing	Chen,	00).	This	means	that	not	only	the	state	but	also	
civil	society,	using	well-recognized	“civil”	norms,	could	potentially	be-
come	part	of	the	power	block	and	mercilessly	attack	the	subaltern	clas-
ses,	to	preserve	its	own	dominant	interests.	Therefore,	if	the	modes	of	
protest	of	 “political	 society”	 are	not	 consistent	with	 the	principle	of	
associations	in	civil	society,	they	violate	institutional	norms	of	liberal	
civil	society.	“Of	course	the	problem	with	“political	society”	understood	
in	this	way	is	that	the	activities	here	would	not	necessarily	conform	to	
our	understanding	of	what	 is	 “progressive”	or	 “emancipatory”.	They	
could	be	struggles	of	squatters	on	government	land	to	claim	residence	
rights	(which	would	include	illegally	tapping	electricity	lines,	for	exam-
ple),	but	they	could	as	easily	be	the	effort	of	a	religious	sect	to	preserve	
the	corpse	of	their	leader	in	the	belief	of	its	resurrection	or	the	decision	
of	a	village	Panchayat	to	kill	a	woman	accused	of	adultery”	(Nivedita	
Menon,	004).	These	struggles,	more	often	than	not,	fail	 ‘the	tests	of	
legality	and	constitutionality	set	by	civil	society’	(Ibid).	
The	idea	of	“political	society”,	though	constituted	“outside”	and	
opposed	to	civil	society,	does	not	clearly	define	what	forms	of	protest	
are	part	of	it.	More	importantly,	it	combines	a	whole	range	of	“strate-
gic”	actions	adopted	by	the	subalterns	as	part	of	this	‘much	less	well	
defined’	domain	of	political	activity.	It	is	less	ideological	in	differen-
tiating	between	organized	political	movements	around	alternative	(to	
both	state	and	civil	society)	democratic	and	radical	“principles”,	and	
the	 “strategic”	and	 “contextually”	defined	 “politics	of	 the	possible”.	
In	fact,	it	combines	them	together	to	include	a	seamless	domain	of	
‘strategies’	of	negotiation	and	survival.	The	point	is	that	for	any	pro-
ject	attempting	radical	democratic	transformation,	ideas,	beliefs	and	
practices	do	not	hang	independent	of	each	other.	In	fact,	if	we	are	not	
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prepared	 to	make	a	more	nuanced	distinction	between	“strategies”	
born	out	of	the	imperatives	of	survival	and	those	that	propel	collec-
tives	to	forge	informed	protest	beyond	their	immediate	interests,	the	
project	of	democratization	will	enter	a	perilously	self-defeating	logic.	
We	will	have	come	full	circle	in	putting	in	place	an	equally	depolitici-
sed,	dehistoricised	and	flattened	notion	of	alternative	radical	political	
sites,	which	is	where	we	began	our	critique	of	civil	society.	It	would	
become	ambiguous	to	mark	the	“governing	principles	of	political	so-
ciety”	and	the	alternative	“forms	of	institutionalization”	it	would	at-
tempt.	While	undoubtedly	it	needs	to	be	acknowledged	that	uncivil	
development	is	making	it	increasingly	difficult	for	the	subalterns	to	
wage	organized	protest	and	pushing	them	towards	more	spontaneous	
survival	strategies,	wouldn’t	it	be	imperative,	for	this	very	reason,	to	
search	for	the	signposts	of	alternative	modes	of	protest	that	could	ac-
tually	bring	them	out	of	what	now	seems	to	be	an	never-ending	stru-
ggle	for	survival?	“Political	society”	in	its	bid	to		contrast	itself	with	
civil	 society	 ends	up	as	a	 seamless	domain	of	qualitatively	distinct	
political	actions	–	of	radical	social	movements,	political	parties	and	
non-partisan	political	formations	for	strategic	and	contextual	nego-
tiations	–	that	in	practice	cannot	actually	co-exist	and	are	bound	to	
enter	into	a	conflict	to	mutually	dislocate	each	other.	
This	paper	 is	 an	attempt	 to	delve	 into	 the	 consequences	of	 the	
antinomies	of	flattened	notions	of	subaltern	politics	on	the	basis	of	a	
field	study	in	Kazipally,	a	pollution	affected	village,	and	to	demonstra-
te	how	sustained	demands	for	the	closure	of	the	polluting	industries,	
based	on	collective	mobilization	and	action,	is	met	with	uncivil	state	
repression	in	nexus	with	mafia	and	the	economic	elites	(industrialists)	
in	the	market.	In	turn,	this	pushes	collectives	to	break	up	and	be	re-
placed	by	interest-based	demands	either	at	the	level	of	smaller	groups	
--	formed	around	available	social	stratifications	--	or	even	individuals.	
This	makes	it	increasingly	difficult	over	time	to	sustain	collective	poli-
tical	action	that	could	demand	and	gain	long-term	structural	changes,	
in	 this	 case	 the	 closure	of	 industries	 and	 the	 revival	 of	 agriculture.	
Therefore, the assumption that a “political society” can unproblemati-
cally refer to or subsume both organized political movements as well as 
contextually marked “strategic politics” actually becomes highly indefen-
sible.	In	other	words,	while	it	is	democratic	to	recognize	the	strategies	
for	survival,	it	is	struggles	that	lie	beyond	survival	strategies	that	are	
imperative	for	any	meaningful	idea	of	democratization.
Understanding the Context
Kazipally	is	a	village	situated	5	kilometers	towards	the	north-east	of	
Hyderabad	in	the	Ginnaram	mandal	of	Medak	district.	Medak	is	one	
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of	 the	most	backward	districts	of	Andhra	Pradesh.	The	 village	has	
506	households	with	a	total	population	of	000	people.	In	what	follo-
ws,	we	present	the	socio-economic	background	of	the	village:
	 note from the editors: While some might have objections to using the word “backwards” in 
this context, in india the term is commonly employed to refer to the unequal results of interna-
tional, national and regional development. The Government of india, for example, operates the 
backward regions Grant fund.
Table 1.1
Occupational Statistics
S. Nº Category Nº of Households
1 Small Cultivators 354
2 Medium Cultivator 50
3 Big Cultivator 10
4 Rich Cultivator 6
5 Landless Labourers 76
6 Industrial Labourers 3
7 Others 7
Total 506
Source: Field Study.
Table 1.2
Caste Statistics
S. Nº Caste Nº of Households
1 Yadava 40
2 Muthrasi 141
3 Muslims 101
4 Mangali 12
5 Chakali 25
6 Goud 10
7 M.Kapu 5
8 Madiga 172
Total 506
Source: Fieldwork
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From	the	above	data,	it	is	evident	that	the	amount	of	resources	availa-
ble	to	people	who	are	victims	of	industrial	pollution	are	very	limited.	
Firstly,	around		percent	of	the	total	households	are	dependent	on	
farming.	In	addition,	another	5	percent	of	households	are	engaged	
in	 agricultural	 labour	 for	 livelihoods.	 In	 total	 therefore,	 around	 97	
percent	of	households	are	dependent	on	agriculture.	The	Green	Peace	
report	suggests	that	industrial	pollution	in	this	area	has	affected	000	
acres	of	farmland	as	well	as	contaminated	well	water	to	the	level	of	
40	 feet.	Pollution	has	displaced	households	 from	 their	 traditional	
livelihoods	and	stripped	people	of	their	assets.	These	villagers	do	not	
have	alternative	skills	to	choose	other	employment	avenues.	The	in-
dustries,	 as	 seen	 from	 the	 evidence,	 do	not	 employ	 villagers.	 Thus,	
although	 the	 industries	 take	 subsidies	 from	 the	government	 stating	
they	will	contribute	towards	the	development	of	backward	areas,	they	
do	not	provide	any	employment	opportunities	or	avenues	for	social	
mobility,	for	instance	skill	development,	to	the	local	population.	Some	
of	the	marginal	and	small-scale	farmers	are	also	engaged	in	other	ac-
tivities	as	their	major	economic	activity.	However,	there	is	an	availa-
bility	of	additional	 incomes	for	those	engaged	as	washer-men,	or	in	
occupations	such	as	fisheries,	selling	fruits	grown	on	common	lands,	
or	dependent	on	livestock.
 
Nature of Industrialisation and Capital
The	industrialization	in	Kazipally	started	in	the	post-Emergency	period,	
when	Indira	Gandhi	contested	Medak	and	won.	This	area	was	adopted	
as	an	Industrial	Development	Area	(IDA).	However,	rapid	growth	of	in-
dustrialization	was	witnessed	only	from	99	onwards.	Most	of	these	in-
dustries,	started	after	99,	operated	on	loan	licensing	and	outsourcing	
by	multi-national	and	other	big	national	corporations.	
There	 are	 now,	 in	 total,	 about	 50	 industries	 in	 Kazipally	 and	
Gaddapothram.	 It	 was	 recently	 discovered	 that	 of	 the	 50	 units,	 5	
units	have	been	operating	without	Central	Pollution	Control	Board	
clearance	 certificates.	 The	 Commissionarate	 of	 Industries	 does	 not	
have	records	about	some	of	these	industries.
Multi-national	corporations,	especially	from	the	United	States,	
outsource	their	products	because,	as	it	is	estimated	by	Baumol	and	
Oates,	if	the	United	States	has	to	achieve	zero	discharge	standards,	
it	will	cost	the	US	economy	$	billion.	It	was	in	99	that	the	Uni-
ted	States’	Environmental	Protection	Agency	(EPA)	was	formed.	The	
	 `State	of	Community	Health	at	Medak	District´,	Green	Peace	India,	Bangalore,	
004.	Also	refer	Deccan	Chronicle	`Dirty	Nakkavagu	Destroying	Farmlands,	Causing	
illness`,	9th	August,	996.	
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EPA	classified	products,	especially	chemicals	and	metallic	products,	
as	Bio-Accumulant	Toxins.	These	were	the	kind	of	chemicals	that	will	
not	 decompose	 and,	 therefore,	 their	 discharge	 accumulates	 toxins	
in	 the	 environment.	The	 term	 ‘dirty	 goods’	 is	 also	 associated	with	
this	 type	of	production.	A	 ‘dirty	good’	 is	defined	as	a	good	 in	whi-
ch	the	effluent	treatment	costs	exceed	the	value	of	the	final	product	
itself.	 Therefore,	 the	 production	 of	 ‘dirty	 goods’,	 if	 abiding	 by	 the	
water,	soil	and	air	quality	standards	set	by	law,	implicitly	works	out	
to	be	uneconomical.	It	is	because	of	this	that	multi-national	corpo-
rations	have	chosen	to	produce	these	‘dirty	goods’	by	loan	licensing	
their	products	to	third	world	producers.	The	national	corporations,	
on	the	other	hand,	are	outsourcing	production	of	‘dirty	goods’	with	
the	objective	of	securing	ISO	00	and	other	such	quality	certifica-
tes	which	are	a	precondition	to	exporting	their	products	to	foreign	
markets.	Such	outsourced	production	is	also	undertaken	by	units	in	
Kazipally	and	Gaddapotharam	industrial	areas.	Shawalace,	the	anti-
AIDS	vaccine	being	produced	by	Bill	Gates	Foundation,	and	Reddy	
labs,	have	been	identified	in	our	research	as	two	of	the	multi-natio-
nal	companies	that	have	ties	with	polluting	 industrial	units.	There	
could	be	many	more	big	actors	who	claim	clean	production	for	pu-
blic	consumption.	
Interestingly,	the	MODVAT	introduced	in	99	has	been	a	boost	to	
small-scale	industries.	Since	MODVAT	is	a	direct	tax,	the	small	scale	
industries	are	being	given	several	subsidies	on	raw	materials,	an	ex-
cise	tax,	and	so	on.	Furthermore,	small	scale	companies	also	recruit	
cheap	labour.	Therefore	the	MODVAT	works	out	lower.	This,	in	turn,	
implies	that	big	corporations	will	obtain	intermediaries,	or	their	out-
sourced	products,	manufactured	at	lower	prices	than	if	these	products	
were	manufactured	by	the	big	corporations	themselves.	Given	Medak	
is	a	backward	area,	the	incentive	packages	for	industries	are	very	at-
tractive.	Although	technically	the	region	falls	in	Medak,	it	is	only	5	
kilometers	from	the	city	and	this	implies	access	to	infrastructure.	This	
model	 of	 industrialization	 referred	 to	 as	 ‘new	 industrialization’	 has	
been	identified	as	generating	high	social	costs	both	in	terms	of	blatant	
violations	of	 labour	standards	and	environmental	pollution	(G.Vijay	
999;	G.Vijay,	 00).	While	 the	 product	market	 of	 the	 industries	 is	
foreign,	the	lack	of	civility	in	the	sense	of	the	violation	of	norms	laid	
down	by	law	in	the	interests	of	the	community	is	built	into	this	mo-
del	of	industrialization.	The	intrinsic	need	for	uncivil	manufacturing	
practices	propels	a	chain	of	lack	of	civility	seen	in	the	unethical	lobb-
ying	with	political	circles,	bribing	of	bureaucracy,	nexus	with	mafia	
and	other	such	uncivil	practices.	A	lack	of	civility	thus	becomes	inevi-
table	and	systemic.	
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Problem of Pollution and Social Cost
The	pollution	 levels	 in	 the	Kazipally	 tank	are	an	outcome	of	 indus-
trial	toxic	effluents	dumping	for	the	past	6	years.	Several	reports	--	a	
technical	report	about	the	Kazi	cheruvu	and	the	ground	water	done	
by	the	environmental	department	of	Jawaharlal	Nehru	Technological	
University	 (JNTU)	 in	99,	 the	monthly	updates	of	water	quality	 in	
the	tanks	by	the	Andhra	Pradesh	Pollution	Control	Board	(APPCB),	
and	the	more	recent	Committee	constituted	by	Andhra	Pradesh	High	
Court,	 Chaired	 by	 Justice	Gopal	Rao,	which	 submitted	 a	 Fact	 Fin-
ding	Report	(004)	--	have	all	established	irrefutable	evidence	about	
the	alarming	levels	of	damage	done	to	these	water	sources.	As	part	of	
our	research,	we	have	obtained	water	samples	 tested	 independently	
by	Yagna	Labs	during	997	and	collected	in	similar	locations	for	com-
parison	again		in	00	by	the	Environmental	Protection	Training	and	
Research	Institute	(EPTRI).	The	results	of	some	of	these	findings	are	
outlined	below:
From	the	above	figures,	we	know	that	not	only	are	different	chemicals	
present	in	the	water	of	the	Kazipally	tank	way	above	the	normal	ran-
ges,	but	for	several	indicators	the	figures	for	00	show	increases	in	
Table 1.3
Comparative Figures for 1997-2003 -Water Sample Test Results*
Parameter normal Sample 1 Sample 2 Sample 3 Sample 4
S Nº Ranges 1997 2003 1997 2003 1997 2003 1997 2003
1 pH 7-8.5 4.2 7.2 7.8 7.2 7.6 7.2 8.1 7.3
2 Dissolved solid 500 mg/ltr ** 3900 2860 7600 2900 970 2865 7960 1860
3 Chloride 200 mg/ltr** 340 930 520 855 550 855 250 445
4 Sulphates 200 mg/ltr** 260 509 320 488 340 495 140 545
5 Flouride 1.0 mg/ltr** 1.8 .752 2.5 .759 2.3 .600 1.0 .666
6 Magnesium 30 mg/ltr** 300 347 300 346 300 272 180 347
Calcium 75 mg/ltr** 700 594 500 644 600 594 200 495
Source: Field Work - 1997, Results based on tests conducted by Yagna Labs, Amberpet.
* Though Kazipally village is situated right below the Kazi talab, there is about 250 meters distance from the actual location of the 
tank. This in a way dilutes the pollution by the time water reaches the village. We therefore collected different samples to show this 
variance as well. In Table-1.3 sample-1 has been collected directly from the tank. Sample-2 and 3 are from the canal. While sample-2 
is from a location of the canal closer to the tank, Sample-3 is from a point closer to the village. Sample-4 is the bore water which was 
used for drinking purposes until recently. This primary data can be supplemented by other secondary data sources including data from 
Commissionarate of Industries, Green Peace, EPTRI and other reports.
** Less than or equal to.
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pollution	levels.	Although	it	is	true	that	pollution	has	been	controlled	
due	to	a	long	drawn	out	battle	by	the	people,	this	is	no	compliment	to	
regulating	authorities	as	the	standards	are	blatantly	violated	to	date.	
This	violation	of	standards	is	illegal,	whether	the	violation	is	by	a	mar-
gin	 or	 an	 enormity,	 since	 the	 standards	 imply	 that	 the	 presence	 of	
chemicals	beyond	these	limits	can	harm	the	life,	property	or	health	of	
the	inhabitants	and	other	natural	life	forms	on	which	the	community	
is	dependent.	This	needs	to	be	the	framework	for	reading	the	above	
figures.
As	a	result	of	pollution,	nearly	7000	acres	of	land	in		villages	
have	been	partially	and	completely	destroyed	 (JNTU	Report,	99).	
There	have	been	several	 reports	of	 loss	of	fish	and	cattle,	on	which	
several	 rural	 communities	 depend	 for	 their	 livelihoods	 (Field	Data,	
997-9,	00-05).	The	recent	health	report	by	Green	Peace	has	made	
startling	revelations	about	the	health	status	in	the	affected	villages.
Thus	we	find	enormous	damage	has	been	done	to	the	natural	en-
vironment	 and	 huge	 social	 costs	 have	 been	 generated	 for	 the	 local	
communities	due	to	industrial	pollution.	
Table 1.4
Disease Incidence in Affected Villages
Nervous System 3 times higher than the controlled group
Circulatory system 2 times higher than the controlled group
Respiratory System 3.81 times higher than the controlled group. 1 in 20 are Affected
Digestive System 1.98 times higher than the controlled group
Blood and Blood forming Organs 2.914 times higher than the controlled group. 1 in 35 persons are affected
Endocrine, Nutritional and Metabolic Systems 1.84 times higher than the controlled group. 1 in 35 people are affected
Neoplasms 11 times higher than the controlled groups
Skin and subcutaneous Tissues 2.67 times higher than the controlled group
Congenital Malformations, deformations and 
Chromosomal abnormalities 3.93 times higher than the controlled group
Cancer 11 times higher than the controlled group
Source: Green Peace, 2004
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Methodology of the Present Study
The	 present	 study	 focuses	 on	 collective	 action	 against	 pollution	 in	
an	effort	to	see	how	the	idea	of	“political	society”,	understood	as	in-
cluding	both	organized	collective	action	or	movements	for	structural	
demands,	and	various	“strategies”	or	“negotiations”	with	immediate	
interests	for	survival,	becomes	unsustainable	in	practical	terms.	For	
this	purpose,	the	study	has	analyzed	three	social	groups	that	are	or-
ganized	 and	 ideally	 posed	 for	mobilization	 against	 polluting	 indus-
tries.	The	farming	community,	youth,	and	women	have	been	chosen	
as	relevant	social	groups	for	this	study.	This	is	because	all	three	social	
groups	have	organized	associations	and,	with	the	exception	of	the	far-
mers’	 association,	 these	 associations	 themselves	 are	meant	 to	 serve	
other	objectives.	The	research	was	interested	in	finding	out	what	these	
associations	were	doing	about	the	problem	of	pollution	which	was	a	
problem	of	 the	 general	 village	 community.	 The	Kalushya	Vyatireka	
Raitu	Committee	(KVRC)	with	a	total	membership	of	40	farmers,	the	
Shivaji	Youth	Association	with	a	 total	membership	of	50	members,	
and	the	DWCRA	micro-credit	groups	which	together	have	about	00	
women,	are	the	associations	which	have	been	taken	up	for	the	study.	
The	study	has	been	done	in	two	phases.	An	earlier	study	done	in	00	
includes	responses	from	all	the	40	farmers.	A	recent	survey	done	in	
005	is	based	on	a	sample	of	0	respondents	from	all	 three	groups.	
Thus,	 this	study	is	based	on	a	total	of	70	respondents.	A	structured	
questionnaire	and	 informal	 interviews	were	used	 to	collect	primary	
data.	In	the	collection	of	primary	data,	we	find	that	since	the	experien-
ce	is	a	shared	one,	we	often	came	across	repetitions	in	the	narratives	
and	therefore	we	are	able	to	argue	that	the	responses	of	this	sample	
speak	for	the	social	groups	these	associations	represent.	
Political Society - Collective or interest-based?
In	dealing	with	the	problem	of	pollution,	we	find	that	whenever	people	
have	raised	structural	questions	through	their	collective	political	acti-
vity,	they	have	faced	uncivil	means	of	repression	both	from	the	coerci-
ve	state	apparatus,	like	the	police,	and	from	organized	mafia.	This	lack	
of	civility	has	weakened	political	activity.	In	what	follows,	we	narrate	
the	experience	of	Kazipally	victims	of	industrial	pollution	in	instances	
where	they	raised	such	structural	questions.	
The	conflict	around	the	pollution	of	the	village	tank	by	industries	
took	a	political	form	that	raised	structural	demands.	There	are	several	
reasons	why	shutting	down	these	polluting	industries	can	be	interpre-
ted	as	a	structural	demand.	Firstly,	villagers	of	Kazipally,	as	already	
pointed	out,	were	predominantly	dependent	on	agriculture	and	other	
traditional	activities	before	their	tank	was	polluted.	The	conflict	thus	
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became	articulated	as	a	conflict	between	farmers	and	industry.	Secon-
dly,	as	already	seen	in	the	narrative	on	the	nature	of	industrialization,	
these	industrialists	are	outsiders	in	the	regional	sense	of	the	term.	The	
industrialists	are	predominantly	from	the	Coastal	Andhra	and	Raya-
laseema	regions	of	Andhra	Pradesh.	This	regional	dimension	assumes	
special	 significance	 in	 the	wake	of	 rising	 aspirations	 for	 a	 separate	
Telangana	statehood.	Furthermore,	 the	 regional	dimension	 is	of	 re-
levance	 in	 two	other	 senses.	Although	 the	 industrial	policy	outlines	
development	of	backward	regions	as	the	objective	of	rural	industria-
lization	in	the	form	of	industrial	development	areas,	and	although	it	
justifies	giving	these	industries	subsidies	and	other	such	benefits,	we	
find	 that	 the	contribution	of	 these	 industries	 to	 the	development	of	
these	backward	regions	is	very	limited.	The	local	people	are	not	given	
employment	opportunities	 in	these	industries.	As	well,	 the	products	
produced	by	these	industries	are	not	meant	for	the	local	market.	
We	also	find	that	the	victims	of	pollution	include	several	groups	
of	impoverished	people.	The	landless,	those	with	livestock,	the	arti-
sans	and	those	in	traditional	service	sectors	have	also	been	victims,	
losing	 income	 sources,	 livelihoods,	 assets,	 health	 etc.	 Vis-à-vis	 the	
industries	which	make	huge	profits,	enjoy	 links	with	 individuals	 in	
power,	and	hold	the	capacity	to	manipulate	the	system,	this	problem	
is	posed	as	a	conflict	between	the	poor	and	the	vulnerable	and	the	
rich	and	the	powerful.	
The	demand	for	permanently	shutting	down	polluting	industries	
is,	therefore,	a	demand	of	the	farming	community	against	the	irres-
ponsible	industries,	it’s	a	demand	of	the	local	community	against	the	
industrialists	who	are	the	outsiders,	and	it’s	a	demand	of	the	poor	and	
vulnerable	people	against	the	rich	and	the	powerful	lobbies.	For	these	
reasons,	 the	demand	 for	 the	permanent	 shut	down	of	 the	polluting	
industrial	units	becomes	a	structural	demand.	
Such	a	demand	was	raised	on	several	occasions.	The	first	time	
was	back	in	99.	The	villagers	of	Kazipally	and	several	other	affec-
ted	villages,	led	by	different	civil	society	based	organizations	inclu-
ding	the	Forum	Against	Pollution,	Jana	Vigyana	Vedika	etc.,	and	the	
political	representatives	of	these	villages,	conducted	rallies	and	Dhar-
nas4. As	a	consequence,	people	of	these	villages	were	lathi-charged	
and	 the	 representatives	were	arrested.	Again	 in	994,	 villagers	fig-
hting	the	industrialists	were	attacked	by	the	mafia	and	although	the	
villagers	put	up	some	resistance,	they	had	to	leave	the	villages	fea-
ring	for	their	lives.	Villagers	who	fled	were	charged	with	attempted	
murder.	 In	 another	 instance	 in	995,	 the	 villagers,	 led	by	 some	of	
4	 	The	most	significant	form	being	blockade	of	the	national	highway
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the	political	representatives,	attacked	industries	and	ransacked	and	
assaulted	 the	 industrialists.	As	a	 consequence	of	 this,	 villagers	de-
manding	closure	of	industries	were	charged	with	attempted	murder,	
and	framed	for	extortion.	
In	005,	based	on	an	affidavit	lodged	by	the	Goa	Foundation	with	
the	Supreme	Court,	stating	that	several	of	these	industries	had	been	
functioning	without	the	clearance	certificates	from	the	Central	Pollu-
tion	Control	Board	since	994,	the	Supreme	Court	ordered	a	public	
hearing.	Objections	were	 raised	 to	 the	way	 the	 public	 hearing	was	
being	conducted.	The	Pollution	Impact	Assessment	Reports	had	not	
reached	several	villages.	The	dates	of	the	hearing	were	not	clear.	Some	
villagers	were	complaining	of	threatening	calls	dissuading	them	from	
attending	the	public	hearing.
Despite	all	this,	villagers	mobilized	themselves	in	huge	numbers	
and	gave	evidence	against	the	industry	on	the	day	of	the	hearing.	After	
the	lunch	break,	perceiving	that	the	public	hearing	was	going	against	
them,	the	representatives	of	the	industries	disturbed	the	public	hea-
ring	by	beating	up	the	Green	Peace	activist.	Following	the	assault	on	
the	Green	Peace	activist,	 there	were	angry	protests	by	 the	villagers.	
Consequently,	 in	 this	 protest,	 the	 assistant	 Sub-Inspector	 of	 Police	
was	 hurt.	 Later	when	 the	Green	Peace	 activist,	 along	with	 another	
researcher,	both	who	were	mobilizing	people,	went	to	register	an	FIR	
in	the	Police	station,	the	District	Inspector	assaulted	them	again.	Af-
ter	realizing	 that	 those	assaulted	were	activists	who	had	nothing	 to	
do	with	 the	protests	of	 the	 villagers,	 the	Additional	Superintendent	
of	Police	arrived	and	tendered	an	apology	to	the	activists.	He	assured	
that	action	would	be	initiated	against	the	District	Inspector.	Although	
complaints	against	the	industrial	representatives	and	the	District	Ins-
pector	were	 registered,	no	 action	was	 initiated	 in	both	 these	 cases.	
Moreover,	 6	 villagers,	 including	both	 the	Green	Peace	activist	 and	
the	researcher,	were	charged	under		sections	of	Indian	Penal	Code	
including	section	07,	which	is	attempted	murder.	Of	the	6	names,		
names	were	mentioned	while	the	other	50	names	were	put	under	the	
category	of	others.	Constables	were	going	around	villages	blackmai-
ling	the	villagers	that	their	names	would	be	included	in	this	 ‘others’	
category	and	were	extorting	money.	The	Sarpanch	of	Kazipally5,	who	
was	siding	with	the	industrialists,	went	to	the	village	and	told	the	vi-
llagers	who	were	mobilizing	against	the	industrialists	that	if	the	Green	
Peace	activist	and	the	researcher,	who	were	mobilizing	people,	could	
be	beaten	up	by	police,	what	could	ordinary	villagers	do?	From	the	po-
int	of	view	of	the	villagers,	the	Green	Peace	activist	and	the	researcher	
5	 President	of	the	village	Panchayat
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were	amongst	those	that	enjoyed	a	network	with	the	urban	elite	and	
had	access	to	bureaucracy,	and	even	ministers	in	the	cabinet.	If	such	
people	could	be	assaulted	in	the	custody	of	the	police,	what	protection	
would	ordinary	villagers	have?	This	scared	the	villagers,	who	then	sta-
yed	away	from	the	public	hearing	on	the	second	day.
On	the	second	day	of	the	public	hearing,		DCM	mini-buses	were	
hired	by	the	industries	in	order	to	bring	people	for	the	specific	purpo-
se	of	giving	statements	in	favor	of	the	industrialists.	Several	villagers	
reported	that	the	village	heads	of	some	villages,	and	some	villagers,	
had	received	bribes	to	speak	in	favor	of	industrialists.	Thus,	what	was	
supposed	to	be	a	democratic	process	of	letting	the	villagers	vent	their	
opinions	freely,	was	subverted	by	the	industrial	representatives	who	
resorted	to	uncivil	acts,	followed	by	the	police	who	repeated	the	un-
civil	acts.	Both	of	these	were	at	intimidating	the	villagers	who,	out	of	
fear,	stayed	away	on	the	second	and	third	days	of	public	hearing.	
From	the	above	narrative	of	events	that	took	place	over	the	years,	
it’s	quite	evident	that	whenever	structural	demands	and	organized	co-
llective	action	strengthened,	the	market,	civil	society	and	state	have	
shown	a	lack	of	civility	aimed	at	suppressing	the	political	activity	of	
the	people.	As	a	consequence	of	such	a	lack	of	civility	by	institutions,	
the	state	 loses	 its	 legitimacy	and	 is	seen	as	unjustly	siding	with	 the	
dominant	interests.	The	state	apparatus	which,	in	this	case,	is	repre-
sented	by	the	Pollution	Control	Board	(PCB)	and	the	police,	who	fail	
to	implement	law	or	take	recourse	to	extra-judicial	methods,	creates	
a	general	perspective	that	not	only	can	the	state	be	manipulated,	but	
it	is	also	arbitrary	and	inconsistent	in	its	behavior.	Thereby	the	state	
loses	its	objective	image.	In	addition	to	this,	by	not	initiating	action	
against	the	mafia	like	elements	because	of	their	links	with	mainstream	
political	parties,	and	by	not	acting	upon	the	acts	of	violence	perpetra-
ted	by	the	industrialists,	the	state	allows	very	little	space	for	organized	
political	protest.	
There	 is	yet	another	direction	 that	political	activity	can	 take	 in	
the	wake	of	an	increasing	lack	of	civility.	As	a	result	of	this,	we	find	
that	what	what	begins	as	political	 activity	 for	 long-term	demands	 -
-	 in	this	case	the	closure	of	industries	--	takes	the	shape	of	interest-
based	 politics.	 The	 problem	with	 interest-based	 politics,	 as	 already	
suggested,	 is	 that	 collective	 interests	are	often	compromised	by	 the	
interests	of	 immediacy	and	 survival.	The	 “political	 society”	 refrains	
from	raising	structural	questions	and	even	questions	of	collective	in-
terest	and	relapses	into	pursuing	opportunities	that	satisfy	immediate	
needs,	especially	around	problems	of	survival.	Alternative	interest-ba-
sed	politics	begin	to	look	far	more	feasible.	Interest-based	“strategies”	
or	“negotiations”	grow.	We	find,	however,	that	whenever	people	have	
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resorted	to	interest-based	politics,	political	activity	has	become	unsus-
tainable	and,	in	the	long	run,	this	has	proven	counterproductive	for	
the	community,	making	it	weaker	and	more	vulnerable.	The	unsustai-
nability	of	political	activity	due	to	interest-based	“negotiations”	of	the	
“political	society”	is	due	to	the	impact	it	has	on	the	solidarity	of	the	
collective.
In	reality,	we	find	that	since	society	is	stratified	based	on	several	
structures,	 interests	are	stratified	as	well.	 In	political	activity	 initia-
ted	by	such	a	stratified	society,	commonality	of	interest	holds	only	a	
symbolic	significance	providing	a	ground	for	an	artificial	unity	of	the	
collective.	While	collective	political	activity	mounts	pressure	on	 the	
system	and	creates	conditions	where	the	system	is	forced	to	accom-
modate	the	demands	of	the	collective,	the	individual	or	small	groups’	
(within	this	collective)	 interest-based	acts	within	a	 ‘political	society’	
take	advantage	of	such	pressure	and	they	through	their	own	demands.	
As	a	consequence	of	the	benefits	accrued	by	the	interest-based	‘poli-
tical	 society’,	 such	beneficiary	 groups	distance	 themselves	 from	 the	
collective	political	activity.	In	doing	so,	they	weaken	the	collective	po-
litical	activity.	In	what	follows,	we	show	how	these	trends	in	interest-
based	politics	have	manifested	in	Kazipally.
In	99,	soon	after	the	dharnas	raised	structural	demands	which	
saw	lathi-charge	and	arrests,	these	demands	took	on	the	shape	of	in-
terest-based	politics.	Instead	of	asking	for	the	closure	of	the	polluting	
units,	the	villagers	demanded	that	they	be	given	some	livelihoods	and	
income-earning	 opportunities.	 The	manufacturing	 process	 in	 these	
predominantly	bulky	drug	and	chemical	 industries	produced	as	dry	
ash	 as	 residue.	 This	 ash	was	 being	 used	 for	 brick	making	 in	 brick	
kilns	located	in	the	vicinity	of	the	village.	There	were	other	jobs	that	
the	villagers	offered	to	do,	including	running	water	tankers,	taking	up	
construction	contracts,	activities	of	transportation,	etc.	The	villagers,	
however,	were	 not	 offered	 employment	 in	 the	 industry	 as	workers.	
Some	youth	were	employed	by	industries	not	directly	responsible	for	
polluting	Kazi	talab.	These	industries	are	located	elsewhere	at	a	much	
further	distance	from	the	village.	However,	the	only	opportunities	that	
the	youth	secured	were	as	daily	contract	workers.	
In	 995,	when	 the	 villagers	 ransacked	 the	 industries,	 although	
the	 industries	did	not	close	down	their	operations,	a	Memorandum	
of	Understanding	(MoU)	was	signed	between	the	Model	Industrial	As-
sociation,	representing	the	industries,	and	the	village,	represented	its	
leaders,	 including	 the	 Sarpanch	 and	 the	 Zilla	 Parishad	 Chairman6.	
A	sum	of	Rs.4	 lakhs	was	paid	 to	 the	village.	A	community	hall,	 the	
6	 Chairman	of	the	District	Council
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laying	village	roads	and	other	such	activities	that	were	considered	to	
be	 village	 developmental	 activities,	 were	 undertaken	 with	 this	mo-
ney.	In	return,	the	villagers	were	asked	to	withdraw	all	the	cases	filed	
by	 them	against	 the	polluting	 industries.	However,	 some	dissenting	
groups	persisted	with	their	court	cases.	In	99,	based	on	the	Andhra	
Pradesh	High	Court	directive,	all	the	polluting	industries	were	closed.	
The	 industries,	 however	 ,approached	 the	Supreme	Court	 and	 got	 a	
stay	ordered	on	the	closure	order	of	the	Supreme	Court.	In	999,	the	
Chief	Minister	of	Andhra	Pradesh	made	a	statement	on	the	issue	of	
pollution	in	which	he	said	that	these	industries	were	earning	foreign	
currency	 for	 the	 country	 and	 that	 the	 pollution	 control	 authorities	
should	go	 slow	on	 the	 issue	of	pollution.	 If	 industries	are	harassed	
then	it	may	impinge	their	growth.	
In	 00,	 based	 on	 the	 cases	 filed	with	 the	 Supreme	Court,	 the	
Supreme	Court	ordered	the	closure	of		industries	until	they	abided	
by	the	prescribed	standards	of	water	quality	and	the	hydrolic	reduc-
tion.	The	PCB,	however,	after	a	brief	period	of	closure,	reopened	the	
industries.	During	 the	 same	 year,	 the	Supreme	Court	 ruled,	 stating	
that	the	industrialists	had	to	pay	compensation	to	the	farmers	whose	
lands	were	damaged	on	account	of	pollution.	However,	 the	amount	
of	compensation	paid	was	the	paltry	sum	of	Rs.700/per	acre	per	an-
num.	This	amount	was	not	even	equivalent	to	the	costs	incurred	for	
seeds.	Furthermore,	those	who	were	landless	did	not	receive	any	com-
pensation.	As	part	of	 the	 same	 judgment,	 safe	drinking	water	 from	
the	Manjira	river,	water	supply	to	Hyderabad	city,	was	also	to	supply	
water	to	the	village.	
In	00,	 the	village	was	able	 to	get	written	approval	 for	one	of	
its	demands.	The	district	collector	ordered	repairs	on	 the	Kazipally	
tank.	The	collector	ordered	that	a	sum	of	Rs.9	 lakhs	(Rs..9	million)	
be	collected	from	the	industries	for	this	purpose.	The	villagers	were	
disappointed,	however,	after	a	brief	period	of	excitement,	when	Grass-
hoppers7	were	sent	to	the	village	to	begin	the	work.	The	day	the	work	
was	to	begin	saw	a	festive	environment	with	a	pooja	being	performed	
at	 the	work	site	and	a	coconut	offering	to	 the	gods.	After	a	 few	he-
aps	of	mud	were	removed	from	the	tank,	the	grasshoppers,	however,	
never	 returned	again.	On	contacting	 the	Medak	collector	 about	 the	
work,	the	collector	told	the	village	representatives	that	the	industria-
lists	were	not	willing	to	give	the	amount	and	that	the	government	was	
negotiating	with	them.	
In	00,	 the	 issue	of	pollution	got	considerable	and	 favourable	
media	attention.	The	regional	press	and	the	regional	electronic	me-
7	 Heavy	engineering	equipment	used	to	dig	mud	out,	popularly	called	a	proclainer.
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dia	gave	coverage	to	this	issue.	Several	representations	were	made	by	
Mr.K.G.Kannabiran	(National	President,	PUCL)	to	the	PCB,	on	behalf	
of	the	people	of	Kazipally.	Following	this	new	attention	the	problem	
received,	a	commission	of	 inquiry,	under	 the	chairmanship	of	 justi-
ce	Gopal	Rao,	a	retired	Chief	Justice	of	Andhra	Pradesh	High	Court,	
was	set	up.	The	commission	was	taken	aback	by	the	condition	of	the	
tank	when	they	paid	a	visit	to	the	village.	Following	this	visit,	villagers	
were	asked	to	provide	evidence	of	violations.	Villagers	began	to	act	as	
vigilance	teams	and	by	doing	so,	caught	several	industries	letting	out	
effluents	into	a	stream	carrying	water	to	the	tank,	and	burning	solid	
toxic	wastes	outside	the	premises	of	the	industry.	As	a	consequence	of	
these	instances	of	law	violation,	a	bond	of	Rs.5	lakhs	(Rs..5	million)	
was	 taken	 from	the	 industries	 for	surety,	and	 in	 the	case	of	 further	
violations	industries	would	lose	this	amount.
In	004,	Green	Peace	released	its	health	report.	The	report	com-
pared	the	disease	patterns	in	pollution	affected	villages	with	other	vi-
llages	which	were	not	affected	by	pollution.	The	health	report	revealed	
several	disturbing	trends.	It	suggested	that	in	several	types	of	diseases	
including	congenital	diseases	and	cancer,	the	pollution	affected	villa-
ges	showed	far	higher	rates	of	occurrence	than	the	other	non-polluted	
villages.	Some	diseases	showed	00-00	times	higher	occurrence.	Af-
ter	these	discoveries,	the	need	was	felt	for	at	least	one	primary	health	
center	with	referral	authority.	Patients	could	then	get	free	treatment	at	
government	hospitals	in	the	city.	Until	now	nothing	has	materialized.	
Overall,	we	find	 that	 the	achievements	of	 the	Kazipally	 victims	
have	been	quite	 limited.	Although	there	have	been	several	demands	
reflecting	collective	interests	--	which	are	not	structural	as	we	define	
it	--	including	proving	employment	opportunities	in	the	industries,	re-
pairing	tanks,	abiding	by	quality	standards,	refraining	from	dumping	
untreated	effluents	into	the	village	tank,	and	setting	up	a	health	center	
with	 referral	authority,	none	of	 these	demands	have	been	achieved.	
The	reasons	for	the	failure	of	these	collective	demands	quite	clearly	
lie	in	the	‘strategic’	and	‘contextually’	defined	‘politics	of	the	possible’	
of	‘political	society’.	
“Political Society” and the Decaying Community
In	99,	when	villagers	had	secured	the	opportunities	to	sell	dry	ash,	
or	take	up	transport	and	construction	contracts,	a	large	number	of	vi-
llagers	were	willing	to	do	this	work.	These	opportunities	looked	small	
in	number	 in	 relation	 to	 the	number	of	 villagers	willing	 to	 take	up	
these	opportunities.	As	a	result,	this	led	to	internal	feuding	over	who	
should	get	these	opportunities.	The	industrialists	“strategically”	gave	
the	authority	to	decide	on	who	could	take	up	these	opportunities	to	
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the	Sarpanch.	It	was	“strategic”	in	the	sense	that	the	Sarpanchs	could	
easily	be	lured	to	take	the	side	of	the	industries,	as	they	received	bri-
bes	from	time	to	time.	Given	the	frequent	tendencies	by	Sarpanchs	to	
take	the	side	of	the	industries,	this	system	of	allocating	opportunities	
led	to	a	situation	where	villagers	who	assured	they	would	not	speak	
out	about	the	problem	of	pollution	were	given	these	opportunities.	A	
section	of	those	fighting	against	pollution,	therefore,	withdrew	from	
the	 struggle	 against	 pollution.	 This	 resulted	 from	 their	 dependence	
on	the	industry	for	their	livelihoods.	So	much	so	that	the	president	of	
the	Kalushya	Vyatireka	Raitu	Committee	(KVRC)	(Farmers	commit-
tee	against	pollution),	the	main	organization	led	by	farmers	to	fight	
against	pollution,	started	to	work	on	a	construction	contract	for	one	
of	the	most	serious	polluting	industrial	units.	Those	farmers	who	were	
relatively	better-off	or	had	some	assets	like	vehicles	(tractors,	etc.)	ne-
cessary	to	transport	material	for	the	construction,		or	who	could	mo-
bilize	labour,	were	the	beneficiaries.	
Since	 the	Sarpanchs	were	hand-in-hand	with	 the	 industrialists,	
they	used	several	other	methods	to	prevent	villagers	from	participa-
ting	in	the	protest	against	pollution.	Some	of	these	means	of	control	
are	worth	discussing	at	 this	point.	Against	 the	backdrop	of	 the	dis-
placement	from	traditional	occupations,	especially	agriculture,	those	
farmers	who	were	actively	 involved	 in	 the	protest	 against	pollution	
obviously	could	not	secure	opportunities	within	the	industry.	One	of	
the	active	 functionaries	of	 the	KVRC	was	 earning	his	 livelihood	by	
engaging	in	unlicensed	stone	quarrying.	This	was	possible	for	him	be-
cause	he	owned	a	tractor	which	was	used	to	transport	the	granite	sto-
nes	and	concrete	to	construction	companies.	The	farmer	had	acquired	
a	loan	of	one	lakh	rupees	to	engage	labour	to	work	for	him.	After	the	
work	was	completed,	the	farmer	paid	the	labour	their	wages	and	when	
he	was	about	to	transport	the	material	to	the	construction	company,	
the	Sarpanch	called	 the	 farmer	and	threatened	to	arrest	 the	 farmer	
for	having	engaged	in	illegal	stone	quarrying.	The	farmer	not	only	felt	
threatened	by	the	possibility	of	arrest,	but	felt	frightened	that	he	may	
not	be	able	to	repay	the	loan	he	borrowed.	The	Sarpanch	then	convin-
ced	the	farmer	that	he	should	withdraw	from	the	protest	against	the	
industries.	Under	duress	the	farmer	kept	away	from	the	KVRS.	
Again	 in	 995	 when	 the	 MoU	 was	 signed	 between	 the	 village	
heads	and	the	Model	Industrial	Association,	a	substantial	number	of	
farmers	did	not	approach	the	court	with	complaints	about	pollution.	
This	was	because	out	of	the	amount	of	Rs.4	lakhs	which	was	paid,	the-
se	farmers	received	part	of	this	amount	in	the	name	of	compensation.	
The	decision	about	compensation	was	arbitrary	since	not	all	farmers	
received	the	amount.	It	was	again	biased	towards	those	who	promised	
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to	keep	away	from	the	political	activity	against	pollution.	The	ZPTC	
chairman	himself,	one	of	the	signatories	of	the	MoU,	owned	about	40	
acres	of	land	in	the	village.	He	was	the	victim	who	had	suffered	the	
greatest	loss	in	terms	of	number	of	acres	of	land	affected.	He	was	ac-
tive	in	the	mobilization	of	the	farmers	from	99	onwards.	After	this	
episode,	although	he	registered	his	presence	in	activities	by	villagers	
protesting	against	pollution	now	and	then,	he	kept	away	from	any	fur-
ther	mobilization	activity	linked	to	protesting	against	pollution.	
Another	instance	where	the	subversion	of	activity	against	indus-
trial	pollution	is	evident	was	the	way	industries	were	dealing	with	the	
farmers	whose	cattle	were	dying	after	drinking	polluted	water.	Earlier	
on,	the	farmers	took	their	cattle	to	the	government	veterinary-hospital	
and,	after	examination	by	doctors,	took	a	certificate	from	them	stating	
that	the	death	of	the	cattle	might	be	due	to	the	consumption	of	toxic	
water.	This	certificate	was	necessary	in	order	to	carryout	further	fo-
rensic	investigations	on	the	dead	cattle	by	the	city-based	government	
veterinary	hospital.	Following	that,	an	FIR	could	be	lodged	with	the	
police,	based	on	which	a	 legal	notice	could	be	served	which	is	then	
used	as	the	basis	for	demanding	compensation	for	the	cattle.	All	such	
complaints	 and	 cases	meant	mounting	 evidence	 against	 the	 indus-
tries.	 Fearing	 this,	 the	 industrialists	 dissuaded	 villagers	 from	going	
to	government	veterinary	hospitals	or	registering	complaints	with	the	
police.	Instead,	they	said	that	those	who	had	cattle	die	on	account	of	
consuming	 toxic	water	could	approach	 the	 industries	 through	 their	
Sarpanch.	 Over	 the	 years,	 several	 villagers	 received	 compensation	
whenever	 they	 lost	 cattle.	However,	 there	 is	no	evidence	 suggesting	
loss	of	cattle	due	to	pollution.	
In	the	004	Panchayat	elections	for	the	post	of	Sarpanch,	a	new	
candidate	stood	with	a	single	point	agenda	that	he	would	ensure	the	
problem	of	pollution	would	be	solved	in	Kazipally	village.	This	can-
didate	was	elected	by	the	village.	Soon	after	getting	elected,	the	new	
Sarpanch	served	notices	to	fifty	industries	accused	of	pollution.	The	
industrialists	were	called	to	negotiate	with	the	village.	Thirty	indus-
trialists	 attended	 the	 negotiation	meeting	 which	 was	 addressed	 by	
Mr.K.G.Kannabiran	(PUCL)	and	G.Haragopal	(APCLC),	who	were	pla-
ying	the	role	of	mediators	for	the	negotiations.	In	this	negotiation,	the	
Sarpanch	made	a	categorical	statement	that	no	compensation	would	
be	accepted	by	the	village	unless	the	industries	stopped	completely	the	
pollution	of	village	tank	and	repaired	the	tank.	A	second	round	of	talks	
was	scheduled	for	a	few	weeks	later.	Meanwhile,	the	Sarpanch	struck	
a	private	deal,	accepted	a	compensation	package	for	the	village	and	
distributed	some	money	amongst	 the	villagers.	Neither	 tank	repairs	
nor	the	reduction	of	pollution	were	achieved.	To	top	it	all	off,	during	
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the	public	hearing	held	in	005,	this	same	Sarpanch	made	a	statement	
that	the	development	of	the	village	was	contingent	upon	industrializa-
tion.	He	strongly	argued	that	industries	should	not	be	closed.	
Thus,	overall,	we	find	from	these	different	instances	stated	above,	
that	what	are	described	as	“strategic	politics”	or	“negotiations”	within	
the	“political	society”	only	ensure	a	very	fragmented	social	mobility.	In	
these	cases,	for	instance,	villagers	received	money	from	time	to	time	
due	 to	 the	protest.	Farmer	activists	of	 the	KVRS	who	 ‘strategically’	
reduced	the	intensity	of	the	struggle	or	stayed	away	from	any	further	
activity,	either	because	they	had	opportunities	given	to	them	by	the	
industries	or	because	 they	were	dependent	on	 the	 local	administra-
tion	to	carry	out	their	illegal	income-earning	activities,	achieved	some	
level	of	comfort	through	this	system.	These	small	group	“strategies”	
and	individual-centred	negotiations	for	incentives	have	effectively	dis-
placed	the	overall	community	interest	and	collective	action	within	the	
“political	 society”,	 both	 in	 terms	of	 giving	up	 community	 demands	
--	getting	the	tank	repaired,	preventing	dumping	of	toxic	effluents	into	
village	tank,	getting	a	health	center	etc.,	--	and	in	terms	of	the	cost	the	
community	 bears	 through	 the	 general	 health	 disorders	 they	 suffers	
on	account	of	unabated	pollution.	Apart	from	these	direct	costs	to	the	
community,	“strategic	politics”	have	a	long-term	impact	on	communi-
ty	life	--	on	trust,	social	fabric,	social	relations,	and	solidarity	amongst	
the	people.	Far	from	the	community	“struggling	collectively	as	a	sin-
gle	 family”	 all	 these	 factors	 lead	 to	 a	 decaying	 community,	making	
sustained	political	activity	very	difficult.	In	the	following	passages	we	
enumerate	the	dimensions	of	the	problem.	
Because	of	 the	 inequality	between	the	victims	of	pollution	and	
the	 polluter,	 the	 vulnerable	 villagers	 are	 usually	 dependent	 on	 the	
institutions	such	as	the	Panchayat.	Lack	of	access	to	information	is	
yet	another	factor	that	leads	to	the	dependence	of	people	on	formal	
institutions	 such	as	 the	Panchayat.	However,	when	 the	 representa-
tives	of	people	 themselves	defect	 to	 the	side	of	 the	polluters,	 those	
representing	the	people	against	pollution	through	political	activism	
find	 themselves	more	vulnerable.	These	village	activists	are	usually	
dependent	on	outside	 social	 activists	or	depend	on	other	networks	
for	 protection	 against	 an	 uncivil	 state	 and	 uncivil	mafia	 elements.	
However,	if	these	social	forces	are	weakened,	then	the	political	acti-
vism	derived	from		the	common	people	of	the	village	fails	to	sustain	
their	resistance.	In	such	circumstances,	political	activism	is	given	up	
for	“strategic	politics”,	aspiring	to	individual	benefits	represented	by	
the	growing	culture	of	compensation	or	simply	meeting	the	immedia-
te	needs	of	the	community,	neither	of	which	address	the	problem	of	
pollution	as	such.	
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A	Narasanna	farmer	says:	
“the	 Panchayat	 is	 corrupt	 and	 some	 leaders	 are	 even	 criminalized.	
There	is	no	one	to	whom	these	leaders	are	accountable.	Once	the	PCB	
closed	down	all	the	polluting	industries.	The	Sarpanch	went	and	gave	
no	 objection	 certificates	 and	 got	 these	 industries	 reopened.	 And	we	
farmers	are	dependent	on	these	industries	for	our	livelihoods	–some	
supply	water,	some	trade	ash,	some	supply	construction	material	and	
so	on.	If	we	participate	in	the	protests	we	lose	our	livelihood…”	
The	fact	 that	farmers	have	associated	themselves	with	different	
activities	linked	to	the	industries	is	an	outcome	of	the	severe	pressures	
they	suffer.	Costs	related	to	curing	health	disorders,	the	marriage	of	
daughters,	and	the	education	of	children	have	been	frequently	men-
tioned	by	people.	All	these	demands	on	income	earners	compel	them	
to	make	compromises	and	withdraw	from	the	struggle	against	pollu-
tion,	entering	into	individual	bargaining.	
Amina,	the	mother	of	a	farmer,	said	that,	“people unite if they see 
a possibility of a solution emerging from the protest. But if they see no 
such possibility, they prefer bargaining with the industrialists individua-
lly and getting whatever they can”.	
Once	achieving	opportunities	becomes	an	individualistic	pursuit,	
as	Padmaja	a	DWCRA	coordinator	points	out,	“a	competitive culture 
increases, comparisons between families in terms of status grow. And 
individualistic behavior leads to a weakening of the community.” As	a	
consequence	of	this	individualistic	behavior	and	competitive	culture,	
Venkataramani,	another	DWCRA	leader,	maintains, “of late there is lot 
of friction between families in the village. Families are not sharing pro-
blems, resources, or labour. Mutual help amongst members of extended 
families has weakened”. 
During	 our	 field	 survey,	we	 came	 across	 several	 cases	 of	 older	
people	 complaining	 of	 not	 being	 cared	 for	 and	 being	 neglected	 by	
their	family.	This	was	one	of	the	most	obvious	fall-outs	of	this	deca-
ying	community.
The	agrarian	culture	 in	 the	 village	 in	 itself	has	 several	 cultural	
forms,	especially	 in	 the	celebration	of	various	 festivals.	The	 timing,	
symbolism,	and	form	of	the	festivals	are	linked	to	the	seasons	and	the	
agrarian	economy.	Today,	the	destruction	of	agriculture	due	to	pollu-
tion	has	reduced	the	village	to	a	mere	collective	in	form,	without	ways	
to	express	this	collectivity	in	day-to-day	life.	Except	for	the	Moharram	
during	which	both	the	Hindu	and	Muslim	communities	participate	in	
the	festivities,	none	of	the	other	festivals	are	celebrated	with	traditio-
nal	fervor	any	longer.		
Narasimha,	a	farmer,	says	that:
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before	all	the	villagers	were	dependent	on	agriculture	and	there	was	lot	
of	community	life.	Further,	the	earnings	of	the	people	was	out	of	hard	
work.	There	was	no	easy	money.
Traditional	village	based	occupations	have	replaced	these	opportuni-
ties	with	 opportunities	 outside	 the	 village.	Most	 of	 the	 youth	work	
as	daily	wage	contract	labourers,	in	the	industries	that	do	not	direc-
tly	pollute	 the	villages	 in	which	they	 live.	This	 is	because	the	youth	
may	object	to	industry	dumping	if	 it	pollutes	the	village	tanks	from	
their	own	village.	While	youth	go	to	industries	located	away	from	the	
villages,	 the	 youth	 leaders	 say	 that	 this	new	work	 environment	has	
brought	the	youth	in	touch	with	a	new	migrant	society.	The	migrant	
communities	working	in	these	industries	have	a	very	poor	quality	of	
life.	This	new	culture	has	created	a	new	section	of	youth	who	do	not	
show	 serious	 concern	 for	 the	 issues	pertaining	 to	 their	 village.	The	
young	are	unwilling	to	 identify	 themselves	with	agriculture	and	the	
rural	community.	This	has	further	weakened	the	community.
While	farmers	maintain	that	the	youth	have	very	 little	commit-
ment	 to	 the	 village,	 the	 youth	 say	 that	 farmers	withdraw	 from	 the	
struggle	as	soon	as	they	receive	compensation.	Women	are	constra-
ined	by	patriarchal	structures	in	taking	independent	decisions	about	
acting	against	the	pollution	problem.	Therefore,	women	are	seen	as	
a	weak	group	 that	have	more	or	 less	a	 residual	 role	when	men	are	
constrained	by	compulsions.	Women	are	seen	as	have	mainly	family	
interests	with	little	social	role.	This	being	the	case,	livelihood	for	male	
members,	or	compensation,	are	seen	as	women’s	priorities	rather	than	
a	commitment	to	eradicating	pollution.	Thus,	what	we	have	is	a	com-
munity	which,	over	the	years,		has	experienced	a	complete	loss	of	trust	
amongst	different	social	groups.	It	is	due	to	this	that	youth	associa-
tions,	the	farmer’s	organization,	and	DWACRA	women	are	unable	to	
work	with	one	another.
“Political	society”	undoubtedly	enables	us	to	grasp	the	distinct	
dynamics	of	 the	subalterns	 in	opposition	and	contrast	 to	 the	nor-
ms	of	civil	society.	In	this	sense,	it	takes	our	understanding	of	the	
process	 of	 democratization	 beyond	 the	 classical,	 safe	 and	 settled	
domains	of	state	and	civil	society.	However,	 in	mapping	the	dyna-
mics	 internal	 to	 this	 domain	 it	 is	 flattened,	 and	dodges	 the	more	
important	issue	of	sustainability	of	such	seamless,	alternative	sites.	
First,	the	squatters	of	Calcutta	could	succeed	in	getting	the	state	to	
recognize	their	“claims”	as	a	“moral	 force”	as	 long	as	they	do	not	
enter	 into	 conflict	with	major	 interests,	 either	 in	 the	 state	 or	 the	
civil	society,	and	raise	structural	questions	as	they	did	in	Kazipally.	
It	 is	understandable	why	“strategic	politics”	cannot	prevent	vario-
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us	slums	across	the	country	from	being	demolished	and	displaced	
people	getting	rehabilitated	by	a	state	that	acts	“contextually”	and	
“instrumentally”7.	 It	 is	 part	 of	 a	 systemic	 logic	 to	 acknowledge	
“strategic”	 interest-based	 negotiations,	 which	 eventually	 displace	
organized	collective	action.	It	is	untenable	to	consider	that	these	va-
ried	protest	forms	can	co-exist	within	the	undifferentiated	“political	
society”.	Second,	a	“political	society”	of	squatters	sustaining	around	
“strategic	politics”	and	emerging	as	a	“community”	or	a	“single	fa-
mily”	is	an	anomaly.	On	the	contrary,	over	a	period	of	time,	“strate-
gic”	or	interest-based	negotiations	only	make	the	community	more	
vulnerable,	thereby	pushing	social	groups	and	individuals	to	pursue	
individual	benefits.	The	growing	culture	of	compensation	and	decli-
ning	trust	between	the	youth,	elderly,	farmers	and	women	in	Kazi-
pally	stands	as	testimony;	such	“negotiations”	are	directly	in	conflict	
with	collective	interests,	and	articulated	around	the	available	social	
stratifications.	“Community	festivals”	remain	as	mere	symbolic	ges-
tures	of	a	collective	life	without	the	necessary	resources	that	could	
sustain	collective	action	for	rehabilitation,	employment	and	digni-
fied	living	for	the	squatters	in	Calcutta,	or	the	closure	of	industries	
and	revival	of	agriculture	for	the	people	of	Kazipally.	Finally,	“politi-
cal	society”	as	“strategic	politics”	only	reflects	politics	that	generate	
perpetual	 insecurity	 for	 the	 vulnerable	 by	 bringing	 unsustainable	
notions	of	mobility	–	those	that	can	only	be	used	by	social	groups	
that	are	better	equipped	to	gain	patronage	of	the	social	elites,	gover-
nment	functionaries	and	political	leaders.	Far	from	“making	a	large	
array	of	connections	with	other	groups	in	similar	situations”,	it	me-
rely	increases	the	possibility	of	excluding	the	more	vulnerable,	such	
as	 the	 landless	 people	 in	 Kazipally,	 without	minimum	 resources.	
For	 these	groups,	 the	state,	 far	 from	responding	through	“welfare	
policies”,	increasingly	becomes	unable	to	cope	with	and	aid	the	un-
civil	developmental	processes.	This	was	more	than	evident	through	
the	implications	on	active	villagers	in	false	cases,	threats	and	phy-
sical	assaults	by	the	mafia	during	public	hearings,	not	to	mention	
brazenly	biased	police	brutality	in	Kazipally.
	 Partha	Chatterjee	in	his	more	recent	work	informs	us	about	the	court	order	to	
evict	the	squatters	he	had	earlier	studied	and	the	increasing	possibility	of	they	being	
forcefully	moved,	“thus	it	is	quite	possible	for	the	equilibrium	of	strategic	politics	to	
shift	enough	for	these	squatters	to	be	evicted	tomorrow…Such	is	the	tenuous	logic	
of	strategic	politics	in	political	society”	(Politics	of	the	Governed,	Permanent	Black,	
Delhi.	00,	p.60).	However,	does	not	still	acknowledge	that	such	“strategic	politics”	
grow	in	lieu	of	organized	political	activity	and	cannot	actually	co-exist	with	it	in	a	
“political	society”.
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The “Democratization” of 
China’s Laws and Policies
Two steps forward one step back 
from Reform and Tiananmen 
to Falun Gong
ONLY	A	FEW	YEARS	AGO,	the	idea	of	putting	“China”	and	“democra-
cy”	together	in	the	same	sentence	would	have	been	inconceivable	to	
many.	Nowadays	“Democratization”	is	a	term	made	more	applicable	
to	China,	due	 to	 the	uncoupling	of	democracy	 from	solely	 the	 idea	
of	direct	political	participation	and	elections.	To	even	begin	speaking	
about	democratic	practice	in	China,	it	must	be	acknowledged	that:	)	
the	protection	of	fundamental	freedoms	is	a	step	in	the	direction	of	
democratic	practice,	and	)	democracy	in	an	authoritarian,	one-party	
state	must	begin	with	limiting	state	power	and	establishing	the	rule	
of	law.	
The	aim	of	this	paper	is	to	discuss	the	“democratization”	of	China	
primarily	as	a	function	of	the	aforementioned	endogenous	changes,	as	
well	as,	less	crucially,	exogenous	pressures,	that	began	as	ideas	to	pre-
	 	Guillermo	O’Donnell	for	one	has	proposed	that	a	mature	democracy	is	not	just	
about	elections	and	the	goal	for	political	development	is	not	simply	to	institutional-
ize	competitive	elections.	Rather,	just	as	important	are	elements	of	the	protection	of	
individual	rights,	and	the	limitations	of	state	power.	See	Guillermo	O’Donnell,	“Hori-
zontal	accountability	in	new	democracies”	in	Andreas	Scheduler,	Larry	Diamond	and	
Marc	F.	Platter	(ends),	The Self-Restraining State: Power and Accountability in New 
Democracies	(Boulder,	CO:	Lynne	Reiner	Publishers,	999),	pp	9-5.
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vent	another	Cultural	Revolution	disaster.	Changes	in	ideas	of	“demo-
cratization”	in	China	can	be	traced	through	an	examination	of	emer-
gent	ideas	of	state	power	versus	people’s	interests	in	China,	as	has	been	
debated	in	intellectual	circles.	It	will	also	be	suggested	that	the	real	test	
of	 the	progress	of	democratic	practice	 in	China	was	the	Communist	
Party	of	China’s	(CCP)	response	to	the	recent	Falun	Gong	issue.	The	
thesis	presented	in	this	paper	proposes	that	using	the	above	definition,	
China	has	made	a	great	leap	forward	in	democratic	practice,	especially	
after	the	Tiennamen	incident	in	June	99.	However,	this	progress	has	
taken	a	major	step	back	with	the	handling	of	the	Falun	Gong	crisis.
Significant Ideas that Began Chinese Democratization 
after the Cultural Revolution
While	 exogenous	 forces	 have	 played	 their	 part	 in	 pressuring	China	
towards	democratization	--	not	the	least	of	which	was	the		million	
US	dollars	of	state	funding	in	005-6	dedicated	to	the	task,	and	the	
requirements	of	conforming	to	the	norms	of	international	institutio-
ns	such	as	the	World	Trade	Organization	(WTO)	--	the	beginnings	of	
China’s	democratization	were	endogenous	in	nature.	The	milestones	
that	chart	the	progression	of	ideas	of	democracy	include	what	Minxin	
Pei	termed	in	995	as	“three	mini-waves	of	spontaneous	pro-democra-
cy	activity”.	These	include	the	Democracy	Wall	movement	of	97-79,	
the	 student	 demonstrations	 of	 96-7,	 and	 the	Tiennamen	Square	
movement	of	4	June	99.	More	recently,	the	internationalization	of	
the	Falun	Gong	issue	in	China	has	been	another	test	of	China’s	fled-
gling	pro-democratic	processes.	
Events	in	the	late	970s,	combined	with	a	driving	need	to	learn	
from	the	Cultural	Revolution	disaster,	led	Chinese	intellectuals	in	the	
90s	 to	become	preoccupied	with	 the	 issue	of	political	 reform.	Yi-
jiang	Ding	sums	up	the	main	intellectual	contentions	of	that	time	in	
this	way:	
“In	 the	early	90s,	 the	nature	of	 the	 socialist	 society	and	 the	basic	
functions	of	the	socialist	state	began	to	be	raised	as	issues	in	the	scho-
larly	discussions.	The	disappearance	of	the	enemy	classes	triggered	a	
series	of	theoretical	developments.	‘The	people’	changed	from	a	social	
class	 to	a	nearly	all-inclusive	group,	which	was	 identical	 to	 ‘society’.	
Class	struggle	was	replaced	by	‘contradictions	among	the	people’	as	the	
main	dynamic	for	social	change”.	
	 	See	Minxin	Pei,	 “‘Creeping	Democratization’	 in	China”,	Journal of Democracy,	
Vol.	6,	4(995):65-79,	p	67.
	 	 Yijiang	 Ding,	 Chinese Democracy after Tiennamen	 (Vancouver,	 Toronto:	 UBC	
Press,	00),	p	9.
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This	radical	change	--	from	seeing	the	population	as	a	homogeneous	
social	class	to	a	heterogeneous	social	group	with	differentiated	inter-
ests	--	consequently	changed	the	primary	function	of	the	state	from	
“dictatorship	over	the	enemies	to	managing	public	affairs	for	the	who-
le	society”.4
Several	key	ideas	sparked	during	this	period	of	intellectual	deba-
te	are	worth	highlighting.	Firstly,	intellectual	debate	in	the	late	90s	
focused	 on	 the	 issue	 of	 the	 changing	 function	 of	 the	 government,	
leading	to	a	call	to	give	power	back	to	society,	and	to	the	important	
concept	of	“small	government	and	big	society”	(xiao zhengfu, da she-
hui).	A	prominent	example	of	how	this	 intellectual	discussion	was	
paralleled	in	policy	was	the	government’s	decision	to	make	Hainan	
Province,	then	known	as	Hainan	Dao,	into	a	Special	Economic	Zone,	
where	certain	limitations	of	governance	and	special	freedoms	were	
put	in	place.5
Secondly,	the	prominent	ideas	in	the	90s	were	not	only	that	the	
state	and	 the	people	 should	be	differentiated,	but	 that	 the	 interests	
of	 the	people	may	not	be	as	unified	as	once	 thought.	As	a	 result	of	
increasing	pressure	 from	intellectual	circles,	 the	Communist	Party’s	
Central	Committee	was	forced	to	acknowledge	that	within	the	various	
social	groups	that	existed	among	the	peoples	and	regions,	there	exis-
ted	“a	certain	lack	of	complete	unity	of	interests”.	This	was,	in	fact,	an	
admission	that	Stalin’s	assumption	that	a	highly	unified	state	without	
conflicts	of	social	interest	could	be	realized,	once	the	“enemy	classes”	
had	been	eliminated,	was	an	erroneous	one.
The	birth	of	the	concept	of	the	limitation	of	state	power,	and	the	
idea	that	the	people	themselves	may	have	different	and	conflicting	in-
terests,	created	a	vacuum	into	which	the	development	of	civil	society	
and	the	rule	of	law	fit	perfectly.
Recent Progress in Democratic Practice: Freedom of 
Association and Civil Society in China
The	 coming	 into	 power	 of	 the	 Chinese	 Communist	 Party	 (CCP)	 in	
949	brought	 into	being	 socialist	 public	 ownership,	 a	 planned	 eco-
nomy	and	a	highly	structured	and	centralized	administrative	system.	
This	effectively	snuffed	out	most	of	the	civil	organizations	which	had	
been	established	prior	to	949,	such	as	clansmen’s	associations,	an-
cestral	halls	and	civil	corps.	The	only	ones	that	remained	were	those	
that	were	of	use	 to	 the	CCP	and,	of	course,	 the	mass	organizations	
4	 	Ibid.
5	 	For	more	detail,	see	Gao	Changyun	and	Shi	Yuan	“The	Hainan	Model	of	‘Small	
Government	and	Big	Society”,	Hainan Kaifa Bao,		Sept	99.	
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which	the	CCP	itself	set	up,	like	the	trade	unions,	and	those	set	up	for	
the	youth.6
The	recent	resurgence	of	civil	society	in	China	has	been	attributed	
to	the	deliberate	“reorganization	of	society”	necessitated	by	economic	
reform	and	development.	This	has	led	to	“the	erosion	of	the	work	unit	
systems	as	a	form	of	social	organization	within	the	state’s	vertical	con-
trol	structure”	as	more	and	more	workers	left	the	state	sector	for	the	
non-state	 sector.7	 Instead,	 this	 vertical	 structure	 has	 been	 replaced	
by	horizontal	groupings	in	associational	activities,	which	have	been	
created	to	fill	the	need	for	new	group	identities	and	interests,	such	as	
those	resulting	from	the	migration	of	peoples	from	different	regions	
in	China.	
The	exponential	growth	of	civil	society	in	China	may	be	likened	to	
the	onset	of	plant	growth	in	a	forest	after	a	drought	is	broken	by	the	
first	rains.	From	a	dismal	44	national	associations	in	the	950s,	the	
number	of	national	associations	in	existence	in	China	rose	sharply	to	
,600,	along	with	,000	local	associations.	And	while	the	Tiennamen	
incident	of	99	took	its	toll	on	the	growth	of	civil	society,	in	004,	the-
re	were	,96	associations	registered,	and	in	006,	7,000.	Some	
estimate	 that	 there	 could	 be	 as	many	 as	 	million	 unregistered	 as-
sociations	 in	China	 today.	 The	 recognition	 of	 the	 need	 for	 a	more	
robust	civil	society	may	have	emerged	from	an	endogenous	appraisal	
of	 the	Tiennamen	crisis	 itself,	given	 that	afterwards	a	more	“positi-
ve	interaction”	between	state	and	society	was	recommended,	and	the	
two-step	development	of	civil	society	was	the	path	suggested	by	cer-
tain	intellectuals	in	China.	In	this	model,	civil	society	would	develop	
at	first	in	the	private	sphere	and	then	expand	into	the	public	sphere,	
potentially	 enabling	 a	 tentative	 step	 towards	 “democratic	 politics”.9	
It	is	important	to	note	that	while	the	most	obvious	driver	for	the	esta-
blishment	of	civil	society	in	China	is	economic	reform,	the	existence	
of	a	climate	of	political	tolerance	that	supports	such	change	cannot	be	
underestimated.
6	 	See	Keping	Yu,	“Changes	in	Civil	Organizations	and	Governance	in	China’s	Rural	
Areas:	A	Case	Study	of	Dongsheng	Village,	Changqiao	Town,	Zhangpu	County,	Fujian	
Province”,	000.	China	Centre	for	Comparative	Politics	&	Economics.	Available	at	
http://www.ids.ac.uk/ids/civsoc/final/china/chn.doc
7	 	Ding,	Chinese Democracy after Tiennamen,	pp	49-50.
	 	Ying	Ma,	“China’s	Stubborn	Anti-Democracy”,	American	Enterprise	Institute	for	
Public	Policy	Research,		Feb	007.	Available	at	http://www.aei.org/publications/fil-
ter.all,pubID.566/pub_detail.asp
9	 	Deng	Zhenglai	and	Jing	Yuejing,	“Building	Civil	Society	in	China”,	cited	in	Ding,	
Chinese Democracy after Tiennamen,	p	7.
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Civil Society Entrenched in Chinese
Laws and Policies
A	significant	indicator	of	progress	toward	a	truly	legitimate	civil	
society	in	China	has	been	the	legal	reforms	that	have	taken	place	with	
respect	to	Chinese	people’s	freedom	of	association.	While	this	is	a	rig-
ht	theoretically	guaranteed		to	every	Chinese	citizen	under	the	Cons-
titution,	in	practice	approval	for	exercising	his	right	has	been	difficult	
to	 come	by.	Since	 the	 revival	 of	discussions	on	 civil	 society,	 salient	
changes	have	taken	place	in	a	positive	direction.
The	 new	understanding	 of	 people’s	 differentiated	 interests	 that	
began	in	the	90s	has	in	fact	led	to	concrete	changes	in	the	law.	Many	
of	 the	prohibitions	 that	 accompanied	 the	CCP’s	 coming	 into	power	
have	been	lifted.	Previously,	in	950	and	95,	two	sets	of	rules	and	re-
gulations	were	put	in	place	by	the	Government	Administration	Coun-
cil	and	the	Ministry	of	Internal	Affairs.	These	were	the	“Interim	Regu-
lations	on	Registration	of	Social	Associations”	and	the	“Detailed	Rules	
for	Implementation	of	the	Regulations”	respectively.	These	rules	and	
regulations	were	explicitly	designed	to	examine	existing	civil	associa-
tions,	banning	those	that	were	not	favorable	to	the	Communist	admi-
nistration,	and	putting	those	that	were	useful	under	the	management	
of	government	departments.	However,	the	basic	underlying	policy	was	
to	suppress	the	development	of	civil	and	social	associations.0
In	contrast,	in	June	99,	the	“Bureau	for	the	Management	of	Civil	
Organizations”	was	set	up,	officially	recognizing	the	existence	of	civil	
society	in	China.	Similarly,	the	“Regulations	on	the	Administration	and	
Registration	of	Social	Associations”	that	were	put	in	place	in	99	by	
the	State	Council	--	a	revised	version	of	the	regulations	promulgated	in	
99	--	were	established	alongside	“Regulations	on	Management	of	Ci-
vilian-run	Non-enterprise	Units”.	While	the	regulations	remained	strin-
gent,	 this	acceptance	of	non-government	controlled	associations	was	
one	more	landmark	event	for	civil	society	in	China,	as	it	formally	trans-
formed	the	strict	government-controlled	system	of	the	administration	
of	civil	organizations	to	allow	for	more	autonomous	associations.
There	now	exists	in	China	roughly	three	kinds	of	civil	organizatio-
ns	in	two	distinct	categories.	The	first	category	includes	the	“official”	
organizations,	which	are	government-run,	and	the	“semi-official”	or-
ganizations.	The	semantic	differences	between	these	two	types	of	or-
0	 	Liu	Junning,	“Civil	Society	and	Limited	Government	–	Take	Chinese	Chambers	of	
Commerce	for	Example”,	000,	Research	Report.	Available	at	http://www.ids.ac.uk/
ids/civsoc/final/china/chn.doc
	 	The	delineation	of	“official”,	“semi-official”	and	“popular”	associations	has	been	
discussed	in,	for	example,	Wang	Ying,	“The	Intermediary	Level	of	Chinese	Society:	
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ganizations	are	often	negligible	because	the	government	department	
appointed	 to	 supervise	 these	 “official”	 and	 “semi-official”	 organiza-
tions	or	associations	often	has	the	power	to	unilaterally	appoint	(or	
dismiss)	the	leaders	of	these	organizations,	and	often	exerts	control	
over	the	organization’s	activities.	A	large	percentage	of	these	contro-
lled	associations	have	a	political	and	/or	economic	function,	such	as	
the	Communist	Youth	League,	the	Private	Entrepreneurs’	Association	
and	the	Trade	Union.
Of	more	 interest	 to	 this	 analysis	of	democratic	practice	 are	 the	
“popular	associations”	which,	in	practice,	enjoy	a	high	degree	of	au-
tonomy.	Moreover,	the	erosion	of	government	control	at		the	township	
level	makes	it	possible	for	even	the	organizations	designated	as	“semi-
official”	to,	at	this	level,	enjoy	a	greater	degree	of	freedom	along	with	
the	“popular”	associations.	While	many	of	the	“popular”	organizations	
are	viewed	as	less	of	a	“risk”	to	political	stability	because	their	primary	
function	is	cultural	or	intellectual,	even	economic-cum-political	asso-
ciations	in	some	smaller	states	and	counties	now	have	the	freedom	to	
voice	the	interests	of	their	members.	These	new	freedoms	given	to	ci-
vil	society	in	China	have	also	meant	an	unprecedented	increase	in	citi-
zen	protests	--	a	phenomenon	that	would	have	been	severely	punished	
prior	 to	 this	 transformation.	 From	 the	mid-990s	 onwards,	 the	 rise	
of	protests	in	China	has	been	well-documented.	The	Chinese	Ministry	
of	Public	Security	reported	0,000	protests	throughout	the	country	in	
994,	5,000	protests	in	00,	74,000	in	004,	and	7,000	in	005.	Or-
dinary	citizens	now	have	more	wherewithal	to	demand	that	the	central	
government	to	address	their	grievances	on	everything	from	corruption	
to	poor	health	care.	In	004,	0	million	petitions	were	filed	requesting	
intervention	from	Beijing;	in	005,	this	number	rose	to	0	million.
Furthermore,	 in	many	 cases,	 civil	 organizations	 now	 have	 the	
autonomy	not	only	to	encourage	their	members’	active	participation	
in	the	internal	issues	of	the	organization	or	association,	but	there	is	
also	a	growing	awareness	of	the	relevance	of	political	issues	and	the	
motivation	for	members	to	participate	in	such	issues.	This	has	led	to	
increased	participation	 in	elections	at	grassroots	 levels	and	 in	rural	
Development	 of	 Associations	 and	 the	 Rebuilding	 of	 the	 Organizational	 System”,	
Zhongguo Shehui Kexue Jikan	(Chinese	Social	Science	Quarterly),	no.	6	(994),	p	5.
	 	Christopher	E.	Nevitt,	“Private	Business	Associations	in	China:	Evidence	of	Civil	
Society	or	Local	State	Power?”,	The China Journal,	no.	6	(July	996):5-4.
	 	Statistics	from	Ying	Ma,	“China’s	Stubborn	Anti-Democracy”,	American	Enter-
prise	Institute	for	Public	Policy	Research,		Feb	007.	It	is	no	wonder	that	the	Chi-
nese	government	now	fears	“participation	crises”.	In	time	this	may	prove	a	real	bar-
rier	to	further	political	liberation.
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areas.	The	extent	to	which	members	of	organizations	are	encouraged	
to	participate	in	elections	includes	compensations	and	subsidies	pro-
vided	by	the	organization	for	such	political	participation.	The	success	
of	these	methods	is	evident	in	the	fact	that	in	rural	areas,	95%	partici-
pation	in	elections	is	often	achieved.4	The	idea	of	grassroots	elections	
will	be	further	examined	later	on	in	this	paper.
Further Progress in Democratic Practice:
Significant Steps towards Rule of Law
and Human Rights in China 
Other	 encouraging	 evidence	 of	 positive	 change	 in	 the	 democratic	
practice	 in	China	 has	 been	 the	 establishment	 and	 strengthening	 of	
rule	of	law.	Franz	Michael	has	this	to	say	about	the	concept	of	the	rule	
of	law:	
In	the	Western	legal	tradition,	law	is	applied	equally	to	all;	it	is	binding	
on	the	lawgiver	and	is	meant	to	prevent	arbitrary	action	by	the	ruler.	
Law	guarantees	a	realm	of	freedom	for	the	members	of	a	political	com-
munity	 that	 is	 essential	 to	 the	protection	of	 life	 and	human	dignity	
against	tyrannical	oppression…5
The	idea	of	the	rule	of	law	is	very	much	a	Western	concept	whose	
main	purpose	is	to	regulate	the	behaviours	of	individuals	in	general,	
and	 government	 officials	 in	 particular,	 by	 prohibiting	 the	 abuse	 of	
power.	The	rule	of	law	implicitly	assumes	the	existence	of	human	rig-
hts,	increasing	the	power	of	the	individual	over	that	of	the	state.	Howe-
ver,	this	is	a	clear	juxtaposition	to	traditional	Chinese	legal	thought,	
where	an	instrumental	approach	to	law	predominated	--	the	law	was	
a	tool	through	which	the	government	ruled	the	governed.	Moreover,	
in	traditional	Chinese	thought,	the	Emperor	(or	party	leader)	was	hi-
mself	above	the	law,	and	indeed	his	every	decree	or	wish	was	the	law	
itself.	 Inherent	 in	 the	Chinese	Socialist	concept	of	 law	and	zheng-fa 
xitong,	there	is	the	idea	of	linghouxing	or	flexibility,	which	allows	the	
state,	or	more	specifically,	the	state	leader	to	interpret	the	law	(most	
often	according	to	his	own	or	his	party’s	interests).
		 The	recent	push	for	the	establishment	of	the	rule	of	law	in	Chi-
na	that	leans	more	towards	the	Western	concept	is	driven	both	exoge-
nously	and	endogenously	by	the	economic	imperative.	To	begin	with,	
4	 	See	Yu	Keping,	“The	Emergence	of	Chinese	Civil	Society	and	Its	Significance	to	
Governance”,	000.	Available	at	www.ids.ac.uk/ids/civsoc/final/china/chn.doc
5	 	Franz	Michael,	“Law:	A	Tool	of	Power”	in	Yuan-Li	Wu	et	al.	Human Rights in the 
People’s Republic of China	(Boulder,	CO:	Westview	Press,	9),	-55,	p	.
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favoring	a	market	economy	over	the	previous	planned	system	meant	
that	laws	became	increasing	vital	in	regulating	China’s	economic	acti-
vities.	Furthermore,	the	central	government	was	forced	to	devolve	fi-
nancial	and	fiscal	power,	property	rights	and	the	material	allocation	of	
power	to	local	governments	and	individuals.6	At	the	same	time,	with	
the	new	open-door	policy	came	the	need	to	attract	foreign	investment	
and	the	confidence	of	foreign	investors	had	to	be	won	by	establishing	
an	impartial	and	consistent	legal	system.	The	opening	up	of	the	eco-
nomy	to	the	international	community	is	indeed	a	two-way	street,	and	
the	established	market	economies	of	the	West,	to	which	China	dearly	
wished	to	have	economic	ties,	also	exerted	external	pressure	on	China	
to	adhere	to	international	norms.	An	example	of	this	is	the	stipulation	
of	a	judicial	review	system7	and	the	changes	in	commercial	laws	and	
practices	 to	which	China	was	 subjected	with	 its	 ascension	 into	 the	
World	Trade	Organization.
From Ideas of Democratization to Its Implementation: 
Legal Reform in China
However,	 given	China’s	 legal	 history,	 the	 recent	 progress	made	 in	
the	rule	of	law	since	the	9	Chinese	Constitution	is	nothing	short	
of	astounding.	This	is	particularly	so	with	regards	to	laws	that	spe-
cifically	curb	the	abuse	of	state	power	over	the	individual.	In	99,	
a	white	paper	was	published	by	the	State	Council	entitled	“The	Si-
tuation	 of	 Human	 Rights	 in	 China”.	 This,	 for	 the	 first	 time,	 was	
a	formal	acknowledgment	of	the	concept	of	Human	Rights	by	the	
Chinese	 government.	 Very	 surprisingly,	 out	 of	 an	 astounding	 49	
laws	passed	in	China	between	99	and	997,	the	Chinese	gover-
nment	has	paid	specific	attention	to	the	legal	rights	of	citizens.	For	
example,	October	990	saw	the	enactment	of	the	Administrative	Li-
tigation	Act	which	gave	citizens	legal	recourse	in	the	onset	of	a	State	
abuse	of	power.	 In	May	994,	China	 enacted	 the	State	 Indemnity	
Law,	which	stipulates	that	“where	a	government	agency	or	its	per-
sonnel	invades	the	legitimate	rights	and	interests	of	a	citizen,	legal	
person	or	other	organization,	resulting	in	injury	while	performing	
6	 	 See	 Zheng	Yongnian,	Will China Become Democratic? Elite, Class and Regime 
Transition	(Singapore:	Marshall	Cavendish	International,	004),	p	56.
7	 	For	a	discussion	of	this,	see	Martin	G.	Hu,	“WTO’s	Impact	on	the	Rule	of	Law	in	
China”,	Mansfield	Dialogues	in	Asia,	00.	Available	at	www.mansfieldfdn.org/pro-
grams/program_pdfs/0hu.pdf
	 	From	the	Complete Collection of Laws, Regulations and Rules in China (Beijing:	
Beijing	University	Press	for	The	Center	of	Legal	Information	and	the	Beijing	Zhong-
tian	Software	Company,	997).
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its	functions,	the	sufferer	shall	be	entitled	to	obtain	state	indemni-
ty”.9	Furthermore,	 in	March	996,	China	put	in	place	the	Law	on	
Administrative	Punishments	that	provides	mechanisms	for	investi-
gating	and	punishing	criminal	offenses	that	take	place	not	only	in	
state	administrative,	economic	and	judicial	agencies,	but	those	that	
take	place	within	the	leadership	organs	of	the	CCP	itself.0	Criticis-
ms	of	the	Chinese	legal	system	stating	that	only	half	of	China’s	laws	
were	enforced	have	some	basis	in	truth,	but	nonetheless,	the	enact-
ment	 of	 the	 990	Administrative	Litigation	Act	 produced	 a	 sharp	
increase	of	lawsuits	against	the	Chinese	government	(about	7,000	
a	year	in	the	early	990s),	of	which	the	government’s	decisions	were	
dismissed	in	an	unprecedented	9%	of	the	cases	and	overturned	in	
.%	of	the	cases.	
While	still	very	much	under	fire	from	Human	Rights	watchdogs	
over	the	Tiennamen	incident,	even	these	agencies	have	had	to	admit	
that	the	Chinese	government	has	in	fact,	in	several	instances,	upheld	
the	law	and	human	rights.	In	some	cases,	the	CCP	has		shown	an	im-
proved	treatment	of	political	prisoners.	Significantly,	there	has	been	
no	death	sentence	for	a	political	prisoner	since	the	reform,	which	may	
be	construed	as	an	important	break	from	past	practices.	At	the	same	
time,	997	revisions	to	legislature	abolished	the	“counter-revolutiona-
ry”	offense	from	Chinese	criminal	law,	replacing	it	instead	with	a	new	
crime	that	concerned	state	security.	Both	external	pressures	and	do-
mestic	changes	to	the	legal	system	have	led	to	leniency	with	regards	to	
political	prisoners	from	99.	For	example,	in	July	997,	Tang	Yuan-
juan	and	Li	Wei,	both	of	whom	had	been	convicted	of	political	cri-
mes	for	their	activities	at	the	Tiennamen	protests,	were	released	from	
prison.	The	 Jilin	 provincial	High	Court	 set	 an	 important	 precedent	
by	nullifying	their	conviction	(one	of	two)	for	“counter-revolutionary”	
offenses	 and	 extending	 this	 decision	 to	 two	 other	 prisoners.	 At	 the	
time,	Tang	and	Li	had	already	each	served	an	-year	sentence,	so	the	
overturning	of	the	“counter-revolutionary”	conviction	allowed	them	to	
be	released	without	serving	out	the	rest	of	their	0	and	-year	senten-
ces	respectively.	
9	 	Zhenmin	Wang,	“The	Developing	Rule	of	Law	in	China”,	Harvard Asia Quarterly,	
Vol.	4.	Available	at	http://www.asiaquarterly.com/content/view//40
0	 	Ibid.
	 	Democracy and Law	(Shanghai)	no.		(995),	p	6.
	 	“People’s	Republic	of	China:	Nine	Years	After	Tiananmen	–	Still	a	‘Counter-Revo-
lutionary	Riot’?”	An	Amnesty	International	Report,	7	Nov	99.	Available	at	http://
web.amnesty.org/library/pdf/ASA7099ENGLISH/$File/ASA709.pdf
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The Falun Gong Issue: A Difficult Testing
Ground for Democratic Practice in China
Falun	Gong,	also	known	as	Falun	Dafa,	is	a	Chinese	spiritual	move-
ment	 founded	 in	 99	 by	 Li	Hongzhi	 (95–).	 Avoiding	 a	 religious	
mantle,	Li	and	his	followers	understand	Falun	Gong	as	a	“cultivation	
system,”	 based	 on	 principles	 of	 qigong	 that	 are	 widely	 accepted	 in	
China.	Falun	Gong	rapidly	became	very	popular	in	China,	attracting	
millions	of	followers	in	the	years	immediately	after	its	founding.	Pri-
marily	out	of	fear	of	mass	social	rebellion	and	disorder,	the	CCP	tried	
to	suppress	the	Falun	Gong	movement.	The	issue	came	to	a	head	in	
the	form	of	a	massive	protest	in	Beijing	by	Falun	Gong	practitioners	
on	the	5th	of	April,	999,	which	led	the	Chinese	government	to	take	
even	 stronger	measures	 against	 the	movement,	 unfortunately	using	
the	law	as	a	tool	to	this	end.
The Falun Gong Issue: A retraction of freedom
of association
Under	the	leadership	of	Li	Hongzhi,	the	Falun	Gong	were	care-
ful	not	to	fall	under	the	existing	state	law	on	religion,	given	that	only	
5	major	 religions	were	 sanctioned,	 and	within	 these	 religions,	 only	
certain	practicing	organizations	were	considered	state-approved	and	
properly	registered.	Instead,	the	Falun	Gong	as	a	qigong-related	as-
sociation,	was	in	a	sense	affiliated	with	the	State	Sports	Administra-
tion.	At	the	protest	on	April	5th,	999,	the	Falun	Gong	insisted	on	be-
ing	recognized	as	a	state-sanctioned	association,	and	as	early	as	99,	
The	Qigong	Research	Association	of	China	(QRAC)	issued	the	Beijing	
Falun	Gong	Research	Association	with	a	“QRAC	Accredited	Qigong	
School	Registration	Certificate”	that	given	official	recognition	to	the	
Falun	Gong	Research	Association	as	an	“academic	organization.”	The	
range	of	operations	were	“theoretical	studies	and	research”,	“promo-
ting	practice”,	and	“consultative	services”	throughout	all	of	China.4
Despite	the	new	laws	in	place	that	gave	freer	rein	to	associations,	
as	discussed	earlier,	the	CCP	chose	to	violate	association	regulations	
as	part	of	a	 two-pronged	strategy5	 to	suppress	 the	Falun	Gong.	On	
July	nd,	999,	the	Ministry	of	Civil	Affairs	declared	the	Falun	Gong	
to	 be	 an	 illegal	 organization,	 stipulating	 that	 it	 had	 failed	 to	 regis-
	 	Bryan	Edelman	and	James	T.	Richardson,	“Falun	Gong	and	the	Law:	Develop-
ment	of	Legal	Social	Control	in	China”,	Nova Religio,	Vol.	6,	(00):-,	p	.
4	 	“The	Truth	Behind	the	5	April	Incident	(abridged)”,		Apr	00.	Available	at	
http://www.faluninfo.net/SpecialTopics/april5abridged.html
5	 	The	other	being	the	violation	of	“moral	virtue”	which	will	be	discussed	later	in	
this	paper.
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ter	under	Article	7	of	the	November	99	Regulations	Governing	the	
Registration	and	Administration	of	Public	Organizations.	The	Falun	
Gong	was	also	accused	of	violating	article	9()	of	these	regulations,	
which	forbade	the	creation	of	regional	subsidiaries.6	This	was	further	
endorsed	by	Li	Baoku,	the	Chinese	Deputy	Minister	of	Civil	Affairs,	
who	made	an	official	statement	on	these	violations,	by	the	Falun	Dafa	
Research	Society,	of	regulations	on	registration	within	the	various	le-
vels	of	civil	affairs	organization.
This	was	clearly	a	step	backwards	from	the	legal	developments	that	
had	ensued	post-Tiennamen.	Special	regulations	on	public	organization,	
assembly	and	demonstration	were	passed	by	the	Standing	Committee	
of	the	National	People’s	Congress	on	October	st,	99,	four	months	
after	the	Tiennamen	incident.	This	was	part	of	the	implementation	of	a	
policy	related	to	the	9	State	Constitution’s	provision	on	freedom	of	
association,	which	anticipated	and	even	served	to	encourage	an	increa-
se	 in	social,	economic	and	cultural	activities	pursuant	 to	Deng’s	pro-
gram	that	required	both	the	democratization	and	legalization	of	state	
structures.7	Despite	leaps	in	the	liberalization	of	laws	with	regards	to	
civil	society,	in	the	face	of	a	real	test,	the	Chinese	government	showed	
itself	unable	to	resist	exerting	full	societal	control.
The Falun Gong Issue: A Reversion to State
Instrumentalism in legal interpretation
As	noted	earlier,	the	notion	of	law	in	the	Chinese	legal	tradition	
is	viewed	as	a	tool	by	which	the	emperor	or	party	leader,	who,	being	
himself	 above	 the	 law,	dictates	 to	his	people,	using	 the	 linghuoxing	
of	the	law	to	provided	interpretations	as	he	saw	fit.	The	more	recent	
socialist	framework	of	legality	also	reflects	this	idea.	The	law,	and	the	
Chinese	legal	idea	of	zheng-fa xitong,	rather	than	being	an	overarching	
concept	that	governs	all,	is	instead	an	instrumentalist	tool	by	which	
the	state	imposes	guidelines	of	its	own	interpretation	on	the	people,	so	
as	to	protect	society	from	“spiritual	pollution”	and	“bourgeois	liberali-
zation”,	and	which	also	ends	up	strengthening	its	dictatorship.	
In	an	interview	with	Jiang	Zemin	in	September	99,	he	was	said	
to	have	admitted	that	one	of	the	important	changes	as	a	consequence	
of	 the	99	Tiennamen	Massacre	was	 that	he	had	come	to	recogni-
6	 	“Falungong	ban	supported	by	law”, BR,	Vol.	4	7(999),	p	9.
7	 	“Commentary	views	public	organization	regulations”,	Renmin ribao,	9	Nov	999.	
Cited	in	Roland	C.	Keith	and	Zhiqiu	Lin,	“The	‘Falun Gong	Problem’:	Politics	and	the	
Struggle	for	the	Rule	of	Law	in	China”,	The China Quarterly,	75(00):6-4,	p	65.
	 	Chih-yu	Shih,	Collective Democracy in China	 (Hong	Kong:	Chinese	University	
Press,	999),	pp	40,	-6.
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ze	 the	 need	 for	 the	 rule	 of	 law	 in	China,	 as	 opposed	 to	 traditional	
rule	by	the	CCP	--	rule	of	man.9	This	was	more	evident	through	the	
exponential	increase	in	law	reform	in	the	subsequent	years,	especia-
lly	after	Deng	Xiaoping’s	speeches	demanding	 the	“liberation	of	 the	
mind”	in	99,	which	was	essentially	the	turning	point	that	broke	the	
spell	of	 caution	after	Tiennamen.	However,	 the	arrival	of	 the	Falun	
Gong	situation,	and	the	CCP’s	alarm	at	its	own	difficulties	in	curbing	
its	spreading	popularity,	combined	with	 international	sympathy,	 led	
the	Chinese	government	to	utilize	these	same	laws	to	put	the	brakes	
on	recent	political	freedom.	Jiang	Zemin,	on	January	0th,	00,	once	
again	linked	the	rule	of	law	with	the	traditional	Chinese	“rule	of	man”	
way,	by	stipulating	that	“Ruling	the	country	according	to	law	and	go-
verning	the	country	with	high	morals	complement	and	promote	each	
other.	Neither	 (…)	 should	 be	 overemphasized	 to	 the	 neglect	 of	 the	
other.”0	This	provided	a	morality	grounds	for	interpreting	the	law.
Even	as	early	as	March	999,	the	state	constitution	had	been	re-
vised	 to	give	equal	weight	 to	 the	 rule	of	 law	 (fazhi)	and	 the	 rule	of	
virtue	(dezhi).	This	was	a	crime	of	which	the	Falun	Gong	could	be	
conveniently	accused.	Xia	Yong,	from	the	CASS	Institute	of	Law,	sta-
ted	that:	
…	 the	 ‘Falungong’	 organization	 and	 its	 activities	 have	 harmed	 the	
physical	and	psychological	well-being,	lives	and	security	of	property	of	
‘Falungong’	practitioners…	they	have	used	heresies	such	as…	‘global	
explosion’	to	confuse	practitioners,	thus	causing	some	practitioners	to	
lose	the	ability	to	think,	judge,	and	discriminate	things	normally.	
In	deliberately	casting	the	Falun	Gong	as	a	“heretical	cult”	that	was	
a	danger	to	society,	the	government	was	now	able	to	persecute	Falun	
Gong	 leaders	 and	 practitioners	 as	 having	 violated	 “state	 security”	 -
-	the	new	crime	which	replaced	the	“counter-revolutionary”	crime	in	
the	997	revision	of	Chinese	criminal	law.	While	the	new	997	revi-
sion	had	a	reference	to	“evil	cults”	 in	article	0	 ,	 the	severity	of	 the	
crime	was	open	to	interpretation,	and	this	interpretation,	unfortuna-
tely,	was	provided	by	 the	Supreme	People’s	Court	and	 the	Supreme	
9	 	See	R.C.	Keith,	China’s Struggle for the Rule of Law (London	and	New	York:	Mac-
millan	&	St.	Martin’s,	994),	p	6.
0	 	Jiang	Zemin,	‘On	“Three	Represents”’	(Beijing:	Foreign	Languages	Press,	00),	
p	6.
	 	Roland	C.	Keith	and	Zhiqiu	Lin,	“The	‘Falun Gong	Problem’”,	p	60.
	 	“CASS	Official	Xia	Yong	on	Falungong,	rule	of	law”,	Xinwenshe,	Beijing,		Aug	
999.	Cited	in	Roland	C.	Keith	and	Zhiqiu	Lin,	“The	‘Falun Gong	Problem’”.
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People’s	Procuratorate	on	November	st,	999.	This	stipulated	that	the	
field	of	punishable	behavior	under	article	00	was	expanded	to	inclu-
de	“illegal	groups	that	have	been	found	using	religion,	qigong,	or	other	
things	as	camouflage…	and	deceiving	people	by	molding	and	sprea-
ding	 superstitious	 ideas,	 and	 endangering	 society”.	 Furthermore,	
this	interpretation	refers	to	other	cognate	articles	in	criminal	law,	in	
order	to	invoke	severe	criminal	punishment	rather	than	administrative	
law	punishment.4	
This,	taken	jointly	with	the	hastily	passed	“Decision	on	Banning	
Heretical	Organizations	and	Preventing	and	Punishing	Heretical	Ac-
tivities”	on	October	0th,	999	by	the	Standing	Committee	of	the	Natio-
nal	People’s	Congress,	gave	the	CCP	legal	basis	for	its	persecution	of	
the	Falun	Gong.	It	also	served	to	highlight	China’s	reversion	to	state	
instrumentalism	in	the	interpretation	of	the	law,	in	which	“Party	lea-
dership	continues	as	a	dominant	theme”.5	This	sudden	halt	on	pro-
gress	of	the	rule	of	law	in	China	was	made	more	evident	in	light	of	
the	differential	treatment	of	cases	from	Tiennamen	in	99	and	Falun	
Gong	in	999.	While	many	cases	from	the	Tiennamen	situation	made	
it	 to	court	 (albeit	belatedly),	most	cases	 relating	 to	Falun	Gong	did	
not,	ostensibly	in	a	bid	to	deny	the	Falun	Gong	a	platform	for	further	
publicity.6	
Conclusion: Hope for the Democratization
of China and grassroots elections
Recent	 liberation	 of	 political	 practice	 in	 China	 began	with	 the	
idea	of	the	need	to	set	limitations	on	state	power,	and	was	driven	by	
the	 imperative	of	 economic	 reform	and	opening	up	of	markets.	 In-
deed,	China	has	made	undeniable	progress	both	in	its	legal	and	policy-
making	mechanisms	to	grant	its	citizens	more	freedom	of	association	
and	protection	from	the	abuses	of	state	power,	under	a	vastly	impro-
ved	 rule	of	 law.	However,	when	push	comes	 to	 shove,	 the	CCP	was	
unable	to	see	a	way	to	implement	these	new	democratic	practices	in	
the	light	of	the	“social	threat”	posed	by	the	Falun	Gong.	The	result	of	
this	is	that	China	has	taken	two	steps	forward,	and	then	taken	a	large	
step	backwards	in	the	realization	of	democratic	practices.	
Ironically,	in	spite	of	the	larger	internationalized	issue	of	China’s	
	 	Edelman	and	Richardson,	“Falun	Gong	and	the	Law”,	p	7.
4	 	Roland	C.	Keith	and	Zhiqiu	Lin,	“The	‘Falun Gong	Problem’”,	pp	6-9.
5	 	Pittman	Potter,	The Chinese Legal System: Globalization and Local Legal Culture	
(London	and	New	York:	Routledge,	00),	p	.
6	 	Randall	Peerenboom,	China’s Long March Toward Rule of Law	(Cambridge:	Cam-
bridge	University	Press,	00),	pp	99-0.
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failure	with	regards	to	the	Falun	Gong,	direct	political	participation	
has	 been	 quietly	 flourishing	 at	 the	 grassroots	 level.	 This	 has	 been	
made	possible	as	result	of	the	demise	of	CCP	communes	at	the	local	
level.	A	 99	 internal	State	Council	 report,	which	was	 “leaked”	 to	
the	Hong	Kong	press,	presented	evidence	that	0%	of	the	CCP	cells	
in	rural	China	had	“collapsed”	or	ceased	to	function,	while	another	
60%	of	 these	were	weak	and	barely	 functional.7	This	gap	 in	 rural	
governance	has	been	filled	by	traditional	lineage-based	lines	of	au-
thority	and	spontaneously	formed	village	residents’	associations.	As	
early	as	December	9,	the	revised	Constitution	of	China	gave	legal	
status	to	these	village	residents’	associations	as	grassroots	civic	or-
ganizations.	This	was	followed	by	the	formal	support	of	the	CCP	for	
these	associations,	by	passing	the	Organic	Law	in	97,	which	saw	
two-thirds	of	Chinese	provinces	passing	 local	 legislation	on	village	
residents’	associations.
Moreover,	since	99,	experiments	in	rural	village-level	self-gover-
nance	have	taken	place	in	all	0	Chinese	provinces.	This	sea	of	chan-
ge	in	legislation,	with	the	help	of	the	pro-democratic	activity	of	local	
associations,	 has	been	 accompanied	by	 a	 similar	 transformation	 in	
rural	residents’	views	on	democratic	practice	–	from	initial	suspicion	
to	strong	endorsement.	A	survey	carried	out	in	99	of	00	residents	
in		villages	in	the	Fujian	province	reported	that	roughly	90%	of	the	
villagers	believed	that	the	head	of	the	village	council	should	be	elected	
through	a	system	of	open	voting	and	5%	of	these	residents	wanted	
the	right	to	vote	on	issues	that	affected	their	daily	village	living.	
The	 village-level	 elections	 scheme	 seems	 to	 be	 taking	 on	 a	 life	
of	 its	 own,	matched	 --	 albeit	 at	 a	 slower	 pace	 --	 by	 government	 le-
gislation.	Recently,	 new	 laws	have	 been	passed	 regarding	 elections.	
Additional	changes	in	004	saw	the	Standing	Committee	of	the	0th	
National	People’s	Congress	pass	the	amendment	that	all	local	people’s	
congresses	at	the	township	level	should	enjoy	the	same	5-year	tenure	
afforded	to	congresses	at	higher	levels.	Furthermore,	the	new	law	sta-
tes	that	candidates	for	elections	may	be	elected,	not	only	by	political	
parties	and	organizations,	but	also	by	arbitrary	groups	of	0	or	more	
voters.	The	law	has	also	stipulated	criminal-level	punishment	for	bri-
bery	and	hampering	of	the	free	exercise	of	electoral	rights.9
7	 	Reported	in	Hong	Kong	publication	Cheng Ming,	March	99,	p	44.
	 	Zhang	Xiaojin,	“Changes	in	Peasants’	Values	During	Reform”,	Shehui	(Society),	
August	99,	p	.
9		Meng	Yan,	 “Revised	 electoral	 law	 enhances	 democracy”,	China Daily,	 7	Oct	
004.	 Available	 at	 http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/english/doc/004-0/7/content_
60.htm	
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Whether	 the	 idea	of	direct	political	participation	will	 spread	 to	
higher	levels	of	government	remains	to	be	seen.	However,	China’s	road	
towards	better	democratic	practice,	whether	in	the	form	of	a	growing	
civil	society,	the	establishment	of	the	rule	of	law,	or	grassroots	electio-
ns,	has	clearly	begun.	In	spite	of	major	setbacks	such	as	the	handling	
of	the	Falun	Gong	issue,	with	the	momentum	that	has	been	building	
since	reform	and	the	opening	up	of	China,	there	can	be	no	real	turning	
back	from	the	path	to	political	liberalization.
Bibliography
Amnesty	International	(99).	“People’s	Republic	of	China:	Nine	
Years	After	Tiennamen	–	Still	a	‘Counter-Revolutionary	Riot’?”,	
Report	from	November	7th,		http://web.amnesty.org/library/pdf/
ASA7099ENGLISH/$File/ASA709.pdf 
Changyun,	Gao	and	Shi	Yuan	(99).	“The	Hainan	Model	of	‘Small	
Government	and	Big	Society”,	Hainan Kaifa Bao,	September	rd.
Ding,	Yijiang	(00).	Chinese Democracy after Tiennamen. Vancouver:	
UBC	Press.
Edelman,	Bryan	and	James	Richardson	(00).	“Falun	Gong	and	
the	Law:	Development	of	Legal	Social	Control	in	China”,	Nova 
Religio,	6	(),	pp.	-.
Hu,	Martin	(00).	“WTO’s	Impact	on	the	Rule	of	Law	in	China”,	
Mansfield Dialogues in Asia,	http://www.mansfieldfdn.org/
programs/program_pdfs/0hu.pdf 
Junning,	Liu	(000).	“Civil	Society	and	Limited	Government	–	Take	
Chinese	Chambers	of	Commerce	for	Example”,	Research	report,	
http://www.ids.ac.uk/ids/civsoc/final/china/chn.doc 
Keith,	Roland	(994).	China’s Struggle for the Rule of Law. London	
and	New	York:	Macmillan	and	St.	Martin’s.
---------------	and	Zhiqiu	Lin	(00).	“The	‘Falun Gong	Problem’:	
Politics	and	the	Struggle	for	the	Rule	of	Law	in	China”,	The 
China Quarterly,	75,	pp.	6-4.
Keping,	Yu	(000).	“Changes	in	Civil	Organizations	and	Governance	
in	China’s	Rural	Areas:	A	Case	Study	of	Dongsheng	Village,	
Changqiao	Town,	Zhangpu	County,	Fujian	Province”,	Centre	for	
Comparative	Politics	&	Economics,	http://www.ids.ac.uk/ids/
civsoc/final/china/chn.doc 
----------------	(000)	.“The	Emergence	of	Chinese	Civil	Society	and	Its	
Significance	to	Governance”,	http://ww.ids.ac.uk/ids/civsoc/final/
china/chn8.doc
Ma,	Ying	(007).	“China’s	Stubborn	Anti-Democracy”,	American 
Enterprise Institute for Public Policy Research,	February	nd,,	
Democratic Innovation in the South
182
http://www.aei.org/publications/filter.all,pubID.566/pub_
detail.asp 
Michael,	Franz	(9).	“Law:	A	Tool	of	Power”,	in	Yuan-Li	Wu	et	al.	
Human Rights in the People’s Republic of China	.	Boulder,	CO:	
Westview	Press.
Nevitt,	Christopher	(996).	“Private	Business	Associations	in	China:	
Evidence	of	Civil	Society	or	Local	State	Power?”,	in	The China 
Journal,	6,	July,	pp.	5-4.
O’Donnell,	Guillermo	(999).	“Horizontal	accountability	in	new	
democracies”,	in	Schedler,	Andreas,	Larry	Diamond	and	
Marc	F.	Plattner	(eds.),	The Self-Restraining State: Power and 
Accountability in New Democracies. Boulder,	CO:	Lynne	Rienner	
Publishers.
Peerenboom,	Randall	(00).	China’s Long March Toward Rule of 
Law. Cambridge:	Cambridge	University	Press.
Pei,	Minxin	(995).	“‘Creeping	Democratization’	in	China”,	Journal of 
Democracy,	6	(4),	pp.	65-79.
Potter,	Pittman	(00).	The Chinese Legal System: Globalization and 
Local Legal Culture.	London	and	New	York:	Routledge.
Shih,	Chih-yu	(999).	Collective Democracy in China. Hong	Kong:	
Chinese	University	Press.
Wang,	Zhenmin	(000).	“The	Developing	Rule	of	Law	in	China”,	
Harvard Asia Quarterly,	4	(4),	http://www.asiaquarterly.com/
content/view//40 
Xiaojin,	Zhang	(99)	.“‘Changes	in	Peasants’	Values	During	
Reform”,	Shehui	(Society),	August.
Yan,	Meng	(004).	“Revised	electoral	law	enhances	democracy”,	
China Daily,	October	7th,	http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/english/
doc/004-0/7/content_60.htm 
Ying,	Wang	(994).	“The	Intermediary	Level	of	Chinese	Society:	
Development	of	Associations	and	the	Rebuilding	of	the	
Organizational	System”,	Zhongguo Shehui Kexue Jikan	(Chinese	
Social	Science	Quarterly),	6.
Yongnian,	Zheng	(004).	Will China Become Democratic? Elite, 
Class and Regime Transition	Singapore:	Marshall	Cavendish	
International.
Zemin,	Jiang	(00).	On “Three Represents”. Beijing:	Foreign	
Languages	Press.
Alexander K. D. Frempong
Innovations in Electoral
Politics in Ghana’s Fourth
Republic: An Analysis
Introduction
The	people	of	Ghana	are	gearing	themselves	up	for	general	elections	
in	December	00.	Election	00	would	be	a	historic	fifth	consecutive	
national	poll	since	the	start	of	the	current	constitutional	democratic	
dispensation	 in	 99.	 The	 transitional	 presidential	 election	 of	Nov-
ember	99	was	highly	disputed	by	the	opposition	parties	leading	to	
their	boycott	of	the	subsequent	parliamentary	poll	that	December.	The	
acrimony	no	doubt	had	arisen	from	the	fact	that	the	outgoing	military	
regime	that	had	metamorphosed	into	a	political	party	to	contest	that	
election	was	perceived	to	have	rigged	elections.
It	was	from	such	shaky	foundation	that	Ghana’s	current	dispensa-
tion	has	blossomed.	The	subsequent	elections	(996,	004,	and	004)	
have	been	more	peaceful	and	generally	 free	and	fair.	 In	000,	 there	
was	a	peaceful	alternation	of	power	from	the	ruling	National	Demo-
cratic	Congress	(NDC)	to	the	opposition	New	Patriotic	Party	(NPP).	
Ghana’s	electoral	successes	have	made	it	a	paragon	of	good	governan-
ce	and	peaceful	coexistence	in	the	West	African	sub-region	which	over	
the	last	decade	and	half	has	been	better	known	for	a	spiral	of	violent	
conflict	(Frempong	006:	57).
How	can	 this	apparent	paradox,	a	flawed	 transition	 setting	 the	
stage	for	democratic	progress,	be	explained?	Ghana,	despite	the	emer-
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ging	culture	of	political	stability,	still	faces	a	number	of	challenges	–	
abuse	of	incumbency,	ethnicity,	and	overdependence	on	donor	inflow;	
but	in	its	successes	and	challenges,	several	lessons	can	be	distilled	for	
the	rest	of	Africa	and	indeed	the	entire	South.
Issues of democracy and elections
Democracy,	particularly,	its	liberal	version,	may	be	defined	as	“a	sys-
tem	of	governance	in	which	rulers	are	held	accountable	for	their	ac-
tions	in	the	public	realms	of	citizens,	acting	indirectly	through	com-
petition	 and	 cooperation	 of	 their	 elected	 representatives	 (Diamond	
and	Plattner	999:	xi).	This	implies	extensive	competition	for	power;	
highly	inclusive	citizenship	and	extensive	civil	and	political	liberties.	
Also,	 in-between	elections,	citizens	must	be	able	to	 influence	public	
policy	through	various	non-electoral means	like	interest	group	asso-
ciations	and	social	movements,	which	invariably	involve	cooperation	
and	competition	among	citizens	(Ibid).
In	 a	 democracy,	 a	 balance	must	 be	 found	 between	 competing	
values;	and	political	actors	must	cooperate	 in	order	 to	compete.	To	
be	effective	and	stable,	there	must	be	the	belief	 in	the	legitimacy	of	
democracy,	tolerance	for	opposition	parties,	a	willingness	to	compro-
mise	with	political	opponents,	pragmatism	and	flexibility,	trust	in	the	
political	environment,	cooperation	among	political	competitors,	mo-
deration	in	political	positions	and	partisan	identifications,	civility	of	
political	discourse	and	efficacy	and	participation	based	on	the	princi-
ples	of	political	equality	(Diamond	et	al	995:9).	Coalition	building	
therefore	becomes	an	essential	component	of	democratic	actions.	It	
teaches	interest	groups	to	negotiate	with	others,	to	compromise	and	
to	work	within	the	constitutional	system.	By	so	doing	groups	with	di-
fferences	learn	how	to	argue	peaceably,	how	to	pursue	their	goals	in	a	
democratic	manner	and	ultimately	how	to	live	in	a	world	of	diversity.
Democracy	is	embedded	in	a	complex	architecture	of	norms	whi-
ch	is	embodied	in,	and	implemented	by,	an	ensemble	of	institutions	
including	the	multiparty	system,	an	independent	judiciary,	free	press,	
and	an	electoral	 system.	The	 stability	of	 a	democratic	order	 in	any	
country	is	ultimately	determined	by	the	extent	to	which	such	institu-
tions	are	able	to	function	in	a	sustainable	manner	(Ninsin	006:	59).
Elections	 are	 a	major	 institutional	 pillar	 of	 liberal	 democracy.	
They	 provide	 the	 platform	 for	 exercising	 the	 core	 rights	 associated	
with	democracy	–	freedom	of	speech,	association,	choice	and	move-
ment.	They	are	also	an	expression	of	the	right	of	participation	in	the	
political	 process.	 For	 the	masses	 they	 are	 the	 opportunity	 to	make	
the	political	leaders	accountable	for	their	stewardship	during	the	time	
they	were	in	power,	as	well	as	subject	to	their	power	as	the	final	sove-
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reign	of	the	country.	The	political	class	sees	them	as	an	opportunity	
for	renewing	their	mandate	to	exercise	legitimate	power.	In	this	sense,	
elections	constitute	a	vital	bridge	linking	the	masses	to	the	political	
class	(Ibid:	75).	In	addition,	growing	commitment	to	democratic	elec-
tions	is	also	an	affirmation	of	a	growing	popular	commitment	to	the	
rule	of	law	(Ibid).
To	what	extent	are	these	essential	qualities	of	elections	attainable	
in	Africa?	While	advances	have	been	made	in	the	apparent	competi-
tiveness	of	elections	in	Africa	with	renewed	participation	of	opposi-
tion	parties,	in	few	cases	do	elections	represent	real	opportunities	for	
the	populace	to	determine	who	governs.	Rather,	they	reflect	more	the	
character	of	the	political	order	and	especially	the	degree	of	risk,	in-
cumbents	are	willing	to	tolerate	(Joseph	999:	).	Elections	in	Africa	
have	often	been	staged-managed,	won	before	Election	Day,	rigged	or	
corrupted	and	electoral	verdicts	“stolen”,	which	are	indicative	of	the	
habit	of	holding	regular	elections	without	democratic	culture.	Regular	
elections	therefore	may	not	constitute	enough	grounds	for	postulating	
democratic	consolidation	(Ninsin	006:	6).
In	Africa,	like	in	other	new	democracies,	the	rules	governing	elec-
tions	are	yet	to	be	institutionalized;	and	even	the	most	ordinary	issues,	
such	as	 the	choice	of	Election	Day	and	one’s	position	on	 the	ballot	
paper,	 which	 normally	 should	 be	 decided	 administratively,	 become	
highly	politicized.	The contest	for	power	itself	 is	a	winner	takes	all,	
marked	by	tensions,	acrimony	and	a	vicious	cycle	of	political	distrust	
(Ninsin	995:	66).
Innovative	measures	that	have	been	taken	by	the	various	stake-
holders	over	the	past	fifteen	years	in	Ghana	to	overcome,	or	at	least	
minimize,	these	problems	and	what	hurdles	remain	to	be	surmounted	
form	the	thrust	of	this	paper.	
Brief historical background 
Ghana’s	post	independence	history	began	in	March	957	with	a	liberal	
democratic	rule	which	soon	degenerated	into	a	quasi	dictatorship;	and	
as	a	result,	the	first	military	coup	of	966	(Gyimah-Boadi	000:)	In	the	
subsequent	one	and	half	decades,	Ghana	made	two	other	brief	attempts	
at	liberal	democracy	between	969-97	and	979-9;	but	each	was	
overthrown	 after	 twenty	 seven	months.	 In	 the	 later	 instance,	 Flight	
Lieutenant	Jerry	Rawlings,	who	assumed	the	reigns	of	power	for	a	hun-
dred	and	twelve	days	in	979	and	handed	over	to	the	civilian	adminis-
tration	of	President	Hilla	Limann	and	his	People’s	National	Party(PNP)	
staged	a	comeback	on	the	Christmas	eve	of	9.	The	new	ruling	group,	
the	Provisional	National	Defence	Council	(PNDC),	also	under	Rawlings’	
chairmanship,	in	spite	of	its	name	stuck	to	power	for	eleven	years	until	
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7	January	99	when	Ghana	embarked	on	the	current	experiment	un-
der	the	99	Constitution,	which	is	in	its	fifteenth	year.	
The	PNDC,	unlike	the	various	military	regimes	before	it,	had,	al-
most	from	the	beginning, given	strong	indication	of	wanting	to	stay	
much	longer	in	power.	It	doggedly	refused	to	bind	itself	to	time,	cho-
osing	to	refer	to	itself	and	its	actions	as	part	of	an	indefinite	political	
process	ostensibly	to	implement	the	so-called	participatory,	grassroots	
democracy	that	had	a	disdain	for	multiparty	politics	(Gyimah-Boadi	
99:5).
The transition election of 1992
Against	this	background,	the	PNDC	only	reluctantly	conceded	to	cons-
titutional	rule	under	pressure	from	external	and	domestic	forces,	in	
the	early	990s.	On	the	international	front,	the	pro-democratic	trend	
of	the	post-Cold	War	era	had	begun	to	have	contagious	effect	across	
Africa	(Ninsin	99:4).	Locally,	there	were	persistent	and	increasing	
demands	 from	various	 civil	 society	 groups	 for	 change	 and	political	
reform,	after	nearly	a	decade	of	a	culture	of	silence	under	PNDC	rule.	
The	PNDC	leaders	then	were	unwilling	coverts	that	were	bent	on	en-
suring	that	they	crafted	a	transition	programme	that	would	leave	their	
interest	virtually	intact.	In	addition,	given	its	poor	human	rights	re-
cord	the	PNDC	regime	had	genuine	fears	for	its	physical	security	once	
it	surrendered	power.
The	 incumbent	 regime,	 therefore,	 had	 special	 interest	 in	 the	
outcome	of	 the	 transition	process	and	would	not	 countenance	any	
measures	that	would	prevent	it	from	retaining	power	in	the	new	dis-
pensation.	The	PNDC,	therefore	deliberately	and	carefully	controlled	
the	 transition	 process;	 it	 single-handedly	 chose	 the	 drafters	 of	 the	
99	Constitution	and	the	members	of	the	Interim	National	Electo-
ral	Commission	(NDC)	that	superintended	the	transitional	electoral	
process	in	99.	
As	a	result,	for	the	first	time	in	Ghana’s	political	history	the	leader	
of	the	out-going	military	regime,	Rawlings,	contested	the	presidential	
election,	while	the	ruling	junta,	the	PNDC	metamorphosed	into	a	po-
litical	party,	the	National	Democratic	Congress	(NDC)	to	provide	him	
with	a	vehicle	for	the	contest.	After	Rawlings	victory	in	the	presiden-
tial	poll,	the	opposition	parties	insisting	it	had	been	rigged	boycotted	
the	subsequent	parliamentary	contest.	
The	 sources	 of	 acrimony	 in	 99	 included	 a	 perceived	 bloated	
electoral	 register,	 the	PNDC	government’s	deliberate	and	systematic	
appropriation	of	state	resources	in	favour	of	the	NDC	(the	use	of	official	
vehicles	for	campaigning,	access	to	state-owned	media;	mobilization	
of	state	apparatus,	etc;	and	suspicion	about	the	INEC	management	of	
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the	elections	(Ninsin	006:64).	The	general	 impression	was	that	 the	
military	government	plotted	to	entrench	its	rule	through	the	backdoor	
provided	by	the	new	democratic	set	up	(Boafo-Arthur	006:6).
Innovations in electoral politics 
From	such	a	slippery	start,	the	strides	that	Ghana	has	taken	in	elec-
toral	politics	since	99	are	 impressive.	Ghana	has	since	held	three	
relatively	peaceful	 and	generally	 acceptable	 elections,	 one	of	which	
led	to	the	alternation	of	power.	Above	all,	from	the	all	time	low	voter	
turnout	of	9%	in	the	99	parliamentary	election	which	the	opposi-
tion	boycotted,	elections	have	been	receiving	between	60%	and	0%	
voter	turnout;	an	indication	of	mass	participation.	
Several	factors	have	accounted	for	this	success	story:	innovative	
constitutional	provisions;	effective	electoral	management	by	the	Elec-
toral	Commission	(EC)	and	related	constitutional	bodies;	consensus	
building	among	political	actors;	the	crucial	roles	of	civil	society	orga-
nizations	and	the	media,	as	well	as	mass	participation	in	the	electoral	
process.	In	the	sub-sections	that	follow	we	discuss	the	major	ones.
Constitutional Provisions
Ghana’s	99	Constitution	made	several	provisions	aimed	at	facilita-
ting	democratic	elections	and	the	implementation	of	those	provisions	
has	contributed	 in	no	 small	measure	 to	Ghana’s	achievements	 thus	
far.	A	few	of	these	would	be	illustrative:	
In	Article		the	rights	to	freedom	of	speech	and	expression,	
freedom	 of	 assembly,	 freedom	 of	 association,	 among	 others	
are	all	guaranteed.	Apart	from	being	useful	in	themselves,	the-
se	 freedoms	 have	 created	 a	 favourable	 environment	 for	 the	
growth	of	 civil	 society	groups	and	political	parties	 that	have	
proved	crucial	for	democratic	consolidation	in	Ghana.
Article	55(5)	provides	that	the	“internal	organization	of	a	politi-
cal	party	shall	conform	to	democratic	principles	and	its	actions	
and	purposes	shall	not	contravene	or	be	inconsistent	with	this	
Constitution	or	any	other	 law”.	As	a	 result	of	 this	provision,	
the	Political	Parties	Law	makes	 it	mandatory	 for	 the	Electo-
ral	Commission	to	supervise	political	party	elections	to	choose	
party	executives	at	the	regional	and	national	levels	as	well	as	
the	choice	of	party	flag-bearers.	This	measure	has	averted	in-
tra-party	conflicts	that	would	have	arisen	over	intra-party	elec-
tion	outcomes.
To	ensure	mass	participation	in	elections	and	politics	in	gene-
ral,	Article	55(0)	preserves	the	right	of	every	citizen	of	voting	
-
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age	“to	participate	in	political	activity	intended	to	influence	the	
composition	and	policies	of	Government”.
In	 fairness	 to	both	 the	competing	parties	and	 the	electorate,	
Article	55	(-)	obliges	 the	state	 to	avail	 to	all	presidential	
and	parliamentary	candidates	equal	access	 to	 the	media	and	
as	much	as	possible	ensure	equitable	access	to	the	resources	
necessary	for	ensuring	genuine	competition.
Article	 9	makes	provisions	on	 the	 rights	 of	 disabled	persons	
“who	must	be	protected	against	all	exploitation,	all	regulations	
and	 all	 treatment	 of	 discriminatory,	 abusive	 or	 degrading	 na-
ture”	(Article	9[4]).	The	Electoral	Commission	has	taken	this	
provision	seriously	and	has	introduced	measures	to	enable	the	
disabled	to	participate	fully	in	the	electoral	process.	In	the	004	
elections	a	number	of	disabled	persons	were	employed	as	elec-
tion	monitors	and	more	 significantly,	 the	EC	 introduced	on	a	
pilot	basis	tactile	ballot	to	allow	blind	voters	to	vote	secretly.	Ho-
pefully	this	will	be	introduced	nationwide	in	the	next	election.
Article	6()	provides	that	“there	shall	be	no	impediment	to	
the	establishment	of	private	press	or	media;	and	in	particular,	
there	shall	be	no	law	requiring	any	person	to	obtain	license	as	
prerequisite	to	the	establishment	or	operation	of	a	newspaper,	
journal	or	other	media	 for	mass	communication	or	 informa-
tion”.	This	provision	has	 led	to	the	emergence	of	several	pri-
vate	newspapers,	radio	and	television	station	which	have	been	
playing	vital	roles	during	elections	–providing	education	on	the	
electoral	processes,	monitoring	voting	as	well	as	the	collation	
and	publication	of	results.
Further,	 Article	 6	 provides:	 “All	 state-owned	 media	 shall	
afford	fair	opportunities	and	facilities	for	the	presentation	of	
divergent	views	and	dissenting	opinions”.	Since	996,	Ghana	
Broadcasting	 Corporation	 (for	 both	 its	 radio	 and	 television)	
during	 election	 campaign	 period	 has	 apportioned	 equal	 air	
time	for	presidential	candidates	and	political	parties	to	present	
their	manifestoes.	Similar	provisions	have	also	been	made	in	
the	public	newspapers	like	Daily Graphic and Ghanaian Times.
In	 addition	 to	 the	 above	 provisions,	 the	 99	Constitution	made	 it	
mandatory	 for	 the	 establishment,	 through	 Acts	 of	 Parliament	 and	
within	six	months	of	 the	start	of	 the	Fourth	Republic,	a	number	of	
constitutional	 commissions	 that	would	 facilitate	 political	 participa-
tion	in	general	and	the	electoral	process	in	particular.	These	were	the	
-
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Electoral	Commission	(EC),	the	Commission	on	Human	Rights	and	
Administrative	Justice	 (CHRAJ),	 the	National	Commission	for	Civic	
Education	(NCCE)	and	the	National	Media	Commission	(NMC). To	
ensure	 their	 independence,	 their	 composition	 and	 functions	 were	
prescribed	in	the	Constitution	(Articles	4,	6,		and	66	respec-
tively)	and	once	appointed,	 they	were	to	be	accountable	only	to	the	
Constitution	(Articles	46,	5,4	and	7	respectively).
Article		provides	among	the	functions	of	CHRAJ,	the	investi-
gation	of	complaints	of	violation	of	fundamental	rights	and	freedoms	
and	to	educate	the	public	as	to	human	rights	and	freedoms.	The	NCCE	
in	Article	(d)	is	to	“formulate,	implement	and	oversee	programmes	
intended	 to	 instill	 in	 the	 citizens	of	Ghana	awareness	of	 their	 civic	
responsibilities	and	an	appreciation	of	their	rights	and	obligations	as	
a	free	people”;	among	other	things.	The	NMC,	on	the	one	hand,	is	“to	
ensure	 the	establishment	and	maintenance	of	 the	highest	 journalis-
tic	standards	 in	the	mass	media”,	and	on	the	other,	“to	 insulate	the	
state-owned	media	from	governmental	control”	(Article	67b	&	c).	In	
practice,	these	three	commissions	in	their	respective	ways	have	con-
tributed	positively	to	electoral	politics	in	Ghana.
Thus	 on	 the	 whole,	 Ghana’s	 99	 Constitution	 has	 provided	
broader	avenues	for	political	participation:	Electoral	Commission,	the	
Legislature,	Executive,	Judiciary,	political	parties,	civil	society	organi-
zations,	traditional	institutions	and	the	media	have	all	been	insulated	
from	state	influence.
The Electoral Commission
The	 99	 Constitution	 provided	 for	 a	 seven-member	 Electoral	
Commission	(EC)	consisting	of	a	chairman,	two	deputy	chairmen	and	
four	others	appointed	by	the	President	in	consultation	with	the	Coun-
cil	of	State	(Articles	4	&	70).	Once	appointed	the	Commission	in	the	
performance	of	its	functions,	“shall	not	be	subject	to	the	direction	or	
control	of	any	person	or	authority”	(Article	46).
Article	45	outlines	 the	 functions	of	 the	Electoral	Commission	
which	include	compilation	and	revision	of	the	electoral	register,	de-
marcation	and	revision	of	electoral	boundaries,	conduct	and	super-
vision	of	public	elections	and	referenda,	education	of	citizens	on	the	
electoral	process	and	other	such	functions	that	may	be	prescribed	
by	law.	It	is	thus	the	principal	organ	for	the	administration	of	elec-
tions	in	Ghana
The	performance	of	these	functions	could	be	fraught	with	contro-
versy	which	could	provoke	acrimonious	disputes	due	to	extraneous	or	
extralegal	factors	introduced	in	the	process	either	by	the	state	through	
its	numerous	agents	or	by	contending	political	parties,	their	candidates	
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or	supporters.	Such	interferences	could	severely	compromise	the	role	
of	the	EC	as	an	impartial	referee	and	thereby	throw	into	grave	doubt	
the	credibility	of	the	entire	election.	This	indeed	was	the	fate	that	befell	
the	INEC	which	conducted	the	transition	election	(Ninsin	006:6-6).	
Key	political	actors	and	their	supporters	became	deeply	mistrustful	of	
the	electoral	process	and	the	new	election	authorities	faced	formidable	
challenges	of	building	both	confidence	and	credibility.	
With	the	inauguration	of	the	Fourth	Republic	in	January	99,	the	
life	of	the	largely	discredited	INEC	officially	came	to	an	end	and	a	new	
Electoral	Commission	(EC)	was	inaugurated	in	August	99.	Its	com-
position	and	powers	as	provided	for	in	the	Constitution	were	amplified	
by	statute,	Act	45.	The	existence	of	a	body	of	laws	and	explicit	rules	
and	regulations	provided	the	Electoral	Commission	with	a	measure	of	
insulation	and	put	the	body	in	a	stronger	position	lawfully	to	resist	un-
due	external	pressures	and	interference	in	its	work.	Above	all,	the	laws	
formed	the	framework	for	the	resolution	of	the	electoral	conflicts.
These	changed	circumstances	and	donor	assistance	enabled	the	
EC	to	embark	on	a	comprehensive	programme	of	reforming	the	elec-
toral	process	and	enhancing	credibility.	 Initially,	however,	suspicion	
and	mistrust	of	the	election	authority	as	an	independent	and	impartial	
arbiter	lingered	in	part	because	the	procedure	for	appointing	the	com-
missioners	still	allowed	for	a	significant	degree	of	presidential	influen-
ce	but	more	so	because	a	deputy	chairman,	Dr.	K.	Afari-Gyan	and	a	
commissioner,	David	Kanga,	both	of	the	defunct	INEC	were	‘promo-
ted’	Chairman	and	Deputy	Chairman	respectively	of	the	new	EC.
The	EC	saw	a	clear	need	for	electoral	reforms	with	a	view	to	achie-
ving	greater	transparency	in	all	aspects	of	the	election	process,	seeking	
to	create	popular	faith	in	the	ballot	and	building	confidence	in	the	EC	
itself.	This	coincided	with	 the	need	of	both	 the	government	and	 the	
opposition	 to	achieve	 some	measure	of	 consensus	 if	 the	Fourth	Re-
public	was	not	to	be	derailed.	On	the	part	of	the	government,	the	ex-
ceptionally	low	voter	turnout	of	9	percent	in	the	99	parliamentary	
election	reduced	the	legitimacy	of	the	whole	transition	process	and	for	
the	opposition	parties	there	was	the	fear	that	if	the	stand-off	with	the	
Rawlings	government	remained	unresolved,	the	government	might	sei-
ze	the	opportunity	to	perpetuate	itself	in	power	(Frempong	007:	7)
The	most	 important	mechanism	for	managing	distrust	of	 the	EC	
and	among	the	various	political	parties	was	the	innovative	Inter-Party	
Advisory	Committee	(IPAC)	formed	in	March	994.	The	IPAC	brought	
together	representatives	of	the	political	parties	to	regular	monthly	mee-
	 	 The	 extraneous	 factors	 include	 impersonation,	 double	 voting,	 juvenile	 voting,	
vote-rigging	and	fraud,	and	general	acts	of	manipulation	of	the	voting	process.
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tings	with	the	EC	to	discuss	and	build	consensus	on	contested	electoral	
issues	(Ayee	997:	0).	In	taking	this	step,	the	EC	was	responding	to	a	
recommendation	of	the	Commonwealth	Observer	Group	(COG)	which	
monitored	the	99	elections.	In	its	report,	the	COG	had	emphasized	the	
practical	value	of	dialogue	and	consultation	as	a	building	block	towards	
democratic	consolidation	and	recommended	the	need	to	institutionali-
ze	the	process	of	dialogue,	even	informally,	as	a	forum	at	which	parties	
could	air	their	grievances	(COG	99:	6-6,	cited	in	Ayee	99b:6).
The	IPAC	offered	a	two-way	channel	of	information	for	both	the	EC	
and	the	parties.	It	enabled	the	EC	to	discuss	all	aspects	of	its	program-
mes	and	activities	with	the	parties,	elicit	input	and	address	problems,	
protests	and	disagreements	whenever	they	were	aired.	And	the	parties	
were	able	to	express	their	views	freely	and	openly	about	EC	programmes	
and	activities	and	to	bring	their	concerns	to	the	table.	The	IPAC	process,	
no	doubt,	had	its	hiccups	but	it	succeeded	in	achieving	compromise	so-
lutions	to	such	contested	matters	as	a	single	day	for	both	parliamentary	
and	presidential	elections;	photo	ID	cards,	and	transparent	ballot	boxes;	
and	gained	the	active	involvement	of	the	party	agents	in	the	registration	
exercise	as	observers.	It	also	agreed	on	a	common	date	for	parliamenta-
ry	and	presidential	elections	(Ayee	997:	0).	It	must	also	be	emphasized	
to	the	credit	of	the	EC	that	although	the	IPAC	was	purely	advisory	and	
non-statutory	and	its	decisions	non-binding	of	the	EC,	it	gave	serious	
attention	to	those	decisions	that	were	practical,	legal	and	cost	effective.	
IPAC	then	became	a	framework	for	building	trust	and	confidence	among	
the	political	class	regarding	the	conduct	of	elections	and	provided	a	pla-
tform	for	deepening	trust	with	the	EC	(Ninsin	006:64).
By	996	several	of	the	major	controversial	issues	had	been	resol-
ved	through	the	IPAC	mechanism.	The	positive	dividend	showed	in	the	
996	elections	and	has	continued.	The	voter	turn	out	in	996	was	an	
impressive	7.5%.	The	general	mood	following	the	election	confirmed	
the	fact	that	the	contending	political	leaders	had	agreed	upon	the	basic	
rules	of	electoral	politics	(Ninsin	99:	94).	Unlike	99,	the	defeated	
presidential	candidates	readily	conceded	defeat	and	congratulated	the	
winner	and	he	in	turn	congratulated	the	 losers	for	their	competitive	
spirit.	It	is	therefore	gratifying	that	this	consensus	building	mechanism	
has	been	sustained	and	replicated	at	the	regional	and	district	levels.
The	EC	has	performed	creditably	in	other	areas	as	well:
It	has	asserted	its	independence	on	many	respects	over	the	years:	
In	March	004,	for	example,	when	the	NPP	government	announ-
ced	the	establishment	of	a	national	procurement	committee	to	
undertake	purchases	for	Election	004,	the	EC	contended	that	
that	action	would	undermine	its	independence	and	had	the	plan	
-
Democratic Innovation in the South
192
shelved.	Similarly	the	EC	resisted	all	attempts	by	the	opposition	
parties	to	prevent	the	inclusion	of	0	newly-created	constituen-
cies	in	the	conduct	of	Election	004.	The	EC,	conscious	of	the	
fact	that	it	had	operated	within	its	mandate	in	creating	the	new	
constituencies,	maintained	its	stand	until	it	was	confirmed	by	a	
Supreme	Court	decision	(Boafo-Arthur	006:	4).
The	EC	has	taken	even	little	controversies	seriously	and	has	taken	
innovative	measures	to	deal	with	them.	Before	the	000	Election,	
the	position	of	candidates	on	the	ballot	paper	was	in	the	order	in	
which	they	filed	their	nomination.	In	996,	this	had	led	to	a	mad	
rush	among	the	political	parties	to	secure	the	top	spot	on	the	ba-
llot	paper.	In	000,	the	EC	resolved	the	matter	by	the	introduction	
of	balloting	 for	positions	on	 the	ballot	paper	days	after	parties	
have	filed	 their	nominations.	 It	 is	 significant	 to	note	 that	 since	
then	this	method	has	been	replicated	for	intra-party	elections.
The	EC	playing	its	neutral	role	was	equally	mindful	of	the	re-
ligious	dimension.	On	November	4,	000	the	EC	organized	a	
prayer	and	fasting	session	at	the	Conference	Hall	of	the	Com-
mission.	(Agyeman-Duah	00:5).
The	manner	in	which	the	EC	has	collaborated	with	donor	agen-
cies,	political	parties,	 think	tanks,	civil	society	groups	and	the	
media	has	been	most	 impressive.	One	such	collaboration	bet-
ween	the	EC,	IFES,	the	Ghana	Association	of	the	Blind	(GAB)	
and	Action	on	Disability	and	Development	Ghana	(ADD)	in	00	
led	to	the	pilot	test	of	the	tactile	ballot,	earlier	referred	to	(GAB	
Report	00).	Similarly,	since	996,	it	has	accredited	the	domes-
tic	poll	watchers	and	ensured	their	unhindered	access	to	places	
has	boosted	public	confidence	in	the	voting	and	its	outcome.
The	efficient	manner	the	EC	has	been	managing	elections	in	the	
country	is	acclaimed	across	the	electorate.	In	a	post-election	004	sur-
vey	96.%	of	respondents	were	of	the	view	that	the	EC	officials	across	
the	country	applied	the	rules	governing	elections,	were	neutral,	 fair	
and	firm	(Department	of	Political	Science,	University	of	Ghana,	Post-
Election	Field	Survey,	004	cited	in	Boafo-Arthur	006:	7).	This	high	
level	of	confidence	the	electorate	has	placed	in	the	EC	is	the	outcome	
of	the	persistent	efforts	by	the	Commission	to	improve	upon	its	per-
formance.	It	has	within	the	past	one	and	half	decades	initiated	seve-
ral	changes	that	have	greatly	improved	and	enhanced	its	role	in	the	
	 	These	reforms	which	cover	voter	registration	and	election	and	election	material	
management	 include	photo	 identification	 cards	 for	 voters,	unique	 voter	numbers,	
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electoral	process	(Boafo-Arthur	006:	).	It	is	therefore,	not	surpri-
sing	that	EC	Chairman	Kwadwo	Afari-Gyan	and	several	of	his	officials	
have	been	involved	in	elections	throughout	Africa	either	as	technical	
facilitators	or	election	observers/monitors.	
The	EC	in	Ghana	has	confirmed	the	fact	that	while	the	success	of	
electoral	politics	depends	on	each	stakeholder	playing	its	assigned	role,	
the	role	of	the	electoral	commission	in	the	process	is	most	crucial.	Apart	
from	neutrality,	the	commission	must	be	fair	and	firm,	to	be	able	to	win	
the	confidence	of	the	contesting	parties	as	well	as	the	electorate.	
The Legislature, Executive and Judiciary
The	traditional	governance	institutions,	the	Legislature,	Executive	and	
the	Judiciary,	have	all	contributed	to	the	success	of	the	electoral	pro-
cess	in	Ghana.	The	Ghanaian	Parliament,	apart	from	the	passage	of	the	
various	acts	establishing	the	EC	and	other	constitutional	commissions	
within	the	constitutionally-mandate	six	months,	has	since	99,	deba-
ted	and	passed	several	constitutional	and	legislative	instruments	broug-
ht	before	it	by	the	EC.	These	instruments	have	facilitated	the	work	of	
the	EC	a	 great	deal.	On	 the	part	 of	 the	 executive,	 both	 the	previous	
NDC	and	the	incumbent	NPP	governments	have,	to	a	large	extent,	sta-
yed	within	the	constitutional	limits	in	their	relations	with	the	electoral	
authorities.	 The	 decision	 of	 the	Rawlings	 government	 to	 respect	 the	
two-term	constitutional	limit	in	000	is	a	case	in	point.	The	role	of	the	
judiciary	has	been	most	beneficial	in	this	respect.	It	has	treated	most	of	
the	election-related	petitions	with	this	dispatch.	Such	cases	included:	
the	fixing	of	the	7	December	Election	Day,	the	controversy	over	the	used	
of	thumb-printed	voter	identification	cards	in	000,	and	the	inclusion	of	
the	thirty	newly-created	constituencies	in	the	004	polls.	
Political Parties
Apart	 from	 elections	 rules	 that	 the	 electoral	 authorities	 impose,	 a	
number	of	normative	and	attitudinal	imperatives	require	compliance	
if	success	is	to	be	achieved.	These	include	tolerance	of	opposing	views,	
free	exchange	and	circulation	of	ideas	and	mutual	respect	among	con-
tending	leaders/candidates	and	their	followers	(Ninsin	006:	6).	It	is	
in	these	respects	that	political	parties,	the	main	political	actors,	have	
contributed	their	quota	to	the	success	of	electoral	politics	in	Ghana.
Through	 their	 involvement	 with	 IPAC	 the	 political	 parties	
reached	 consensus	 on	 the	 rules	 of	 the	 game	 and	 committed	
political	party	agents	observing	voter	registration	and	the	voting	itself,	domestic	elec-
tion	monitoring	by	civil	society	groups,	the	IPAC,	photo	identification	of	voters	on	
electoral	roll,	transparent	ballot	boxes.
-
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themselves	to	upholding	elections	as	the	only	credible	method	
by	which	Ghanaians	would	choose	and	alternate	government	
(Ibid	64).
Since	996	aggrieved	defeated	parliamentary	candidates	have	
resorted	to	the	courts	rather	than	the	streets,	 to	seek	redress	
under	the	law.
Political	parties	in	Ghana	have	pushed	the	consensus	building	
a	step	further	with	the	introduction	of	the	Platform	of	Gene-
ral	Secretaries	and	the	Chairmen’s	Caucus	on	the	initiative	of	
the	Institute	of	Economic	Affairs	(IEA).	The	Platform,	made	up	
of	political	parties	represented	in	Parliament	came	into	being	
in	 00.	 It	meets	 on	 a	 twice-monthly	 basis	 to	 discuss	 issues	
relating	 to	 party	 programmes	 and	 activities.	 The	Chairmen’s	
Caucus	has	since	004	been	dealing	with	larger	problems	that	
threaten	democratic	consolidation	in	Ghana	(Asante	006:	6)
Since	000,	political	parties	have	formulated	the	Political	Par-
ties	Code	of	Conduct.	 In	004,	 for	example,	at	a	meeting	or-
ganized	by	the	IEA,	representatives	of	registered	political	par-
ties	in	Ghana	formulated	a	Political	Parties	Code	of	Conduct	
(004)	to	regulate	the	conduct	of	political	parties	during	and	
between	elections.	The	Code	stresses	the	democratic	imperati-
ves	of	multipartyism,	mode	of	campaigning,	out-of-campaign	
activities,	measures	for	safeguarding	elections,	etc	(Boafo-Ar-
thur	006:	4).	The	enforcement	of	the	Code	was	a	partnership	
between	the	political	parties,	EC	and	IEA	(IEA	Political	Parties	
Code	of	Conduct	004)
A	significant	contribution	that	these	innovations	by	political	par-
ties	have	made	to	electoral	politics	in	Ghana	is	the	impact	on	the	vo-
ter	turn	out	and,	in	effect,	mass	participation.	From	a	low	of	9%	in	
the	99	polls,	voter	turnout	was	7.%	in	996,	6.7%	in	000	and	
5.%	in	004.	The	consensus	building	among	the	political	elite	has	
created	confidence	among	their	followers	and	this	has	been	manifes-
ted	in	the	sustained	high	voter	turnout.	That	in	itself	underscores	the	
importance	ordinary	Ghanaians,	acting	as	the	electorate,	now	attach	
to	elections.
Civil Society Organizations
Perhaps	 the	most	 innovative	 contributions	 to	Ghana’s	 electoral	 po-
litics	have	come	from	civil	society	organizations	(CSOs)	in	terms	of	
voter	education,	election	observation/monitoring	and	other	strategies	
for	peaceful	elections.	
-
-
-
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Voter Education
From	996	civil	society	groups	have	been	very	active	in	the	voter	edu-
cation	efforts:
Human	rights	advocacy	and	policy	think	tanks	like	the	Institute	
of	Economic	Affairs	(IEA)	and	the	Ghana	Center	for	Democra-
tic	Governance	(CDD-Ghana)	have	liaised	with	traditional	civil	
society	bodies	like	the	trade	unions,	business	and	professional	
associations	to	create	formidable	networks	of	private	 institu-
tions	that	have	facilitated	democratic	development	and	redu-
ced	election-related	violence	to	the	minimum	(Gyimah-Boadi	
004:0).	
Publications,	 opinion	 surveys	 and	 studies	 and	 independent	
research	by	the	IEA,	CDD-Ghana,	the	Department	of	Political	
Science	and	 the	School	of	Communications	Studies	 (both	of	
the	University	of	Ghana)	have	also	provided	some	of	the	best	
information	on	politics	and	elections	since	99	(Ibid:	06).
In	the	000	elections,	live	broadcasting	of	public	debates	by	pre-
sidential	candidates,	on	television	and	radio,	was	introduced.	It	
was	organized	by	the	Ghana	Journalist	Association	(GJA)	in	co-
llaboration	with	an	American	NGO,	Freedom	Forum.	The	two-
hour	exercise	involved	five-minute	opening	statements	by	each	
candidate,	a	series	of	questions	from	the	audience	and	another	
five-minute	closing	remark	by	candidates.	This	unprecedented	
experience	enabled	the	electorate	to	assess	further	the	qualities	
of	 the	potential	 presidents;	 it	 brought	 the	new	dimension	of	
giving	voters	the	opportunity	to	judge	candidates	on	the	basis	
of	their	position	on	specific	issues,	introducing	“content”	in	a	
structured	fashion	for	the	first	time	into	Ghanaian	presidential	
campaigns.	(Agyeman-Duah	005:4)
In	004,	the	presidential	debate	of	000	was	repeated.	An	inno-
vation	this	time	was	the	civil	society-sponsored	weekly	televised	
debates	 for	 the	 four	contending	political	parties;	 in	addition,	
the	several	 issues-based	radio	discussion	programs	enhanced	
the	public	discourse.
Also	introduced	in	004	were	CDD-Ghana’s	Public	Forum	and	
IEA’s	Town	Hall	Meeting	for	parliamentary	candidates	in	seve-
ral	constituencies	across	the	country,	at	which	issues	of	public	
interest	(including	education,	health,	HIV/AIDS,	the	economy	
and	national	security)	were	addressed.	(Ibid:	9).	The	consti-
tuencies	were	carefully	chosen	taking	into	consideration	such	
factors	as	the	intensity	of	contest	or	volatility	of	voter	behavio-
-
-
-
-
-
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ur;	 female	and	 independent	candidacy;	newly-created	consti-
tuencies	and	constituencies	prone	to	violent	conflict.	To	make	
the	 forums	 effective,	 capacity	workshops	were	 organized	 for	
the	participating	candidates	 (CDD-Ghana,	Parliamentary	De-
bates,	004).	The	two	projects	offered	a	common	platform	for	
candidates	to	present	their	programmes	before	the	electorate	
with	the	objective	of	helping	the	candidates	to	focus	their	cam-
paigns	on	issues	relevant	to	the	developmental	needs	of	their	
constituencies	and	the	electorate	to	make	informed	choice.	
Election Observation/Monitoring
Election	observation	in	99	was	dominated	by	international	observer	
groups.	Since	then,	domestic	poll-watchers	have	emerged	and	beco-
me	increasingly	significant.	In	996,	the	two	organizations	that	assu-
med	 this	 role	were	Ghana-Alert,	 the	Network	 of	Domestic	Election	
Observers	(NEDEO),	a	coalition	of		prominent	national	religious,	
professional	 and	 human	 rights	 organizations.4	 The	 advantage	 here	
was	that	the	domestic	groups	could	begin	their	poll	watching	as	early	
as	July	996,	four	months	ahead	of	the	polls.	They	were	thus	better	
placed	than	the	international	observers	to	monitor	developments	be-
fore,	during	and	after	the	voting.	5
For	 the	 000	Elections,	 domestic	 election	monitoring	 assumed	
new	 and	 innovative	 dimensions.	 Several	 local	 groups	 including	 the	
Coalition	of	Domestic	Observers	 (CODEO),	 the	Forum	of	Religious	
Bodies	(FORB),	and	Ghana	Legal	Literacy	Resource	Foundation,	un-
dertook	to	monitor	the	polls	on	an	independent	basis	and	succeeded	
in	recruiting,	training	and	deploying	over	5,000	observers	and	cove-
red	about	half	of	the	over	0,000	polling	stations	nationwide.	
The	domestic	observation	process	in	000	was	far	more	extensi-
ve,	including,	the	general	pre-election	scenario	and	media	coverage	of	
party	political	activities	from	May	to	December	of	the	election	year.	
The	monthly	reports	from	the	monitors	formed	the	basis	of	fo-
rums	where	representatives	of	the	political	parties	and	media	houses	
	 	These	included	the	Commonwealth	Observer	Groups,	African-American	Institute	
and	Jimmy	Cater	Centre.
4	 These	included	the	Christian	Council	of	Ghana,	the	Catholic	Secretariat,	the	Fed-
eration	of	Muslim	Councils,	the	Ahmaddiyya	Muslim	Mission,	Ghana	National	As-
sociation	of	Teachers	 (GNAT),	National	Union	of	Ghana	Students	 (NUGS),	Ghana	
Journalist	Association	(GJA),	Ghana	Association	of	Women	Entrepreneurs	and	the	
Institute	of	Economic	Affairs	(IEA).	
5	 Their	 activities	 included	 the	 training	 of	 election	 monitors	 at	 the	 national,	
regional	and	district	levels	and	the	deployment	of	over	four	thousand	observers	to	
polling	stations	across	the	country	on	Election	Day	(Gyimah-Boadi	999:4).	
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discussed	lapses	and	shortcoming	in	performance	and	worked	out	co-
rrective	measures	(Gyimah-Boadi	00:	65).
 CODEO,	for	example,	selected	twelve	constituencies	deemed	to	
be	potential	flashpoints	for	trouble	from	the	ten	administrative	regions	
of	the	country	where	specially	trained	observers	were	sited	to	monitor	
the	political	environment,	noting	in	particular	the	activities	of	the	EC,	
the	conduct	of	party	primaries,	incidents	of	violence	and	the	use	and	
abuse	of	incumbency	by	the	ruling	party.	The	aim	was	to	publicize	the	
monitors’	report	to	draw	attention	to	infractions	and	irregularities	that	
could	undermine	the	electoral	integrity (Agyeman-Duah	005:5).
Civil	society	support	of	the	004	election	was	even	more	elaborate	
and	extensive.	CODEO,	for	example,	repeated	its	previous	observation/
monitoring	activities6	and	for	the	first	time	monitored	political	party	
primaries	where	parliamentary	candidates	were	selected	(Ibid:	0).
By	their	election	observation/monitoring	activities,	the	civil	CSOs	
have	provided	empirical	basis	 for	all	stakeholders	–the	government,	
opposition,	Parliament,	political	parties,	the	EC,	other	relevant	public	
agencies	and	civil	society–	to	take	measures	to	improve	in	future	elec-
tions	(Ibid:	5).
Strategies for Peace
Other	CSOs	have	focused	on	ensuring	peaceful	and	orderly	elections	
and	have	had	a	moderating	effect	on	the	political	scene	and	reduced	
acrimony	to	a	large	extent	(Ninsin	99:	67).	In	the	run-up	to	the	000	
elections	several	civil	society	groups	were	pivotal	in	reducing	moun-
ting	political	tensions	through	campaigns	for	peace.	For	example,	the	
Musicians	Association	of	Ghana	 (MUSIGA)	organized	musical	 con-
certs	to	promote	peaceful	elections;	while	religious	bodies	held	high	
profile	prayers	for	electoral	peace	and	non-violence.	
Thanks	largely	to	this	relentless	peace-mongering	by	civil	society,	
the	fears	and	anxieties	over	Election	Day	violence,	to	a	large	extent,	
did	not	materialize	(Gyimah-Boadi	00:	66).
Traditional Authorities
Onf	great	importance	to	democratic	consolidation	and	also	innovation	
for	other	countries	in	the	South	to	emulate	the	Ghanaian	experience	
6	 	 It	 launched	a	project	months	before	 the	election	 to	monitor	and	better	publi-
cize	acts	of	political	corruption	falling	under	the	rubric	of	the	abuse	of	incumbency.	
Trained	monitors	observed	the	conduct	of	public	officials	and	candidates	from	Sep-
tember	to	December	004	in	at	least	two	constituencies	in	each	of	the	ten	regions	of	
Ghana;	while	others	tracked	the	daily	news	content	produced	by	four	state-owned	
media	organizations,	including	two	newspapers,	one	radio	station	and	one	television	
network.(CDD-Ghana	Monitors’	Report,	004:)
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is	 the	role	of	 traditional	authorities	 in	promoting	peaceful	elections.	
Article	76	()	of	the	Ghanaian	constitutions	states	that	“a	chief	shall	
not	take	part	in	active	party	politics;	and	any	chief	wishing	to	do	and	
seeking	election	to	Parliament	shall	abdicate	his	stool	or	skin”,	but	that	
has	given	them	the	opportunity	to	play	a	fatherly	and	neutral	role	in	
Ghanaian	politics	since	99.	A	good	example	was	when	various	pro-
minent	traditional	rulers	convened	a	crisis	meeting	with	political	par-
ties	and	the	EC	in	mid-November	000,	and	ended	with	the	adoption	of	
a	-point	resolution	for	violent-free	and	peaceful	elections.	Many	tra-
ditional	rulers	also	took	advantage	of	political	rallies	in	their	localities	
to	appeal	for	free	and	peaceful	elections	(Agyeman-Duah	005:).	
The Media
Fair	and	equal	access	to	the	media	for	all	political	parties	and	their	
candidates	 are	 important	 elements	 for	 leveling	 the	political	playing	
field.	To	help	reduce	if	not	resolve	the	inequalities	in	media	access	and	
coverage	 for	 the	parties	 and	candidates,	 institutions	of	 civil	 society	
groups	have	introduced	workshops	and	seminars	to	sensitize	media	
practitioners	 to	 their	 democratic	 and	 professional	 responsibilities	
(Agyeman-Duah	005:0).
Relaxation	of	media	censorship	since	99	has	also	paved	the	way	
for	 the	 emergence	of	 independent	newspapers	as	well	 as	 radio	and	
television	stations.	The	media	contributed	greatly	to	the	quality	of	the	
electoral	process	in	996.	
The	more	active	presence	of	the	independent	media,	which	pro-
vide	a	constant	stream	of	election	analysis,	has	helped	to	generate	a	
high	degree	of	public	interest	in	elections.	By	providing	channels	of	
discourse	outside	the	state’s	control	and	expressing	opposition	views	
as	well,	the	independent	media	has	been	largely	responsible	for	kee-
ping	elections	competitive	(Gyimah-Boadi	999:44).The	independent	
print	and	electronic	media	have	also	made	it	possible	for	information	
unflattering	to	government	or	not	sanctioned	by	state	authorities	to	
reach	the	public	and	therefore	created	a	balance	in	media	coverage.	
The	role	of	the	electronic	media	in	monitoring	elections	has	been	
unique	and	innovative.	Private	FM	stations	post	their	reporters	coun-
trywide	 to	 give	 live	 reports	 of	 events	 at	 the	 polling	 stations	 and	 at	
collating	centres.	Throughout	Election	Day	stations	are	awashed	with	
reports	of	the	unfolding	balloting	process.	They	inform	electoral	offi-
cials	on	where	to	send	additional	voting	materials	to	alleviate	a	shor-
tage;	the	Police	are	notified	of	potential	and	actual	trouble	spots;	sus-
picious	characters	and	vehicles	at	polling	stations	are	reported	on	air	
including	their	number	plates;	and	ordinary	citizens’	call	on	to	report	
whatever	seems	to	be	irregular	at	the	polling	stations.	
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These	pre-emptive	actions	have	promoted	orderliness	at	the	po-
lling	stations	and	deterred	many	potential	election	fraudsters	and	ri-
ggers	and	have	largely	been	responsible	for	the	high	level	of	transpa-
rency	and	low	level	of	irregularities	recorded	in	the	balloting	process.	
(Agyeman-Duah	005:6)
Media	 reporters,	 who	monitor	 ballot	 counts,	 announce	 results	
live	 from	 the	polling	and	constituency	 collating	 centres	 throughout	
the	country	while	the	operations	desks	at	the	radio	studios	tally	the	
figures	and	give	 the	provisional	 results	of	both	 the	presidential	and	
parliamentary	votes.	Some	stations,	such	as	JOY-FM	of	Accra,	have	
created	websites	where	the	provisional	results	are	posted	as	they	un-
fold.	Thus,	the	Ghanaian	electorate	can	know	the	provisional	outco-
me	of	 elections	before	 the	Electoral	Commission	makes	 the	official	
announcement.
Challenges
Ghana,	however,	 is	no	paradise!	In	spite	of	 its	achievements	several	
hurdles	 remain	 to	 be	 surmounted.	 In	 the	 first	 place,	 the	 relations	
between	 incumbent	 President	 John	 Kufuor	 and	 ex-President	 John	
Rawlings	have	not	been	cordial.	Their	personal	differences	run	deeper	
than	the	start	of	the	Kufuor	administration	in	007	but	the	intermit-
tent	attacks	and	counter-attacks	by	these	prominent	politicians,	who	
represent	 the	 faces	of	 the	 two	dominant	political	parties	 in	Ghana,	
have	had	a	negative	repercussion	on	an	otherwise	progressive	deve-
lopment	 in	 electoral	 politics.	 It	 is	 hoped	 that	 the	 recent	mediatory	
step	by	retired	UN	Secretary	General	Kofi	Annan	would	yield	fruitful	
results	ahead	of	Election	00	
Another	threat	is	that	Ghana’s	democratic	progress	has	been	pa-
ralleled	by	increased	ethnicity.	Particularly	since	000,	elections	have	
been	 shaped	 by	 the	 Akan	 –Non-Akan	 divide.	 The	 ruling	 NPP	 has	
gained	most	of	its	votes	from	the	five	Akan	regions	while	it	has	perfor-
med	poorly	in	four	Non-Akan	regions;	and	for	the	opposition	NDC	the	
reverse	has	been	the	case.	The	only	exception	here	is	the	cosmopolitan	
Greater	 Accra	Region,	which	 though	 traditionally	Non-Akan,	 voted	
7	 	Kufour	as	a	Local	Government	Minister	in	the	Rawlings-led	PNDC	had	resigned	
following	the	brutal	murder	of	three	judges	and	an	ex-military	officer	in	which	gov-
ernment	functionaries	were	implicated.	Since	then	there	have	been	no	love	lost	be-
tween	them.
	 	Nearly	half	 the	Ghanaian	population	belongs	 to	 the	broad	Akan	ethnic	group	
which	is	geographically	spread	across	five	of	the	ten	regions	–	Ashanti,	Brong	Ahafo,	
Central,	Eastern	and	Western.	The	other	ethnic	groups	covering	the	remaining	five	
regions	–	Greater	Accra,	Northern,	Upper	East,	Upper	West,	and	Volta	–	are	loosely	
called	‘Non-Akan’	in	this	context.
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for	the	NPP,	not	least	because,	majority	of	the	people	there	are	Akans.	
The	sad	aspect	is	that	the	people	of	Central	Region	who	had	not	voted	
along	ethnic	lines	were	ridiculed	rather	than	hailed.
The	frequency	of	boycotting	of	parliamentary	sessions	by	oppo-
sition	groups	casts	doubts	on	how	deeply	the	political	elite	have	im-
bibed	the	ethos	of	consensus	building.	While	in	opposition	the	NPP	
had	boycotted	parliament	over	issues	like	vetting	of	presidential	mi-
nisterial	nominees	and	the	budget.	The	current	opposition	NDC	had	
continued	and	deepened	the	boycott	 ‘tradition’.	Issues	 like,	national	
reconciliation,	national	health	 insurance,	extension	of	 the	 franchise	
to	Ghanaians	abroad,	 and	 the	 conviction	of	one	of	 its	members	by	
a	court	of	law,	have	all	attracted	boycotts	by	the	NDC	parliamentary	
caucus.
In	spite	of	the	several	measures	aimed	at	leveling	the	playing	field	
electoral	resources	remain	skewed	in	favour	of	incumbency;	the	996	
and	004	election	campaigns	in	particular	demonstrated	the	affluence	
of	 incumbency	 and	 the	penury	of	 opposition.	The	 intriguing	point,	
however,	as	Election	000	amply	demonstrated,	is	that	incumbency	is	
not	always	an	advantage.	Could	Election	00	produce	another	alter-
nation	of	power?	
Deepening	 citizens	 understanding	 of	 the	 electoral	 system	 and	
management	and	educating	them	on	their	civic	responsibilities	is	yet	
another	challenge.	Although	Ghanaians	appear	 to	be	generally	con-
versant	with	their	civic	responsibilities	and	are	highly	committed	to	
democracy,	evidence	from	election	observations	indicates	high	levels	
of	 ignorance	about	 the	 laws,	procedures	and	processes	of	elections.	
As	a	result,	corrupt	voting	practices	are	rampant	and	pointless	argu-
ments	provoke	conflicts	and	at	times	violence.	There	are	indications	
that	 election-related	 violence	 results,	 in	part,	 from	 indiscipline	 that	
is	engendered	by	those	who	believe	that	the	opening	of	the	democra-
tic	space	gives	unbound	freedom	of	expression	and	action.	(Baffour	
Agyeman-Duah	005:9).
Isolated	 cases	 of	 election-related	 violence	 have	 broken	 out	 be-
fore,	during	and	after	elections	in	Ghana.	In	000,	the	post-election	
violence	 in	Bawku,	 the	Upper	East	 regional	capital	was	a	 test	case;	
and	in	004,	there	were	episodes	of	violence	in	Tamale,	the	Northern	
Regional	capital.	The	arrest	and	subsequent	death	in	military	custody	
of	Alhaji	Mobila,	the	Regional	Chairman	of	the	Convention	People’s	
Party	(CPP)	was	perhaps	the	darkest	spot	in	the	004	elections.	There	
were	also	incidents	of	attacks	on	electoral	officers	and	the	burning	of	
ballot	materials	as	well.
Though	Article	54	of	the	99	Constitution	charged	the	adminis-
trative	expenses	of	the	EC	on	the	Consolidated	Fund,	in	practice,	the	
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EC	like	other	constitutional	commissions,	has	been	consistently	sub-
jected	to	government	budgetary	cuts,	with	serious	implications	for	its	
efficiency,	effectiveness	and	independence.
Closely	related,	the	most	successful	innovations,	whether	by	the	
EC,	the	political	parties	or	civil	society,	have	been	over-dependent	on	
donor	funding9;	and	that	raises	doubt	about	sustainability	when	such	
funds	dry	up.	The	frequency	of	meetings	of	IPAC	and	other	political	
party-related	 bodies	 have	 been	 constrained	by	 availability	 of	 donor	
funds	in-between	elections.
There	are	still	 some	flaws	 in	 the	EC’s	conduct	of	elections.	For	
example,	the	004	voter	registration	exercise	was	somewhat	marred	
by	conflicting	directives	 from	 the	EC	and	 the	manner	 in	which	 the	
related	photo-taking	exercise	was	conducted	gave	critics	the	chance	
to	allege	that	the	EC	had	favoured	the	incumbent	party	in	its	electoral	
stronghold	of	the	Ashanti	Region.
Conclusion
This	 post	mortem	of	 electoral	 politics	 in	Ghana	 has	 demonstrated	
how	 the	country	has	 responded	 to	 liberal	democracy	over	 the	past	
fifteen	 years.	While	Ghana	has	witnessed	 a	 revolution	 through	 the	
ballot	the	ballot	box	since	its	return	too	constitutional	rule	in	99,	
there	are	still	problems	of	institution-building;	inclusion,	accommo-
dation	and	compromise;	incumbency;	and	ownership	of	the	electoral	
process,	 to	 grapple	with.	 In	 both	 its	 successes	 and	 challenges,	 the	
Ghanaian	experience	provides	useful	lessons	for	the	emerging	demo-
cracies	in	the	South.	
First,	Ghana	has	demonstrated	that	national	constitutions	in	the	
South	must	 provide	 the	 bedrock	 for	 establishing	 independent	 elec-
toral	bodies	free	to	adopt	innovates	ideas	in	the	management	of	the	
electoral	process.
Second,	innovation	in	the	electoral	process	is	essential	for	demo-
cratic	consolidation.	Such	innovations,	however,	must	be	the	collec-
tive	 responsibility	of	 all	 stakeholders	 –	 government	and	opposition,	
political	parties,	civil	 society,	 the	media,	 traditional	authorities,	etc.	
Not	only	should	innovations	take	the	socio-cultural	context	into	con-
sideration	but	also	they	should	be	seen	as	an	ongoing	process	which	
must	evolve	over	time	time.	
9	 	 The	 major	 donors	 include	 the	 Department	 for	 International	 Development	
(DFID)	Canadian	International	Development	Agency	(CIDA),	the	Danish	Interna-
tional	Development	Agency	(DANIDA),	International	Federation	of	Electoral	Sys-
tems	(IFES),	Friedrich	Ebert	Foundation	(FES)	and	the	United	States	International	
Development	Aid	
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Third,	the	practice	of	dialogue	and	consultation	among	political	
parties	 through	an	 intra-party	consultative	mechanism	is	an	 impor-
tant	building	block	in	ensuring	peace	in	electoral	politics.	
Fourth,	even	a	flawed	transition	can	set	the	stage	for	democratic	pro-
gress	if	all	the	stakeholders	would	effectively	play	their	respective	roles.
Lastly,	free	and	fair	elections	as	well	as	peaceful	transfer	of	power	
are	possible	 in	Africa	and	such	good	practices	 should	be	published	
and	publicized.
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Jorge Rovira Mas*
On Democratic Consolidation
in the South: Comments on 
Frempong´s Paper
FIRST	OF	ALL,	I	would	like	to	congratulate	CLACSO-APISA-CODES-
RIA	 for	 the	 organization	 of	 this	 unique	 and	 important	 event	 and	 I	
want	thank	Ciska	Raventós	Vorst,	my	colleague	at	the	Social	Sciences	
Research	Institute	of	the	Universidad	de	Costa	Rica,	for	her	invitation	
to	 come	here	and	comment	on	 this	 interesting	paper.	Last,	but	not	
least,	 I	want	 to	 express	my	 greetings	 to	 Professor	 Frempong	 today	
–	March	6th	007–	when	the	people	in	the	Republic	of	Ghana	are	cele-
brating	the	fiftieth	anniversary	of	their	Independence.	
I	have	organized	my	comments	in	five	points	or	propositions.
My first point is this
This	paper,	 from	a	 theoretical	point	of	view,	 falls	within	 the	mains-
tream	approach	for	 the	study	of	 the	third	wave	of	democratization,	
known	as	the	 transition/consolidation paradigm.	This	wave	began	in	
South	Europe	 in	 974	 (Portugal	 and	Greece	 in	 974,	 and	Spain	 in	
975)	and	since	then	has	spread	all	over	the	world.	
*	 Ph.	D.	in	Sociology	(Universidad	Nacional	Autónoma	de	México,	90).	Full	Profes-
sor	at	 the	Universidad	de	Costa	Rica,	Department	of	Sociology	and	at	 the	Social	
Sciences	Research	 Institute.	He	has	extensively	published,	books	and	articles,	on	
political	economy	of	development	as	well	as	political	sociology.	Among	his	books,	he	
was	co-editor	of	Diccionario	electoral	(San	José:	Instituto	Interamericano	de	Dere-
chos	Humanos-Centro	de	Asesoría	y	Promoción	Electoral,	000).
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The	start	of	the	systematic	analysis	of	this	process,	specifically	the	
transition	to	democracy	from	authoritarian	regimes,	was	spurred	by	
the	book	 edited	by	Guillermo	O´Donnell,	 Philippe	C.	Schmitter	 and	
Lawrence	Whitehead,	Transitions from Authoritarian Rule (96).	A	de-
cade	later,	these	efforts	were	further	explored	through	two	new	books	
devoted	to	the	problems	of	democratic	consolidation:	Consolidating the 
Third Wave Democracies. Themes and Perspectives and	Consolidating 
the Third Wave Democracies. Regional Challenges (997),	both	edited	by	
Larry	Diamond,	Marc	F.	Plattner,	Yun-han	Chu,	and	Hung-mao	Tien.
Although	not	commonly	acknowledged,	it	was	in	Central	America	
where	the	third	wave	first	started	in	Latin	America.	The	first	process	
of	 this	kind	was	 the	 replacement1	 in	979	of	 the	Somoza	authorita-
rian	regime	by	the	sandinistas	in	Nicaragua.	Immediately	after	that,	
in	Honduras	 in	 90,	 the	 transition	 to	 democracy	 began	when	 the	
military	government	gave	up	power	and,	by	means	of	transplacement,	
started	the	election	processes	which	has	held	up	to	this	day.	The	same	
thing	came	about	in	El	Salvador	(90,	9,	94),	and	by	transfor-
mation	 in	 Guatemala	 (94,	 95),	 the	 last	 country	 in	 this	 region	
that	began	the	transition	and	completed	the	first	steps	of	the	demo-
cratic	consolidation	dynamic.	In	fact,	the	transition	to	democracy	in	
Central	America	as	a	whole	took	a	long	time,	from	979	to	996,	and	
concluded	with	 the	 signing	of	Peace	Accords	 in	Guatemala	 in	Dec-
ember	of	the	latter	year.	All	this	included	civil	wars	within	countries,	
the	low	intensiy	war	against	the	sandinistas	in	Nicaragua	held	by	the	
Reagan	Administration	 (9-99)	 in	 the	United	States,	 as	well	 as	
intense,	 extended	 diplomatic	work,	 in	which	many	Latin	American	
governments	participated,	for	around	fifteen	years.
In	my	work	on	the	different	processes	of	democratic	consolida-
tion	in	Central	America,	I	have	reached	the	conclusion	that	there	are	
	 	We	can	theoretically	distinguish	“[…]	three	broad	types	of	processes.	Transforma-
tions	(or	in	Linz	´s	phrase,	reforma)	occurred	when	the	elites	in	power	took	the	lead	
in	bringing	about	democracy.	Replacement	(Linz	´s	ruptura)	occurred	when	opposi-
tion	groups	took	the	lead	in	bringing	about	democracy,	and	the	authoritarian	regime	
collapsed	or	was	overthrown.	What	might	be	termed	transplacement	or	“ruptforma”	
occurred	when	 democratization	 resulted	 largely	 from	 joint	 action	 by	 government	
and	opposition	groups”.	See	S.	Huntington,	The Third Wave. Democratization in the 
Late Twentieth Century	(USA:	University	of	Oklahoma	Press,	99),	P.	4.	
	 	The	earliest	and	deepest	analysis	about	the	elections	in	Central	America	and	their	
political	meaning	along	the	eighties	of	the	past	century	were	developed	by	Edelberto	
Torres	Rivas.	See	especially	his	book	La democracia posible,	San	José:	Editorial	Uni-
versitaria	de	Centro	América-Facultad	Latinoamericana	de	Ciencias	Sociales,	97;	and	
his	articles,	 “Democracias	de	baja	 intensidad”,	Pensamiento Iberoamericano,	5,	Ma-
drid,	99,	and	“Centroamérica:	La	transición	autoritaria	a	la	democracia”,	Polémica,	4,	
Segunda	Época,	San	José	de	Costa	Rica,	March	9.	
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six	crucial	factors	in	searching	for	democratic	consolidation	(Rovira	
Mas,	99;	996;	000;	00).	They	are:
Number	:	The	democratic	commitment	of	the	elites.
Number	:	The	civil-military	relations.
Number	:	The	dynamics	of	the	party	system	or	how	well	it	is	
functioning	in	order	to	institutionalize	the	main	political	con-
flicts	in	society.
Number	4:	The	electoral	institutions,	their	independence	from	
the	main	formal	or	real	powers	in	society	and	their	performan-
ce	to	establish	the	legitimacy	of	the	elections.
Number	5:	The	development	of	a	civic	or	democratic	political	
culture.
Number	6:	The	economic	performance	of	the	society	over	the	
long	 run.	This	 factor	 is	 important	because	of	 its	 indirect	 in-
fluence	on	the	legitimacy	of	the	political	regime.	
Having	said	this,	my	point	here	is:	How	have	the	main	political	actors	
that	are	undertaking	the	democratic	consolidation	process	in	Ghana	
dealt	with	the	military	factor?	How	have	civilians	established	supre-
macy	over	the	military	there?
This	has	been	a	very	important	issue	in	Central	America	and	no	
less	in	Latin	America	in	general.
My second point is this
As	we	all	know,	Juan	Linz	stated	(990)	that	democracies	with	a	par-
liamentary	system	of	government	are	more	durable	than	others	with	
presidentialism.	 This	 thesis	 was	 confirmed	 by	 Przeworski,	 Álvarez,	
Cheibub	and	Limongi	(997)	in	their	important	paper	“What	Makes	
Democracies	Endure?”	delivered	to	the	Taipei	Conference	of	995	on	
democratic	consolidation.
British	colonies	have	had	a	tendency	towards	this	kind	of	institu-
tional	arrangement	and	Ghana	was	a	British	colony.	Therefore,	I	would	
like	to	ask	Professor	Frempong	why	you	chose	presidentialism	in	your	
country	and	which	historical	and	cultural	factors	were	relevant,	and	
what	kind	of	political	background	intervened	in	choosing	it?
My third point is
Uruguay	was	the	first	country	in	the	world	to	establish	state	funding	
for	 electoral	party	 campaigns	as	 early	as	9,	 and	 the	 second	one	
was	Costa	Rica	in	956	(Casas,	00).	This	is	and	has	been	a	very	im-
portant	and	disputed	issue	in	modern	democracies	and,	of	course,	in	
-
-
-
-
-
-
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those	that	emerged	during	the	third	wave	of	democratization.
Therefore,	how	do	parties	fund	their	electoral	campaigns	in	Gha-
na?	Is	there	public	funding	or	only	private,	and	how	has	this	influen-
ced	electoral	competition	and	democratic	consolidation	processes?
My fourth point is another question
We	not	only	have	to	look	at	political	actors,	institutions	and	the	
processes	of	building	democratic	environments	that	have	been	taking	
place	due	to	the	positive	outcomes	of	the	transitions	and	the	consoli-
dation	of	democracies	in	the	South.	
What	is	also	important,	from	a	sociological	perspective,	is	to	look	
at	the	social	classes	and	social	forces	that	have	been	the	main	promo-
ters	and	supporters	of	democratization.	This	is	what	my	question	is	
about	in	the	case	of	Ghana:	Which	forces	have	been	involved	in	rela-
tion	to	the	level	of	development	of	capitalism	in	this	African	country?
And my last point is this one
When	I	read	the	paper	and	took	into	account	the	factors	that	the	au-
thor	mentioned	 in	order	 to	comprehend	the	multiple	 initiatives	un-
dertaken	by	a	certain	number	of	public	and	private	institutions	in	the	
name	of	democratic	consolidation,	one	idea	and	one	institution stood	
out	for	me	as	the	most	important	things	to	remember.
The	idea	is	this	one.	The	origin	and	number	of	initiatives	that	diffe-
rent	groups	of	society	undertake	for	democratic	consolidation	is	very	
important.	But,	at	the	same	time,	as	important	as	this	is	the	coopera-
tion	between	them,	and	the	capacity	for	jointly	building	a	momentum	
from	many	sectors	and	parts	of	the	society	in	favor	of	democracy.
Of	all	the	institutions	mentioned	in	the	paper,	I	am	most	impres-
sed	by	a	 real	 innovative	one:	 the	creation	 in	994	of	 the	 Inter-Party	
Advisory	Committee	(IPAC).	I	think	that	it	was	a	brilliant	political	idea,	
given	the	circumstances	of	Ghana	after	the	elections	of	99	and	the	
Constitution	 adopted	 in	 99.	 Even	 though	 the	 composition	 of	 the	
Electoral	Commission	was	very	narrow	and	the	influence	of	the	Exe-
cutive	Power	in	the	nomination	of	its	members	was	very	large,	this	has	
been	a	way	for	the	political	parties	to	be	indirectly	incorporated	into	
the	administration	of	the	electoral	process.	This	is	always	an	important	
point	at	the	very	beginning	of	the	institutionalization	of	democracy.
In	 some	 cases	 in	Central	America,	when	guerrillas	 transformed	
themselves	into	political	parties	and	signed	Peace	Accords,	as	occurred	
in	99	in	El	Salvador,	the	Frente	Farabundo	Martí	para	la	Liberación	
Nacional	 (FMLN)	asked	 for	a	chair	within	 the	Electoral	Court.	This	
was	their	way	to	assure	conditions	to	supervise	the	general	elections	of	
994,	when	all	the	main	political	actors	participated	for	the	first	time.
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But	this	issue	is	always	a	central	one	for	the	democratic	commit-
ment	of	the	elites.	In	Ghana	they	solved	it	in	an	unusual	and	workable	
way.	
This	idea	and	this	institution	are	indeed	innovative	lessons	from	
Ghana	which	can	give	us	a	better	understanding	of	 the	democratic	
consolidation	processes	in	the	South.	
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ConflictPrevention in Asia
WHY	DO	DEMOCRACIES	ENCOUNTER	more	 violent	 secessionist	
movements	in	comparison	to	non-democracies?	While	there	is	eviden-
ce	that	democratic	states	contribute	to	international	peace,	the	con-
verse,	 that	democracies	enjoy	 internal	peace,	seems	problematic.	In	
fact,	the	evidence	seems	to	suggest	that	authoritarian	states	face	fewer	
separatist	challenges	of	a	violent	nature	than	do	democratic	ones.	De-
mocracy,	which	introduces	competitive	elections,	 is	commonly	offe-
red	as	a	solution	to	political	problems.	However,	in	ethnically	divided	
societies,	competitive	democracy	may	exacerbate	political	tension	and	
polarize	groups.	Are	systems	of	democratic	governance	incompatible	
with	durable	peace	in	such	societies?	This	work	examines	how	respect	
for	minority	rights	can	contribute	to	conflict	prevention	in	multi-cul-
tural	democracies	in	Asia.
Democracy, Peace and Conflict
Since	the	end	of	the	Cold	War	in	Europe,	the	notion	that	democracy	
is	the	ideal	form	of	government	has	almost	become	axiomatic,	though	
the	empirical	evidence	for	such	a	normative	conclusion	is	not	yet	de-
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finite.	 Closely	 related	 is	 the	 belief	 that	 a	 community	 of	 democratic	
nations	is	the	best	way	to	maintain	domestic	and	international	peace.	
There	 is	considerable	evidence	 for	 the	democratic	peace	 in	 interna-
tional	relations,	and	democracy,	or	the	promise	of	democratization,	
has	been	an	integral	component	in	several	peace	agreements	since	the	
end	of	the	cold	war,	that	have	ended	civil	conflict	within	nations.
In	 the	 last	 two	decades,	 several	countries,	 in	Asia,	Latin	Ameri-
ca,	and	Eastern	Europe,	have	become	democratic.	The	on-going	third	
wave	of	democratization	began	in	Southern	Europe	in	the	mid	970s,	
moved	on	to	Latin	America	and	Asia	in	the	90s,	and	in	the	990s,	
reached	sub-Saharan	Africa,	Eastern	Europe	and	 the	Soviet	Union.	
This	wave,	 rather	 tsunami,	of	democratization,	 like	previous	ones	 is	
not	a	smooth	and	straightforward	one.	Some	countries,	like	Pakistan	
and	Thailand	have	also	reverted	back	to	military	dictatorship.	The	in-
ternational	donor	community	is	committed	to	democracy,	most	impor-
tantly	by	promoting	civil	society.	This	commitment	may	have	suffered	
some	serious	handicaps	after	9-,	but	it	has	still	remained	the	main	
mantra	of	the	aid	agencies.	Implicit	in	the	literature	on	democracy	is	
also	the	idea	that	a	democratic	government	is	the	best	way	to	manage	
conflict,	 both	 internal	 and	 external.	 In	 fact,	 as	 Shapiro	 and	Cordon	
point	out,	“there	is	a	strong	propensity	to	associate	democracy	with	a	
wide	array	of	activities	and	outcomes	that	people	value.”4
Most	of	 the	 literature	on	democracy	assumes	that	 it	 is	 the	best	
form	of	government.	In	fact,	in	contemporary	popular	and	academic	
discourse	on	Afghanistan	and	Iraq,	the	mere	imposition	of	democracy	
was	prescribed	as	the	most	important	step	towards	peace.5	Theoreti-
	 	Russet,	Bruce,	Grasping the Democratic Peace	(Princeton	University	Press,	99);	
Wallensteen,	Peter,	Understanding Conflict Resolution: War, Peace and the Global Sys-
tem,	London:	Sage	Publications,	00;	Spencer,	Weart,	Never at War: Why Don’t De-
mocracies Fight One Another?	New	Haven:	Yale	University	 Press,	 99;	 There	 are	
some	works,	 which	 are	 critical	 to	 this	 democratic	 peace	 concept:	 Bermer,	 Stuart	
A,	“Dangerous	Dyads:	Conditions	Affecting	the	Likelihood	of	Interstate	War,	6-
965”,	Journal of Conflict Resolution,	Vol.6,	No.	(99);	Babst,	Dean	and	William	
Eckhardt.	“How	Peaceful	Are	Democracies	Compared	With	Other	Countries,”	Peace 
Research	4	(99)	pp.	5-57;	Henderson,	Errol	A.,	Democracy and War: The End of 
an Illusion	(Lynne	Rienner	Publishers,	Boulder,	00).	
	 	Huntington,	Samuel,	“How	Countries	Democratize”	Political	Science	Quarterly	
06	(4)	99:	579-66.	Huntington,	Samuel,	The Third Wave: Democratization in the 
Late 20th Century	(Norman,	University	of	Oklahoma	Press,	99).
	 	Potter,	David	et	al.	Democratization	(Cambridge:	Polity	Press,	997).
4	 	Shapiro,	Ian	and	Casiano	Hacker	Cordon	(eds)	Democracy’s Value,	(Cambridge,	
Cambridge	University	Press,	999).
5	 	Goodson,	Larry	P,	“Afghanistan’s	Long	Road	to	Reconstruction”	Journal of De-
mocracy	-	Volume	4,	Number	,	January	00,	pp.	-9.
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cal	work	on	democratic	transition	and	democratization	has	also	em-
phasized	the	conflict	resolution	capacity	of	democracy.	Poe	and	Tate’s	
conclusion6	that	there	is	a	negative	relation	between	democracy	and	
the	level	of	repression	has	been	elaborated	in	several	works.7	In	con-
temporary	academic	and	popular	discourse,	the	idea	that	democracy,	
as	such,	rather	than	any	other	form	of	government,	is	the	best	way	to	
resolve	inter-state	conflicts	has	been	stressed.	According	to	Linz	and	
Stepan,	“democracy	has	become	the	only	game	in	town	when	no	signi-
ficant	political	groups	seriously	attempt	to	overthrow	the	democratic	
regime	or	secede	from	the	state.”9	
Several	theorists	have	also	extended	the	democratic	peace	thesis	to	
argue	that	a	“democratic	peace”	is	evident	within	intra-state	conflicts	
as	well.0.	 It	has	been	 reasoned	 that	democracy	 reduces	 the	 likeliho-
od	of	discrimination,	especially	of	ethno-political	minorities,	and	thus	
the	likelihood	of	political	repression.	However,	as	Errol	A.	Henderson	
points	out,	“the	democratic	peace	proposition”	has	not	been	explicitly	
tested	with	reference	to	third	world	post-colonial	states,	where	most	ci-
vil	wars	take	place.	In	recent	years,	research	has	attempted	to	explain	
why	the	new	democracies	have	not	been	able	to	benefit	from	the	values	
of	 democracy.	 Recently,	 Thomas	 Carothers	 argued,	 “Many	 countries	
6	 	Poe,	Steven	C.,	and	C.	Neal	Tate,	“Repression	of	Human	Rights	to	Personal	Integ-
rity	in	the	90s:	A	Global	Analysis,”	American Political Science Review,	vol.,	no.4:	
pp.5-7.
7	 	Henderson,	Conway,	“Conditions	Affecting	the	Use	of	Political	Repression”,	Jour-
nal of Conflict Resolution,	5:	99,	0-4;	Mitchell	Neil,	and	James	McCormick,	
“Economic	and	Political	Explanations	of	Human	Rights	Violations”;	World Politics	
40:	 476-9;	 Ziegenhagen,	 Eudard,	 The Regulation of Political Conflict	 (New	 York:	
Praeger,	96).
	 	Again,	there	is	criticism	of	the	idea	that	democratic	government	will	automati-
cally	bring	peace	but	this	remains	a	minority	view.	Pinkney,	Robert,	Democracy in 
the Third World,	Lynne	Rienner,	(Colorado,	Boulder:	00);	Reiter,	Dan,	“Why	NATO	
Enlargement	Does	Not	 Spread	Democracy”	 International Security,	 5,	 4	 (Spring),	
pp.4-67.	
9	 	Linz,	Juan	J	&	and	Alfred	Stepan,	Problems of Democratic Transition and Con-
solidation: Southern Europe, South America, and Post Communist Europe	(Baltimore:	
John	Hopkins,	999),	p.	5.
0	 	Matthew,	Karin	and	Marissa	Myers.	997.	 ”Democracy	and	Civil	War:	A	Note	
on	the	Democratic	Peace	Proposition”,	International Interactions,	,	:	pp.09-;	
Rummel,	R.J,.	“Libertarian	Propositions	on	Violence	Within	and	Between	Nations:	A	
Test	Against	Published	Research	Results,”	The Journal of Conflict Resolution,	Vol.	9	
(95)	pp.	49-455.
	 	Gurr,	Ted,	ed.	Minorities at Risk: A Global View of Ethnopolitical Conflict	(Wash-
ington	DC,	US	Institute	of	Peace,	99).
	Henderson,	Errol	A.,	Democracy and War: The End of an Illusion	(Lynne	Rienner	
Publishers,	Boulder,	00).
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that	policy	makers	and	aid	practitioners	persist	in	calling	“transitional”	
are	not	in	transition	to	democracy,	and	of	the	democratic	transitions	
that	are	under	way,	more	than	a	few	are	not	following	the	model.”
The	latest	contribution	to	the	debate	has	been	the	argument	that	
a	 new	 form	 of	 government,	 “semi-authoritarian4”	 has	 emerged	 in	
the	new	democracies	that	rose	in	the	third	wave	of	democratization,	
and	that	such	“semi-authoritarian”	states,	rather	than	representing	a	
transitory	phenomenon,	are	a	new	political	phenomenon	in	themsel-
ves.	Such	states	exhibit	the	characteristics	of	both	democracies	and	
authoritarian	 states.	 They	 combine	 rhetorical	 acceptance	 of	 liberal	
democracy,	the	existence	of	some	formal	democratic	institutions,	and	
respect	for	a	limited	sphere	of	civil	and	political	liberties	with	essentia-
lly	non-liberal	or	even	authoritarian	traits.	As	Ottaway	explains,	they	
“maintain	the	appearance	of	democracy	without	exposing	themselves	
to	the	political	risks	that	free	competition	entails.”5.
Others	have	termed	the	new	democracies	“pseudo-democracies”,	
“semi-democracies”,	or	“hybrid	democracies”.6	They	argue	that	such	
“semi-democracies”	are	more	prone	to	violence	than	authoritarian	or	
fully	consolidated	democratic	states,	which	have	been	conceptualized	
as	being	the	two	ends	of	the	democratic	spectrum.	Fein	argued	that	
the	most	 repressive	 states	are	 those	 that	exhibit	 intermediate	 levels	
of	 democracy,	 the	 “semi-democracies”,	 the	 idea	 that	 dominates	 the	
debate	 today.7	 Another	 explanation,	 similar	 to	 the	 “semi-authorita-
rian”	thesis,	is	that	there	has	been	that	a	“premature	closure”	of	the	
transition	process	–through	the	establishment	of	 formal	procedures	
	 	Carothers,	Thomas,	“The	End	of	the	Transition	Paradigm”	Journal of Democracy,	
Volume	,	Issue		(00)	pp.	5-.	Quote	in	page	6.	For	a	lively	debate	on	the	Transi-
tion	paradigm	see	Journal of Democracy	Volume	,	Issue		(00).	
4	 	Brumberg,	Daniel,	“Democracy	in	the	Arab	World?	The	Trap	of	Liberalized	De-
mocracy”	Journal of Democracy,	Volume	,	Number	4	October	00.	
5	 	Ottaway,	Marina	S.	Democracy Challenged: The Rise of Semi-Authoritarianism,	
Washington,	DC:	Carnegie	Endowment	 for	 International	Peace,	00.	Ottaway	ar-
gues	 that	 such	 regimes	abound	 in	 former	Soviet	 successor	 states	 like	Kazakhstan	
and	Azerbaijan,	 in	 sub-Saharan	Africa.	 In	 these	countries,	most	of	 the	multiparty	
elections	of	 the	990s	 failed	 to	produce	working	parliaments	or	other	 institutions	
capable	of	holding	the	executive	even	remotely	accountable.	Such	regimes	exist	in	
the	Arab	world,	in	the	Balkans,	and	in	Latin	America,	where	she	argues	that	Venezu-
ela	and	Peru	have	regressed	to	this	state	of	affairs.	In	Asia,	she	classifies	the	states	of	
Malaysia,	Singapore	and	Pakistan	as	“semi-authoritarian”	states.
6		Håvard,	Hegre,	et	al,	00.	“Toward a Democratic Civil Peace? Political Change 
and Civil War, 1816-1992”,	 American	 Political	 Science	 Review,	 Vol.95,	 No.,	
March.
7	 	Fein,	Helen	“More	Murder	in	the	Middle:	Life	Integrity	Violations	and	Democ-
racy	in	the	World,	97”	Human Rights Quarterly	7,	:	70-9,	995.
217
Ashok Swain
and	 institutions,	 before	 a	 real	 change	 in	 the	 nature	 of	 power–	 has	
taken	place.	However,	 these	explanations,	still	bypass	the	essential	
question,	as	to	whether	democracies	sharpen	or	lessen	ethnic	division	
by	conceptualizing	an	“ideal”	democracy,	and	then	trying	to	explain	
anomalies	that	rise	from	this.	Moreover,	the	“semi-authoritarian”	con-
ception,	while	 being	 an	 important	 contribution	 to	 the	 literature	on	
democracy,	does	not	explain	why	a	number	of	consolidated	democra-
cies,	 like	 India,	Turkey,	Sri	Lanka,	 Israel	or	even	 the	UK	and	Spain	
face	violent	separatist	challenges	within	their	state	borders.
Thus,	current	literature	has	focused	on	the	transition	paradigm,	
or	on	an	attempt	to	define	a	particular	democratic	polity	as	imperfect,	
while	keeping	the	ideal	of	democracy	intact.	Such	an	approach,	howe-
ver,	is	not	able	to	explain	a	crucial	point.	Why	have	democracies,	even	
consolidated	ones,	witnessed	violent	separatist	movements?	Countries	
that	are	mature	and	stable	democracies	–and	with	an	inclusive	form	
of	 society–	 such	as	 India,	have	even	 faced	several	 violent	 separatist	
challenges.	This	goes	against	the	prevailing	notion	of	the	co-relation	
between	democracy	and	internal	peace.	
Several	research	works	have	already	pointed	out	that	the	type	of	
political	system	sharply	affects	the	nature	of	protest	in	a	state.	The	de-
mocracies	are	supposed	to	have	more	extensive	but	less	deadly	protest	
than	the	autocracies.9	The	structure	and	ethos	of	democratic	regimes	
are	such	that	they	are	adjusted	to	respond	to	limited	challengers	in	a	
conciliatory	way,	which	reinforces	the	utility	of	protest	over	rebellion	
for	the	opposition	groups.	On	the	other	hand,	authoritarian	regimes	
generally	rely	more	on	coercive	control,	which	increases	the	relative	
utility	of	rebellion	for	challengers.	It	has	been	argued	that	the	extent	
of	political	 repression	depends	on	 the	 level	of	 threat	 faced	by	a	go-
vernment,0	and	that	democracies	repress	 less	as	 they	 face	different	
types	of	threats	when	compared	to	autocracies,	or	because	they	did	
	Ohlson,	 Thomas,	 and	 Soderberg,	Mimmi,	From Intra State War to Democratic 
Peace in Weak States,	 Uppsala	 Peace	 Research	 Papers	 Number	 5,	 Department	 of	
Peace	and	Conflict	Research,	Uppsala	University,	Sweden,	00,	p.5.
9	 	Gurr,	Ted	R.	“Why	Minorities	Rebel:	A	Global	Analysis	of	Communal	Mobiliza-
tion	and	Conflict	 since	945”	 International Political Science Review,	 vol.	4,	no.	,	
99;	Swain,	Ashok,	Social Networks & Social Movements: Are Northern tools Useful 
to Evaluate Southern Protests,	Uppsala	Peace	Research	Paper	No.	4,	00;	Zimmer-
mann,	Ekkart,	“Macro–Comparative	Research	on	Political	Protest”,	in	Ted	R.	Gurr,	
ed.,	Handbook of Political Conflict: Theory and Research	(New	York:	Free	Press,	90),	
pp.	67-7.
0	 	Gartner,	Scott	S.	and	Patrick	M.	Regan,	“Threat	and	Repression:	The	Non	Linear	
Relationship	between	Government	and	Opposition	Violence”,	Journal of Peace Re-
search	:	,	7-,	996.
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not	view	dissent	as	threatening	to	the	regime.	Ronald	A.	Francisco’s	
empirical	evaluation	of	the	relationship	between	coercion	and	protest	
in	three	coercive	states	(the	German	Democratic	Republic,	Czechos-
lovakia,	 and	 the	Palestinian	 Intifada)	finds	 that	 the	protesters	 react	
violently	to	extremely	harsh	coercion.	
It	is	true	that	democracies	have	not	faced,	in	general,	rebellions	
that	have	regime	change	as	their	aim,	but	rather	secessionist	move-
ments.	According	 to	 the	Uppsala	Conflict	Data	Project,	Russia,	Tur-
key,	India,	Indonesia,	Sri	Lanka,	Senegal,	Philippines	are	among	the	
democracies	that	faced	separatist	violence.	There	is	no	doubt	that	de-
mocracies	face	more	separatist	violence	than	non-democracies.	Even	
several	“mature”	democracies	are	facing	a	number	of	violent	separa-
tist	challenges	at	present	or	they	have	faced	in	the	recent	past.
Certainly,	there	is	a	“dearth	of	practical	advice	for	policy	makers	
on	 how	 to	 design	 and	 implement	 democratic	 levers	 that	 can	make	
peace	endure”.	It	is	important	to	closely	examine	why	democracies	
do	not	experience	rebellions	 for	 the	regime	change	but	at	 the	same	
time,	 they	have	been	 facing	 violent	 separatist	 conflicts.	A	 thorough	
research	undertaking	requires	evaluation	across	the	spectrum	of	non-
democratic,	semi-democratic,	or	democratic	states.	This	paper	tries	to	
examine	how	democratic	process	contributes	to	the	internal	conflict	
escalation	and	conflict	resolution,	particularly	in	Asia.	
Democracy and People
There	is	the	debate	between	whether	democracy	must	be	defined	in	
the	most	minimal	way,	or	if	it	should	be	defined	as	all	encompassing.	
One	of	the	most	basic	definitions	of	the	concept	has	been	the	minima-
list	definition	of	the	Italian	philosopher	Norberto	Bobbio,	that	demo-
cracy	is	in	essence,	the	replacement	of	the	power	of	persuasion	over	
that	of	force.4	As	he	put	it,	“What	is	democracy,	other	than	a	set	or	
	 	Davenport,	Christian,	“Human	Rights	and	the	Democratic	Proposition”,	Journal 
of Conflict Resolution,	4,	:	9-6,	999.
	 	Francisco,	Ronald	A.,	“The	Relationship	Between	Coercion	and	Protest:	An	Em-
pirical	Evaluation	in	Three	Coercive	States”	Journal of Conflict Resolution,	9:	(June	
995):6-.	However,	by	bringing	in	the	role	of	international	context	and	the	im-
portance	of	press	freedoms	and	information	flows,	Kurt	Schock	finds,	in	a	compara-
tive	study	of	the	Philippines	and	Burma,	the	excessive	repression	of	authority	might	
able	to	curb	the	popular	protest.	Schock,	Kurt,	“People	Power	and	Political	Opportu-
nities:	Social	Movement	Mobilization	and	Outcomes	in	the	Philippines	and	Burma”,	
Social Problems,	vol.	46,	no.	,	August	999,	pp.	55-75.
	 	Harris,	Peter	and	Reilly,	Ben(eds),,	Democracy and Deep Rooted Conflict: Options 
for Negotiators,	Stockholm:	International	IDEA	Handbook,	99.
4	 	Zolo,	Danilo,	Democracy and Complexity: A Realist Approach	(Polity:	Polity	Press,	
99),	p.	99.
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rules,	 for	 the	 solution	 of	 conflict	without	 bloodshed?”5	 The	 classic	
definition	by	Schumpeter6	was	that	democracy	was	merely	a	system	
in	which	rulers	were	selected	by	competitive	elections,	while	Popper7	
defined	it	as	a	means	by	which	people	removed	rulers	without	resour-
ce	to	force.	In	contrast	to	this	minimalist	expectation,	Dahl’s	concept	
of	“polyarchy”	asks	for	the	presence	of	elected	officials,	free	and	fair	
elections,	inclusive	suffrage,	the	right	to	run	for	public	office,	freedom	
of	 expression,	 existence	 and	 availability	 of	 alternative	 information,	
and	 associational	 autonomy,	 as	 essential	 to	 democracy.	 Diamond	
also	supports	Dahl’s	framework	in	his	work.9	
However,	in	democratic	states	that	face	violent	separatist	conflict,	
neither	 the	minimal	nor	 the	all-encompassing	models	seem	to	have	
the	desired	effect.	 In	other	words,	despite	 the	manner	 in	which	de-
mocracy	 is	 defined,	 there	 is	 a	 possibility	 of	 separatist	 conflict.	 And	
the	exact	definition	of	democracy	is	still	contested	in	many	transitory	
democracies	that	face	numerous	challenges	such	as	the	need	for	po-
pular	legitimacy,	the	shallow	roots	of	democratic	values,	weak	party	
systems,	organized	 factional	 interests	and	complicated	electoral	 ru-
les.	Such	systems	also	struggle	with	the	customization	of	politics,	the	
decentralization	 of	 state	 power,	 the	 introduction	 of	mechanisms	 of	
direct	democracy,	judicial	reform,	the	alleviation	of	poverty,	and	eco-
nomic	stabilization,	to	name	just	a	few	of	the	trials	that	they	face.0	
Przeworski	argues	that	majoritarian	politics	do	not	converge	on	com-
mon	interests,	in	modern	polities,	and	that	elections	do	not	represent	
the	general	will.	Democracy	can	be	defined	as	a	system	where	 the	
government	is	in	power	by	the	consent	of	the	people	and	the	gover-
nment	is	accountable	to	the	governed.	All	these	are	crucial,	and	the	
denial	of	one	of	these	leads	to	a	crisis	of	legitimacy	of	the	state.	In	fact,	
5	 	Shapiro,	Ian	and	Casiano	Hacker	Cordon	(eds)	Democracy’s	Value,	(Cambridge,	
Cambridge	University	Press,	999),	p.	.
6	 	Schumpeter,	Joseph	A.,	Capitalism, Socialism and Democracy	(New	York:	Harper	
&	Brothers,	94).
7	 	Popper,	Karl,	The Open Society and its Enemies	(London:	Routledge	and	Kegan	
Paul,	96).
	 	Dahl,	Robert	A.,	Preface To Democratic Theory	 (Chicago:	University	of	Chicago	
Press,	956).
9	 	 Diamond,	 Larry	Developing Democracy- towards consolidation	 (John	Hopkins	
University	Press,999).
0	 	Schedler,	Andreas,	“What	is	Democratic	Consolidation?”	Journal of Democracy	
9.	(99)	9-07.
	 	Przeworski,	Adam,	Minimalist	Conception	of	Democracy:	A	Defense”	in	Ian	Sha-
piro	and	Casiano	Hacker	Cordon	(eds)	Democracy’s Value,	(Cambridge,	Cambridge	
University	Press,	999).
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the	policies	followed	by	several,	which	consistently	held	recourse	to	
the	argument	that	democracy	meant	majority	rule	in	refusing	to	cons-
titutionally	guarantee	minority	rights,	put	the	minority	in	a	position	
closely	comparable	to	the	subjects	of	arbitrary	power.
In	 recent	years,	 there	 is	 a	growing	 interest	 to	apply	 the	 “inclu-
sion”	approach	while	doing	democratic	auditing	of	a	particular	sta-
te.4	This	approach	has	been	pioneered	by	Young5,	who	fashions	the	
concept	 of	 “deep	democracy”	 arguing	 that	most	 democracies	 today	
are	 plebiscite	 democracies,	 in	which	 “candidates	 take	 vague	 stands	
on	a	few	issues,	citizens	endorse	one	or	another,	and	then	have	little	
relation	 to	 the	policy	process	until	 the	next	 election”.6	As	 she	puts	
	 	O’Brien,	Conor	Cruise,	“Terrorism	under	Democratic	Conditions:	The	Case	of	the	
IRA”.	Chapter	5,	pp.	9-04	 in:	Crenshaw,	Martha	(ed)	9.Terrorism, Legitimacy, 
and Power: The Consequences of Political Violence.	Wesleyan	University	Press,	Mid-
dletown,	Connecticut.	Roeder	argues	for	institutional	guarantee	of	minority	rights	
against	 a	 predatory	majority	 in	 a	 democracy.	 Arguing	 against	 the	 power	 sharing	
arrangements,	he	advocates	in	favor	of	divided	power	arrangements	that	are	more	
likely	to	deter	the	escalation	of	ethnic	crisis	 to	ethno	national	crisis.	Philip	Power	
G.	Roeder,	 “Dividing	as	an	Alternative	 to	Ethnic	Power	Sharing”,	Paper	presented	
at	the	00	Annual	Meeting	of	the	International	Studies	Association,	Portland	Hill,	
Portland,	Oregon,	February	6-March	,	00
	 	For	criticism	on	the	inclusive	democracy	thesis,	see	Roemer,	John.	E	“Does	De-
mocracy	engender	 justice?”	00,	Discussion	Paper	0-0,	University	of	Copenha-
gen.	Department	of	Economics	(formerly	Institute	of	Economics),	pp.56-;;	Maskin,	
Eric,	and	Partha	Dasgupta	and	“Democracy	and	Other	goods,”	pp.	69	to	90,	in	Ian	
Shapiro	 and	 Casiano	Hacker	 Cordon	 (eds)	Democracy’s Value,	 (Cambridge,	 Cam-
bridge	University	Press,	999).	
4	 	Recent	research	has	focused	on	how	democracy	can	be	defined,	and	measured.	
Among	the	questions	that	have	been	raised	are	if	democracies	be	measured	objec-
tively,	and	can	they	ranked	as	mature,	transition,	and	lacking?	Beetham,	David	(ed),	
Defining and Measuring Democracy,	Sage	Modern	Political	Series,	Volume	6,	(Sage	
Publications	New	Delhi	994).	On	the	other	handsome	others	argue	that	democracy	
cannot	be	easily	measured,	as	 the	 theoretical	 conception	of	democracy	cannot	be	
operationalized	as	it	is	extremely	multi-dimensional.	Elklit,	Jorgen,	“Is	the	Degree	of	
Electoral	Democracy	Measurable?	Experiences	from	Bulgaria,	Kenya,	Latvia,	Mon-
golia,	and	Nepal,	David	Beetham	(ed),	Defining and Measuring Democracy,	Sage	Mod-
ern	Political	Series	Volume	6,	 (Sage	Publications	New	Delhi	994);	Haynes,	 Jeff,	
Democracy in the Developing World: Africa, Asia, Latin America, and the Middle East	
(Polity:	Cambridge,	00).
5	 	 Iris	Marion	Young,	 ed.,	 Inclusion	 and	Democracy	 (Oxford:	Oxford	University	
Press,	000).	Among	other	theorists	of	this	approach,	which	in	essence	can	be	defined	
as	the	idea	that	anyone	who	is	affected	by	a	decision	should	have	a	say	in	the	tak-
ing	of	that	decision,	are:	Dennis	Thompson	and	Amy	Gutmann,	Democracy and Dis-
agreement (Cambridge,	Massachusetts:	Harvard	University	Press,	996);	Christiano,	
Thomas,	The Rule of the Many	(Boulder,	Colorado,	Westview	Press,	996).	
6	 	 Iris	Marion	Young,	 ed.,	 Inclusion	 and	Democracy	 (Oxford:	Oxford	University	
Press,	000),	p.	5.
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it,	 “The	 normative	 legitimacy	 of	 a	 democratic	 decision	 depends	 on	
the	 degree	 to	which	 those	 affected	 by	 it	 have	 been	 included	 in	 the	
decision	making	process	and	have	had	 the	opportunity	 to	 influence	
the	outcomes.”	Klare,	for	example,	has	suggested	a	definition	of	a	new	
“post	liberal”	conception	of	democracy,	one	that	is	“more	egalitarian,	
participatory,	and	environmentally	sensitive.”7
If	such	a	broadening	is	possible,	then	does	such	an	approach	have	
relevance	 in	countries	 such	as	 India,	Sri	Lanka,	Philippines,	Thailand	
and	Indonesia?	Is	the	lack	of	inclusion,	or	a	perceived	feeling	of	exclusion	
the	root	cause	of	alienation,	that	is	then	expressed	in	terms	of	a	separatist	
violent	struggle?	If	this	is	the	case,	then	how	can	it	be	approached?	
Democracy and Minority Challenges
Democracy,	which	introduces	competitive	elections,	is	commonly	offe-
red	as	a	solution	to	political	problems.	However,	as	Przeworski	points	
out	 elections	may	not	 represent	 the	will	 of	 all	 population	 groups.	
Several	countries	consistently	argue	that	majority	rule	renders	cons-
titutionally	guaranteed	minority	rights	unnecessary.	For	example,	in	
Sri	Lanka	or	Turkey	a	minority	has	been	denied	all	participation	in	the	
democratic	process,	other	than	voting	and	being	automatically	outvo-
ted.	There	are	several	countries,	like	these	two,	that	refuse	to	follow	
international	human	rights	standards,	subjecting	minorities	to	arbi-
trary	power	by	a	predatory	majority.9	 In	a	democracy,	 the	majority	
has	the	ability	to	abuse	its	electoral	power	against	the	minority	or	to	
elect	a	government	that	imposes	laws	and	mores	of	one	religion.40
Diversity	 poses	 significant	 challenges	 for	 democratic	 politics.	
History	plays	an	important	role	in	shaping	this	diversity.	Most	of	the	
7	 	Klare,	Karl	“Legal	Theory	and	Democratic	reconstruction:	Reflections	on	99”	
in	G.S.	G.Skapska	(eds),	Alexander	A Fourth Way,	New	York	and	London:	Routledge,	
994.
	 	Przeworski,	Adam,	Minimalist	Conception	of	Democracy:	A	Defense”	in	Ian	Sha-
piro	and	Casiano	Hacker	Cordon	(eds)	Democracy’s Value,	(Cambridge,	Cambridge	
University	Press,	999).
9	 	O’Brien,	Conor	Cruise.	9.	‘Terrorism	under	Democratic	Conditions:	The	Case	
of	the	IRA.’	In	Martha	Crenshaw	(ed.),	Terrorism, Legitimacy, and Power: The Conse-
quences of Political Violence. Middletown,	CT:	Wesleyan	University	Press.;	Roeder,	
Philip	G.	005.	‘Power-Dividing	as	an	Alternative	to	Ethnic	Power-Sharing.’	In	Philip	
G.	Roeder	and	Donald	Rothchild	(eds),	Sustainable Peace: Democracy and Power Di-
viding Institutions after Civil Wars.	 Ithaca:	Cornell	University	Press;	Swain,	Ashok	
(ed.).	005.	Education as Social Action: Knowledge, Identity and Power.	Houndmills	
and	New	York:	Palgrave	Macmillan	and	UNRISD.	
40	Clemens,	Walter	C.	Jr.	00.	‘Complexity	Theory	As	A	Tool	For	Understanding	and	
Coping	With	Ethnic	Conflict	and	Development	Issues	in	Post-Soviet	Eurasia.’	Inter-
national Journal of Peace Studies,	vol.	7,	no.	,	pp.	-5.
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post-colonial	 states	 face	 the	 absence	of	 consensus	 on	 their	 nation-
hood	due	 to	 their	 colonial	masters’	 construction	 and	politicization	
of	 the	diversity	 to	keep	 them	in	power.	Democracy	 is	also	 inheren-
tly	difficult	 in	ethnically	or	culturally	 segmented	societies	as	 it	can	
encourage	zero-sum	political	behavior,	particularly	by	 the	majority	
group.4	Thus	as	Sisk	argues:	“Minorities,	particularly,	equate	demo-
cracy	not	with	freedom	or	participation	but	with	the	structured	do-
minance	of	adversarial	majority	groups.”4	This	may	explain	why	a	
number	of	well-established	democracies	as	well	as	countries	engaged	
in	a	transition	process,	face	violent	challenges	from	minority	groups	
within	state	borders.	It	shows	an	inherent	weakness	in	democracies,	
that	majority	rule	is	not	necessarily	friendly	to	or	understanding	of	
minorities	and	their	desires	and	needs.4	This	does	not	mandate	an	
abandonment	of	democracy,	but	it	suggests	that	efforts	at	democrati-
zation	should	be	guided	by	the	realization	that	it	is	a	conflict-driven	
process	which	may	 exacerbate	 inequalities	 and	 encourage	 affected	
groups	 to	pursue	 insurgency.44	 Institutionalized	power	 sharing	me-
chanisms,	for	example,	may	offer	incentives	for	cooperation	between	
ethnic	groups.45	
At	 the	 same	 time	we	need	 to	 take	 into	account	 that	 increasing	
ethnic	diversity	does	not	undermine	democracy	per	se.	Some	argue	
that	it	is	likely	that	a	high	level	of	ethnic	fragmentation	can	actually	
4	 	Reilly,	Benjamin.	00.	Democracy in Divided Societies: Electoral Engineering for 
Conflict Management.	 Cambridge:	 Cambridge	 University	 Press:	 Reilly,	 Benjamin.	
00.	 ‘Electoral	Systems	 for	Divided	Societies.’	 Journal of Democracy,	 vol.	 ,	no.	
;	Varshney,	Ashutosh.	00.	 ‘Ethnic	Conflict	and	Civil	Society:	India	and	beyond.’	
World Politics,	vol.	5,	no.	,	6-9.
4	Sisk,	Timothy	D.	996.	Power Sharing and International Mediation in Ethnic Con-
flict.	New	York:	Carnegie	Commission	on	Preventing	Deadly	Conflict	&	Washington,	
DC:	United	States	Institute	of	Peace,	p.	.
4	 	Alfredsson,	Gudmundur	and	Danilo	Turk.	99.	 ‘International	Mechanisms	for	
the	Monitoring	and	Protection	of	Minority	Rights:	Their	advantages,	disadvantages	
and	interrelationships.’	In	Monitoring Human Rights in Europe: Comparing interna-
tional procedures and mechanisms.	Dordrecht:	Martinus	Nijhoff	Publishers;	Ottaway,	
Marina	S.	00.	Democracy Challenged: The Rise of Semi-Authoritarianism.	Washing-
ton,	DC:	Carnegie	Endowment	for	International	Peace.
44	 	Henderson,	Errol	A.	00.	Democracy and War: The End of an Illusion.	Boulder:	
Lynne	Rienner	Publishers.
45		 Hartzell,	 Caroline	 and	Mattew	 Hoddie.	 00.	 Institutionalizing Peace: Power 
Sharing and Post-Civil War Conflict Management.	Berkely,	Los	Angeles	and	London:	
University	of	California	Press.;	Hartzell	et	al.	(00);	Lijphart,	Arend.	977.	Democ-
racy in Plural Societies.	New	Haven:	Yale	University	Press;	Sisk,	Timothy	D.	996.	
Power Sharing and International Mediation in Ethnic Conflict.	New	York:	Carnegie	
Commission	on	Preventing	Deadly	Conflict	&	Washington,	DC:	United	States	Insti-
tute	of	Peace.	
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help	democratic	consolidation	if	no	group	has	the	capacity	to	control	
power	alone.46	
The	ideals	that	shape	democracy,	which	has	become	the	favored	
system	of	modern	state	rule,	are	supposed	to	make	it	the	best	option	
for	ethnic	minority	protection	and	preservation	of	their	identity.	The	
rising	prominence	of	minority	rights	and	identity	has	required	a	fun-
damental	shift	of	focus	for	democracies	to	try	and	accommodate	these	
groups	in	the	best	possible	manner.
Despite	 its	 imperfect	 nature,	 democratic	 system	 seems	 to	 offer	
the	most	promising	situation	for	minorities.	The	most	common	grie-
vance	of	any	ethnic	group	is	the	inability	to	be	heard,	but	a	functio-
ning	democracy	usually	allows	for	the	opportunity	of	all	members	to	
have	a	voice.	As	Amartya	Sen	notes,	“the	right	to	freedom	of	speech	
is…the	precondition	 for	having	 any	other	 rights	 at	 all.”47	 In	 a	non-
democratic	set	up,	this	is	impossible.	The	expression	of	political	de-
mands	as	made	available	in	most	democracies	does	allow	for	dissent	
and	some	organized	structure	for	group	conflict.	It	can	be	argued	that	
some	variations	of	democracy	are	more	successful	in	accommodating	
minorities	than	others.	
Democracy	 is	a	delicate	plant	 that	 thrives	only	 if	 the	soil	 is	ca-
refully	 cultivated.	Good	 governance	 is	 necessary	 for	 the	 survival	 of	
democratic	values,	meaning	equal	opportunities	for	participation	by	
all,	vibrant	civil	society,	transparency,	accountability	and	the	rule	of	
law.	The	legitimacy	of	a	democratic	process	depends	on	the	degree	to	
which	those	affected	by	it	have	been	included	in	the	decision	making	
process	and	have	had	the	possibility	to	influence	the	outcomes.	A	dy-
namic	and	structured	civil	society	can	hold	governments	accountable	
and	can	form	the	basis	of	a	democracy.	However,	democracy	is	a	re-
cent	visitor	to	many	parts	of	Asia	and	it	is	a	bit	early	to	get	an	appro-
priate	audit	of	the	democratic	development	in	the	region.	
Democracies and Separatist Violence in Asia
For	new	Asian	democracies,	it	is	a	major	challenge	to	establish	how	the	
minority	population	can	be	integrated	while	guaranteeing	respect	for	
their	group	rights	as	well	as	individual	rights	in	the	democratic	con-
solidation	process,	in	order	to	further	strengthen	the	internal	peace,	
stability	and	security.	Making	the	problem	worse	for	these	emerging	
democracies,	which	have	been	conceptualized	as	being	between	the	
46	Reilly,	Benjamin.	000.	‘Democracy,	Ethnic	Fragmentation,	and	Internal	Conflict.’	
International Security,	vol.	5,	no.	,	pp.	6-5.
47	 	Amartya	Sen,	‘Human	Rights	and	Economic	Achievements,’	in	Bauer	and	Bell,	
The East Asian Challenge for Human Rights, 9.
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two	ends	of	the	democratic	spectrum,	research	in	recent	years	shows	
that	they	are	more	prone	to	ethnic	violence	than	authoritarian	or	fu-
lly	 consolidated	 democratic	 states.4	 Especially	 in	 transitory	 demo-
cracies,	communal	groups	have	opportunities	for	mobilization,	while	
at	the	same	time	the	state	lacks	resources	and	strong	institutions	to	
reach	the	kinds	of	accommodation	typical	 for	established	democra-
cies.49	As	a	result,	in	countries	like	the	Philippines	and	Indonesia	the	
transition	process	is	facing	periodic	closures.	Democracy	has	already	
been	replaced	by	military	dictatorship	in	Thailand.
The	regular	disturbances	on	the	path	of	democratic	consolidation	are	
further	complicating	the	relationship	between	the	ethnic	groups	and	
the	state.	Democratically	elected	leaderships	in	these	countries	are	sti-
ll	weak	and	are	trying	to	establish	full	control	over	the	state	power.	In	
their	quest	for	power,	they	try	to	follow	the	strategy	of	confrontation	
rather	than	the	policy	of	accommodation	as	the	‘tough’	stance	against	
the	minority	challenge	gets	the	approval	of	the	majority	community.	
This	policy	helps	in	the	electoral	competition	as	it	has	been	clearly	de-
monstrated	in	recent	elections	in	Thailand,	Indonesia	and	Sri	Lanka.	
However,	 the	 weak	 democratic	 regimes,	 unlike	 their	 authoritarian	
4	 	Hegre,	Håvard,	Tanja	Ellingsen,	Scott	Gates,	and	Nils	Peter	Gleditsch.	00.	‘To-
ward	a	Democratic	Civil	Peace?	Political	Change	and	Civil	War,	6-99.’	American 
Political Science Review,	vol.	95,	no.	.
49	 	Ibid.
Table 1
Asian Democracies and Minority Violence
Country Democratic Score:
Freedom House 2006
Democratic Score: 
Economist Intelligence 
Unit, 2007
Violent Demand for 
Statehood by Minorities 
(UCDP) 2005 
India Free Flawed Democracy
(rank 35)
Assam - Kashmir 
Manipur - Nagaland
Indonesia Free Flawed Democracy
(rank 65)
Aceh
Philippines Partly Free Flawed Democracy
(rank 63)
Mindanao
Sri Lanka Partly Free Flawed Democracy
(rank 57)
Eelam
Thailand Partly Free Hybrid regimes
(rank 90)
Patani
Source: www.pcr.uu.se, www.freedomhouse.org, www.economist.com.
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predecessors	or	counterparts,	are	not	capable	of	enforcing	complete	
control	over	the	newly	mobilized	minorities.	Results	from	the	00-
00	East	Asia	Barometer	Survey	show	that	the	respondents	in	East	
Asian	democracies	 covered	by	 the	 survey,	 including	 the	Philippines	
and	Thailand,	overwhelmingly	prefer	democracy	to	authoritarianism	
as	a	regime,	but	when	it	comes	to	norms	and	processes,	many	of	them	
have	yet	to	shed	their	authoritarian	habits	and	mindsets.50
Indian Experience
It	is	very	difficult	to	definitely	conclude	as	to	why	India,	despite	being	
a	strong	and	stable	democracy	is	facing	several	separatist	violent	con-
flicts.	In	prima	facie,	India	seems	to	be	a	country	where	the	“democra-
tic	peace	proposition”	for	internal	peace	seems	to	have	failed.	Howe-
ver,	in	spite	of	hosting	a	number	of	violent	secessionist	movements,	
India	has	established	a	consolidated	democracy.	With	the	help	of	its	
democratic	institution,	it	has	been	able	to	bring	peaceful	and	lasting	
solutions	 to	 several	minority	challenges:	Sikhs	 in	Punjab,	Tamils	 in	
India,	and	Gorkhas	in	West	Bengal	to	name	a	few.
India	has	always	been	a	surprise	for	theorists	of	democracy.	It	has	
consistently	defied	 those	who	prophesied	 its	 imminent	demise.5	 In	
spite	of	a	fissiparous	society	and	considerable	socio-economic	challen-
ges,	including	abject	poverty,	widespread	illiteracy,	and	a	deeply	hie-
rarchical	social	structure,	all	of	which,	in	theory,	are	uncongenial	for	a	
flourishing	democracy,	India’s	democracy	shows	no	signs	of	withering	
away.	Most	analysts	agree	that	crucial	to	the	survival	of	democracy	in	
India	has	been	the	nature	of	the	Indian	state,	and	its	willingness	to	
bargain	and	accommodate	varying	interests.	This	has	been	seen	as	key	
in	maintaining	the	democratic	system	despite	the	deep	divisions	in	so-
ciety.	In	the	most	radical	of	these	approaches,	Lijphart5,	for	example,	
has	 insisted	 that	 India	fits	neatly	 into	 the	consociational	paradigm,	
though	it	does	not	seem	to	be	so	at	first	glance,	and	even	though	the	
consociational	system	has	not	been	formally	enshrined	in	the	Indian	
50	 	East	Asia	Barometer	Surveys	00-00.	Data	analyzed	by	Chull,	Doh	and	Jason	
Wells.	005.	‘Is	Democracy	the	only	Game	in	Town?’	Journal of Democracy, vol.	6.	
no.	,	pp.	-0.
5	As	the	country	went	to	the	polls	for	the	second	time	in	957,	Selig	Harrison,	in	
an	oft	quoted	remark,	said,	“the	odds	are	wholly	against	the	survival	of	freedom…in	
fact,	the	issue	is	whether	any	Indian	state	can	survive	at	all,”	India: The Most Danger-
ous Decades	(Princeton,	960),	p.	.	
5	 	Arend	Lijphart,	“The	Puzzle	of	Indian	Democracy:	A	Consociational	Interpreta-
tion”,	The	American	Political	Science	Review,	Vol.	90,	No.	.	(Jun.,	996),	pp.	5-
6.	Also,	Lijphart,	Arend.	977.	Democracy in Plural Societies.	New	Haven:	Yale	Uni-
versity	Press.
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polity.	He	argues	that	Indian	democracy	has	displayed	all	four	crucial	
elements	of	power-sharing	theory,	which	are:	(a)	grand	coalitions	that	
include	representatives	of	all	major	groups	(b)	cultural	autonomy	for	
these	 groups	 (c)	 proportionality	 in	 political	 appointments	 and	 civil	
service	posts	(d)	a	minority	veto	with	regard	to	vital	minority	rights	
and	autonomy.	
These	may	at	first	glance	seem	a	rebuttal	of	the	majority	system,	
or	the	“winners	take	all	system”,	with	concentration	of	power	in	bare	
one	party	majority	governments,	centralized	power,	a	disproportio-
nal	 electoral	 system,	 and	 absolute	majority	 rule,	 that	 has	 charac-
terized	 the	 Indian	 political	 system.	However,	 Lijphart	 argues	 that	
the	federal	arrangements	in	which	states	and	linguistic	boundaries	
largely	coincide,	the	rights	of	religious	and	linguistic	minorities	to	
have	autonomous	schools	are	protected,	and	the	existence	of	sepa-
rate	“personal	laws”	for	the	minorities,	make	India	a	good	case	for	
the	consociational	system.	Though	Lijphart’s	argument	has	been	cri-
ticized5,	what	is	important	in	the	Indian	system,	is	the	willingness	
to	compromise.	Bargaining	is	crucial	to	this	process.	Kanti	Bajpai,54	
for	example,	argues	that	the	Indian	package	to	deal	with	ethnic	rela-
tions,	has	consisted	of	three	main	elements:	(a)	a	political	order	mar-
ked	by	 liberal	 constitutionalism,	 state	backed	secular	nationalism,	
and	 state	 led	 social	modernization	and	economic	development	 (b)	
power	sharing	in	terms	of	group	rights	and	the	devolution	of	autho-
rity	to	ethnic	based	lower	levels	of	government,	and,	finally,	coercion	
and	force	if	the	first	two	failed.	
Within	the	democratic	framework,	it	is	possible	to	follow	an	in-
clusive	model	like	the	consociational	model.	What	is	important	is	that	
democracy per se is not the means to conflict resolution, as majoritaria-
nism, again a crucial component of democracy, can be used to exacer-
bate ethnic conflict. As	Lipjhart	points	out,	“the	most	serious	obstacle	
to	power	sharing	in	divided	societies	is	the	presence	of	a	solid	majo-
rity	that,	understandably,	prefers	pure	majority	rule	to	consociationa-
lism”.	 It	 is	extremely	 important	 to	establish	a	democratic	state	 that	
appropriately	accommodates	the	ethnic	and	religious	diversity	of	the	
country.	Yet	such	concessions	have	kept	many	modern	states	unified	
and	democratic	in	the	face	of	possible	succession.
5	 	For	an	explicit	and	complete	rejection	of	the	consociational	theory	with	regard	
to	India	see	Paul	R.	Brass,	The Politcs of India Since Independence	(Cambridge:	Cam-
bridge	University	Press,	99)	pp.	4-4.
54	Kanti	 Bajpai,	 “Diversity,	 Democracy	 and	 Devolution	 in	 India”,	 in	 Michael	 E.	
Brown	and	Sumit	Ganguly,	eds.,	Government Policies and Ethnic Relations in Asia 
and the Pacific	(Cambridge:	MIT	Press,	997),	pp.-.
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Concluding Remarks
In	recent	times	there	has	been	a	greater	recognition	of	‘group	rights’	
and	as	such	the	responsibility	of	the	state	to	offer	special	treatment	
and	protection	of	the	minorities,	as	opposed	to	blanket	individual	rig-
hts	to	all	citizens	of	the	state.	Yet	the	intriguing	question	is	how	a	ba-
lance	can	be	achieved	between	protecting	the	notion	of	the	individual	
and	the	sovereign	state,	whilst	not	neglecting	a	minority,	which	most	
often	has	valid	claims	to	special	recognition.	Equality	before	the	law	
does	not	necessarily	equate	to	equality	for	all	people.
Granting	greater	group	rights	to	minorities,	or,	often	enough,	just	
adhering	 the	procedures	and	 legislation	 that	already	exist	 is	almost	
enough	to	prevent	ethnic	conflict	from	breaking	out	in	a	democracy.	
Self-identity,	some	form	of	self-rule	and	pride	go	a	long	way	to	em-
powering	minorities.	The	lack	of	a	voice	is	perhaps	the	greatest	grie-
vance	of	minorities,	which	includes	recognition	of	the	special	nature	
of	their	people,	culture	and	language.	Not	ensuring	such	opportuni-
ties	 for	minorities,	whether	 it	 is	manifested	 through	 economic	 dis-
crimination,	communal	violence	or	elsewhere	is	the	peril	of	ignoring	
such	concessions.
In	order	to	achieve	their	best	interests,	and	as	such	prevent	mino-
rity	opposition,	the	political	system	of	the	nation-state	is	most	impor-
tant.	A	mature,	stable	democracy	represents	the	best	chance	for	mino-
rities	to	achieve	the	education,	health,	economic	status	and	religious	
freedom	that	prevent	them	from	enacting	their	frustrations	through	
violence.	Furthermore,	such	a	system,	with	its	established	institutions	
and	‘healthy’	civil	society	most	often	sees	minority	protest	in	the	form	
of	non-violent	marches	or	actions,	which	is	also	best	for	the	state.	New	
democracies,	that	is,	those	nations	with	a	short	history	of	democracy	
are	 the	 states	 that	 are	most	 vulnerable	 to	minority	 ethnic	 violence.	
Such	a	system	allows	for	the	gathering	of	minorities	who	can	plan	in-
surrection,	but	also	is	a	system	without	the	strong	institutions	to	grant	
concessions	and	cope	with	dissent.	However,	the	old	democracies	if	
they	lack	flexible	approach	to	address	minority	issue,	may	also	face	
violent	 opposition	 from	minority	 communities.	 The	 conflict	 in	 Sri	
Lanka	is	a	good	example	of	this.	In	the	case	of	India,	the	democratic	
institutions	have	helped	to	bring	peaceful	solutions	to	several	violent	
minority	movements	by	accommodating	various	demands.	Where	the	
accommodation	policy	has	failed,	conflict	still	continues	as	it	has	been	
in	the	case	of	Kashmir.
Violence	as	a	solution	to	minority	concerns	only	takes	place	un-
der	certain	circumstances.	A	state	that	will	not	allow	a	minority	voice	
allows	for	problems	to	be	bottled	up,	to	potentially	become	explosive	
in	the	form	of	ethnic	violence.	There	are	numerous	solutions	propo-
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sed	in	improving	minority	situations,	and	also	in	dealing	with	mino-
rity	violence.	Each	minority	group	is	unique	in	its	own	way.	Although	
each	 strategy	 has	 its	merits,	 there	 are	 certainly	 common	 elements.	
There	needs	to	be	institutional	variations	within	each	country’s	demo-
cracy,	 regarding	electoral	 laws,	 timing	of	 elections,	drawing	of	pro-
vincial	boundaries	and	choice	between	majoritarian	or	consociatio-
nal	structures.	Such	decisions	need	to	be	made	to	include	minorities	
to	create	a	system	that	suits	the	unique	situation	of	each	individual	
country.	More	 often	 than	not,	 in	 a	 democracy	 the	 legislation	 exists	
for	all	manner	of	minority	concerns;	the	problem	is	making	it	more	
streamlined	and	more	accessible	to	those	who	need	it	most.	Greater	
recognition,	cooperation	and	conciliation,	using	all	 the	available	fa-
cilities	would,	more	often	than	not	solve	most	of	the	problems.	It	is	
necessary	that	the	loser	of	an	election	believes	that	their	group	rights	
will	be	protected	and	that	there	will	be	an	opportunity	in	the	future	for	
electoral	 success.	Where	systematic	abuse	exists	and	 is	perpetuated	
by	an	all-powerful	group,	the	international	community	has	a	greater	
responsibility	to	ensure	that	the	existing	legislation	is	followed,	and	
that	there	are	repercussions	for	not	doing	so.
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